Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff towing company sought to amend its Statement of Claim to add claims for an interim and permanent mandatory order compelling the Ontario Provincial Police to adhere to a 'First On Scene' tow policy.

The Crown opposed the amendments, arguing that statutory provisions prohibit injunctive and mandatory relief against the Crown.

The Master confirmed jurisdiction to assess the legal tenability of proposed pleadings and held that mandatory orders are a form of injunctive relief prohibited against the Crown.

The Master denied the amendments seeking mandatory orders but permitted amendments pleading irreparable harm and intimidation, as they were tenable claims relevant to damages.

The plaintiff moved for an order requiring the defendant to produce a second corporate representative for examination for discovery.

The plaintiff had already commenced the examination of the defendant's current General Manager, who was not employed by the defendant at the time of the incident but had informed himself by speaking with the proposed second representative.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the first representative was unable to answer questions or that the plaintiff would be deprived of a meaningful discovery without examining the second representative.

The moving party sought costs after being mostly successful on a motion to prohibit the responding party's counsel from appearing on a pending motion to quash.

The court found the moving party was entitled to costs but reduced the requested amount by 50% due to divided success and the straightforward nature of the motion.

Costs were fixed at $6,200 for the moving party and $500 for the supporting party, payable after the final determination of the remaining motions.

The respondent brought a motion to prohibit the applicants' counsel from appearing on a pending motion to quash a summons to witness, arguing that the counsel was the primary source of contentious evidence.

The respondent also sought to strike portions of the applicants' affidavits.

The court granted the motion to prohibit counsel from appearing, finding it improper for a lawyer to act as counsel when they are the source of important and contentious evidence, even if provided via information and belief.

The motion to strike the affidavits was dismissed as premature.

Following a successful motion by the defendant to temporarily stay the action, the court determined the quantum of costs payable by the responding party, General Sprinklers Inc. The moving party sought partial indemnity costs of $11,127.66, while the responding party suggested $5,000.00.

The court found the moving party's requested fees excessive due to overlap with related motions and fixed costs at $7,500.00 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of the unredacted financial statements of the corporate defendant for the years 2015 to 2017.

The plaintiff alleged the individual defendant breached a non-compete clause and sought disgorgement of benefits received by the corporate defendant.

A previous order allowed the corporate defendant to redact non-relevant information from the financial statements.

After reviewing the unredacted statements pursuant to Rule 30.06(d), the Master concluded that the redacted information was not relevant to the disgorgement claim, as the statements only provided a general high-level overview without the specific details sought by the plaintiff.

The motion for production of the unredacted statements was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add an insurer as a defendant for unidentified motorist coverage, over four years after learning an unidentified vehicle was involved in the accident.

The proposed defendant argued the claim was statute-barred.

The court applied recent appellate jurisprudence holding that the limitation period for an unidentified motorist claim does not begin to run until a demand for indemnity is made and refused.

As no demand had yet been refused, the limitation period had not expired, and the motion to amend was granted.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 25.10 and 30.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking document production and particulars regarding an alleged agreement of purchase and sale for parkland.

The court found the plaintiff's responses to the document inspection requests satisfactory, as the plaintiff produced the draft agreements and emails relied upon.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to provide further particulars regarding the facts relied upon to support the allegation that the unsigned draft agreement was binding and properly entered into.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing her motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The action was dismissed in January 2014 after the plaintiff failed to set it down for trial by the deadline.

Applying the Reid factors, the court found the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the delay, failed to prove inadvertence, did not move promptly to set aside the dismissal, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants given the passage of nearly ten years since the accident.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving parties (the Donato Parties) sought an order enforcing an arbitrator's confidentiality decision and sealing the arbitral award so it would not form part of the public record in the appeal proceedings.

The court applied the Sierra Club test for confidentiality orders and found that the moving parties failed to establish a serious risk to an important commercial interest that required protection.

The court held that the general public interest in encouraging private arbitration does not automatically justify a sealing order when an arbitral award is appealed to the court.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he was wrongfully ejected from a concert at the request of the moving defendant due to racial discrimination, and subsequently assaulted by security staff.

