Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The defendant brought a motion under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to restrict the self-represented plaintiff from initiating or pursuing further interlocutory proceedings in a motor vehicle accident action commenced in 2012.

The court found the plaintiff had engaged in vexatious conduct through persistent unsuccessful appeals of interlocutory orders concerning irrelevant demands for an interpreter's personal information, blind-copying numerous unrelated persons on litigation correspondence, and flooding defence counsel's inbox with repetitive emails.

The motion was granted, ordering that the plaintiff shall not institute any new motions or appeals in the action except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court.

No costs were ordered given the plaintiff's receipt of social assistance.

The plaintiff brought an undefended trial claiming his sister-in-law agreed to transfer life insurance proceeds to him following his wife's death.

The court raised concerns about the lack of consideration for the alleged agreement, as the plaintiff admitted the defendant received nothing in exchange.

The court deferred its decision to allow the plaintiff's counsel to provide written submissions on the issue of consideration.

The moving defendants sought a temporary stay of the plaintiff's certification motion pending the determination of a certification motion in a related price-fixing class action involving different electronic components.

The defendants argued that a stay would promote efficiency as the expert evidence and methodology were substantially similar in both actions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the actions involved different products, time periods, and parties, and that an indefinite delay would be unfair to the plaintiff class and contrary to the goals of judicial economy and access to justice.

The court issued a protective order on consent of the parties in a case involving allegations of appropriation and misuse of confidential technical and business information.

The order governs the handling and protection of confidential documents and information exchanged during discovery, requiring advance notice before filing such materials in court, but explicitly stating it does not constitute a sealing order or publication ban.

The court also provided specific case management directions for the litigation.

In a class action where core negligence claims were dismissed on appeal and the remaining "knowing assistance" claim was conceded as having no prospect of success, the action was formally dismissed.

The defendant auditor sought $485,000 in costs for defending the action.

The Law Foundation of Ontario (LFO), which funded the plaintiff through the Class Proceeding Fund, resisted this amount, arguing that previous costs awards covered the merits.

The court found the defendant was entitled to costs for the "knowing assistance" claim but deemed the requested amount excessive.

Applying a 40% discount to the plaintiff's estimated actual costs for this component, the court awarded $68,000 for the action and an additional $4,000 for the costs motion, totaling $72,000, payable by the LFO/CPF to the defendant.

The plaintiff sought to continue a temporary certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a property, alleging mortgage fraud and lack of notice regarding a foreclosure judgment.

The court reviewed a more complete record and found that the plaintiff's claims were not supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff had obtained the second mortgage, defaulted on payments, was aware of the foreclosure action, and had retained counsel regarding the claim and subsequent notice to vacate.

The court concluded that any claim the plaintiff had to an interest in the property was extinguished by the 2016 foreclosure judgment.

The motion to continue the CPL was denied, and the temporary CPL was discharged.

The plaintiffs successfully moved to set aside a dismissal order that resulted from their former lawyer's (Mr. Chang) negligence, including failure to attend court, respond to motions, and communicate with clients.

This decision addresses the costs of that motion and previous costs awarded against the plaintiffs, which they sought to recover from Mr. Chang and his firm, Bougadis Chang LLP.

The court found Mr. Chang's conduct warranted a costs award against him and his firm, fixing costs at $55,658.40 for the plaintiffs and $3,000 for defendant Ping Lee, both payable by Mr. Chang and Bougadis Chang LLP.

The defendants in a proposed price-fixing class action brought a motion for directions to pause the proceeding pending the release of a Supreme Court of Canada decision in a related case.

The plaintiffs opposed the delay.

The court found that it made sense to await the Supreme Court's decision for efficiency, but declined to vacate the scheduled motion dates immediately.

The court directed that most cross-examinations proceed, but deferred the cross-examination of the plaintiffs' expert economist until after the Supreme Court hearing.

The defendant hospital brought two motions: one to enforce an alleged settlement (a Pierringer Agreement) and another for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim.

The court dismissed the motion to enforce the settlement, finding that while the parties had agreed on the settlement amount, essential terms regarding document production and witness cooperation remained unresolved.

The court also dismissed the summary judgment motion, concluding that competing expert evidence regarding the nursing standard of care and whether the nurses' actions contributed to the plaintiff's compartment syndrome created genuine issues requiring a trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action for settlement purposes and to approve a national settlement regarding alleged exhaust leaks in certain Ford Explorer vehicles.

The court approved the discontinuance of claims regarding other Ford models, added a new representative plaintiff, and certified the class for settlement.

Finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, the court approved the settlement, the notice plan, and honoraria for the representative plaintiffs.

A commercial tenant brought an action alleging breach of an exclusive use clause in a shopping mall lease, claiming loss of profits after its restaurant business failed.

The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and utilities and sought to enforce a personal guarantee provided by the tenant’s principal.

The court dismissed the tenant’s claim and found that lease covenants are independent, meaning rent remained payable regardless of the alleged breach.

The guarantor could not rely on alleged oral amendments or the absence of a separate indemnity document to avoid liability under the written guarantee.

Judgment was granted on the counterclaim for rent arrears with contractual interest and substantial indemnity costs.

