CITATION: Goja v. Goja, 2026 ONSC 869
Court File No.: FS-23-38464 Date: 2026-02-12 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: Michael Freeman Toryila Goja, Applicant – and – Joy Aiseosa Goja, Respondent
Counsel: Abeer Iftikhar, for the applicant Joy Goja, self-represented respondent
Heard: January 5, 6, and 7, 2026
Robert Centa J.
1. Overview
[ 1 ] Michael Goja and Joy Goja married each other in Nigeria on October 27, 2012. They immigrated to Canada in April 2019 and separated on November 28, 2021. They have two children, a six-year-old son named Z (born September 2019), and a three-year-old daughter named A (born May 2022). Michael and Joy separated before A's birth.
[ 2 ] Michael commenced this proceeding by application dated September 3, 2023. Joy delivered her answer and claim on November 14, 2023. Although each party initially made a significant number of claims against the other, they have managed to resolve many of these issues including the equalization of net family property, and spousal support (both retroactive and future). Both parties request a divorce.
[ 3 ] The issues remaining for trial relate to the children. The parties have asked me to determine the following issues:
a. What parenting arrangement is in the best interests of the children, including primary residence and parenting schedule?
b. What decision-making regime is in the best interests of the children?
c. Should A's middle name be changed?
d. Is it in the children's best interests to permit international travel?
e. What is the appropriate order for child support (both retroactive and future)?
[ 4 ] As I will explain, at the moment, Michael and Joy have not demonstrated an ability to communicate effectively or to work in the best interests of the children. They currently live over one hour's drive away from each other. Z is well-situated in a school very close to Michael's house. A has lived almost her entire life with Joy and will be starting junior kindergarten in September. I have decided that it is in the best interests of Z to have primary residence with Michael and for A to have primary residence with Joy. I award sole decision-making responsibility for Z to Michael and for A to Joy. I order table child support going forward but dismiss the application for retroactive child support. I dismiss Michael's request to change A's middle name and impose international travel restrictions without the consent of the other parent or a further order of the court.
[ 5 ] I hope that this order provides stability and certainty to Joy, Michael, and their children. I also hope that, over time, Joy and Michael will learn to communicate effectively and respectfully with each other and in the best interests of the children. In the future, Joy and Michael may be able consent to different residential and parenting arrangements. However, for now, I am satisfied that the orders explained below are in the best interests of Z and A.
2. The parties and their witnesses
[ 6 ] Michael is currently 43 years old. Michael owns 11965379 Canada Corp., which he established in 2020 to provide IT consulting services. Michael employs himself through the corporation.
[ 7 ] Michael currently lives with his brother in a one-bedroom plus den apartment near the intersection of Jane St. and Weston Road in the west end of North York. The apartment is located a short walk from Portage Trail Community School, a public school in the Toronto District School Board. Michael testified about all of the matters in dispute. Michael called two witnesses at trial: Julius and Veronica Goja.
[ 8 ] Julius Goja is Michael's brother. He moved in with Michael when he immigrated to Canada in September 2023, which was after the parties separated. Julius testified about his observations of Michael as a caregiver for the children, his observations of Michael and Joy when they exchanged the children for parenting time, and issues related to A's middle name. Julius also testified about his interaction with Joy and Michael around the time of their wedding, and his perception of why they separated. This last bit of evidence was not relevant to the matters in issue, and I will disregard it.
[ 9 ] While I think that Julius was trying to be candid, at times I found him to be somewhat evasive and some of his answers to be less than forthright. In my view, he was attempting to provide assistance to his brother's case. While this is understandable at a personal level, it causes me to place less weight on some of his evidence.
[ 10 ] Veronica Goja is Mr. Goja's mother. She lives in Nigeria. Mr. Goja intended to call her as a witness, but the internet connection was not sufficiently strong to permit her evidence to be provided over Zoom. Given the technical difficulties, Mr. Goja withdrew Veronica as a witness, and I will disregard the evidence that she was able to provide.
[ 11 ] Joy is currently 40 years old. Joy currently provides nursing or personal support worker services to three different companies.
[ 12 ] Joy currently lives in a three-bedroom detached home in Scarborough, near the corner of Finch Avenue East and Brimley Road. She lives in this house with her sister Nosa George, her brother-in-law Enesi George, and their two children. Joy called Enesi and Nosa as witnesses.
[ 13 ] Nosa and Enesi George immigrated to Canada in January 2023. They each testified about their observations of Joy as a caregiver for Joy's children and explained the assistance they provide to Joy to care for children when necessary. I found that Nosa and Enesi were each trying to be candid and helpful with their evidence.
3. Assessing the evidence of the parties
[ 14 ] There are many significant factual disputes in this case. Resolving those disputes will require me to assess the reliability and credibility of the witnesses at trial.
[ 15 ] It is important to recall that reliability and credibility are different. Credibility has to do with the honesty, sincerity, or veracity of a witness. Reliability describes the other factors that can influence the accuracy of testimony, such as the witness's ability to observe, recall, and recount events in issue.[^1]
[ 16 ] Witnesses can sincerely believe their evidence is true, but that does not mean that what they are saying is reliable. Memory is fallible and becomes increasingly frail over time. Even an apparently convincing, confident, and credible witness may not be an accurate or reliable reporter. There is significant risk in placing too much emphasis on demeanour or the confidence with which a witness speaks where there are contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in their evidence or where that testimony is inconsistent with contemporaneous records.[^2]
[ 17 ] One of the leading decisions on assessing credibility is Faryna v. Chorny, where the court explained that:
[t]he credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.[^3]
4. Divorce
[ 18 ] The parties each applied for a divorce. I am satisfied that the parties meet all of the statutory requirements under the Divorce Act.[^4] I grant an order for a divorce.
[ 19 ] Because I am granting a divorce under the Divorce Act, the final order for corollary relief is to be granted under the Divorce Act.[^5]
5. Parenting issues
A. The residences of the children from December 2021 to date
[ 20 ] The parties separated on November 28, 2021, and they were able to reach an agreement about the residence and parenting schedules until August 2024.
[ 21 ] Although Michael disputed this, I find that from November 28, 2021, until the end of March 2023, Z lived primarily with Joy but had regular parenting time with Michael. I find that Michael attempted to minimize the amount of time that Z spent with Joy. From the end of March 2023, until August 2024, Z lived primarily with Michael, and Joy had parenting time with Z.
