Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Hairat Ajoke Anyanwu, Applicant
AND:
Chukwudi Samuel Anyanwu, Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice T. Law
COUNSEL: Applicant, Self-Represented Respondent, Self-Represented
HEARD: February 4, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1This is my decision with respect to the Respondent’s motion seeking permission for him to move back to the matrimonial home and the Applicant’s cross-motion for exclusive possession of the home. The Applicant also brought a motion for the release of unredacted police and child protection records, which will proceed on consent.
2While the substantive issues before me are relatively straightforward, the secondary issue of whether the court should impose additional conditions on the Respondent given his litigation conduct deserves more careful consideration.
3As set out in detail below, the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct against the Applicant which I find is consistent with the definition of litigation abuse. In addition, the Respondent’s conduct has been experienced by court staff to be harassing and threatening. In these circumstances, it is my view that the court must step in with more stringent case management orders to ensure that the goal of fair, timely, and proportionate justice is met.
Brief Background
4The Applicant in this matter is Hairat Ajoke Anyanwu. The Respondent is Chukwudi Samuel Anyanwu. They were married on November 14, 2015. They have three children together aged nine, six and three.
5The Applicant was the primary caregiver of the children during their marriage. She was trained in nursing prior to the marriage, a career that she abandoned after marriage. The Applicant says that during the marriage, she participated in the Respondent’s real estate business by assisting with and closing mortgage deals while they were together, a job that she had no interest in. The Applicant’s real estate license has since been cancelled.
6The Respondent was the primary income earner for the family. He is a real estate broker. According to his financial statement, he owns at least two real estate brokerages: Starion Realty Inc. and Century 21 Starion. He is also listed as the sole owner of the parties’ matrimonial home and four other properties (although he inexplicably omitted these four other properties in his initial financial statement of June 26, 2025). During the marriage, the Respondent’s income consisted of real estate sales commissions, income from his brokerages, and rental income.
7The Applicant, in her evidence, details a history of family violence. She alleges that the Respondent was verbally, emotionally, financially, and physically abusive towards her during the marriage. She states that the children have witnessed the Respondent’s abuse against her and that his behaviour towards her scares them. The Respondent denies that he was the perpetrator of any abuse.
8In July 2023, the Respondent was arrested. It is unclear to me what charges he was specifically arrested for. However, it appears from the evidence filed that the Respondent was alleged to have choked the Applicant in front of the children. The Respondent denied the allegations. In December 2023, the Respondent received a 12-month Peace Bond in relation to these charges. The Applicant states that the Respondent continued to abuse her during the term of the Peace Bond, but she did not report it out of fear of reprisal.
9In September 2023, the Respondent was charged with criminal harassment. The Applicant fled to a shelter with the children after being allegedly choked by the Respondent, however he was able to locate them. The Applicant found a tracking device in her vehicle put there by the Respondent. The Applicant says that after she reconciled with the Respondent, she went to the police station to recant her statement which led to these charges being dropped.
10The parties separated on June 3, 2025. On that day, the Respondent was arrested on 8 criminal charges including assault (x3), utter threat to cause death (x2), criminal harassment, disobey court order, and forcible confinement. The Applicant was the complainant. The Respondent’s release order included terms that he not contact or be within 100m of the Applicant and the children except pursuant to a family court order. Due to the terms of the release order, the Respondent resided at one of his rental properties after his release from jail.
11The local children’s aid society, the Hamilton Child and Family Supports (“the HCFS”), was involved with this family. On August 11, 2025, the HCFS provided a summary of its involvement to the Applicant’s former counsel. That letter states that HCFS is worried about the children being exposed to the conflict between the parties as they frequently heard yelling and arguments which caused them emotional distress. They also reported one child seeing the Respondent pushing and shoving the Applicant during at least one argument and not letting her leave. The HCFS verified risk of physical harm by the Respondent against the Applicant. It also verified risk of emotional harm as a result of the parties’ conflict.
12Notwithstanding its concerns, the HCFS decided to close the file since the matter is before the family court, and the parties were no longer residing with each other. The HCFS concluded, “The risks that have been identified relate to both parents being in the home with the children and exposing them to adult conflict.” Upon receiving this letter, the Respondent provided 19 pages of rebuttal, emails, and charts to the HCFS disputing their conclusions. This led to a six-page response from the HCFS, in which they did not alter their conclusion that the children are at risk while both parents are in the home.
13On November 17, 2025, the Respondent pled guilty to the charges of criminal harassment, disobeying a court order, and an additional charge of failing to comply with a release order. He was sentenced to two years probation with conditions including not to contact or be within 50 metres of the Applicant and the children except pursuant to a court order. During the motion, the Respondent advised that he is now appealing his guilty plea.
