Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiffs, who moved from Thailand to Canada to operate a Thai restaurant, sued the defendants for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after their employment was terminated.

The court found no enforceable contract but held that the defendants were unjustly enriched by the plaintiffs' financial contributions and goods shipped for the restaurant.

The plaintiffs' recovery was offset by loans and expenses incurred by the defendants.

The court also awarded the plaintiff cook unpaid wages and pay in lieu of notice, while granting the defendants' counterclaim for cash retained by the plaintiff husband.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff issued an ultimatum regarding her husband's pay and subsequently participated in organizing a work stoppage, demanding changes to her employment duties.

The court found that while the plaintiff did not clearly resign, her actions constituted a repudiation of her employment contract, justifying the end of her employment.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The defendant's counterclaim for wrongful resignation was also dismissed, as the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff's departure caused the alleged financial losses.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $41,852.77.

The court found that the contract between the parties entitled the plaintiff to full indemnity for losses, including legal fees.

The court also noted it would have awarded full indemnity regardless, due to the defendant's high-handed and dishonest conduct in appropriating funds.

The defendant was ordered to pay the full amount sought.

The prospective plaintiff sought an ex parte order to commence a civil action using a pseudonym or initials, and for orders preventing disclosure of his real name and sealing motion materials, based on allegations of sexual abuse by a former teacher.

The Master dismissed the motion orally, finding it should not have been brought ex parte and that the procedure for publication bans under the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction (CPPD) had not been followed.

The Master also found the evidence insufficient to displace the strong presumption of open courts, noting that the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans requires a "real, substantial and well-grounded" risk, which was not met by the solicitor's affidavit alone.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to re-bring it on notice with proper procedure and evidence.

The defendant insurer, Sun Life, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's long-term disability claim as statute-barred.

Sun Life argued the two-year limitation period began in February 2014 when it sent a letter closing the file but inviting further medical information.

The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, provided additional information three years later, and Sun Life issued a final denial in June 2017, explicitly referencing the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed Sun Life's motion, finding that the February 2014 letter was equivocal and that the parties were engaged in an ongoing internal appeal process.

Therefore, a legal proceeding was not an "appropriate means to seek a remedy" until the clear and final denial in June 2017, which is when the limitation period commenced.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $15,172.25 following its success on a motion brought by the moving party to stay a finding of contempt.

The moving party argued costs should be reduced because the plaintiff was unsuccessful on its oral motion for a finding of contempt against an individual personally.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs due to the failed oral motion, but awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $11,000.

The appellant was wholly unsuccessful on appeal.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $8,301.47 including HST for the appeal.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the requested costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, and ordered the appellant to pay them forthwith to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought a motion to find the defendants, Marcel and Jean-Georges Bisson, in civil contempt for deliberately refusing to sign Full and Final Releases as ordered by a previous judgment.

Applying the three-part test from Carey v. Laiken, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear, the defendants had actual knowledge of it, and they intentionally failed to comply.

The defendants were found in contempt, fined $20,000, and the releases were deemed signed by court order.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a full indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a kidney removed in 2000 due to a misdiagnosis of cancer, which she was informed of shortly after the surgery.

She commenced the action in 2015.

The court found that the plaintiff knew the material facts necessary to make a claim by the end of 2001, as she was aware of the misdiagnosis, the unnecessary surgery, and had been encouraged by family to sue.

The court held that the claim was discovered well outside the two-year limitation period and dismissed the action.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff, the parties submitted written arguments regarding costs.

The defendant insurer sought costs against the plaintiff's counsel personally for allegedly unnecessary court appearances.

The court declined to award costs against counsel personally but significantly reduced the plaintiff's costs award to $1,750 due to the plaintiff's responsibility for delay and unnecessary expense.

Following the plaintiff's success in resisting an appeal from a Master's order, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale or, alternatively, on a partial indemnity scale.

The court found no reason to award costs on an elevated scale and fixed the plaintiff's costs on a partial indemnity basis at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

A snow removal contractor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury slip-and-fall claim and related cross-claims.

The plaintiff filed no responding evidence and did not appear on the motion.

The court held that the absence of any admissible evidence regarding the fall, injuries, or sidewalk condition meant there was no genuine issue requiring a trial as against the contractor, and the claim against it was dismissed.