[ 22 ] A was born in May 2022 and lived primarily with Joy until August 2024. Michael testified that he received parenting time only starting in November 2023.
[ 23 ] On August 27, 2024, Horkins J. ordered, on a temporary and without prejudice basis, that Z would reside with Michael and A would reside with Joy. Michael was to have parenting time with A each Friday afternoon until Saturday morning, increasing as of June 2024, to Friday afternoon until Monday morning. Joy was to have mirrored parenting time with Z so that the children had regular time together each weekend.
[ 24 ] In September 2025, without any notice to Michael, Joy moved to Oshawa with A. In response, Michael brought an urgent motion, which came before Mathen J. on September 15, 2025. Justice Mathen held that Joy had relocated her residence from Oshawa from Scarborough within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Divorce Act, without providing notice as required by s. 16.9 of the Divorce Act. Justice Mathen ordered Joy to return A forthwith to Michael. Justice Mathen declined to make any findings about Joy's motivation in relocating with A. Justice Mathen confirmed that the August 2024 temporary parenting schedule remained in effect.
[ 25 ] Both children resided primarily with Michael from September 15 to November 2025 and then the August 2024 temporary parenting schedule resumed.
[ 26 ] I note that at this trial, there is no legal presumption in favour of maintaining the existing parenting arrangements.[^6]
B. The position of the parties
[ 27 ] The parties have very different proposals on what is the best interests of the children on the following issues:
a. Primary residence and parenting time:
i. Michael submits that the court should order that the children shall have their primary residence with him. He proposes that Joy have parenting time with the children on three consecutive weekends each calendar month, from after school Friday until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.;
ii. Joy submits that the court should order that the children shall have their primary residence with her. She proposes that Michael have parenting time with the children on three consecutive weekends each calendar month, from after school Friday until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. In the alternative, Joy proposes equal time shared parenting with an alternating seven day schedule.
b. Decision making:
i. Michael submits that he should have final decision making authority for the children, after consulting meaningfully with Joy about major decisions (for example, medical, educational, or religious issues) and engage a third-party professional for guidance and recommendation;
ii. Joy submits that she should have final decision making authority for the children, after consulting meaningfully with Michael about major decisions (for example, medical, educational, or religious issues) and engage a third-party professional for guidance and recommendation.
c. Education
i. Michael proposes that both children should attend the school that Z has attended for the past three years;
ii. Joy proposes that, if the court orders equal time shared parenting, that the children attend a public school located in a catchment area between their respective homes. As an example, Joy suggested one school that is approximately 11 kilometers from her residence and approximately 21 kilometers from Michael's residence.
d. Name for daughter:
i. Michael asks the court to order that the middle name of their daughter be changed to reflect A's paternal lineage in accordance with Nigerian tradition;
ii. Joy submits that the middle name proposed by Michael be added to their daughter's name.
C. The best interests of Z and A
[ 28 ] In making a parenting order, I am to take into consideration only the best interests of the child, giving primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.[^7] In determining the best interests of the children, I must consider all factors related to their circumstances, including the factors set out in s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act. Where the factors pull in different directions, I am to resolve them in favour of promoting the child's physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being.[^8]
[ 29 ] In this case, I am satisfied that Joy and Michael are both good and kind parents toward the two children. None of the witnesses testified that they ever saw either Michael or Joy neglect or abuse the children. I am satisfied that each parent is capable of tending to the physical, emotional and psychological safety, security, and well-being of Z and A.[^9] But for some of the other strong factors discussed below, a shared parenting arrangement could have worked well for the children.
[ 30 ] Neither party tendered any evidence regarding the views and preferences of the children, who I note are only 7 and 3 years old. I cannot ascertain the views of the children and give no weight to that factor.[^10]
1. The needs of the children
[ 31 ] I find that Z and A each has different needs, given their age, stage of development, and need for stability.[^11]
[ 32 ] Z is 7 years old. Since September 2023, he has attended Portage Trail Community School, a local TDSB school that is less than 500 metres from Michael's apartment. Michael testified that Z is thriving academically and is one of the best students in his class at Portage. Michael testified that Z is well-integrated into the school community, is very sociable, and has made a lot of friends who live close to the school. Joy agreed that Z is well integrated into Portage and its community, was exhibiting no behavioural problems at school, and that Portage was a safe school. Joy quibbled slightly with the characterization of how well Z was performing at school. While she agreed that he was doing "okay" for his age, she stated that he was not "doing excellent" in school. No report cards were presented at trial.
[ 33 ] Joy submits that their son is only 7 years old and in grade one. She testified that Z can easily switch schools in the TDSB because they have a "standardized curriculum." She testified that Z will quickly reintegrate himself and make new friends at any new school. She testified that it was normal for kids to change schools.
[ 34 ] While I accept that Z is resilient and capable of adapting to new environments, Z's connection to his school is a very important consideration for me. Portage appears to provide significant stability for Z. Setting Z up for academic success is in his best interests. The fulfilment, confidence, and psychological safety that will be nurtured through a stable and successful academic relationship are also undoubtedly in his best interests.
[ 35 ] I recognize that it would be extremely difficult for Z to both attend Portage and live with Joy during the school week. Joy testified that the commute from her home to Portage takes 60 or 70 minutes each way. Joy's work schedule makes the commute from her home to Portage very challenging. Joy testified that she works three nursing jobs, and her schedule varies. She frequently works changing shifts that run from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. or from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The morning shift makes drop-off at school difficult to impossible. The afternoon shift makes pick-up from school difficult to impossible. While Nosa and Enesi testified that they assist Joy with the pick-up and drop-off of A at the local day care facility, there was no evidence that they could meaningfully assist with the lengthy commute to Portage.
[ 36 ] Joy admitted that the lengthy commute is not in Z's best interests. She testified that on the occasions when she has had to drop Z off at school, he was often sleeping in the car and was tired when he arrived at school. She admitted that the commute was not fair to Z and was not in his best interests. Joy submitted that the commuting problem could be solved one of two ways: first, make Z's primary residence with her and switch his school from Portage to a school in her catchment area, which would eliminate the commute; or second, pick a new school somewhere between where Michael and Joy each live. I note that Joy did not suggest that she could move much closer to the Portage school. She testified that she tried to find jobs closer to where Michael lives but she "could not find any jobs that she wanted."