14On November 20, 2025, the Applicant was charged with assault (x3). The Respondent was the complainant. In his affidavit of June 13, 2025, at para. 12, the Respondent stated, “In light with recent excruciating events, the Respondent has now decided to pursue charges against the Applicant and has now submitted multiple video and picturial [sic] proofs to the Crown and the police of the multiple times the Respondent has purposefully struck, scratched, punched the Respondent.” The Applicant’s evidence is that the Respondent frequently abuses her by raging, yelling, pushing, shoving, and dragging her and then recording her after the fact when she is upset from his abuse. He would then show those recordings to friends and family while claiming that she is mentally unstable. The Applicant advised that all charges against her were withdrawn in January 2026.
15The Respondent has consistently said that all criminal charges against him are frivolous, without merit, and an example of the Applicant’s weaponization of the legal system. He denies all the allegations made against him. He says that it is the Applicant who is the aggressor and perpetrator of many of the criminal charges against him.
Procedural Background
16The procedural background paints a picture of the Respondent’s conduct in this litigation.
17The Applicant commenced her court application on June 9, 2025, several days after the Respondent was charged and removed from the home. At an urgent motion on June 18, 2025, I ordered the Respondent to return the matrimonial home’s mailbox key to the Applicant and to pay child support based on an income of $90,000. The Respondent conceded that his annual income was $90,000 per year, although I noted it was likely low given the financial information before the court. The balance of the Applicant’s motion was adjourned to a case conference.
18On July 21, 2025, the parties participated in a case conference before Walters J. A temporary without prejudice order with respect to parenting and disclosure was entered into on consent. It was agreed that the Applicant and the children would continue to reside in the matrimonial home, and the Respondent would have 5 overnights out of 14 with the children, to be reviewed “at anytime”. The Respondent did not comply with the disclosure order.
19Less than three weeks later, on August 8, 2025, the Respondent brought an “urgent” motion seeking to change the parenting schedule and return to reside in the home. In response to this motion, the Applicant brought a cross-motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, payment of expenses on the matrimonial home, proportionate sharing of s. 7 expenses, disclosure of police and child protection records, and appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“the OCL”).
20The Respondent’s urgent motion and Applicant’s cross-motion came before me on August 22, 2025. The Respondent’s motion was not “urgent” as the parties had just agreed to a parenting schedule the month before. However, in an effort to move the matter forward, I referred the matter to the OCL and dealt with the simple issue of payment of s. 7 expenses. The remaining issues, which were more complex, were adjourned to a long motion date to be called during the January 2026 sittings. I specified the materials that were to be before the court for the long motion. Costs of $1,000 against the Respondent were ordered.
21The Respondent failed to comply with my order. Specifically, he failed to pay his portion of the s. 7 expenses, failed to pay the costs award, did not submit his OCL intake form, and failed to comply with my directions on materials to be filed for the long motion.
22Evidently not liking what I ordered, on August 29, 2025, one week after I adjourned the Respondent’s motion to the January 2026 sittings, the Respondent filed another “urgent” motion seeking the same relief, and seeking to set aside my orders, particularly my OCL order. On September 5, 2025, this motion was dismissed by Brown J. She prohibited the Respondent from bringing any further motions on the same issues without leave of the court. On October 27, 2025, Brown J. ordered the Respondent to pay costs of $3,500, payable at a rate of $250 per month for his ill-conceived motion. These costs were not paid.
23Undaunted, on November 3, 2025, one week after receipt of Brown J.’s costs order, the Respondent filed another urgent motion, again, seeking adjudication on essentially the same claims that were before me on August 22, 2025, and which I had adjourned to a long motion. Again, the Respondent’s motion for leave came before Brown J. on November 21, 2025. Brown J. dismissed the Respondent’s request, noting that it would not be effective or efficient to use the court’s resources to grant the Respondent leave to bring the same claims on a short motions list in December when the motion was already to return on the January 2026 sittings. Costs of the motion were reserved.
24A settlement conference was held on December 2, 2025, before Walters J. Walters J. permitted the parties to file only two documents in addition to what I had ordered for the long motion: the Respondent’s current probation order and the Applicant’s bail recognizance. No other materials were permitted to be filed for the long motion. The Respondent did not comply with this order. He filed 3 additional affidavits (including another “new” affidavit filed on December 30, 2025) as well as conference briefs.
25It should be noted that at each motion, the Respondent filed materials that were contrary to the practice directions. The Respondent’s affidavits were single spaced, often exceeded the length permitted, and contained inappropriate exhibits. Each motion appearance was treated as an opportunity by the Respondent to rehash allegations, provide opinion and argument, include inadmissible hearsay, and to accuse the Applicant of manipulating the court and other authorities. The Applicant had to respond to each frivolous motion brought by the Respondent, thereby incurring costs.