An employer appealed a Master's order granting a motion to amend a statement of claim to add the employer as a defendant in an action against an insurer for termination of long‑term disability benefits.

The employee, a unionized worker, sought to claim that the employer was liable for disability benefits after the insurer stopped payments.

The court held that the employee’s entitlement to disability benefits against the employer arose from the collective bargaining agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration.

Because the employer was not an insurer under the policy and could not be sued in court for obligations arising under the collective agreement, the amendment adding the employer as a party was improper.

The appeal was allowed and the Master's order set aside.

Neighbouring property owners brought an application seeking an injunction preventing interference with their access to a laneway used as the sole vehicular access to several residential properties.

The respondents owned the servient property containing the laneway and argued that any historical right-of-way had been extinguished under the 40‑year search rule in the Registry Act because the servient easement was absent from title.

The court found the applicants openly used the laneway and relied on it for access, and held that proprietary estoppel applied because the respondents had allowed such use and later attempted to deny it in an unconscionable manner.

The court also interpreted s. 113(5)(a)(iv) of the Registry Act as preserving openly used unregistered easements, including rights-of-way that were historically registered but later omitted from title.

An injunction was granted prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the applicants’ use of the laneway.

In a long-running civil action arising from an arrest for criminal harassment and subsequent withdrawal of charges, the defendants sought relief relating to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with outstanding costs orders made during prior unsuccessful appeals and motions.

The self‑represented plaintiff had accumulated unpaid costs orders totalling over $6,000 and continued to advance pleadings that disregarded prior court directions limiting the scope of permissible claims.

The court held that litigants, including self‑represented parties, must comply with costs orders and procedural rules, and that ignoring such orders undermines fairness to opposing parties.

Exercising its authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court stayed the action until the outstanding costs were paid.

The plaintiff was also ordered to pay additional costs of the motion.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought a motion seeking substituted service of its statement of claim and leave to amend the statement of claim to correct drafting errors and add an architect to the title of proceedings.

The court considered whether the omission of the architect from the title constituted a misnomer.

Although the master found the misnomer test articulated by the Court of Appeal could be satisfied because the intended defendant was clearly identified within the body of the pleading, he held that a prior Superior Court decision limited the doctrine to cases where a party was misnamed rather than omitted from the title.

Instead, the court permitted the amendment as a correction of a technical irregularity because the allegations of negligence against the architect were sufficiently particularized in the pleading.

Leave to amend was granted and the time for service was extended.

The applicants brought two motions: one to vacate a longstanding non‑dissipation order secured against their property and another seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory mistrial order declaring a mistrial after thirteen days of trial.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the mistrial decision raised serious and important issues regarding whether trial length and scheduling constraints could justify terminating a trial.

The court granted both the extension of time and leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal open to serious debate and of significance to the administration of justice.

The court also vacated the non‑dissipation order, concluding that the evidentiary basis for the order had been discredited and that there was no ongoing risk of asset dissipation warranting such security.

A commercial landlord applied for a declaration that a lease with its tenant gym operator was terminated and sought an order for possession due to alleged nuisance caused by excessive noise.

The evidentiary record consisted largely of hearsay and minimal firsthand evidence, and the landlord had not complied with procedural requirements for expert evidence regarding acoustics.

The tenant’s responding materials were also procedurally deficient and attempted to seek relief, including an interlocutory injunction, without proper originating process or motion materials.

The court found the pleadings and evidentiary record insufficient to permit an intelligible adjudication of the parties’ rights and obligations.

The application was adjourned to allow the parties to clarify issues, consider proper procedures, and potentially pursue settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a ruling that her action should proceed to trial and not be dismissed on a forthcoming summary judgment motion.

The defendant argued that the claim was barred by res judicata, issue estoppel, abuse of process, and the Limitations Act because the same issues had already been adjudicated in a prior action concerning the construction of a residential property.

The court found that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate factual and legal issues previously determined and that the new action was also commenced outside the applicable two-year limitation period.

Applying principles of proportionality and the culture shift endorsed in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court determined that further motion proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

The action was dismissed immediately as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff sought payment under a critical illness insurance policy after being diagnosed with thyroid cancer.

The insurer rescinded the policy alleging the insured failed to disclose sleep apnea during the application process.

The court held the insurer was not entitled to rescind the contract because the application questions were ambiguous and the insured reasonably did not understand sleep apnea to fall within the categories asked.

However, the insurer successfully relied on a contractual 90‑day exclusion clause because signs leading to the cancer diagnosis began before the 91st day after the policy came into effect.

As a result, coverage was excluded despite the insurer’s failed rescission argument.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to transfer the trial venue from Timmins to Toronto and to strike the plaintiff’s jury notice in an action for damages arising from the denial of an aviation insurance claim after the destruction of an aircraft.

The court applied Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the moving parties failed to establish that Toronto was a substantially better venue than the plaintiff’s chosen forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action was essentially one for declaratory relief requiring determination by a judge alone.

The court found that significant factual issues concerning the purpose of the flight and the meaning of “ab initio instruction” under the insurance policy required factual determination suitable for a jury.

The motion to change venue and strike the jury notice was dismissed.