[ 37 ] Neither of the solutions proposed by Joy is satisfactory. Each proposed solution requires Z to switch schools, which is suboptimal for the reasons stated above. There is also no guarantee that Z will be admitted into a school outside each parent's catchment area. The most Joy could say was that she had identified a school that would consider applications from students living outside the catchment area. With respect, that is not an acceptable plan.
[ 38 ] Given Z's age, stage of development, and need for stability, I find that it is in his best interests to remain at Portage. Joy has not satisfied me that she has a reasonable plan that would permit Z to remain at Portage and have primary or shared residence with her during the school year. While this is only one of the factors that I will consider, it is a factor that I will give significant weight.
[ 39 ] I will now consider the needs of A, who is only 3 years old. A has attended daycare in Scarborough and will start junior kindergarten in the fall. I agree with Joy's evidence that A has a community in her daycare and has attachments to her peers and caregivers. However, I doubt that those ties are as developed as Z's ties with his elementary school.
[ 40 ] In my view, it is much more important that A's primary residence has been with Joy for her entire life, except for the period from September 15 to November 14, 2025, when her primary residence was with Michael. Notwithstanding this history, Michael submits that the court should order that A's primary residence be with him. It is difficult to see how this proposal is appropriate, given A's age and stage of development, and her need for stability. She has spent almost her entire life with Joy as her primary caregiver. A wholesale change in that arrangement would undoubtedly be extremely disruptive for her. I am not satisfied that Michael offered an appropriate plan to address A's need for stability.
[ 41 ] Michael testified that it is currently a long commute for him to pick up and drop off A at her daycare. It can take him an hour each way, depending on traffic, to travel the 30 km. Moreover, once A starts junior kindergarten in the fall, she will have the same commuting challenges as Z. Initiating shared parenting would pose very serious challenges as soon as September 2026.
[ 42 ] In my view, given A's young age and the fact that she has lived almost all of her life with Joy, maintaining the stability of that primary relationship is in A's best interests. It would not be in A's best interests to have her primary residence with Michael, who did not meaningfully address this issue. Moreover, once school starts for A in September 2026, A would face an unacceptable commute if she was spending any school nights at Michael's apartment. Michael did not satisfy me that he had a reasonable plan that would overcome these serious obstacles.
[ 43 ] In my view, this factor suggests that Z should have his primary residence with Michael and that A should have her primary residence with Z. I will now consider the other factors before reaching a final conclusion.
2. Relationships between Z and A and other family members
[ 44 ] One of the factors to be considered in determining the best interests of each child is the nature and strength of Z and A's relationship with each spouse, each other, grandparents and other persons who play an important role in their lives.[^12]
[ 45 ] Michael testified convincingly about his close relationship with Z. He stated that Z was very closely bonded with him. I took from his testimony that he shared a closer relationship with Z than with A, largely due to the residence and parenting arrangements that have been in place. Michael testified that Z and A had a good relationship, and that Z is sad when plans involving A do not work out or are changed. Joy did not seriously challenge the strength of Michael's bond with Z.
[ 46 ] Joy emphasized her close relationship with A. Joy explained that A's primary residence has been with her for almost A's entire life. Joy testified that when her work schedule permits, she keeps A home with her rather than sending her to day-care. Michael did not seriously challenge Joy's evidence on this point.
[ 47 ] Each parent testified that they did not want the children to be separated and that the children living together would be good for their emotional stability. Each said that it was important to keep the children together, which is something that they have not enjoyed so far in their lives.
[ 48 ] At the beginning of closing submissions, I asked the parties to address the possibility of an order that Z and A would each have their primary residence with one parent. Both Michael and Joy objected to my suggestion because that was not what they wanted, and no one was asking for that outcome. However, parental preferences and rights do not play a role in the analysis except to the extent that they are necessary to ensure the best interests of each of Z and A.[^13] Michael and Joy each submitted that keeping Z and A together "was the most important thing." With respect, the evidence at trial provides no support for that submission.
[ 49 ] While I accept without question that it is desirable to keep siblings together where possible, I did not find the evidence of either Michael or Joy persuasive on this point. It seemed to me that each of the parents made this point not out of genuine concern for the best interests of the children, but rather to advance their argument that they should be awarded primary residence and decision-making responsibility for both children. I find that neither parent has taken any steps over the last four years that prioritized the children spending their time together. While I agree that fostering a close relationship between Z and A is in their best interests, it is not the only factor to be considered.
[ 50 ] Michael and Joy testified that each of Z and A enjoyed good relationships with the adults and children in their extended families that shared their homes. I have no doubt that this is true, but this factor is less important than many of the other pressing factors in this case.
[ 51 ] I find that Z has a strong relationship with Michael and that A has a strong relationship with Joy. I find that Z and A have a strong relationship with each other. While it would be preferable to have the children have the same primary residence, that is only one factor among many and, in this case, it is not sufficient to overcome the strength of the other factors that indicate that it is in the best interest of each child to have a separate primary residence.
3. Family violence
[ 52 ] Under the Divorce Act, I am to consider any family violence and its impact on the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the children and the appropriateness of an order that would require Joy and Michael to cooperate on issues affecting Z and A.[^14] In considering the impact of family violence, I am to take the following into account:
a. the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
b. whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
c. whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
d. the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
e. any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
f. whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
g. any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
h. any other relevant factor.[^15]
(a) Incident on May 5, 2023
[ 53 ] Michael testified that Joy and two members of her family committed acts of family violence towards him on May 5, 2023.
[ 54 ] Michael testified that sometime around April 10, 2023, he unilaterally decided that it would be in Z's best interests to live full-time with him and not to be in day care (where he was catching illnesses from other children). In my view, Michael had no right to make this decision or to change unilaterally Z's primary residence. This decision was particularly inflammatory because Joy did not drive at this time, and it was very challenging for her to visit Z or exercise any parenting time.