26In addition, the Respondent directly interfered with the Applicant’s legal representation. On December 23, 2025, mere weeks before the hearing of this long motion, the Respondent made a report to the Law Society of Ontario about the Applicant’s lawyer. He included his complaint in his motion materials. He alleged that Applicant’s counsel filed “inflammatory, prejudicial, and irrelevant, coercive material designed to assassinate character and to mislead the courts rather than to advance admissible evidence.” He alleged that counsel misled the court, encouraged or relied on fabricated evidence, manipulated institutions (such as the Hamilton Child and Family Supports and judges), and generally engaged in bad faith litigation. Predictably, Applicant’s counsel refused to continue representing the Applicant and she was without a lawyer at this motion.
27To be clear, in the multiple times Applicant’s counsel has been before me, I have not found her to engage in any of the conduct complained of. In fact, given the Respondent’s pattern of conduct in these proceedings, I am concerned that he made those complaints as a part of his litigation abuse towards the Applicant.
28The Respondent’s poor conduct did not stop with the filing of multiple repetitive motions and interfering with the Applicant’s legal representation. Court staff have also reported behaviour by the Respondent bordering on harassment, including, the Respondent repeatedly re-filing documents that had already been rejected, repeatedly emailing court staff, and demanding that staff remove the Applicant’s properly filed court documents. The Respondent refuses to accept rejection of his court documents, sometimes abusing the system by filing the same improper documents over the portal when it had already been rejected by email earlier in the day. Court staff advised that they have had over 100 email interactions with the Respondent since June 2025, not including telephone calls and in-person visits. Staff also reported feeling threatened by the Respondent’s behaviour when he comes in-person to file his materials. As a result, and to avoid further harassment, court staff frequently accept the Respondent’s materials even when the materials are contrary to the Family Law Rules and practice directions.
29This long motion was set before me on February 4, 2026. It should be noted that since June 9, 2025, the court has facilitated court time for the parties on 7 separate occasions, including this long motion. I find this to be disproportionate to the complexity of this case. Four of these appearances involved motions initiated by the Respondent. The Respondent’s affidavits were in breach of the practice directions and at times, specific court orders. On each occasion, the Applicant incurred significant costs to defend the motions.
The Motions Before the Court
30The issues currently before me relate to the Respondent’s request for equal parenting time, to be exercised in the matrimonial home as well as the Applicant’s request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.
31The Respondent argues that his request is in the best interests of the children. Essentially, he claims financial hardship as a result of having to maintain all expenses on the matrimonial home while residing in one of his rental properties. The Respondent claims that if he is allowed to move back into the home, it would relieve the financial stress on him, which would allow him to devote the money he does have to the maintenance of the matrimonial home, payment of the children’s private school expenses (which he has not paid since September 2025), and payment towards a nanny (which he deems necessary for his plan).
32The Respondent’s plan is to hire a neutral live-in nanny or babysitter “to act as a buffer to aid for peace and help keep the peace at all times”. He would install cameras in the home to ensure that the nanny or babysitter is doing their job properly and to “serve the dual purpose of ensuring all parties keep the peace.” The Respondent proposes maintaining a respectful distance from the Applicant based on an agreed-upon schedule. That schedule is not set out in his materials. He also proposes that there be communication boundaries to prevent “harassment” or “provocation”, and that the parties do not involve the children in disputes. He proposes that both parties contribute their share towards the children’s expenses. It is unclear what that share is.
33Unsurprisingly, the Applicant opposes the Respondent’s request and cross-motions for exclusive possession of the home. She states that cohabitation with the Respondent is impossible given the history of family violence. The Applicant is fearful of the Respondent and does not believe he will respect any boundaries given his failure to do so in the past. The Applicant further notes that the Respondent has never been the children’s caregiver. She said that the current parenting schedule as set out in Walters J.’s order of July 21, 2025, was specifically designed without mid-week parenting time for the Respondent because he had indicated he needed to work; it is unclear how he would now be able to parent the children during the weekdays. Finally, the Applicant argues that the Respondent’s claim of financial hardship is questionable at best given the conflicting and misleading evidence he has provided about his financial situation. She notes that despite his claim of financial hardship, the Respondent continues to own two vehicles (one of which he is paying $3,200 per month for), owns multiple properties and businesses, and has a Rolex valued at $20,000 which he could sell.
34The argument of the long motion was frustrating. Due to the Respondent’s failure to comply with the filing requirements for this motion and to ensure both parties were treated fairly, I indicated that I would rely on all affidavits filed by both of them since the commencement of this application. That meant that I reviewed 12 affidavits in total. Many of them included repetitive information, and in the case of the Respondent’s materials, argument, opinion, and hearsay.
