Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the Royal Bank of Canada against Nagina Wahab, who had guaranteed the debts of HI & DQ’s Foods Incorporated.

The court found that Wahab’s defences—including lack of independent legal advice, inability to understand English, and claims of acting under another’s direction—were unsupported by evidence.

The court held that the requirements for summary judgment were met, as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Wahab was ordered to pay $300,000 plus interest and costs.

The applicant, an 86-year-old long-serving volunteer Scouter, was denied renewal of his volunteer status by Scouts Canada based on alleged safety concerns and resistance to program adaptation.

The applicant brought an application seeking to have the court intervene, arguing that Scouts Canada failed to follow its own disciplinary and performance management policies.

The court found that the relationship between the volunteer and the organization was contractual in nature, giving the court jurisdiction to intervene.

The court concluded that the allegations of misconduct were unfounded and that Scouts Canada breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to follow its policies.

The court granted declaratory relief, a mandatory order for the processing of any future applications by the applicant, and substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant brought a motion seeking declarations that his 99-year-old mother was incapable of managing property and instructing counsel, and seeking the appointment of a litigation guardian and guardian of property.

The court reviewed competing capacity assessments and preferred the assessment finding incapacity, noting the mother's confusion and inability to understand the litigation.

The court appointed a neutral third-party lawyer as litigation guardian and guardian of property, passing over the mother's other son due to extreme family conflict and a prior finding of unconscionable procurement.

The court also ordered the mother's counsel to pay $3,500 in costs personally for taking unreasonable positions and failing to address his client's lack of capacity.

The law firm Torkin Manes brought a motion to remove itself as lawyer of record for the defendants.

The firm had been receiving instructions from an individual who subsequently stopped communicating with them regarding this action and a companion proceeding.

Due to the inability to receive instructions, the court found an irreconcilable breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship and granted the motion to remove the firm as lawyer of record.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of defence to withdraw an admission that they had entered into a conditional agreement of purchase and sale for a farm.

The plaintiff opposed the withdrawal.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing an admission and found that the proposed amendment raised a triable issue, as one of the three joint tenants had not signed the agreement.

The court also found that the admission was inadvertent and that there was no prejudice to the plaintiff, who had known from the beginning that the document was missing a signature.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a residential property after the defendant vendor failed to close the transaction due to an inability to discharge two mortgages.

The mortgages were subsequently assigned to a third party who opposed the CPL and sought to sell the property under power of sale.

The court found that while the plaintiff established a triable issue regarding an interest in land, the balance of equities under the Dhunna factors did not favour granting the CPL.

The plaintiff failed to prove the property was unique, damages were an adequate remedy, and the third-party mortgagee would suffer greater prejudice if the CPL were granted.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to continue the action under the simplified procedure.

The defendants did not oppose the amendment but sought costs unnecessarily incurred under Rule 76.13.

The court previously awarded these costs and reserved the costs of the motion itself.

In this decision, the court determined the quantum of costs for the successful defendant, Concrete Walls, fixing them at $10,000 plus HST on a partial indemnity basis.

This decision addresses the costs of an application and counter-application concerning corporate ownership and control of the "Tetra group" of companies.

The court previously dismissed the application brought by Lois Struthmann and Tansy Serediak and generally granted the relief sought by Aloysius (Al) Struthmann in his counter-application.

Mr. Struthmann, as the successful party, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court awarded Mr. Struthmann costs fixed at an all-inclusive amount of $38,000.00, payable jointly and severally by Lois Struthmann and Tansy Serediak.

The court rejected arguments that no costs should be awarded due to good faith or the absence of a formal liability finding, emphasizing the indemnity principle and the unsuccessful parties' refusal to accept an earlier settlement overture.

The applicants sought costs of $18,000 on a partial indemnity basis, or alternatively no costs, following an application where they were largely successful in being removed as trustees of a Henson trust but unsuccessful in seeking directions to sell a farm.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $30,555.90 payable by the applicants from their shares of the estate.

The court found there was divided success and ordered that no costs be awarded.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to plead, in the alternative, breach of the defendant's obligation to give reasonable notice of termination of a consulting agreement, without alleging new facts.

The defendant opposed, arguing it raised a statute-barred new cause of action or lacked particulars.

The court granted leave to amend, finding it was an alternative theory of damages based on existing facts, not a new cause of action, and that sufficient material facts were pleaded.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs for the amendment.

The defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the action for non-compliance with a costs order was denied, but its motion to strike certain evidence was granted, with $1,000 costs awarded for that portion.

Following a four-week trial where the plaintiff was awarded over $7 million for a traumatic brain injury sustained after jumping from a moving school bus, the court determined the costs payable by the defendant.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the plaintiffs' offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court adjusted the 2005 Costs Grid for inflation to determine appropriate hourly rates for counsel.

In assessing disbursements, the court reduced several expert witness fees because the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information regarding the experts' hourly rates and time spent.

The court also disallowed the premium for adverse costs insurance, finding it was not a compensable disbursement as it did not advance the litigation.

