Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FC-26-00000114-0000

Date: 2026-02-13

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Adam Nicholas Peristy, Applicant

And: Jaqueline Elizabeth Bishop, Respondent

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice A. Pazaratz

Counsel: Nigel Smith, Counsel, for the Applicant Angela Grant-Lee, Counsel, for the Respondent

Heard: February 13, 2026

Endorsement

[1] This was an urgent pre-Case Conference motion brought by the Applicant father.

[2] The issue is simple – whether a school placement for a six-year-old child should be reversed immediately.

[3] Regrettably, the materials filed by the parents were overly long and dealt with many disputed facts which have little to do with what I'm supposed to decide today.

[4] The father's motion documents are dated February 3, 2026.

[5] The mother did not file her responding materials in time, so I stood the matter down and allowed the mother to file an affidavit of February 10, 2026 and the father to file a reply affidavit of February 12, 2026.

[6] There's not much dispute about the relevant facts.

a. The parties have two children Ella, 6, and Dax, 3.

b. They separated October 4, 2025.

c. There are serious allegations back and forth. Most of those allegations are in relation to substance abuse issues by the mother which are acknowledged. The mother alleges the father also has substance abuse issues, which he disputes.

d. Either way, since early October, the father has continued to reside in the matrimonial home in the east end of Hamilton. The mother has gone to live with her parents in Burlington.

e. The parties created a pattern of the children residing with the mother (at her parents' home) on weekdays, and with the father on weekends. He says this is only a temporary arrangement because he wants more time with the children but his current work schedule makes him less available on weekdays.

f. Either way, we have a very recent status quo in terms of parenting time, and neither party is proposing to change that today.

g. The only issue is school.

h. Ella was attending grade 1 at Viscount Montgomery School in Hamilton. She had been in that school for more than two years.

i. In early December 2025 the mother transferred Ella to Bruce T. Lindley school in Burlington. She says she spoke to the father about this. She says he agreed to the move. He says she mentioned it, but he definitely didn't agree. The mother proceeded to change the child's school in any event.

j. The mother says driving Ella from Burlington to Hamilton and then back again took a long time every day, particularly with the younger child Dax in tow. The father says the mother has exaggerated the travel time or imposition on the children.

k. So the father wants Ella returned to Viscount immediately (he also wants Dax registered at Viscount in September 2026 but that's an issue for later). The mother wants to leave Ella in school in Burlington, closer to the maternal grandparents' home.

[7] There are many more facts which the parties disputed. Disagreement about earlier discussions and safety plans. And recurring commentary about inappropriate behaviour by each parent, with some allegations denied or explained. It is impossible to make a meaningful factual determination at such an early stage based on untested materials.

[8] The real issue – the basis for my agreeing that this matter needs to be dealt with prior to a Case Conference – is that there is a mutual acknowledgement that there was a change in the status quo regarding Ella's school registration, shortly after separation. The parties absolutely disagree about whether the change was consented to. Given the father's response by having his lawyer send a letter objecting to the move and then bringing this motion, I cannot presume that the change was on consent.

[9] Sections 16(3)(a) of the Divorce Act and 24(3)(a) of the Children's Law Reform Act identify stability as one of the factors to be considered in determining the best interests of a child. This is a factor deserving of some weight in the analysis of the impact of changing schools (and inherently, friends) on a child. Lauzon v. Lauzon, 2021 ONSC 5684 (SCJ).

[10] A request to change a child's school often runs afoul of the principal of stability. There must be a good reason to upset the child's former school arrangements. Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712 (SCJ); Assaf v. Aoudeh, 2020 ONSC 5246 (SCJ); Bandas v. Demirdache, 2013 ONCJ 679 (OCJ); NS v CN, 2012 ONSC 4993 (SCJ); Ursic v. Ursic; Malott v. Powell, 2012 ONSC 5344 (SCJ); Lauzon v. Lauzon, 2021 ONSC 5684 (SCJ); Lang v. Qureshi, 2025 ONSC 585 (SCJ)

[11] If an aspect of a child's life, such as school placement, is to be disrupted by an order of the court, there must be good reason for the court to do so. Thus, before a court will order a child to transfer schools, there must be convincing evidence that a change of schools is in the child's best interests (Perron v. Perron, 2012 ONCA 811 (Ont. C.A.); Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712 (SCJ); McCutcheon v. McCutcheon, 2023 ONSC 6840 (SCJ)).

[12] Compelling and cogent evidence must show that a change in schools is in a child's best interests. J.E.S. v. S.S., 2020 ONSC 6064 (SCJ); Nicholls v. Roberts, 2023 ONCJ 164 (OCJ); Rasmussen v. Fasulo, 2025 ONCJ 349 (OCJ).

[13] Any change of school must be considered from the child's perspective. A school age child will likely have already formed attachments to the school he or she attends. Continuing the child's existing school placement promotes stability in the child's life. Ursic v. Ursic. A child's need for stability, consistency and familiar supportive relationships is often heightened during the emotionally stressful period of parental separation.