35As with his motions before Brown J., the Respondent repeatedly referred to materials that were not before me in sworn evidence, despite multiple warnings that he not do so. He referred me to conference materials and supposed opinions of Walters J., which I refused to admit as evidence. He repeatedly argued that the Applicant was engaged in character assassination of him and that she was weaponizing the court system. He struggled to answer a direct question that did not coincide with his narrative. He repeatedly justified his failure to comply with practice directions or court orders by relying on his self-represented status.
36Most troubling, the Respondent attempted to deflect and blame others for his failure to comply with court orders. As already noted, the Respondent repeatedly flouted orders relating to the filing of materials and the practice directions. He did not pay any of the cost awards made by myself or Brown J. He failed to file his OCL intake forms which led to the OCL closing its file.
37The Respondent’s failure to comply with my OCL order was particularly egregious. The reason I had made the original OCL referral on August 22, 2025, was to address the Respondent’s allegations that the Applicant was coaching his children. As a result of his concerns, it was evident from his affidavit that he had been speaking to his children about the litigation and the involvement of the OCL would have hopefully reduced the need for that to happen. Instead of complying with my order, the Respondent refused to send in his intake form and chose to bring a motion to set aside my order. On October 21, 2025, the OCL sent a letter to both parties and the court advising that it had closed its file because of the Respondent’s continued failure to file his intake form.
38When confronted with his failure to comply with my OCL order, the Respondent was evasive. He first claimed that he had filled in his OCL intake form but did not “file” it. Then, he claimed that the OCL had made a mistake; the OCL had closed the file not because he had failed to file an intake form but because it had not received my signed order. I have no evidence of this. Rather, I have a letter from the OCL indicating that it had closed its file because the Respondent had failed to provide an intake form, and the court’s records show my order had been taken out and signed on August 22, 2025. Moreover, the Respondent filed affidavits clearly outlining his intention not to comply with the OCL order. His affidavit evidence claimed that the OCL order would be used by the Applicant as a “punitive tool” against him. He claimed that the court needed to review all of the HCFS reports first before involving the OCL. Despite this assertion, I note that as of the date of this long motion, the Respondent had failed to sign consents to release the HCFS’ file to the Applicant. On the evidence provided, I have no trouble finding that the Respondent intentionally failed to comply with my OCL order and thwarted the ability of this court to receive reliable views and preferences from the children.
Decision on Substantive Issues
Issue #1: The Respondent’s Request for 50-50 parenting time in the matrimonial home
Law and Analysis
39Subsection 16.1(2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) sets out the jurisdiction of the court to make an interim parenting order, pending the determination of the application. According to s. 16(1) of the Divorce Act, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child when making such an order.
40The best interests factors to be considered are set out at s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act however, pursuant to s. 16(2), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. I have considered the factors as set out in these subsections in this decision.
41Family violence is a factor in this case. According to s. 16(4), in considering the impact of any family violence, the court shall take the following into account:
a. the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
b. whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
c. whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
d. the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
e. any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
f. whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
g. any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
h. any other relevant factor.
42Finally, s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act states that the court should give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child. This “maximum contact principle” is only significant to the extent that it is in the child’s best interests: see Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at paras. 134-145.
43In considering the best interests factors set out in the Divorce Act, I am cognizant that although a significant amount of material is before the court, it is nevertheless a temporary motion. Parenting determinations at temporary motions are particularly challenging where there is conflicting evidence on critical issues presented to the court by way of affidavit evidence, untested by cross-examination: see Grover v. Grover, 2023 ONSC 3607, at para. 11.
44As a result, temporary orders are meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be more fully canvassed at subsequent stages in the process – quite often at a trial: Brown v. Brown (1999), 1999 15074 (ON SC), 45 O.R. (3d) 308 (S.C.); Neilipovitz v. Neilipovitz, 2014 ONSC 3889.
45After considering the legal principles, I find that the Respondent’s request to vary the current temporary order in favour of equal parenting, to be exercised in the matrimonial home is not in the children’s best interests.
46The evidence is not disputed that the Applicant has always been the children’s primary caregiver. After the parties’ separation, and since July 21, 2025, the children have been in the primary care of the Applicant with 5 out of 14 nights with the Respondent. The Respondent provided insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the status quo is not working and that it would be in the best interests of the children that it be changed.