Total costs of $741,266.08 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The applicants agreed to purchase a property and paid a $40,000 deposit.

The transaction failed to close on the scheduled date due to existing encumbrances on title, including mortgages and a caution from a previous failed sale.

The respondent, who had assumed the seller's rights, attempted to extend the closing date but was unable to provide clear title.

The applicants refused further extensions and demanded the return of their deposit.

The court found that the respondent was not in a position to convey substantially what the applicants contracted for, as the property remained subject to encumbrances.

The court declared the respondent in breach of the purchase agreement and ordered the return of the deposit to the applicants.

Following a summary judgment ruling enforcing a settlement agreement, the parties disputed the calculation of property taxes and the applicable interest rate on the outstanding amount.

The court held that 'property tax' includes water and garbage charges.

The court further held that the original mortgage contract interest rate of 6.45% applies to the outstanding settlement amount, rather than the Courts of Justice Act rates, as the settlement compromised claims under the mortgage but did not intend to provide an interest-free period upon default.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, primarily focusing on a defamation claim, due to the plaintiffs' failure to provide the statutory notice required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The court dismissed the libel claim of one plaintiff, Nina Willis, finding that compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent and its absence constitutes an absolute bar.

However, the motion to dismiss was denied for her remaining claims and all claims of the other plaintiffs, as it was not plain and obvious that these claims, including potential claims akin to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, could not succeed.

The court also declined to dismiss claims for plaintiffs who had not been properly served with the motion.

Following a prior summary judgment decision finding that a settlement had been reached between the parties, the defendants brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence concerning the date on which two settlement cheques were negotiated.

The moving parties relied on Rules 52.10 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that bank statements showing the cheques were cashed earlier than assumed would materially affect the findings regarding their intention to be bound by the settlement.

The court held that the proposed evidence could have been obtained and presented with reasonable diligence during the original summary judgment motion and therefore did not satisfy the requirements for admitting fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The court further concluded that, even if admitted, the evidence would not have changed the outcome because the defendants never demanded repayment of the funds after the plaintiff proposed revised payment terms.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The moving party sought to set aside a prior order dismissing a consolidation motion and to set aside a notice of discontinuance in a related professional negligence action.

The motion alleged that a tolling agreement allowing the plaintiff in the other action to recommence proceedings against solicitors rendered the discontinuance a sham and an abuse of process.

The court held that although the existence of the tolling agreement ought to have been disclosed at the earlier motion, the failure to do so did not amount to fraud on the court or justify setting aside the dismissal order under Rule 59.06(2).

The court further held that the moving party lacked standing to set aside the notice of discontinuance in litigation to which she was not a party and had shown no substantive prejudice from the deferral of that action.

The motion was dismissed and the responding parties were awarded costs.

The plaintiff employer sought a Mareva injunction restraining a former employee from disposing of two real properties pending trial of a civil action alleging theft of funds.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case, a real risk of asset dissipation, and that the balance of convenience favoured the injunction.

Evidence included an alleged written admission of theft and discovery testimony indicating an intention to transfer real property interests to a former partner.

The court found a strong prima facie case and a real risk that the defendant would dissipate assets before trial.

The balance of convenience favoured preserving the assets because they represented the defendant’s only significant property available to satisfy a potential judgment.

The court heard a reference for an accounting of monies owing, contributions made, and ownership holdings regarding multiple real estate properties owned by a partnership.

The court found that the managing partner breached his obligations by moving to Korea and delegating his duties, and disallowed his claims for management fees, travel expenses, and delegated work.

The court also found that the investing partner breached the agreement by unilaterally selling properties and retaining the proceeds, ordering him to repay the funds to the partnership.

Due to disorganized financial records, the court provided specific directions on allowable expenses and ordered the parties to prepare standardized itemized lists for a resumed hearing if they could not agree on the final accounting.

A commercial landlord‑tenant dispute arose after the landlord halted renovations at nightclub premises and later began demolition while litigation over an alleged lease breach was pending.

Earlier proceedings determined the tenant had not breached the lease and that the landlord had unreasonably withheld consent to an assignment.

At this damages trial, the court considered whether the landlord was liable for losses during a seven‑month delay period and whether demolition prior to termination established liability for the remainder of the lease term.

The court found the landlord wrongfully expelled the tenant and commenced demolition before termination, thereby destroying the leased premises.

Damages were awarded for the seven‑month period and for the balance of the lease term, but the court declined to award damages for equipment loss due to insufficient proof and the tenant’s failure to mitigate.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) and Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and constituting an abuse of process.

The self‑represented plaintiff attempted to sue federal officials and government counsel following unsuccessful tax litigation relating to a reassessment request and Canada Child Tax Benefit claim.

The court found the pleaded causes of action, including negligence, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of good faith, and malicious falsehood, lacked the essential elements required in law.

The action was also an impermissible attempt to relitigate matters already determined by the courts.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend and costs were awarded to the defendants.