[ 55 ] Michael testified that on May 5, 2023, one month after he unilaterally moved Z to his apartment, he was having dinner with his mother and Z in his apartment. He testified that he answered a knock on the door and Joy, her mother, and one of her sisters pounced on him and pushed him to the ground.[^16] He testified that Joy's sister grabbed Z and ran into the hallway with him. He testified that Joy and her mother pushed him around, called him names, and pinned him to the wall, so that he could not pursue Z into the hallway. He testified that the sister brought Z back into the apartment and took over the apartment. He testified that Joy and her family members scratched the walls and the rugs in his apartment. Michael testified that Joy and her family members were hitting him, and he was left with a bruise on his arm, with a dislocated thumb and toe.
[ 56 ] Michael testified that he called the police, who attended at the apartment with the paramedics. He testified that Joy and her sister were charged with forcible entry and assault. It was common ground that these charges were withdrawn by the Crown on November 3, 2023, and that the CAS file was closed.
[ 57 ] Michael stated that the paramedics asked him if he wanted to go to the hospital, but he declined. He said he want to the hospital two days later because he was still in pain, could not sleep, and was having panic attacks.
[ 58 ] Michael testified that Z observed these acts of family violence, and that Z had nightmares after the incident in question. Michael testified that Z would wake up screaming and would then need to sleep in Michael's bed.
[ 59 ] Joy did not cross-examine Michael on his version of events. In her evidence, she did not provide her version of what happened in the apartment that evening. Michael's version of events stands uncontradicted.
[ 60 ] I accept Michael's version of events. Although this was a one-off incident of family violence, I find that it was serious. The incident appears to have been pre-meditated and planned by Joy, who enlisted her family members to engage in the violence. It is fortunate that Michael did not suffer more serious physical injuries and that it appears that Joy and her family members were not physically harmed.
[ 61 ] This incident of family violence is made more serious because Z was exposed to the family violence. Although the violence was not directed at Z, he was directly involved in the incident because Joy's sister seized him and ran into the hallway. This compromised Z's safety and put him at significant risk of physical harm. Z also observed the incident of family violence at its beginning and when he was brought back into the apartment. In addition, Z suffered nightmares and appeared to fear for his father's safety after the event in question. The incident caused psychological harm to Z, although I do not have any evidence on the duration or severity of such harm.
[ 62 ] As noted above, Joy did not offer her version of these events. I take it from her questions to Michael that she believes the events of May 5 were triggered by his unilateral decision to withdraw Z from daycare and to keep Z with him contrary to their prior agreement. Joy went so far as to characterize Michael's actions as a "premeditated abduction of Z." I observe that Joy was not cross-examined on her views.
(b) Other complaints
[ 63 ] Michael and Joy also seem to have made a series of complaints about each other to various authorities:
a. Michael testified that in July 2024 he called the police when Joy did not return Z at the designated time. He testified that Joy refused to return Z after her parenting time and announced that she would return him the next day. Michael testified that Joy stopped returning his messages and that it took the intervention of the police to return Z to him;
b. Michael testified that prior to April 1, 2023, Joy complained to the police about Michael and alleged that he had assaulted her. Michael testified that the police and the CAS investigated but found nothing and closed the file. Joy did not testify about this incident;
c. Joy testified that Michael called the police and the CAS to come and look at her apartment because he felt it was not suitable. Joy testified that she was told her apartment was fine and there was nothing wrong with her living arrangement; and
d. Michael testified that Joy once called the police when he went to pick-up the children to say that he was harassing her and that she did not want Michael to come to her house.
[ 64 ] I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities than any of these events amounted to acts of family violence or coercive or controlling behaviour. However, they are very concerning. It appears that both parties are willing to involve state agencies to investigate their fairly trivial complaints about each other's parenting. At a minimum, the complaints are proof that Michael and Joy are not able and willing to communicate and cooperate effectively or maturely on matters affecting Z and A. These incidents cause me to conclude that shared decision-making is likely to lead to further conflict and, perhaps, further incidents of family violence.
(c) Conclusion
[ 65 ] I am satisfied that Joy engaged in family violence on May 5, 2023. I am also satisfied that Michael's unilateral decision to take Z out of daycare and to have Z live with him full-time set this chain of events in motion. Michael's role does not excuse Joy's unacceptable decision to resort to violence. Family violence is never acceptable and will not be tolerated. If Joy felt that Michael had done something wrong, she should have contacted the police or commenced a court application. However, it is important to recognize that the cycle of family violence that exploded on May 5, 2023, did not start on that day. I will be taking the conduct of Joy and Michael into account when assessing the best interests of Z and A.
[ 66 ] Given that the charges have been dropped, and in all of the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that there are no ongoing civil or criminal proceedings, orders, conditions, or measures that are relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.[^17]
4. Communication and cooperation
[ 67 ] In assessing the best interests of Z and A, I am to consider the ability and willingness of Joy and Michael to communicate and cooperate with one another on matters affecting the children.[^18] It will also be convenient to consider at this time each of Michael and Joy's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the relationship of Z and A with the other parent.[^19]
[ 68 ] After hearing all of the evidence, I find that Joy and Michael have no ability to communicate and cooperate with one another on matters affecting the children. Neither Joy nor Michael is solely responsible; they have each contributed significantly to this unfortunate situation.
[ 69 ] In my view, it is not helpful to count the myriad examples offered in evidence. I am satisfied that Michael and Joy could each have spent another full day in the witness box providing further examples of each other's obstructive behaviour, rude and belittling comments, gatekeeping behaviour, and unilateral interference with each other's attempts to parent the children. The counting statistics are less important than my overall impression. A few of these incidents are much more significant than many of the others, as I will explain below.
[ 70 ] Joy frequently demonstrated an unwillingness to communicate or cooperate with Michael regarding the children. I find that examples of Joy's unwillingness include the following:
a. Joy did not discuss her intention to move out of the apartment with Z before she did so. Even if she felt she had could not disclose this information prior to moving, she did not communicate clearly and candidly with Michael after she moved out. She did not answer his telephone calls when he returned to the empty apartment. As described below, she advised Michael that she had sent Z to Nigeria to be with her family when that was not true.
b. Joy did not keep Michael informed regarding her delivery date for A, did not invite him to be part of the birth or to take care of Z when she went to the hospital, and advised him of A's birth two days after the fact by text message.
c. Joy restricted Michael's parenting time with A for several months after her birth.
d. Joy did not cooperate with Michael gaining access to information and updates from A's daycare and did not add Michael to the registration forms as a trusted person.
e. Joy declined to provide Michael with copies of A's birth certificate or health card.