47In fact, there is evidence suggesting that additional time with the Respondent would be harmful to the children. The Applicant has provided evidence suggesting that the Respondent has engaged the children in the parties’ conflict and has denigrated the Applicant in front of them. The oldest child disclosed to the Applicant that the Respondent told her that the Applicant lied to police, that she is trying to take the children’s RESP money, that the Applicant is an “idiot”, that the Applicant’s mother is not their real grandmother, and other matters relating to this litigation. While I accept that these statements have not been tested, they are consistent with the Respondent’s pattern of conduct, and particularly his denigration of the mother and persistent denial of findings that do not fit his narrative. It is concerning that the Respondent may be making these statements to his young children during his parenting time. Although the Respondent’s response to this evidence is that the children are being coached, his sabotage of this court’s appointment of the OCL deprives me of any ability to assess his claims.
48Furthermore, the Respondent’s plan is unrealistic and not in the children’s best interests. Even if the Respondent’s claim that all the allegations of physical abuse made against him are untrue, it is clear that there is a great deal of toxic conflict between the parties. This is supported by the opinion of the HCFS, who verified risk of physical and emotional harm relating to both parents being in the home with the children and exposing them to adult conflict. It is notable that the HCFS’ letter of August 11, 2025, described the oldest child’s feeling of relief when the Respondent moved out of the home. The fact that the Respondent feels the necessity to hire a nanny or babysitter to “keep the peace” is indicative of the real possibility that the plan could lead to additional violent conflict between the parties. In these circumstances, an unacceptable level of risk would be introduced if the Respondent were to return to the live with the Applicant in the matrimonial home.
49The Respondent’s plan to install cameras in the home ostensibly to monitor the nanny or babysitter but also to serve the “dual purpose” of keeping the peace is also highly intrusive and consistent with the Applicant’s allegations of coercive control. The Applicant’s evidence, which I accept, is that while the parties were together, the Respondent would use indoor security cameras to monitor her and the children with the purpose of controlling and scaring them into doing what he wanted. In its letter of August 11, 2025, the HCFS also noted that the girls were happy that the surveillance cameras in the home were removed after the Respondent left the home. It is not in the children’s best interests for those cameras to be re-installed just to “keep the peace” while the Respondent is in the home. Finally, it should be noted that the previous presence of security cameras failed to keep the peace between the parties as demonstrated by the altercations that occurred in the home.
50While the Respondent claims that allowing him to move into the home would relieve his financial hardship, which would then benefit the children, I note that “financial hardship” is not a best interests factor. Furthermore, caselaw is clear that the court must ascertain the child’s “best interests” from the perspective of the children rather than that of the parents: Gordon v. Goertz, at para. 3. While the Respondent argues that relief from financial hardship would directly benefit the children because he would then be able to afford their private school tuition, this argument is entirely disingenuous. As stated by the Applicant, the Respondent could sell his Rolex watch, worth $20,000, and pay for a large portion of the children’s tuition. He provides no explanation as to why he failed to do so between September 2025, when the tuition became due, and the present.
51Even if financial hardship is a best interests criteria, I find that the Respondent has failed to establish that there is any financial hardship. The Respondent’s financial statements raise more questions than they answer. It is, furthermore, unclear to me how the Respondent moving back into the matrimonial home would relieve any hardship as, in addition to maintaining the expenses on the matrimonial home, he would incur the additional costs of a full-time nanny, and the continued cost of the children’s private school fees.
52Finally, I have no faith that the Respondent would be able to respect boundaries if he were to move back into the home. The Respondent is unable to follow court orders that he disagrees with. He is, at present, not in compliance with my procedural order as it relates to this long motion, two costs orders, a disclosure order, an order for payment of s. 7 expenses, and an OCL order. He argues relentlessly with professionals that do not agree with him, including inundating them with lengthy correspondence. The Respondent has bombarded his own surety with requests to agree to him moving in with the Applicant, a situation described by the Applicant as “constant harassment.” To now expect the Respondent to follow nebulous “boundaries” for the sake of keeping the peace seems unrealistic.
53I note that in Marinovic v Marinovic, 2025 ONSC 3340, Mathen J. also dealt with a situation where the father wished to move back to the matrimonial home, where the mother and the children resided. Mathen J. denied the request after finding that the father drew the children directly into the parental conflict and behaved in a manner that made the mother feel pressured and threatened. In that case, Mathen J. noted that while she accepted the father wished to reunite the family, he was not entitled to pursue that relief at all costs, and certainly not at the expense of the mother’s wishes or the children’s well-being. I adopt Mathen J.’s statements as being directly applicable to this case.
54As a result of the foregoing, the Respondent’s request is dismissed.
Issue #2: The Applicant’s Request for Exclusive Possession of the Matrimonial Home
55The Applicant seeks exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Both spouses have an equal right to possession of the matrimonial home upon breakdown of the marriage. However, the court may nonetheless make a temporary order under s. 24(2) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”), granting exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to one spouse and ordering a spouse to pay associated expenses.