The moving defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action against him, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction as the claim was based solely on an infringement of the Human Rights Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that there is no independent tort of discrimination and the Human Rights Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

The plaintiff's employment was terminated without cause at age 63.

The employer treated the termination as a retirement and paid the plaintiff his retirement allowance benefits under the company policy.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming entitlement to both the retirement allowance and compensation for termination in lieu of notice.

The court found that the employment contract and retirement policy expressly precluded the payment of both benefits.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed, and the employer was granted summary judgment to recover an overpayment of funds mistakenly paid in lieu of notice.

The plaintiff hired the defendant general contractor for a home renovation on a cost-plus basis.

After becoming concerned about costs, the plaintiff hired a cost consultant who discovered a fraudulent invoicing scheme, including inflated sub-trade accounts and double-counted HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for civil fraud and to pierce the corporate veil to hold the sole shareholder personally liable.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contractor committed civil fraud and the shareholder used the corporation as an instrument of fraud.

The defendants' counterclaim for unpaid invoices was largely dismissed due to lack of supporting documentation.

The defendants brought a threshold motion following a jury trial, arguing the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function from a 2014 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff suffered chronic pain that prevented her from pursuing a career as a police officer, leading the jury to award $175,000 for loss of future income and $65,000 for pain and suffering.

The court applied the Meyer v. Bright test and found the plaintiff's chronic pain constituted a permanent, serious impairment of an important function, dismissing the defendants' motion.

Kingsway appealed an arbitrator's decision ordering it to indemnify Dominion for statutory accident benefits paid following a four-vehicle chain reaction collision.

The arbitrator found that s. 9(3) of the Fault Determination Rules did not apply because the fourth vehicle was stationary, and applied ordinary tort rules to find Kingsway's insured 100% at fault.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 9(3) applies to the three vehicles in motion regardless of the stationary fourth vehicle.

Following the Court of Appeal's decision in State Farm, s. 9(3) precludes 'leapfrogging' loss transfer claims between vehicles that do not directly collide.

The self-represented plaintiff abandoned her motion for documentary production shortly before it was scheduled to be heard.

The defendants sought costs of the abandoned motion on a full indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's conduct and previous abandoned motions.

The court awarded costs to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, noting that while costs were justified under Rule 37.09(3), the plaintiff's self-represented status and health issues mitigated against an extraordinary costs sanction.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 for one defendant and $2,500 for the other.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d), arguing the corporate plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay a potential costs award.

The plaintiff, a small trade contractor seeking $340,000 for unpaid invoices, opposed the motion.

The Master found the defendant failed to meet its initial burden, noting the plaintiff had ongoing contracts, work in progress, and accounts receivable, and the potential costs liability for defending the action was modest ($17,000).

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The tenant sought an interlocutory injunction restoring possession of leased premises after the landlord locked it out pursuant to a surrender of lease agreement tied to a relocation to replacement premises.

The tenant argued the agreements should be rescinded due to mutual mistake regarding zoning and building code requirements for operating a hot yoga studio.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald, the court held the tenant failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm.

The zoning and regulatory requirements were readily ascertainable and did not constitute a fundamental mistake undermining the agreements, and any losses were compensable in damages.

The court therefore refused the injunction, ordered the tenant to vacate the original premises, and required the landlord to pay the remaining inducement payment while permitting the tenant to occupy the replacement premises under the replacement lease.

The defendants moved to stay the plaintiffs' action for wrongful dismissal and oppression under the CBCA, arguing the dispute was subject to a broad arbitration clause in a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The plaintiffs argued the arbitration clause did not cover employment matters and that forcing arbitration would be oppressive.

The court applied the Mantini test, found the arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the dispute, and held that proceeding to arbitration would not be oppressive as all remedies sought could be pursued there.

The motion to stay the action was granted.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of the statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought $12,816.24 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the discretion to award costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of the issues, efficiency of the proceeding, and conduct of the parties.

The court noted the breadth of the original motion challenging several tort claims and the preparation required by the plaintiff’s counsel.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.