Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The court declared Glycobiosciences Inc. and Kevin Drizen vexatious litigants under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews a lengthy history of litigation by Glyco and Drizen, noting repeated unsuccessful actions, disregard for adverse rulings, and failure to pay costs.

The court imposed restrictions on their ability to commence or continue proceedings in Ontario without leave, and stayed all ongoing matters.

The reasons also address the legal test for vexatious litigant status and the balancing of access to justice with the need to protect the court system from abuse.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add the Crown and various provincial ministries as defendants, and to make related amendments alleging misfeasance, conspiracy, and Charter breaches arising from the mistaken transfer of her vehicle's ownership and detachment of her license plate.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amended claim lacked the heightened particularity required for serious allegations like conspiracy and misfeasance, and improperly named individual ministries rather than the Crown.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to deliver a re-drafted Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim within 30 days.

The plaintiff moved to certify a medical device products liability action as a class action under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The action concerns alleged bacterial contamination of the Sorin 3T Heater-Cooler System used during open chest cardiac surgeries.

The defendants did not oppose certification, reserving their rights to settle the litigation plan.

The court found the five requirements for certification under section 5(1) were satisfied and granted the order.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim to limit their damages to $200,000 and to have the action proceed under the simplified procedure pursuant to Rule 76.

The defendants opposed the application of the simplified procedure, arguing prejudice due to discovery limits.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that the amended claim and the defendants' counterclaim both fell within the $200,000 limit, making the simplified procedure mandatory.

The court declined to apply the presumptive costs consequences under Rule 76.13(1), leaving the costs of the amendment to the discretion of the trial judge.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) was successful in its application to enforce guarantees against Anwar Fares and Maya Bakhos, and in opposing the guarantors' application for a declaration that the guarantees were invalid.

The court, therefore, addressed the issue of costs.

TD sought substantial indemnity costs based on contractual provisions in the loan agreement and guarantees.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found TD entitled to substantial indemnity costs.

However, the court adjusted the claimed amount, disallowing certain disbursements (flights to Ottawa, unexplained courier/taxi fees) and assessing fees based on proportionality and the unsuccessful party's reasonable expectation, ultimately ordering the guarantors to pay TD $25,723.03.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim, the successful plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $13,324.96.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting the motion was not unreasonable given the poor drafting of the statement of claim.

Costs were fixed at $6,500 all inclusive.

The plaintiffs brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion against the defendants regarding vicarious liability for the fraudulent acts of their employee.

The defendants sought their costs of the motion on a substantial indemnity basis, while the plaintiffs argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court ordered that the costs of the summary judgment motion be reserved to the trial judge, as the issues remained live and the work done would reduce trial costs.

The court also found the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial indemnity costs for their default judgment motion against the employee, but requested a revised costs outline.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application, the respondents sought costs.

One respondent settled their costs claim, while the other, represented by pro bono counsel, sought substantial indemnity costs due to the applicants' conduct.

The court held that pro bono representation does not preclude a costs award and that ordinary costs rules apply.

The court found the applicants' conduct expanded the litigation but did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the pro bono respondent in the amount of $84,836.79.

The plaintiff was successful on a motion for summary judgment for the sale of a mortgaged property and sought substantial indemnity costs of $16,285.09 based on the mortgage covenant.

The self-represented defendant did not file costs submissions.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the defendant unduly prolonged the matter and advanced meritless arguments.

The court fixed costs payable to the plaintiff at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff franchisors for unpaid royalties, the court determined costs, the terms of the draft order, and post-judgment interest.

Despite a contractual clause providing for substantial indemnity costs, the court exercised its discretion to award a reduced lump sum of $15,000, finding the plaintiffs' claimed costs excessive for a straightforward motion.

The court also formally dismissed the defendants' counterclaim, which lacked merit, and enforced the contractual post-judgment interest rate of 24% per annum, finding no exceptional circumstances to override freedom of contract.

In a supplementary endorsement, the court clarified a statement made in a previous endorsement regarding the defendants' counsel and his law clerk.

The court confirmed that the counsel had not sent his law clerk to appear before the court and that he committed no act of unprofessionalism.

The court noted that the plaintiff decided not to seek costs against the defendants' counsel under Rule 57.07 and encouraged the parties to focus on resolving the issues between the clients.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the self-represented defendant's counterclaim.

The defendant's employment had previously been terminated for refusing a security clearance check, leading to an injunction and a subsequent contempt finding against her.