56The criteria for the court’s consideration in determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession are found at s. 24(3) of the FLA:
a. the best interests of the children affected;
b. any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations;
c. the financial position of both spouses;
d. any written agreement between the parties;
e. the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and
f. any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children.
57In determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider how a move might disrupt the child, and the child’s views and preferences, if they can be reasonably ascertained: FLA, s. 24(4).
58The onus is on the Applicant, as the moving party, to establish that one or more of the six factors listed in s. 24(3) are met: see Aston v. Matwee, 2015 ONSC 8087, at paras. 39-40.
59Kraft J. set out the following principles as they relate to exclusive possession in Trotta v. Chung, 2022 ONSC 6465, at paras 30-31,
30The case law has provided the following considerations and principles to guide the exercise of its discretion under s. 24(3) of the FLA:
a. Whether the parent who makes the claim for exclusive possession is the primary parent; Menchella v. Menchella, 2012, ONSC 1861, at paras-16-18.
b. Whether the parties have suitable alternate accommodations available; Naccarato v. Naccarato, 2017 ONSC 6641, at para. 13.
c. Whether violence or a psychological assault upon the sensibilities of the other spouse to a degree that renders continued sharing of the matrimonial dwelling impractical. Aston v. Matwee, 2015 ONSC 8087, at para. 34; Kutlesa v. Kutlesa 2008 CarswellOnt 1657; and
d. Whether the best interests of a child are paramount in determining an order for exclusive possession: Bortolotto v. Bortolotto, [2002] O.J. No. 2068 (Ont. S.C.J.)
31An order for exclusive possession is dramatic and is highly prejudicial to the dispossessed spouse. Such an order should not be made on a motion where there is conflicting evidence that requires findings of credibility that would only be available at trial.
60In the circumstances of this case, I am persuaded that the Applicant’s request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home should be granted.
61The children require stability. They have resided primarily with the Applicant in the matrimonial home since before the separation. There are no suitable alternate accommodations available to them. Given the conflict between the parties, it is impossible for both parties to remain in the home together. It would not be in the children’s best interests to uproot them from their current home or to require them to endure the conflict between their parents by permitting the Respondent to move back in.
62The Applicant does not have the financial ability to afford another home. She is in the process of reinstating her nursing license and only started working a full-time position in January 2026. Her most recent financial statement shows no savings, but significant debt of over $127,000. She says the debt was a result of the Respondent utilizing her line of credit and credit card without her consent during the marriage. She is also attempting to pay for the children’s private school fees, which the Respondent refuses to contribute to, despite promising to do so in September 2025.
63While the Respondent claims financial hardship and argues that he is unable to pay for the expenses on the matrimonial home, I note that he does not come to this court seeking a sale of the matrimonial home as alternate relief. In addition, the Respondent’s evidence fails to satisfy me that he is unable to afford the expenses on the matrimonial home. In fact, the Respondent’s evidence leads me to conclude that his statements about his financial situation cannot be believed, for the following reasons:
a. The Respondent’s financial disclosure is deficient; he is in breach of the disclosure order of Walters J. dated July 21, 2025.
b. The Respondent’s notice of assessment shows a line 150 income in 2023 of $600,901, which he claims was a result of a one-time capital gain. However, this does not explain how his line 150 income was -$4,475 in 2022 and $3,352 in 2021 and yet he was able to afford all household expenses and the maintenance of five properties with that limited income. The Respondent’s self-reporting of his financial situation is suspect.
c. When asked about the status of his 2024 income tax returns, the Respondent was at first evasive and then eventually admitted that he had not yet filed his 2024 income taxes. The Respondent should have known that his 2024 income is directly relevant to these proceedings and this motion, in particular.
d. Despite suggesting that he is in significant debt, his financial statement of November 26, 2025, shows no change in his debt position since the date of separation. This is despite the fact that he claims on the same financial statement that his yearly expenses are approximately $870,165.00 and his annual income is $90,000.
e. The Respondent does not explain how he continues to afford maintaining a Mercedes S-class and a Mercedes G-wagon, one of which is incurring monthly charges of at least $3,200. He does not provide a response to the Applicant’s claim that he has a $20,000 Rolex watch that he could have sold to relieve his alleged financial pressure.
f. The Respondent’s April-May 2025 business account statement for Starion Realty Inc. showed deposits of over $75,000. No explanation was provided as to where this income came from. It contradicts the Respondent’s assertions that his business has dried up.
g. The Respondent’s personal bank statements show significant discretionary spending including at Tim Hortons, Starbucks, Uber, Instacart. I would have expected the Respondent to cease all discretionary spending and instead prioritized the family if he truly is in dire financial circumstances.
