Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

On competing motions in a legal malpractice action, the court refused to strike the defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety and narrowed the issues suitable for summary adjudication.

The court held that standard of care and certain causation and damages issues could proceed summarily, while broader causation questions tied to unjoined parties would require a trial-within-a-trial analysis.

The court also ruled extensively on evidentiary admissibility, striking specific affidavit paragraphs, exhibits, and will-state statements while allowing other hearsay-limited material for non-truth purposes related to knowledge and retainer scope.

The matter was directed to continue with a focused summary judgment record and a subsequent case management conference.

The plaintiff, Tianyu Li, brought a motion for summary judgment in an oppression action under the Ontario and Canada Business Corporations Acts, seeking $760,000 against the defendants, who were involved in the operation and sale of two supermarkets.

The court found that there were significant factual disputes, a voluminous record, and a lack of expert evidence, making the matter unsuitable for summary judgment.

The motion was dismissed and the action, along with the defendants’ counterclaim, was ordered to proceed to trial.

The applicant, a self-represented family lawyer, brought a motion to remove Epstein Cole LLP as solicitors of record for his ex-wife in their family law dispute.

He argued that lawyers from the firm would be called as witnesses regarding their alleged interference with his livelihood and application for judicial appointment, and that they harboured animus toward him creating a conflict of interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no real likelihood that the lawyers would be called as witnesses, no evidence of untoward animus, and that removing the respondent's counsel of choice would cause her significant prejudice.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim appealed a Master's order granting the plaintiff/defendant by counterclaim leave to issue a third party claim against CBC and CBRE.

The appellants argued that the third party claim for contribution and indemnity was legally untenable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly applied the low threshold akin to a motion to strike, and properly concluded that the third party claim was supported by Rules 29.01(b) and (c) based on independent claims for breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff brought a motion to find the defendant in contempt of court for violating freezing orders issued following a trial that found the defendant liable for a $7.3 million fraud.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual knowledge of the clear and unequivocal orders, yet intentionally failed to disclose his worldwide assets and actively dissipated hundreds of thousands of dollars to offshore accounts and third parties.

The defendant was found guilty of civil contempt and sentenced to 50 days of incarceration, with a subsequent hearing scheduled to determine if he could purge his contempt and mitigate his final sentence.

The applicants sought a Norwich Order requiring the respondent website to disclose the personal information of anonymous users who posted allegedly defamatory reviews about the applicants' business.

The respondent did not appear.

The court applied the five-part test for a Norwich Order, finding that the applicants had a bona fide claim for defamation, the respondent was involved in the acts by facilitating the anonymous posts, and the respondent was the only practicable source of the information.

The court granted the order, noting that the interests of justice do not favour permitting anonymous posters to engage in a campaign of defamation with impunity.

The plaintiff, an insurance broker, brought an action for wrongful and constructive dismissal against his former employer.

The defendant employer argued that the plaintiff had voluntarily retired and was an independent contractor.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence to be less credible than the defendant's and a third-party witness, concluding that the plaintiff had indeed voluntarily retired as he had previously announced.

The court also determined that the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, but dismissed the action entirely based on the finding of voluntary retirement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing her personal injury action for delay.

The action arose from an alleged injury during a massage in 2010.

The court found the plaintiff's delay was egregious and lacked a reasonable explanation, but accepted that the deadline was missed inadvertently.

Applying a contextual approach, the court concluded the defendant would suffer no actual prejudice and set aside the dismissal order, allowing the action to proceed on its merits.

This decision addresses eight motions in a billion-dollar secondary market securities class action.

The court granted motions by SNC-Lavalin and its Outside Directors to strike paragraphs from the Plaintiffs' Amended Reply and dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion to deliver a Fresh as Amended Reply, finding that the Plaintiffs were attempting to plead a new, uncapped liability claim without leave and reintroduce previously rejected allegations of bribery in Libya.

The court also granted motions by the Outside Directors and Michael Novak to strike paragraphs from Riadh Ben Aïssa's Statement of Defence, which similarly attempted to introduce allegations of bribery in Libya and knowledge against co-defendants beyond the scope of the granted leave.

Additionally, the court granted protective orders for the examinations for discovery of Messrs.

Ben Aïssa, Duhaime, and Roy, who faced criminal charges, to protect their Charter rights and the integrity of criminal proceedings, but denied requests to stay or postpone discoveries.

The defendant, a Crown Attorney, moved to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant was immune from personal suit under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, as her actions were performed in the course of her duties.

Furthermore, the action against the Attorney General (who would be the proper defendant) was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide proper notice under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and s. 8(5) of the MAG Act.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied as the defects were incurable.

The applicant, Tibbett & Britten Group Canada Inc., sought costs on a full indemnity basis after being successful in a prior application.

The court determined that the original agreement providing for full indemnity costs was spent and a new agreement, lacking such a provision, governed.

Consequently, the applicant was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also denied the applicant's claim for costs related to an FSCO investigation, characterizing them as potential damages rather than costs of the proceeding.

