Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

An anti-SLAPP motion brought by directors of MediPharm Labs Corp. to dismiss a libel action arising from a lawyer's letter sent during a proxy contest.

The letter, authored by counsel and approved by the defendants, raised concerns about the plaintiffs' solicitation activities, potential securities law violations, and market manipulation.

The court found the expression related to matters of public interest, the plaintiffs failed to establish substantial merit to their claim, and the defendants had valid defences including qualified privilege, fair comment, responsible communication, and truth.

The motion was granted and the claim dismissed.

The plaintiff, Shamsul Alam MD, moved for default judgment against the defendant, Azam Khan a.k.a.

MD Azam Khan, regarding alleged loans for construction at eight properties.

The defendant sought to set aside the noting in default.

The court found the evidentiary record insufficient to grant default judgment and noted inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s affidavits and the nature of the parties’ relationship.

Despite the defendant’s significant delay and lack of explanation, the court set aside the noting in default to allow the matter to proceed on the merits, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and the complexity of the issues.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Bemco Financial Services Ltd., for a deficiency on a mortgage loan after a power of sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the sale price, accounting for rents, management fees, property taxes, or real estate commissions.

The court disallowed a three-month interest penalty as a prohibited penalty under the Interest Act, but otherwise accepted the plaintiff’s accounting and entitlement to the deficiency.

The defendants, Lee Darvin Weinkauf and Merlie Otadora Weinkauf, brought a motion to set aside their noting in default and a default judgment obtained by RFA Bank of Canada in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court reviewed the chronology of the mortgage default, the parties' communications, and the applicable legal test for setting aside default judgments.

The court found that the defendants did not provide a plausible excuse for their failure to defend, nor did they establish an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This decision addresses cross-applications between two groups of real estate investors, led by David Civiero and Grant Alexander Hood, regarding the winding up or buy-sell/shotgun disposition of their jointly held corporations.

The court grants leave to add parties, converts the applications to actions, and orders transfer and consolidation with a related Toronto action, finding that the complexity and credibility issues require a full trial.

The applicants sought an injunction to prevent the respondents from trespassing on their portion of Silver Lake by navigation.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether the application should be decided using the new, broader definition of "navigable water" from the Canadian Navigable Waters Act (CNWA) enacted in 2019, or the common law definition.

The court ruled that the new definition in s. 2 of the CNWA must be used, as Parliament's intention was to protect navigation rights on more bodies of water.

This interpretation was deemed to produce a just and reasonable result, effectively replacing the common law "aqueous highway" test.

Mr. Levitt sought an urgent stay of an order by Chiappetta J. requiring him to answer a question from cross-examination, including producing "all" correspondence, regardless of privilege claims.

He intended to seek leave to appeal this order.

The court applied the three-part interlocutory injunction test (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

While acknowledging irreparable harm if privilege were wrongly breached, the court found no serious issue to be tried, as Mr. Levitt had not appealed the original production order and failed to adduce evidence of privilege.

The balance of convenience also weighed against a stay due to delays and Mr. Levitt's conduct.

The motion for a stay was dismissed, and costs were awarded against Mr. Levitt.

Trisura Guarantee Insurance Company brought a motion for a declaration that its perfected security interest under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) had priority over any solicitor's charging order that might be obtained by BPR Litigation Lawyers, the former lawyers for Unimac Group Ltd. The court dismissed the motion, finding that the PPSA does not apply to solicitors' charging orders.

Furthermore, the court held that the common law 'first in time' rule does not apply to solicitors' charging orders due to their equitable nature and purpose.

Trisura's indemnity agreement with Unimac did not preclude BPR from seeking a charging order against funds recovered or preserved through their instrumentality.

The court considered dismissing the action brought by the plaintiff T.D.B.L. under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The claim, advanced by T.D.B.L.'s son (who is not a lawyer), alleged illegal removal of her child under the Child and Family Services Act and constitutional rights violations.

The court found T.D.B.L.'s claim could not succeed, as challenges to child custody orders or care agreements cannot be made in a civil proceeding, and there was no plausible basis for constitutional rights breaches.

