Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

In an oppression application under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, the applicant sought declarations of 50% ownership and broad accounting relief concerning multiple closely-held ventures.

The court found, on objective intention and course-of-conduct evidence, that the parties had agreed to equal ownership and profit-sharing in two ongoing ventures, and that non-disclosure and non-accounting conduct was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.

Relief against one corporation tied to a restaurant sold in 2018 was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court declared 50% share ownership in the remaining corporations, ordered issuance of shares, full financial disclosure and accounting, and payment over of any amounts found owing.

Costs of $30,000 were awarded to the applicant.

In an application over beneficial ownership of residential land, the applicant alleged an oral trust arrangement under which the respondent held legal title for the applicant's benefit.

The court found on the evidence that both periods of title holding reflected the same trust-based understanding, and rejected the respondent's position that the later arrangement was a true landlord-tenant relationship.

Although a bare trust in land failed for lack of writing under the Statute of Frauds, the court held a constructive trust could be imposed to prevent inequitable reliance on statutory formalities.

Declarations were granted confirming beneficial ownership and entitlement to conveyance on demand, subject to payment of specified ownership-related obligations including the down payment and interest.

The trustee in bankruptcy moved for a phase-one determination that profit payments made by Douglas Grozelle to net winners in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme were void as against creditors and recoverable for the estate.

The court found the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme, held insolvency and fraudulent intent could be inferred globally, and concluded the payments were void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and not saved by good-faith or good-consideration defences.

The court approved a two-stage insolvency process: common liability issues resolved summarily now, with individualized quantum determinations in phase two.

The winners’ cross-motion for broad directions attacking the trustee’s process and authority was dismissed.

Following cross-motions for summary judgment where the plaintiff was successful in recovering the residual proceeds of a power of sale, the court determined costs and prejudgment interest.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $45,515.37, noting the plaintiff beat its Rule 49 offer and the defendants unreasonably rejected a settlement proposal.

The court also awarded prejudgment interest at 2% from the date of the power of sale.

The parties attended a case conference to schedule a 40-day trial for a construction dispute commenced in 2015.

The court noted that there were ongoing interlocutory motions regarding productions and pleadings, and no expert reports had been delivered.

The court declined to fix a trial date, holding that an action with ongoing interlocutory matters is not ready for trial, and directed the parties to return to trial scheduling court once the outstanding matters and expert reports are completed.

Following a personal injury trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages but found 25% contributorily negligent, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought over $817,000 in costs and disbursements, arguing for substantial indemnity costs from the date of a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants argued for an award of $380,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The court rejected the application of substantial indemnity costs, finding the trial result was not a 'near miss' to the plaintiff's offer.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $500,000 all-inclusive on a partial indemnity scale.

The parties in a class action jointly sought an adjournment of the trial commencement to allow time to finalize settlement discussions.

The court granted the adjournment, moving the trial start date from February 1, 2021, to February 16, 2021, noting that no further adjournments would be granted.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of a contempt motion brought by the plaintiffs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST), its counsel, and legal assistant.

The court found the motion to be without merit and the defendants wholly successful.

Despite the plaintiff being self-represented and having been warned about costs, the court determined that costs should follow the event due to the serious nature of the allegations.

Applying the factors under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and balancing the indemnity principle with access to justice, the court awarded the defendants $7,500 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, a reduction from their requested $10,000.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff alleged that she and her late husband gave the proceeds from the sale of two properties to the defendants in trust, and that these funds were used to purchase a condominium to be held in trust for the plaintiff.

The defendant argued the funds were legitimate payouts for discharged mortgages.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding the documentary evidence supported the defendant's position that the funds were mortgage payouts, not trust funds.

The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the mortgages were shams designed to avoid creditors.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for summary judgment regarding a real estate transaction deposit, the parties were unable to settle the quantum of costs.

The respondent sought $31,015.72 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicant argued for approximately $11,000.

The court found the time spent by the respondent's counsel reasonable but reduced the partial indemnity hourly rate from 80% to 60% of the actual rate.

Costs were fixed at $24,314.82 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiffs sued the school board, a vice-principal, and a former student for events that occurred in September 2009, alleging false imprisonment, malicious intent, and negligence after the plaintiff student was arrested for uttering threats.

The court found the defendants' evidence credible, rejected the plaintiffs' allegations of a grudge or malicious intent by the vice-principal, and concluded the confinement of the student during the investigation was justified.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus to compel the Town of Georgina to approve a fill application and issue a permit.