[ 71 ] Most significantly, in early September 2023, Joy texted Michael to advise him to pick up A the next day from an address in Oshawa, which was her new home address. Michael brought an urgent motion to address this situation. The decision of Mathen J. is discussed above at paragraph [24] above. While I accept Joy's explanation that she did not know that the order of Horkins J. prevented her from moving, it is troubling that she moved herself and A to Oshawa without first discussing the possibility of the move with Michael, much less seeking his consent. I accept Joy's explanation that she wanted to move to Oshawa for a better home and school for the children, and that the move was not intended to prevent Michael from exercising parenting time. However, it should have been obvious to her that the move from Scarborough to Oshawa would significantly burden the exercise of Michael's parenting time. This incident is a telling indicator of how little interest Joy has in communicating effectively with Michael regarding parenting issues, how little value Joy places on Michael's role with the children, and how little thought she gave to how her move could affect his relationship with A.
[ 72 ] Michael frequently demonstrated an unwillingness to communicate or cooperate with Joy regarding the children. I find that examples of Michael's unwillingness include the following:
a. Michael withdrew Z from daycare without discussing the matter first with Joy;
b. Michael did not advise Joy that he had enrolled Z at Portage school and did not consult with her about that decision;
c. Michael did not consult with Joy about enrolling Z in at least two summer programs;
d. Michael refused to provide Joy with certain information about the children that she needed to apply for OSAP; and
e. Michael refused to provide Joy with Z's health card and did not engage constructively with Joy when she raised concerns about wanting a second dentist to assess whether Z needed dental work.
[ 73 ] Each of Joy and Michael maintain that the other is a bad communicator and fails to cooperate in matters related to parenting. They are both right. Each of Joy and Michael claim that they themselves are a great communicator and are not the problem. They are both wrong.
[ 74 ] I find that both Joy and Michael have consistently communicated poorly with each other. They frequently use inappropriate and demeaning language toward each other in their text messages to each other. They each devalue the other parent's role as a parent with the children. While both parties provided a carefully curated set of text messages that they felt supported their position, I am certain that the messages tendered into evidence do not reflect the full story. In any event, the text messages that are in evidence do not flatter either Joy or Michael. They demonstrate that neither is willing or seemingly able to cooperate with the other.
[ 75 ] I find that each of Joy and Michael withheld government documents, information, and account information and access codes from each other.
[ 76 ] I find that each of Joy and Michael cancelled or were late for pickups and drop-offs without advising the other in a timely manner. The fundamental problem is not that one parent was going to be late. Things happen and to call traffic in Toronto unpredictable is to be kind. Indeed, I am concerned that Michael reads far too much into Joy being late from time to time. The real problem is when Joy and Michael each failed to tell the other in a timely way that they would be late or that plans had changed.
[ 77 ] I find that Michael and Joy have been unable and unwilling to communicate and cooperate with one another on matters affecting the children. There is no evidence that Michael or Joy have or are able to put the needs of Z and A above their own needs and preferences.[^20] I am also very concerned that they are not willing to support the development and maintenance of Z and A's relationships with the other parent. Put slightly differently, they have not yet demonstrated that they are willing to support those relationships. It is imperative that they start to do so. It is extremely important for the health and security of Z and A that they have good relationships with both parents. Z and A will suffer if Michael and Joy do not start to communicate constructively and support Z and A having strong, healthy relationships with the other parent.
[ 78 ] In conclusion, the inability or demonstrated unwillingness to communicate effectively or cooperate with each other about the children is a very important factor in my assessment of what is in the best interests of Z and A. I am not satisfied at this time that Michael and Joy are capable of the type of routine communication and cooperation that is an essential precondition to shared decision-making or a fully shared residential arrangement for Z and A. At this time, I am very concerned that shared decision-making or fully shared residential arrangements raise the significant risk that the children will be exposed to conflict or family violence. That is obviously not in the best interests of Z and A.
5. The care of the children
[ 79 ] I am to consider the history of care of Z and A, the plans in place for the future care of the children, and the ability and willingness of each of Michael and Joy to care for and meet the needs of the children.[^21]
[ 80 ] I find that Joy and Michael have each provided good care to Z and A. They and their supporting witnesses all testified that Joy and Michael established good routines to support their children's health, sleep, and hygiene. Each of the parents seems to be a caring parent working hard to help their children flourish and thrive. Even during cross-examination, Joy expressed only modest concerns that A's hair sometimes looked rough and unkempt after returning from time with Michael. Michael attempted to demonstrate that Joy was not taking A to daycare, but I do not accept his evidence. Joy testified that she keeps A at home with her when she is not working and takes her to daycare when necessary. I accept Joy's evidence on this point. I am satisfied that each of Michael and Joy has done their best to care for Z and A.
[ 81 ] I am concerned about Michael's living arrangements and how those arrangements would interfere with his ability to meet the needs of the children if they were both to have their primary residence with him. Michael lives in a one-bedroom plus den apartment with his brother Julius and, often, his mother. According to Julius, he sleeps outside of the bedroom and there are two beds in the bedroom, one for each of Z and A. However, Julius also testified that there are only two beds for Michael, Z, and A. Michael later testified that he sleeps on a sofa-bed but allowed that he sometimes ends up sleeping with Z or A.
[ 82 ] Joy testified that she lives in a three-bedroom home. Even with the presence of her sister and brother-in-law and their children, I accept that Joy has more room to provide for the children and a better arrangement to support their needs for sleep.
[ 83 ] I am not so concerned about the sleeping arrangements at Michael's apartment that I think he is incapable of providing a primary residence to one child or to have overnight parenting time with both children. I am concerned that it might not be in the best interests of the children to both have their primary residence there given the size of the apartment and the sleeping arrangements. It is only one factor for me to consider.
6. Cultural and religious upbringing
[ 84 ] In determining the best interests of Z and A, I am to consider the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage.[^22]
[ 85 ] Each of Michael and Joy testified that they take the children to church with them on Sundays. Neither party suggested that they objected to the church attended by the other. Both parents are taking responsibility for the religious upbringing of the children. I am also satisfied that each parent is capable and willing to support the cultural heritage of their children. The only matter of controversy relates to the question of A's middle name, which I will address below.