The court also noted T.D.B.L. did not appear to be actively participating or properly represented.

Consequently, T.D.B.L.'s action was dismissed without costs.

A case management judge reviewed the statement of claim, noting that one plaintiff, Ms. Laronde, was unrepresented and her claims lacked clarity.

The court initiated a process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to consider dismissing her action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Pending a written hearing, Ms. Laronde's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and further filings from her were restricted.

The plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal an order discharging a Certificate of Pending Litigation and setting aside an interim injunction was dismissed.

The defendants, as the successful party on the motion, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the defendants' costs outline and found the claimed amount reasonable, ordering the plaintiffs to pay costs fixed at $3,852.87 within 30 days.

The plaintiff, a vulnerable widow with limited financial knowledge, sued the defendant for civil fraud after losing $250,000 USD of her life insurance proceeds in speculative options trading through the defendant's account.

The defendant, a computer-literate individual with investment knowledge, had promised the plaintiff's dying husband he would look after her and her children.

The court found the defendant committed civil fraud by taking advantage of the plaintiff's vulnerability and making reckless trades, despite his claims that the plaintiff directed the trades.

The court awarded compensatory damages of $192,000 USD and punitive damages of $25,000 CAD.

The plaintiff, Andreas Haas, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully resisting a motion to stay his action in favour of arbitration.

Haas argued for substantial indemnity based on a Rule 49.10 offer to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10 did not apply to a successful responding party in a motion and that there was no egregious conduct by the moving parties to warrant substantial indemnity under Rule 49.13 or 57.01.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of issues and a party's initial refusal to admit, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at an all-inclusive amount of $25,500.00, to be divided evenly among the three defendants.

The court, acting under Rule 2.1, dismissed the applicant's proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

This decision followed a prior endorsement where the applicant was invited to provide submissions explaining why the application should not be dismissed, but no submissions were received.

The court found the proceeding sought relief it could not grant.

The plaintiff in a defamation action sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add allegations of further defamatory statements by the existing defendant and to add a psychiatrist as a new defendant for negligence and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court denied leave to add the new defamation allegations against the existing defendant, finding them barred by the two-year limitation period and lacking sufficient particulars.

However, the court granted leave to add the claims against the psychiatrist, finding that although the negligence claim based on a third-party duty of care was novel, it was not plain and obvious that it would fail.

The court also allowed the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim to proceed.

Purchasers of a hotel condominium unit sought return of a $228,250 deposit after the transaction failed to close by the contractual deadline.

The developer argued the purchasers breached the agreement by failing to close and forfeited the deposit.

The court found the developer’s solicitor had effectively extended the closing date through assurances that the parties need not close while concerns about increased common expenses were addressed.

No revised disclosure statement or statutory notice under the Condominium Act, 1998 was delivered despite a significant increase in common expenses.

Because the transaction failed to close through no fault of the purchasers, the agreement was terminated and the purchasers were entitled to the return of their deposits with prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add three new defendants and a new cause of action for conspiracy to injure, nearly four years after the incident.

The defendants opposed, arguing the claims were statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding the plaintiff met the low evidentiary burden to show reasonable diligence in discovering the alleged conspiracy, which is secretive by nature.

The court also found the proposed pleading contained all necessary elements for a conspiracy claim.

The defendants were granted leave to plead a limitations defence.

Following the dismissal of a bailiff’s motion for summary judgment, several co-defendants sought costs for their participation in the motion.

They argued that the moving party’s record relied on allegations involving them, requiring broader participation than suggested.

The moving party contended that the issues affecting these defendants were narrow and that any costs should be deferred to the trial judge.

The court held that the defendants’ participation was justified and declined to defer the matter.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 all-inclusive, payable forthwith by the moving party.

The applicant brought a motion and application to set aside a 2009 order declaring the respondent sole owner of a Toronto property and directing rectification of the land titles register.

The earlier order had been obtained without notice to the applicant.

The court found that the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts regarding her ability to locate and communicate with the applicant at the time the order was obtained.

As a result, the order was set aside under Rule 39.01(6) and the parcel register was directed to be restored to its prior state, with remaining ownership issues to be determined at trial.