Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

At a case conference and pre-trial for a motor vehicle accident personal injury claim proceeding under the Simplified Rules, the court addressed whether the trial could be completed within the allotted five days.

The plaintiff had initially proposed a witness list that exceeded the time limit.

After the plaintiff reduced her witness list, the court imposed a strict trial timetable to ensure the matter could be heard within five days, noting that the plaintiff chose the Simplified Rules and must bear the burden of fitting her case within its constraints.

The applicant company sought an interim and interlocutory injunction to enforce a standstill agreement against its founder and largest shareholder, pending arbitration.

The respondent had issued a press release calling for the replacement of the board of directors, which the applicant argued breached the negative covenants in the agreement.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the breach of negative covenants, irreparable harm to the company's goodwill, and a balance of convenience favoring the applicant.

The anti-SLAPP motion was dismissed because the application had substantial merit and the public interest in enforcing commercial contracts outweighed the protection of the expression.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike claims related to a family business dispute, arguing they were barred by the ultimate 15-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the claims could not succeed.

The judge emphasized that Rule 21 motions are for clear cases based on pleadings, not for fact-finding, especially when issues like the precise 'act or omission' triggering the limitation period and potential willful concealment are disputed and require evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that an oppression remedy is automatically precluded by corporate dissolution, noting that such remedies can include damages for past wrongs and that technical dissolution does not necessarily mean a cessation of operations or asset misappropriation.

The Caisse Populaire de North Bay Limitée moved for summary judgment seeking possession of a mortgaged property due to default on two mortgages and dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim alleging oppressive conduct.

The defendant, Christi-Anne Marie Lafrance, disputed the validity and amounts of the mortgages, arguing they were stayed or discharged by her bankruptcy, and that the Caisse engaged in oppressive conduct.

The court granted leave to amend the plaintiff's name to Caisse Populaire Alliance Limitée, granted summary judgment on the Caisse's claim, and dismissed the counterclaim, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The court clarified that secured debts are not stayed or discharged by bankruptcy if the debtor continues to benefit from the contract.

The defendants brought a motion under Ontario's Anti-SLAPP legislation to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiffs.

The action stemmed from "vicious" online reviews posted by the defendants about the plaintiffs' plumbing business and its principal.

The court determined that the online reviews constituted "expression" on a "matter of public interest." While the plaintiffs' defamation claim was found to have substantial merit and no valid defence, the court ultimately dismissed the action.

It concluded that the minimal harm suffered by the plaintiffs did not outweigh the significant public interest in protecting freedom of expression, even when the expression was offensive and vitriolic.

The court also clarified that the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The defendants sought to re-schedule a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing for further discovery, mandatory mediation, and a right to a trial in open court, and also raised a potential conflict of interest concerning the defendants' counsel.

The court granted the re-scheduling, finding that the plaintiffs had ample time over five years to pursue procedural rights and obtain expert evidence, which was still lacking.

The court emphasized that there is no absolute right to a civil trial, particularly when expert evidence is essential but absent in a medical malpractice claim.

Concerns regarding mediation and counsel disqualification were dismissed as untimely and tactical.

The defendants moved to transfer the action from Toronto to Sudbury, arguing that Sudbury was a significantly better venue.

The plaintiff opposed, partly on the basis that the motion was brought late.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's procedural objection, finding no prejudice from the three-day delay.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) holistically, the court found that factors such as where the events occurred, where damages were sustained, the subject matter's location, and the convenience of parties and most witnesses favored Sudbury.

The court also noted that the availability of case management and judicial facilities was neutral.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The court issued an endorsement following a case conference regarding whether an examination for discovery should proceed remotely by videoconference or in person during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs objected to a remote examination, citing concerns about assisting counsel, assessing witness demeanor, lack of solemnity, and potential for abuse.

The court, applying Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered the examination to proceed by videoconference, emphasizing the imperative of technological competency and the need to avoid litigation delays, finding that the benefits of proceeding remotely outweighed the perceived risks.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision discharging a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) related to a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for land.

The Master found issues with the plaintiff's disclosure, the uniqueness of the land, delay, and credibility.

While the plaintiff sought an urgent appeal hearing, the parties had previously agreed to a stay preventing the property's sale or transfer pending the appeal.

The court determined that, due to this agreement and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, the appeal was not time-sensitive or urgent, and therefore would not be scheduled immediately but would be spoken to on June 1, 2020.

The plaintiffs brought two motions: one alleging Ford's non-compliance with an approved class action settlement regarding exhaust odours in 2011-2015 Ford Explorers, and another seeking additional class counsel fees.

The court dismissed the non-compliance motion, finding no evidence that Ford breached its good faith obligations or that class members were deprived of proper repairs.