The court found that the defendant's counterclaim, which alleged wrongful accusations and Charter violations, did not disclose any tenable claims and that any abuse of process claims were premature.

The counterclaim was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiff contractor brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add the spouse of the defendant corporate officer as a defendant for breach of the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act.

The claim arose from unpaid invoices for drilling and blasting services performed on multiple solar energy projects, with the plaintiff alleging that trust funds received by the contractor were diverted.

The court considered whether the claim against the proposed defendant was statute‑barred and whether leave should be granted under the Rules of Civil Procedure to add a party.

The court held that the limitation period for the trust claim began when the trust monies were received, not when the plaintiff last performed work.

Because the motion to add the new defendant was brought within two years of discovering the payment of trust funds, and any prejudice could be remedied by costs, leave to amend was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination without cause after approximately 16 years of service in a specialized technical role.

The court determined that the reasonable notice period and mitigation issues could be resolved on the summary judgment record, while claims for aggravated, punitive, and certain special damages required viva voce evidence at a summary trial.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court found a 16‑month reasonable notice period appropriate given the employee’s age, long service, specialized duties, and limited re‑employment prospects.

The employer failed to establish a failure to mitigate.

Judgment was granted for damages for lack of reasonable notice, with remaining issues reserved for a summary trial.

In a health care cost recovery action brought by the Crown against tobacco companies under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009, a defendant moved to strike portions of the statement of claim referencing alleged misrepresentations made by tobacco companies before parliamentary committees.

The court considered whether statements made to House of Commons and legislative committees could be relied upon in a civil action.

It held that parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech, protects statements made during parliamentary proceedings and committee appearances, including by non‑members who participate as witnesses.

Because the privilege is absolute and prevents courts from questioning such statements, the impugned pleadings referencing those presentations could not stand.

The motion to strike those paragraphs was therefore granted.

The bank brought summary judgment motions to enforce two small business loans and related personal guarantees arising from franchise purchases.

The borrowers admitted receiving the funds and failing to repay but attempted to amend their pleadings to assert misrepresentation and unconscionability based on allegedly fraudulent financial information provided by third parties.

The court held that the proposed defenses were not viable, emphasizing that borrowers cannot rely on a lender to inform them of their own financial circumstances and that lack of independent legal advice is not a standalone defence where guarantors understood the agreements.

The relationship between lender and borrower was a normal commercial one with no vulnerability triggering unconscionability.

Summary judgment was granted for the bank for the outstanding loan, guarantee, and credit account amounts.

The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss or quash a third party appeal from interlocutory orders of a Master concerning timelines and procedures for a protection motion relating to alleged trade secret documents.

The third party sought to set aside the Master’s orders and refer its protection motion to a judge.

The court held that the Master acted within jurisdiction, that the orders were procedural and interlocutory, and that the appeal was brought in the wrong forum and outside prescribed timelines.

Applying principles of court openness and the test for confidentiality orders from Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada, the court found no evidentiary basis for the requested protection.

The plaintiff’s motion was granted, the third party’s motion dismissed, and an interim without prejudice confidentiality order was issued to facilitate continued production pending determination of the protection motion.

The applicant sought enforcement of minutes of settlement reached during court‑mandated mediation in a wrongful dismissal action.

The settlement required the respondents to pay $18,500, including a portion payable directly to Human Resources and Skills Development Canada to cover employment insurance overpayment.

After paying an initial instalment, the respondents repudiated the agreement and refused to complete the settlement.

The court held that the signed minutes of settlement constituted a legally binding agreement and that the essential terms were clear and agreed upon while both parties were represented by counsel.

Applying the principles governing enforcement of settlements under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court enforced the agreement and granted judgment for the outstanding settlement balance.

Following an uncontested personal injury trial where the defendants were noted in default and damages of $820,000 plus prejudgment interest were awarded, the plaintiffs sought costs.

The court considered the plaintiffs’ written costs submissions after the trial.

In light of the defendants’ conduct and the necessity of the litigation steps taken by the plaintiffs to pursue redress, the court found the claimed costs reasonable.

Costs were fixed at $37,202.61 inclusive of HST.

The respondents sued the appellant tour operator in Small Claims Court for a ruined vacation after experiencing unacceptable service at a resort in Cuba.

The Deputy Judge awarded damages, finding the appellant breached a duty to supervise its third-party supplier and could not rely on an exclusionary clause.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice set aside the judgment, holding that a tour operator's common law duty is limited to exercising due care in selecting a competent supplier, not supervising them.

The court also found the exclusionary clause was unambiguous and enforceable.