However, the municipality’s cross-claim for contribution and indemnity raised unresolved factual issues, including the interpretation of meteorological evidence and whether contractual snow-removal obligations were met.

Those issues required expert evidence and were determined to be genuine issues for trial.

This was a costs endorsement following a civil action in which the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs after recovering a fraction of the damages originally claimed.

The responding party argued the result was modest and that lower costs would be proportionate.

The court held that success was partially divided because the landlord substantially reduced the damages, and fixed costs at $20,000 plus disbursements and HST.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien action for failure to pay a previous costs award.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to stay its own action and compel the defendant to participate in arbitration pursuant to their contract.

The court held that a master does not have jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act, as that requires an application to a judge.

The court exercised its discretion under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act to dismiss the remaining contract action, noting it served no purpose after the lien was discharged.

The court also dismissed the action based on the plaintiff's failure to pay the prior costs award.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of a mortgage debt, possession of the mortgaged commercial property, dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim, and leave to issue a writ of possession.

The defendants sought an adjournment to obtain counsel and additional documentation and argued that the mortgage assignment and notice requirements were defective.

The court held that the defendants failed to produce documentary evidence supporting their claims of mortgage renewal or payments and did not meet their obligation to put their best foot forward on the motion.

The court further found that notice of assignment through a notice of sale satisfied statutory requirements and that the mortgage was clearly in default.

Summary judgment and possession were granted, with issuance of a writ of possession delayed for thirty days to allow occupants to vacate.

Following the execution of an Anton Piller order in a commercial dispute, certain seized documents were identified as relating to “controlled goods” under the Defence Production Act.

The moving party sought an order declaring that the independent supervising solicitor appointed under the Anton Piller order was not required to register under Part 2 of the Defence Production Act in order to possess or examine such documents.

The Attorney General of Canada intervened and argued that the registration requirements applied.

The court held that an independent supervising solicitor appointed under the Model Anton Piller Order functions as a person employed for the execution of civil process and qualifies as a “peace officer” within the meaning of the Criminal Code for the limited purpose of the statutory exemption.

Accordingly, the solicitor was exempt from the registration requirement under s. 36 of the Defence Production Act.

The defendants moved to dismiss an action for unpaid electrical services on the basis that the named plaintiff lacked legal capacity because the corporation identified in the claim did not legally exist.

The court considered whether the misidentification constituted a misnomer under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the test for misnomer, the court held that the defendants clearly understood who the contracting party was and that the action concerned invoices issued under the trade name used by the corporation.

The court permitted amendment of the plaintiff’s name to the correct corporate entity notwithstanding the expired limitation period and found any prejudice could be addressed by costs.

The court also ordered the action transferred from Brampton to Toronto and set a litigation timetable.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the successful defendant sought costs including substantial indemnity costs after a rejected settlement offer under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the interaction of Rules 49.10, 49.13, and 57.01 and the jurisprudence governing elevated cost awards.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs require reprehensible or egregious conduct unless specifically triggered by Rule 49.10, which did not apply where the plaintiff obtained no judgment.

As there was no misconduct by the plaintiff, elevated costs were not warranted.

The court nevertheless awarded the successful defendant partial indemnity costs in a reduced amount reflecting fairness and reasonable expectations.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action sought repayment of approximately $58,000 in alleged loans, but little progress occurred after a failed summary judgment motion, leading to administrative dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and relevant Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court found that although the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, the dismissal resulted from inadvertence, the motion to set aside was brought promptly once discovered, and the defendants failed to establish prejudice.

Emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the lack of demonstrable prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal order and allow the action to proceed subject to a timetable.

The plaintiffs sought interlocutory injunctive relief restraining a former shareholder, director, and employee from using confidential information and soliciting customers following the sale of his shares in a closely held corporation.

The evidence indicated the departing fiduciary took electronic files containing proprietary customer information and immediately solicited key customers after the share sale.

The court found a strong prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of a non‑competition agreement.

Given the likelihood of irreparable harm through loss of goodwill and customer relationships, and the balance of convenience favouring the plaintiffs, injunctive relief was granted.

The injunction restrained the former fiduciary and his corporation from using confidential information and soliciting customers for a limited period pending trial.