[ 86 ] I am satisfied that any plausible parenting and decision-making arrangement for Z and A will equally serve their cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage.
D. Conclusion on decision-making responsibility and parenting time
[ 87 ] As noted above, the parties have very different proposals on what is in the best interests of the children on the issues of primary residence, parenting time, and decision-making.
[ 88 ] In making my parenting order, my sole focus is on the best interests of Z and A.[^23] The best interests of the child is the only proper consideration in determining the residence, decision-making responsibility, and parenting time for Z and A.[^24] Parliament has directed that my primary consideration must be each child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well being.[^25]
1. Primary residence and parenting time
[ 89 ] In my view, it is in Z's best interests to have his primary residence with Michael and for A to have her primary residence with Joy.
[ 90 ] I have carefully considered the relationship between Z and A. I accept without reservation that it is desirable that siblings share a primary residence so that they may share their childhood experiences, support one another, and solidify their sibling bonds.[^26] It is never simple to consider the separation of siblings.[^27] While some cases refer to the "doctrine of non-separation of siblings," that convenient shorthand cannot supersede the statutory direction to focus on the best interests of the child.[^28] Even if this approach is "rarely considered," there are exceptional cases where circumstances where such a result will be in the best interests of the child.[^29]
[ 91 ] For a significant part of their lives, Z and A have not shared the same primary residence and it is not clear that either of them will remember that period of time in their lives.[^30] There is no evidence that Z and A are not settled and happy in the homes where they currently live.[^31]
[ 92 ] While it would be preferable to have the siblings reside together, there are a number of factors that cause me to conclude that it is in the best interest of Z and A to make a different order in this case.
[ 93 ] As I have explained above, the uncontradicted evidence is that Z is thriving in his current school environment. I am not prepared to sever his relationship to that school. It is in Z's best interests to succeed in school. Maintaining his connection to a public school within an easy walk of Michael's home provides Z with the best chance of educational success. Z is well adjusted in his school and community and that should not be changed.[^32] The fact that Z is comfortable and happy in his current school is a sign of stability is his life that should not readily be disrupted.
[ 94 ] Joy did not satisfy me that there is any reasonable prospect that she will be able to pick-up and drop-off Z at school if there is a shared primary residence. Joy's work schedule makes a lengthy daily commute to and from Z's school impossible. Moreover, it is not in Z's interests to spend two hours a day commuting. Such a long commute will be exhausting for Z and will prevent him from participating in extra-curricular activities, tutoring, and integrating into his peer group through before and after school play and activities.[^33] In my view, it is not in Z's best interests to have a long daily commute to school.[^34] Joy's only plan to avoid the commute was to have Z register in a school somewhere between their homes, despite the fact that neither parent currently lives in the catchment area. This plan was not well-developed, is extremely uncertain, and it is not acceptable.
[ 95 ] Based on the evidence at trial, it appears that Z may at present have a closer bond with Michael than with Joy.[^35] I am concerned that moving Z's primary residence away from Michael may be harmful to Z.[^36] However, the evidence on this point was not entirely satisfactory and I do not put much weight on this factor.
[ 96 ] On the other hand, as noted above, A has lived primarily with Joy for almost all of her life. I find that A's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security, and well-being will best be met by maintaining that primary residential relationship with Joy and her family.[^37]
[ 97 ] While I am very concerned about Joy's participation in the incident of family violence on May 5, 2023, I do not think it significantly undermines Joy's ability and willingness to care for the needs of A. I must weigh this incident against all of the other factors affecting the best interests of A.[^38] The incident, while serious, appears to have been an isolated event. Although I think the risk of reoccurrence is low, I emphasize that such an incident must never be repeated.
[ 98 ] Michael did not satisfy me that he has an adequate plan for providing a primary residence for both Z and A. I am concerned about the size of Michael's apartment for the number of residents and the fact that there are times when there are more people than beds in his apartment. I am concerned that it will place undue burden or stress on Michael to house both children on a primary basis.[^39] Michael did not provide a plan for caring for A that would compensate for the disruption to A's primary relationship with Joy.
[ 99 ] Fostering the relationship between A and Z is only one of the factors to be considered when assessing the best interests of each child. I conclude that the desirability of having the siblings reside together does not outweigh the other factors present.
[ 100 ] Each child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of that child.[^40] I order that the children spend each weekend together and alternating weekends with each parent. In my view, this order will reflect the best interests of the children, support and foster the relationship between Z and A, and provide meaningful parenting time for each of Michael and Joy with the child who does not have their primary residence with them.
[ 101 ] The parties have reached minutes of settlement to address holidays, summer schedules, and other issues. An order shall issue to reflect that agreement.
2. Decision-making
[ 102 ] Pursuant to s. 16.3 of the Divorce Act, the court has a wide discretion to craft a framework for decision-making that supports and promotes the best interest of the child. The court may:
a. grant sole decision-making responsibility in all areas to one spouse;
b. grant joint decision-making responsibility in all areas to both spouses;
c. grant joint decision-making responsibility to both spouses in one or more areas of responsibility but give sole decision-making authority in the other areas to one spouse or allocate those other areas of decision-making between the spouses;
d. allocate each party sole decision-making responsibility in separate specified areas, with no provision for joint decision-making in any areas; and
e. require the parties to engage in all reasonable efforts and take all reasonable steps to make some or all significant decisions jointly, but to designate which party has final say in each area of decision-making in the event of disagreement.[^41]
[ 103 ] Justice Chappel has helpfully summarized the legal principles to be considered when determining what type of decision-making order is in the best interests of the children.[^42] I have considered all of these principles, but I will address only the ones most relevant to this case.