[14] In Cosentino v Cosentino 2016 ONSC 5621 (SCJ) this court listed some of the many reasons we should be extremely cautious about allowing a parent to unilaterally change a child's school placement on an interim basis – particularly if there are relocation implications.

a. Even with very young children, any decision about selecting a school has the potential to impact – and perhaps even determine – the long-term outcome of a parenting dispute.

b. Once a child is enrolled in any school, almost inevitably that child will remain in that school for at least the balance of that school year.

c. If a parent proposes to simultaneously relocate to another city and enrol a child in a school in that city, the child's primary residence will immediately shift in favour of that parent. Equal time – and equal parenting – in almost any format will no longer be viable once school is in session, if any amount of distance and travel time are created by the new interim arrangement.

d. Once a child becomes entrenched in any particular school and city, inevitably that will come to be characterized as the " status quo " and concerns will arise about disrupting the child's routine, familiar surroundings, and relationships with teachers and schoolmates.

e. After a primary residence has been established, the likelihood of reverting to equal time — let alone reversing the primary residence — will be quite remote. Once the driving time between residences approaches an hour or more, equal time and mid-week or regular transitions between households will be problematic. With the passage of time, inconvenience will turn into impossibility.

f. At the motion stage judges are forced to make weighty temporary decisions based on hastily prepared, incomplete, contradictory, and untested affidavit materials. The resulting temporary orders can have a huge impact on final orders. Effectively, they can have a forever impact on children. As a result, motions judges must be mindful of both short-term and long-term dynamics, to ensure that meaningful time and involvement by both parents is not undermined by the unilateral action of either party.

g. On a temporary choice-of-school motion — particularly one with mobility overtones — a cautious approach is necessary to safeguard the best interests of the child, and avoid manipulation of the process.

h. The status quo — and avoiding reckless creation of a new status quo — are fundamentally important considerations.

i. The school issue is inextricably intertwined with the more general parenting and mobility issues. Major changes with mobility implications should not be made on a temporary basis, except in the most compelling of circumstances. In those rare cases where a new arrangement or a new city are inevitable, major changes are sometimes permitted on a temporary basis, to avoid family members experiencing unnecessary delay. But where the outcome at trial is uncertain – and particularly where vitally important information about the child's best interests is anticipated by way of an assessment or section 112 investigation – interim changes should be avoided.

j. The onus is on the party seeking to impose a change to a child's situation or plan.

k. At the motion stage, the issue is not whether a parent should ever be allowed to relocate a child's residence and school to another city. The abundant caselaw on mobility and relocation makes it clear that in appropriate circumstances — after thorough consideration of all of the evidence -- much greater moves have been approved as being in the best interests of the child.

l. The issue is whether a parent should be allowed to unilaterally impose a change to a child's routine which will subvert a successful status quo, and create an entirely self-serving new status quo in the middle of a parenting dispute.

m. Parents who attempt to unilaterally move a child to another city and school in the middle of a parenting dispute, do so at their peril. In any contest between "best interests of the child" and "fait accompli" — best interests will always prevail.

[15] In this case I conclude that there was a long-standing status quo with respect to school placement and the mother elected to change it.

[16] I do not fault part of the mother's rationale. Driving the child to school in Hamilton from her temporary residence with her parents in Burlington includes a little extra driving time. But in the scheme of things, the minor detriment to the child of having to travel a bit further to school is outweighed by the huge detriment associated with suddenly being pulled out of the school she was used to attending.

[17] In attempting to address disruption in Ella's life, I am mindful of the fact that now that she's been in her new school for less than two months, sending her back to Viscount will entail further disruption.

[18] But the overall best interests of this child require that the court guards against unilateral behaviour by either parent which may have profound long-term implications – intentionally or otherwise.

[19] The child Ella is to be immediately returned to full time attendance at her former school, Viscount Montgomery.

[20] Neither party is to enroll either child in any school beyond the end of the current school year, nor is either parent to allow or promote any discussion with either child which might create an expectation on either child's part as to which school they will be attending beyond the end of the 2025-2026 school year.

[21] Adjourned to March 11, 2026 at 12 noon for a Case Conference with Justice Kril, in person, in the family court building.

[22] The Applicant was successful and seeks $2,500.00 costs calculated on a partial indemnity basis. The Respondent's counsel notes that the mother is experiencing financial hardship and she herself spent more than $5,000.00 on this motion.

[23] I hope this mis-step does not poison relations between these parties. They are not bad people or bad parents and I don't want them to think that family court invites nasty affidavits like the ones I saw today.

[24] But this was a simple issue that was created by the mother's self-help.

[25] The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant costs of this motion fixed at $2,000.00 inclusive of HST.

Pazaratz J.

Date: February 13, 2026