Additionally, certain disbursements for file review and irrelevant legal research were disallowed.

The respondent's request for costs for having to respond to the applicant's costs submissions was denied as there were legitimate issues to be determined.

A condominium corporation sought an equitable lien and priority over a registered mortgage for substantial unpaid common expense arrears relating to numerous units.

The corporation argued that the unit owner had been unjustly enriched by failing to pay common expenses and that the court should grant equitable relief or revive the statutory condominium lien that had expired.

The court held that the Condominium Act, 1998 provides a comprehensive statutory scheme governing liens for common expenses and that courts cannot create an equitable lien where the statute occupies the field.

Even if such a lien existed, it would not take priority over the previously registered mortgage under the Land Titles Act.

The court further held that a purchaser or mortgagee is entitled to rely on the representations contained in a status certificate and is not required to investigate beyond it.

The motion seeking priority or revival of the lien was dismissed.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her former legal and financial advisors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with advice provided during negotiation of a marriage contract.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions asserting that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process because the plaintiff had a statutory remedy under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set aside the marriage contract against her spouse.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to her claims more than two years before commencing the action.

The court further held that attempting to obtain, through damages against advisors, relief that should have been pursued through family law proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ claim concerning a transfer of real property allegedly gifted by the parties’ parents to the defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged the transfer should be voided based on mental incapacity of the donors, undue influence, and alleged oral promises that the property would pass to them as part of an estate plan.

The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings under Rule 21 and the “plain and obvious” standard.

While certain arguments based on the Statute of Frauds and evidentiary issues were premature at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the pleadings could not sustain the relief sought.

The motion to strike was allowed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

A contractor commenced a $205 million action against a public transit authority arising from a major subway expansion contract.

The authority moved under Rule 21.01(1)(a) for determination of a contractual clause prohibiting litigation until the contractor’s final invoice had been processed, and sought a stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that interpretation of the clause was a pure question of contractual interpretation suitable for determination on a Rule 21 motion.

The provision was enforceable between sophisticated commercial parties and clearly prohibited commencing an action before the contractual triggering event.

As the triggering event had not yet occurred, the action was stayed pending its occurrence.

The defendant public authority moved for summary judgment dismissing a long-running action on the basis that the claims were barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 7(1) of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Hryniak and the public/private power analysis from Des Champs, the court held the record did not permit a confident determination that the impugned conduct correlated sufficiently with the exercise of a public duty or authority.

The evidentiary record suggested the defendant was acting both as regulator and as a commercial actor dealing with potential lessors of Crown near-shore oil rights.

Summary judgment was refused, a mini-trial was declined, and the action was directed to proceed to trial expeditiously.

On a refusals motion arising from two related civil actions over a settlement agreement resolving a car dealership dispute, the moving parties sought production of solicitor-client communications and legal files concerning settlement negotiations.

The responding parties alleged they entered the agreement in reliance on misrepresentations and sought to set it aside, but did not plead reliance on legal advice.

The court adopted the two-part implied waiver analysis requiring that legal advice be material to the lawsuit and affirmatively put in issue by the party claiming privilege.

It held that merely placing state of mind in issue was insufficient, and that disclosure of a single email did not amount to selective disclosure waiving privilege over the broader solicitor-client communications.

The motion was dismissed.

In a certified class proceeding involving claims for unpaid wages and vacation pay, the representative plaintiffs sought partial default judgment against a defendant who had been noted in default.

The claims arose under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and included statutory claims and damages for negligence, inducing breach of contract, and oppression relating to unpaid wages, vacation pay, termination pay, and severance pay.

The court held that, by virtue of the default, the defendant was deemed to admit the allegations in the amended statement of claim.

Based on the deemed admissions and evidentiary record, the court concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against the defaulting defendant.

The precise terms of the judgment and certification order were to be settled at a case conference.

An execution creditor sought an order compelling a mortgagee bank to provide a mortgage discharge statement to permit enforcement of a judgment through a sheriff’s sale of the debtor’s property.

The moving party argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance should not apply because it was decided per incuriam or was distinguishable where the creditor had unsuccessfully attempted to examine the judgment debtors.

The court held it was bound by the Court of Appeal authority, which found that mortgage discharge statements constitute personal information protected by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

Despite acknowledging significant practical difficulties for judgment creditors enforcing debts, the court concluded the precedent prevented ordering the disclosure.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The court provided directions in an interpleader proceeding concerning funds paid into court following the cessation of payroll services operations by a corporate respondent.

Approximately $2.39 million held in a payroll account had been paid into court, and an advisor was appointed to administer claims by numerous clients asserting entitlement to the funds.

The advisor reported that a portion of the fund could be traced to specific claimants while the remainder was co‑mingled and proposed a distribution allocating traceable funds to identified clients and the balance pro rata.

The court directed further reporting, service of materials to claimants, and procedures for claimants to file notices of appearance and submissions regarding the proposed distribution.

A further hearing was scheduled to determine whether the proposed distribution or an alternative should be approved.