For the fees motion, the court awarded a modest additional amount of $75,000 plus HST, finding the initial request for $1.2 million excessive given the limited actual financial benefits to the class members from the settlement's reimbursement program.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce participant expert evidence from a lawyer, David Murray, regarding the standard of care applicable to the defendant lawyer in a solicitor's negligence claim.

The court, applying the Westerhof and Mohan/White Burgess criteria, ruled that while Mr. Murray was qualified, his proposed opinion on the objective standard of care was not formed as part of his ordinary participation in the events at issue and thus did not qualify as participant expert evidence under Rule 53.03.

The court declined to permit the opinion evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an interim stay and an adjournment of a scheduled certification motion in Ontario.

The purpose was to pursue certification of a national class in a parallel class proceeding in British Columbia, citing the death of lead counsel in BC and anticipated legislative changes allowing opt-out national classes there.

The court denied the motion, finding the request was a late-stage tactical shift amounting to forum shopping, inefficient, and unfair to the defendant and class members, especially given the Ontario action's advanced stage and prior agreements on scheduling.

Plaintiffs' counsel brought a motion seeking court approval of their contingency fee retainer agreement, class counsel fees, disbursements, and an honorarium for the representative plaintiff, Soheil Kafai, following a class action settlement.

The court considered factors for reasonableness of fees, including complexity, risk, responsibility, monetary value, importance to the class, skill, results, and opportunity cost.

The court approved the retainer agreement, fees, disbursements, and a $1,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff, finding them fair and reasonable.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for a class action settlement and allocation plan concerning a Hepatitis A contamination recall of frozen fruit.

The court approved the $3,000,000 settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, considering the arm's length negotiations, lack of significant objections, and risks of continued litigation.

The plan allocated funds across four categories: purchasers, immunized members, bodily injury members, and family members/health insurers.

Following the discontinuance of the action, the defendants brought a motion for costs.

In response, the plaintiff filed an affidavit containing correspondence regarding settlement offers.

The defendants brought a motion to strike these paragraphs, arguing they were protected by settlement privilege.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding that under Rule 57.01(1), written offers to settle are explicitly contemplated as admissible and relevant factors to be considered on a motion for costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the appointment of an inspector under s. 161 of the Business Corporations Act to investigate two defendant companies.

The defendants opposed, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing as they were no longer shareholders.

The court found the plaintiffs had standing based on original share certificates.

The court granted the motion, holding that the companies' failure to provide financial statements prior to 2012 raised an index of suspicion of oppressive conduct, meeting the low evidentiary threshold for appointing an inspector.

The inspector's mandate was limited to issues not statute-barred.

Following a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to individually named defendants whose claims had been struck as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had asserted a $10 million claim against individual employees and directors of corporate defendants without adequately pleading separate acts or interests beyond their corporate roles.

The individual defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the claims constituted tactical harassment.

The court found the claims against the individuals lacked proper particulars but concluded the circumstances did not justify elevated costs.

Partial indemnity costs were instead fixed at reduced amounts reflecting duplication of work with corporate defendants’ counsel.

Following dismissal of a civil action arising from an oil leak and claimed remediation damages exceeding $1 million, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs and disbursements totalling $210,000.

The plaintiffs argued the fees were excessive, that success at trial was divided regarding remediation issues, and that certain disbursements and expert expenses were unreasonable.

The court applied Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and rejected the argument of divided success, emphasizing that the overriding issue was liability and the defendants were wholly successful.

The court also found the expert report and other disbursements reasonable and proportionate to the complexity and duration of the litigation.

Costs were fixed in favour of the defendants.

Following a successful motion enforcing a Canadian-recognized foreign judgment obtained against a foreign state and its agencies for terrorism-related conduct, the successful parties sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court considered whether the conduct of the foreign state justified elevated costs.

It held that substantial indemnity costs require reprehensible litigation conduct, not merely objectionable political or international conduct by a foreign state.

Because the defendants did not participate in the proceeding and simply ignored it, their conduct did not meet the threshold for elevated costs.

Partial indemnity costs of $15,456.05 were awarded as fair and reasonable under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following a re-hearing of a class action certification motion relating to the ‘Sixties Scoop’, the court addressed costs after granting certification and dismissing the federal Crown’s motion to strike.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court held that such costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and were not justified.

Applying a partial indemnity scale and reviewing historical certification-motion cost awards, the court found the plaintiffs’ request modest given the complexity of the litigation and the work spanning both the original and rehearing motions.

The court fixed costs at an all-inclusive amount reflecting fairness to the losing party and proportionality to comparable certification proceedings.