Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff condominium corporation sought the appointment of an interim receiver over one of the defendant corporations (2502511 Ontario Corp.) and the continuation of a Mareva injunction, alleging fraudulent depletion of its reserve account.

The defendants opposed the receiver appointment and sought the lifting of the Mareva injunction.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and noted the defendants' non-compliance with disclosure obligations and previous court orders.

Given the significant risk of asset dissipation and the defendants' failure to operate transparently, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a limited interim receiver over 2502511 Ontario Corp. and extended the Mareva injunction, while authorizing a reduced monthly living expense for one defendant.

The moving party sought an order under Rule 39.03 to examine a non-party lawyer and accountant regarding an estate freeze transaction, and for the production of their files.

The responding parties opposed the examination and production of the lawyer's file on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that the responding parties implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by pleading that they relied entirely on the moving party's misrepresentations when signing the estate freeze documents.

The motion was granted, and the non-parties were ordered to produce relevant documents and attend examinations.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an order to continue the action, as the primary plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement that had been accepted by the plaintiffs' former counsel.

The plaintiffs argued the settlement should not be enforced because the plaintiff had a 'change of heart' shortly after acceptance and had not calculated his net recovery.

The court granted the order to continue and enforced the settlement, finding that a valid agreement was reached and a mere change of heart did not justify exercising discretion to set it aside.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the defendant's property, claiming specific performance of an alleged agreement of purchase and sale.

The defendant argued there was no binding agreement and raised the Statute of Frauds.

The court found triable issues regarding the real estate agent's authority to bind the defendant, whether the terms were agreed upon, and whether the Statute of Frauds was satisfied through written communications or part performance.

Balancing the equitable factors, the court concluded the potential prejudice to the plaintiff outweighed the presumptive prejudice to the defendant and granted leave to issue the CPL.

The plaintiff in a construction dispute brought a motion to compel the defendants to answer questions refused at discovery and to produce a further and better affidavit of documents.

The core issue was whether the defendants implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege regarding advice received during the negotiation of an Amending Agreement.

The Master found no waiver regarding the negotiation of the agreement, but found an implicit waiver regarding advice on payments made after the agreement.

The Master also ordered disclosure of competing quotations but denied requests for consultant files and financial means.

The plaintiff was granted leave to complete the discovery and awarded partial indemnity costs of $6,500.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded the full amount of its construction lien and breach of contract claim ($73,767.26), the court determined costs and interest.

The plaintiff had made an offer to settle for $55,000, which the defendant ignored.

The court found the defendant's conduct throughout the litigation to be obstinate, provocative, and designed to delay.

Despite the costs claimed ($123,565.03) being disproportionate to the judgment amount, the court awarded $120,000 for the reference and $15,000 for a motion to strike on a substantial indemnity basis, emphasizing that proportionality should not reward unreasonable conduct.

Prejudgment interest was set at 1% and post-judgment at 2%.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment based on a consent to judgment signed by the defendants as part of a settlement agreement regarding a defaulted loan secured by Florida real estate.

The defendants argued that one corporate defendant should not be a party, that they lacked independent Canadian legal advice, and that the debt was satisfied by a foreclosure.

The court found that the non-signing corporate defendant should not be subject to the judgment, but rejected the other defenses, noting the defendants had US legal advice and the settlement agreement explicitly valued the foreclosed property at a set credit amount.

Judgment was granted against the signing defendants for the remaining balance, converted to Canadian dollars.

Following the dismissal of the application, the successful respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $15,084.47.

The applicant argued the amount should be between $4,152.75 and $5,339.25.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the importance of the case to the respondent and the legal issues involved.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action for defamation against his nephew regarding a series of abusive emails sent to the plaintiff and a small number of relatives.

The court found the emails met the test for defamation but noted they were isolated, minimally published, and caused no actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation.

The court awarded nominal damages of $500, declined to issue an injunction, and made no order as to costs.

The plaintiff sued the Law Society of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and infliction of mental injury.

The Law Society moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act, or constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the Law Society's motion, finding that the plaintiff's claims were not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not begin until her beneficial ownership of funds was confirmed by court order.

The court also found genuine issues requiring trial regarding statutory immunity and declined to strike portions of the claim as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff claimed indemnity under an insurance policy, alleging its apartment building was structurally damaged by the Ladysmith Earthquake.

The defendant insurer denied the claim, arguing the earthquake did not cause the damage.