[ 104 ] I carefully considered ordering that the parties share joint decision-making responsibility for their children. There are many benefits to having the parents share decision-making responsibility for their children.[^43] However, as Kraft J. explained, before a court can make an order for shared decision-making, there must be evidence that the parties are able to communicate effectively with one another despite their differences.[^44]
[ 105 ] Based on my findings above, I am not satisfied that the parties are able to communicate effectively in the interests of their children. In my view, there is a history of significant conflict that has significantly limited Michael and Joy's ability to parent together.[^45] I find that the parties will be unable to make important decisions regarding A and Z under a joint decision-making arrangement.[^46] At the present time, the parties' ability to cooperate and communicate about issues relating to Z and A is not sufficiently functional to recommend an order for joint decision-making.[^47]
[ 106 ] The nature, extent, and frequency of the conflict between Michael and Joy on issues related to Z and A is likely to harm their best interests if joint decision-making is ordered. In my view, this is not a case where one parent has created the conflict that has resulted in this breakdown in communication.[^48] Both parties are responsible for this long-standing dynamic and joint-decision making is not appropriate.[^49]
[ 107 ] In my view, allocating areas of decision-making between the parties is more likely to inflame conflict than to de-escalate it. I do not think that a parallel-parenting model would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case.[^50]
[ 108 ] I conclude that Michael should have sole decision-making responsibility for Z for the major decisions that affect him such as health, education, religion and extra-curricular activities. I conclude that Joy should have sole decision-making responsibility for A for the same matters. I encourage the parties to consider consulting with each other before they make important decisions but will not order that they do so.
E. Name change
[ 109 ] The parties separated on November 28, 2021. Joy gave birth to the parties' daughter on May 18, 2022. Joy did not tell Michael the expected due date or invite him to the hospital for the birth. Joy registered A's birth and gave her a forename, the middle name Esosa, and the surname Goja (which is Michael and Joy's shared surname). She testified that she did not list Michael on the registry at that time because he was denying that he was the father of their daughter. On cross-examination, however, Joy testified that Michael is now listed on the birth register. No official documents relevant to this question were placed in evidence. The parties now both accept that Michael is A's father, and I make no findings about and place no weight on the earlier dispute.
[ 110 ] Michael seeks an order changing A's middle name from Esosa to Sena. Michael did not argue that Joy violated the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4, when she named her daughter as she did. Rather, he submits that the middle name "Esosa" is not appropriate because it is an Edo name, which reflects Joy's tribe and state, rather than "Sena," which is a Tiv name, which reflects Michael's tribe and state. Z's middle name is Sena. Michael submits that if A had been born in Nigeria, she would be given a Tiv middle name following a patrilinear naming convention. Michael testified that it was important to preserve A's heritage and to align her middle name with her brother's middle name. He testified that it was important that A be "correctly" named to permit her to identify herself confidently in the Nigerian community.
[ 111 ] Julius testified that A's middle name was an Edo name, not a Tiv name, and that this violated Nigerian patrilineal naming conventions.
[ 112 ] Joy testified that Nigerian parents were not from the same state or tribe, it was common to have tribal names from both sides of the family. Joy proposed adding the name Sena to their daughter's name, but this was not acceptable to Michael.
[ 113 ] Neither side called any expert evidence on Nigerian patrilineal naming conventions. In the circumstances, Michael has not proved that Joy violated any Ontario law by naming A as she did, that there is a Nigerian patrilinear naming convention, that A will suffer any hardship because of her given names, or that adding Sena as an additional middle name to A's name would be inappropriate. Moreover, Michael did not convince me that it would be in the best interests of the child to override the name chosen by Joy in favour of the Nigerian patrilinear naming convention.
[ 114 ] As I indicated above, I am ordering that Joy will have decision-making responsibility in respect of A. Normally, whether to change the name of the child would be an incident of that decision-making responsibility.[^51] Michael cited a number of cases in his written argument, but they all related to circumstances where one party sought to prohibit another party from changing the name of a child.[^52] That is not this case. Joy named their daughter at a time when the parties were separated. Michael did not submit that Joy violated any statutory provisions when she named their daughter. It is Michael, not Joy, who wishes to change the name of their daughter. And, respectfully, Michael's resistance to Joy's proposal seemed to reflect a preference for attempting to win an issue rather than finding compromises that reflected the best interests of their daughter. Michael has not persuaded me that it is in the best interests of their daughter to change the name she has had her entire life.
[ 115 ] In all of the circumstances, I decline to order that A's name be changed. As noted above, at trial Joy proposed adding "Sena" as an additional middle name. In my view, that would be a reasonable outcome that would not only allow their daughter to have a name that fully reflects the background of both of her parents but would also demonstrate empathy and good will by Joy towards Michael. I encourage Joy to reflect on whether she is prepared to implement the proposal she made at trial.
F. Future travel and related documents
[ 116 ] Michael wishes to be able to travel to Nigeria with the children. He explained that he anticipated taking the children to Nigeria either for vacations or to visit the ancestral home. Originally he asked that if Joy did not respond within seven days to his request for consent to travel outside the country with the children, she would be deemed to consent to his request. Sensibly, Michael withdrew this request.
[ 117 ] Joy submitted that Nigeria is a dangerous country, and the children should not travel there.
[ 118 ] Although Michael framed his request as relating to all international travel, I took the focus of his concern to be travel to Nigeria. I note that Nigeria is not a contracting party or signatory to the Hague Convention.[^53]
[ 119 ] Each of the parents testified that the other took unilateral steps to change the living arrangements for one or both of the children.
[ 120 ] Around the time of their separation in late November 2021, Joy texted Michael looking for Z's passport. On November 28, 2021, Michael texted Joy to ask about Z's whereabouts. She texted back and replied, "He is in Nigeria with my family." This is an extremely concerning statement. Even allowing for Joy's upset at the time of the separation, telling Michael that Z had been removed from the country to Nigeria was extremely ill-advised and hurtful.
[ 121 ] Having listened carefully to their evidence at trial, and observed how each parent approached this litigation, I am concerned that there is a reasonable possibility that one or the other might seek to remove permanently one or both of the children from Ontario.
[ 122 ] I hope that, over time, Joy and Michael will demonstrate to the other through their actions that they can be trusted to act in the best interests of the children and in accordance with the orders of the court.
[ 123 ] For now, I order that neither parent may remove a child from Ontario without the written consent of the other parent or an order of the court.
6. Child support
[ 124 ] The parties agree that child support should be determined in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, based on whatever parenting arrangement is ordered by the court.[^54] Michael also proposes that the parties share certain s. 7 expenses proportionately, in accordance with their incomes.