64The Respondent is currently residing at one of his rental properties. I have no evidence that he is unable to continue residing at that property, or alternatively, that he could not rent out the property and reside at a smaller, cheaper residence.
65The Applicant’s request for exclusive possession is granted. The Respondent is to pay all expenses on the matrimonial home until it is sold or upon a further order of the court.
Decision on Procedural Issues
66The Respondent’s behaviour in these proceedings is consistent with tactics used by perpetrators of litigation abuse.
67Litigation abuse does not appear to have been defined in the caselaw yet. Professor Nicholas Bala, in his paper, “Litigation Abuse in Ontario Family Law Cases” (Paper delivered at the LSO Family Law Summit, 27 March 2025), 2025 Docs 1843, offers a definition of litigation abuse that was cited with approval in Reeves v. Larson, 2025 ONSC 6030, at para. 60. Professor Bala defines litigation abuse as “conduct that misuses the Family Court process in a way that could reasonably be expected to cause emotional or financial harm to the other party or their children, which is greater than would occur with the proper use of the family justice process.” According to Professor Bala, “litigation abuse” describes a pattern of conduct that is abusive and causes unnecessary expense and stress to the other party. It is a form of family violence. Litigation abuse differs from “high conflict” matters as it is one-sided: Bala, at p. 2.
68Litigation abuse requires a firm judicial response. According to Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, at para. 12:
Family Law litigants who come to the court for assistance must come with a strong sense of assurance that the process will be an effective means of mending and stabilizing the family fabric, rather than a futile money pit of failed justice. The court has a critical responsibility and role to play in ensuring that proceedings which are intended to protect families and lead to resolution of pressing and emotionally divisive issues are not hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party and the children in their care.
69The Family Law Rules provides a toolbox to prevent a party from embarking upon the game of litigation abuse. Judges should be “as creative as necessary in crafting remedies so as to ensure that the non-compliance identified and the resulting damage to the other party are addressed as fully, justly and quickly as possible”: Levely, at para. 13.
70Professor Bala observed that available and appropriate judicial responses to litigation abuse include case management; fines for non-disclosure; striking of pleadings; findings of contempt; costs awards; dismissal of claims and summary judgment; orders for security for costs; and declarations that a person is a vexatious litigant: Bala, abstract.
71In this case, the Respondent’s conduct fits into many of the categories of abusive tactics listed by Professor Bala, at p. 7-8. For example:
a. Abusive communications sent to the Applicant’s counsel;
b. Failure to obey multiple orders including: procedural orders, two orders for costs, a disclosure order, an order to pay his portion of the children’s s. 7 expenses, and an OCL order.
c. Deliberate failure to comply with limits set out in practice directions and Rules.
d. Harassment of court staff when he is told his documents do not comply with the practice directions and the Rules.
e. Repeatedly denigrating the Applicant in written documents and before the court, including calling her a liar and manipulator.
f. Making repeated unfounded allegations against the Applicant, including claims that she is weaponizing the legal system and engaging in “character assassination.”
g. Repeatedly seeking review of prior orders without evidence of any change.
h. Interference in the Applicant’s solicitor-client relationship by making numerous unfounded allegations against the Applicant’s counsel.
i. Repeated, voluminous, and persistent communication with third parties about his charges, including the police, the Crown, the HCFS worker, the HCFS supervisor, the agency’s disclosure worker.
72When confronted with his failure to comply with court orders and practice directions, the Respondent claimed that he was entitled to a relaxation of the Rules and practice directions because he is a self-represented litigant. While I agree that the court has an obligation to assist self-represented litigants and, in some cases, make procedural adjustments, that does not mean self-represented litigants are allowed to flagrantly ignore court orders, Rules, and practice directions.
73As stated in Steele v. Cebulak, 2019 ONSC 1778, at para. 28:
Self-represented litigants may be afforded some additional consideration consistent with the Court’s obligation to treat both parties fairly, but they are not afforded some special licence to behave badly without consequence. The reputation of the administration of justice requires an appropriate response. Moreover, other parties to the litigation who have behaved appropriately should not have to indefinitely absorb the misconduct of those who do not.
74The Respondent’s misuse of the court process, his use of the court process to victimize the Applicant, and his harassment of professionals associated with the court system requires a firm judicial response. It is my view that the court must step in with more stringent case management orders to ensure that the goals of fair, timely, and proportionate justice, as set out at r. 2 of the Family Law Rules, are met.