After a seven-day trial featuring extensive expert testimony on seismology and structural engineering, the court found the earthquake's force was negligible and insufficient to cause the damage.

The court concluded the structural issues were caused by differential soil settlement and dismissed the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff, 864401 Ontario Limited, brought a breach of contract and breach of trust claim against 944952 Ontario Limited and its directors (Dan, Ryan, and Ian McGill) concerning a property management contract.

The plaintiff alleged that 944 misappropriated funds from a trust account.

The defendants counter-claimed for airfare and argued the plaintiff repudiated the contract, entitling them to accelerated management fees.

The court found that the plaintiff did not repudiate the contract, but rather 944 breached the contract and committed a breach of trust by unilaterally transferring funds from the trust account.

Dan and Ryan McGill were found personally liable for knowingly assisting in the breach of trust, while Ian McGill was not.

The plaintiff was awarded $43,100.00, which had been paid into court, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

The defendant, Anciento M. Braga, brought a motion for a capacity assessment of the plaintiff, She He Huang, under s. 16(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The court considered Ms. Huang's history of dismissing multiple counsel, rejecting significant settlement offers, and demonstrating a rudimentary understanding of trial proceedings despite a prior assessment finding capacity.

Citing concerns about her fluctuating mental state and inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her litigation decisions, the court ordered Ms. Huang to undergo a new capacity assessment.

The costs of the assessment and interpreter services were to be borne by Ms. Huang from her income replacement benefits.

The plaintiff sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision with a train and commenced two separate actions.

She brought a motion to consolidate the two actions.

The defendant municipality and a third party opposed consolidation, arguing it would cause prejudice by exposing them to new crossclaims and affecting a limitation period defence.

The court declined to consolidate the actions due to the potential prejudice, but ordered that the two actions be tried together to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

Following a prior motion decision, the parties were unable to agree on costs and sought a determination from the court.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motion was vexatious and unnecessary, while the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs and argued the motion was required to secure payment of outstanding costs awards and attendance for an examination in aid of execution.

The court held that success on a motion must be assessed by comparing the circumstances before and after the motion and whether the motion induced compliance.

The court found the motion was necessary to obtain payment of outstanding costs awards and to secure attendance for examination.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff, reduced to reflect lack of success on one issue.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to examine three non-party medical professionals for discovery.

The underlying action involved a plaintiff who became quadriplegic after an incident in a swimming pool.

The defendant sought to examine the non-parties regarding hospital records indicating the plaintiff had stated he dove into the pool, contradicting his discovery evidence that he fell from a ladder.

The court granted the motion, finding that the non-parties had information relevant to the material issue of liability, the defendant was unable to obtain the information from the plaintiff, and it would be unfair to require the defendant to proceed to trial without examining them.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

Following dismissal of both an oppression claim and counterclaim under the Business Corporations Act, the defendants sought costs relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle that exceeded the trial result.

The plaintiff argued the offer was of perpetual variation and that each party should bear their own costs.

The court rejected those submissions, finding the offer was capable of calculation at any time and constituted a substantial offer compared to the trial outcome.

Applying Rule 49.10 strictly, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs from the date of the offer.

Costs were fixed at $56,473 after adjusting the hourly rate claimed for trial counsel.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, arguing they offended s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act by referring to the contents and outcomes of a College of Nurses discipline proceeding.

The plaintiff argued the Court of Appeal had previously granted leave to include these facts.

The court held that s. 36(3) provides an absolute prohibition against admitting records or decisions of College proceedings in civil actions.

The motion was granted, and the impugned portions of the pleadings were struck.

Following a prior decision dismissing the action against an insurer defendant, the court addressed costs allocation among the parties.

The plaintiff had added the insurer as a defendant to ensure coverage but offered to release the insurer if other defendants admitted minimal liability.

The remaining defendants refused, and the insurer brought a successful summary judgment motion resulting in dismissal of the claim against it.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court apportioned costs between the plaintiff and the co-defendants, finding that both contributed to the insurer remaining in the action.

Costs of the action and the summary judgment motion were divided proportionally between them.

Following the release of reasons on an earlier motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards among insurers involved in a dispute regarding indemnity exposure.

The court applied s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the significance of the motion’s outcome and the potential insurance liability implications.

After reviewing the bills of costs and submissions, the court reduced certain claimed hours and adjusted the hourly rate for one party before fixing partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in favour of two defendants against the proposed statutory third party.

The proposed statutory third party was ordered to pay the costs within 60 days.