The court reviewed the requirements for mandamus and the parties' positions on the standard of review and municipal discretion.

Ultimately, the court raised a jurisdictional issue, noting that under section 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, applications for relief in the nature of mandamus must generally be brought in the Divisional Court.

The court granted the parties 60 days to make submissions on jurisdiction, failing which the application would be dismissed.

The third party insurer brought a motion under Rule 31.10 for leave to examine the plaintiffs as non-parties in each other's related actions regarding their observations of the other occupants during a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs had previously refused these questions on the basis of relevance to their individual actions, and a prior motion to compel answers was dismissed with an invitation to bring the motion under Rule 31.10.

The court granted the motion, finding that the questions were relevant to damages and credibility, and that the plaintiffs' narrow approach to relevance frustrated the discovery process and the principle of proportionality.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice action on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The defendant argued the plaintiff discovered the claim when he learned a nerve had been cut during surgery.

The court found that knowledge of a cut nerve, without reason to believe it was more than an unfortunate surgical outcome, was insufficient to start the limitation period.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff dismissing the limitation period defence.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants, as the successful parties on the summary judgment motion, sought costs in the range of $17,000-$19,000.

The Plaintiff argued for deferral of costs to the trial judge or a significantly lower award, citing that some defence materials would be used at trial and the limited value/complexity of the motion.

The court found the Defendants' costs claim reasonable, noting the Plaintiff's own higher costs outline for the original motion and the "pay-as-you-go" principle for interlocutory motions.

The court awarded the Defendants $12,000 in all-inclusive costs, plus an additional $500 for preparing the costs submissions.

The plaintiff real estate broker brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant property owner for an unpaid leasing commission.

The owner cross-moved to dismiss the claim, arguing its property manager lacked actual authority to enter into the listing agreement on its behalf.

The court found that the property management agreement granted the manager actual authority to arrange for advertising and promotion, which included engaging a broker.

The court further held that the plaintiff was entitled to the commission because a valid offer to lease was received during the listing period and the owner's agent breached the agreement by failing to refer the prospective tenant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted and the defendant's cross-motion was dismissed.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment on liability to the plaintiff, the court considered the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought costs of the summary judgment motion and the proceeding to date.

The court noted that the potential range of damages remained uncertain and could significantly affect the appropriate costs disposition.

Because damages might ultimately be minimal or reflect only disgorgement of profit, the court held that the proper allocation of costs could not yet be determined.

Costs were therefore reserved pending the final determination of damages.

The moving parties sought to dismiss an application challenging a continuing power of attorney and seeking various related remedies on the basis of res judicata.

They argued that similar issues had already been raised in related proceedings and resolved through minutes of settlement.

The court held that the doctrine of res judicata requires a final judicial determination between the same parties or their privies, and that a private settlement agreement without a court order does not constitute such a determination.

Because the responding party was not a party to the settlement and no judicial decision resolved the issues, the prerequisites for cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel were not met.

The motion to dismiss the application was therefore denied.

The applicant sought declarations that a life insurance policy issued in 1982 should be enforced according to its original terms, including paid‑up value calculations appearing on the face of the policy.

The respondent insurer alleged that the paid‑up values in the policy were inserted in error and sought rectification to reduce them by a factor of five.

The record contained conflicting affidavit evidence and competing expert opinions regarding the intended structure of the policy and the calculation of paid‑up values.

The court held that the disputes involved material factual conflicts, credibility assessments, and complex issues relating to rectification and limitation periods.

As a result, the matter could not properly be resolved on an application record and required a trial.

A homeowner sued a contractor for a refund of the contract price after a lakeside dock constructed under a five‑year workmanship and materials warranty became uneven after two winters.

The contractor argued the damage was caused by extraordinary ice and weather conditions rather than defective construction and counterclaimed for defamation based on threatening emails and alleged reputational harm.

The court found the precise physical cause of the uplift uncertain but concluded the dock’s premature failure, absent a satisfactory exculpatory explanation, entitled the plaintiff to damages.

However, the plaintiff failed to mitigate losses by investigating repair options, and the evidence established the dock was repairable at modest cost.

The court awarded damages limited to the estimated repair cost and dismissed the defendant’s defamation counterclaim for lack of proof of publication or actual loss.