75For this purpose, I note that r. 1(7.2) provides the court with broad discretion to make procedural orders in fulfilling its primary objectives to deal with cases justly. Rule 1(8) permits the court broad discretion to deal with litigants who fail to comply with court orders, including the payment of costs and fines. Rule 14(21) permits the court to order no motions be brought if a party tries to delay the case or add to its costs or in any other way to abuse the court’s process by making numerous meritless motions.
76In this case, and consistent with the goal to deal with matters justly, I will assign myself as the case management judge until trial. I will put restrictions on the Respondent’s ability to bring further motions. If the Respondent remains in breach of court orders, leave will unlikely be granted. I will also include below a process through which rejections of the Respondent’s materials are dealt with.
Costs
77The Applicant was entirely successful on the Respondent’s motion and her cross-motion.
78The issue of costs in family law matters is governed by r. 24 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, as amended.
79Rule 24(3) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. Consideration of success is the starting point in determining costs: Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 22584 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 2.
80In addition to a party’s success on the motion, the court may also consider other factors when awarding costs, including: the reasonableness of a successful party’s behaviour (r. 24(8)), any bad faith (r. 24(10)), and any offers to settle (r. 24(12)).
81Recovery of costs by a self-represented litigant is discretionary. The court retains the discretion to fashion an award of costs that is fair and reasonable in the circumstances: Jordan v. Stewart, 2013 ONSC 5037.
82Self-representation cannot be used to shield or insulate a litigant from a costs award, otherwise it would create a two-tier system — any such consideration is outweighed by the need to ensure that the objective of sanctioning/discouraging inappropriate behaviour is met. At a time when our family court system is seeing ever-increasing numbers of self-represented parties, it is important to reaffirm that costs sanctions apply equally whether parties have counsel or not. No one should get a “free pass.”: M.A.L. v. R.H.M., 2018 ONSC 2542, at para. 13; see also Barran v. Schanck, 2019 ONCJ 218.
83In this case, the costs requested by the Applicant was a nominal amount of $1,000. Given my findings in relation to the Applicant’s success and the Respondent’s unreasonable behavior, I will grant the Applicant’s request for costs.
Orders
84The following temporary orders shall issue:
The parties shall sign a consent to release their records from the Hamilton Child and Family Supports and the Hamilton Police Service to each other within 14 days of this decision.
The Respondent shall file his intake form with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer within 7 days of this decision. The Applicant will provide a copy of this decision to the OCL also within 7 days.
The Respondent’s motion to move back into the matrimonial home is dismissed.
The Applicant shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home at 272 Provident Way, Mount Hope, Ontario, until the home is sold.
The Respondent shall pay all expenses relating to the matrimonial home, until it is sold.
The Respondent shall pay costs of this motion of $1,000 within 14 days.
This matter is set for a trial scheduling conference on June 8, 2026, before Walters J.
Case Management Orders
I will be assigned case management of this matter until I am unavailable, in which case the trial coordinator will assign another case management judge. The case management judge will be responsible for all leave requests, “urgent” motions, short motions, long motions, and 14B motions.
Pending trial, the Respondent is barred from bringing any more motions to move into the matrimonial home or for equal parenting time. Court staff may reject such motions automatically even if the materials comply with the practice directions or Family Law Rules.
The Respondent shall not be permitted to bring any further motions without leave of the court. Court staff are directed to reject all motions by the Respondent except those that seek leave.
If the Respondent wishes to seek leave, the following process shall apply:
a. All motions for leave will come before the case management judge, in chambers.
b. The Respondent shall serve on the Applicant and file with the court a notice of motion and affidavit of no more than 5 pages, double spaced, written in 12-point font setting out the reason for seeking leave and proof of compliance of prior court orders. Only relevant attachments are to be included.
c. Court staff shall reject the Respondent’s leave motion if it does not comply with the procedural parameters set out in this order.
d. The Applicant may respond to the leave request, but is not required to do so. If the Applicant chooses to respond to the request, she shall do so within 7 days of being served.
e. If leave is granted, the Respondent shall comply with court orders, practice directions and Family Law Rules with respect to the filing of his motion materials. Court staff shall reject the Respondent’s materials if they do not comply with court orders, practice directions or the Family Law Rules.
f. Costs may be ordered on the motions for leave.
The Respondent shall be permitted to file court documents only via email. He shall not be permitted to file court documents through the portal or at the counter, unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
The Respondent shall not file the same document more than once. If the Respondent does so, court staff may reject the document.
Court staff have authority to reject the Respondent’s materials if they do not comply with court orders, the Family Law Rules or the practice directions. If the Respondent persists in emailing or calling court staff about the rejection of a document, court staff may bring the communications to the attention of the case management judge, who will then exercise his/her discretion to make further orders, including but not limited to accepting the documents, or ordering costs and fines against the Respondent.
Law J.
Date: February 27, 2026