[ 125 ] Michael and Joy are obliged to support Z and A in accordance with their incomes. Child support is the right of the child and that right exists independent from statutory provisions and court orders.[^55]
A. Retroactive child support
[ 126 ] Michael seeks a retroactive child support payment of $397.00 from Joy to cover the period from November 21, 2021, to the date of this order. Joy did not make a request for any retroactive child support.
[ 127 ] The court has jurisdiction to order retroactive child support, which hold payors to the legal obligations they always had to pay child support at levels that are appropriate for their income.[^56] In considering the request for retroactive child support, I am to consider four factors:
a. the reason for the recipient parent's delay in seeking the child support;
b. the conduct of the payor parent;
c. the past and present circumstances of the child, including the child's needs at the time the support should have been paid; and
d. whether the retroactive award might entail hardship.[^57]
[ 128 ] I exercise my discretion not to award retroactive child support to either party.
[ 129 ] First, the amount at issue is very small.
[ 130 ] Second, the calculations provided by Michael in support of the claim for retroactive support are based only on his T-4 income. Michael did not produce any financial statements or tax returns for his numbered corporation to Joy. He did not provide a valuation of his company. I am not satisfied that Michael's T-4 employment income fairly reflects all of the money available to him for the payment of child support.[^58] I would consider including all or part of the corporation's pre-tax income in Michael's annual income for the years 2021 to date, but I cannot do so because Michael failed to provide the financial statements and the tax returns for his corporation, despite being under a legal obligation to do so.[^59] Michael was under a legal obligation to provide the following information about his corporation:
- (1) A spouse who is applying for a child support order and whose income information is necessary to determine the amount of the order must include the following with the application:
(f) where the spouse controls a corporation, for its three most recent taxation years,
(i) the financial statements of the corporation and its subsidiaries, and
(ii) a statement showing a breakdown of all salaries, wages, management fees or other payments or benefits paid to, or on behalf of, persons or corporations with whom the corporation, and every related corporation, does not deal at arm's length;[^60]
[ 131 ] Michael did not provide the information he was legally required to provide. The court is entitled to impute such income to a parent as it considers appropriate in the circumstances where the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.[^61]
[ 132 ] In the circumstances and given the small amount Michael claims as retroactive support, rather than imputing any income to Michael, I exercise my discretion not to award any retroactive child support.
B. Prospective child support
[ 133 ] Michael and Joy each submit that I should award child support at the table amount based on my determination of primary residence and parenting time.
[ 134 ] As a result of my decision, Michael and Joy are not in a shared parenting arrangement within the meaning of the Child Support Guidelines.[^62] Michael will not have 40% of the parenting time with A over the course of the year and Joy will not have 40% of the parenting time with Z over the course of the year.
[ 135 ] A and Z have split parenting time with the parties. According to s. 8 of the Guidelines, in a split parenting situation, where each spouse has the majority of parenting time with one of the children, the amount of a child support order is the difference between the amount that each spouse would otherwise pay if a child support order were sought against each of the spouses.
[ 136 ] Child support is to be ordered in the amount set out in the applicable table according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the parent against whom the order is sought and the amount, if any, determined under s. 7 of the Guidelines.[^63]
[ 137 ] Michael submits that Joy's income should be set at $72,699, being the total income from her 2024 notice of assessment. Joy does not dispute this amount. Joy would, therefore, pay monthly child support to Michael in respect of Z in the table amount of $673.
[ 138 ] Michael submits that I should use his income of $44,840 from his 2024 notice of assessment. Joy submits that this is unfair because Michael did not produce the financial information for the corporation. For the reasons set out above, I agree.
[ 139 ] In my view, determining Michael's income under s. 16 of the Guidelines would not be the fairest determination of Michael's income.[^64] Pursuant to s. 17(1) of the Guidelines, I will have regard to Michael's income over the last three years, which he reports to be $44,840 in 2025, $44,840 in 2024, and $71,935 in 2023. Taking an average of those three years, I set Michael's income at $53,871.67.
[ 140 ] I recognize that Michael testified that the reason his income fell is because he took time away from his work to learn about AI. That may be. However, Michael's failure to provide the necessary financial documents makes it impossible for me to evaluate his evidence. He alone controls how much he is paid out of the company. I have no idea what, if any, personal expenses he is running through the company that should be added back into his income.
[ 141 ] Using $53,871.67 as the income number results in Michael paying monthly child to Joy in respect of A in the table amount of $498.
[ 142 ] In the result, I order that Joy pay Michael monthly child support of $175 as of February 1, 2026. As detailed in my order below, the parties must exchange complete financial information on or before July 1, 2026. The parties' child support payments will be adjusted on a go-forward basis on the complete and accurate financial information.
[ 143 ] If section 7 expenses are incurred on behalf of A or Z and consented to by the other spouse (such consent not to be unreasonably withheld), they shall contribute to those expenses in an amount proportionate to their income being Joy 57% and Michael 43%.
7. Costs
[ 144 ] If the parties are not able to resolve costs of this application, Michael may email his costs submission of no more than three double-spaced pages to my judicial assistant on or before February 19, 2026. Joy may deliver her responding submission of no more than three double-spaced pages on or before February 26, 2026. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.
8. Order
[ 145 ] I make the following final order:
a. Mr. Goja's claim for an order seeking to change the name of the parties' daughter is dismissed. A's name shall not be changed without the consent of Ms. Goja.
b. Pursuant to s. 22(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act, I declare that the habitual residence of each of Z and A is Ontario.
c. With respect to the parties' son, Z, pursuant to s. 16.1(4) of the Divorce Act, I order that:
i. his primary residence will be with Mr. Goja;
ii. sole decision-making responsibility is allocated to Mr. Goja;
iii. his birth certificate, health card, and passport (if any) will be held by Mr. Goja, who will provide true copies of these documents to Ms. Goja within 10 days of this judgment.
d. With respect to the parties' daughter, A, pursuant to s. 16.1(4) of the Divorce Act, I order that:
i. her primary residence will be with Ms. Goja; and
ii. sole decision-making responsibility is allocated to Ms. Goja; and
iii. her birth certificate, health card, and passport (if any) will be held by Ms. Goja, who will provide true copies of these documents to Mr. Goja within 10 days of this judgment.
e. Pursuant to s. 16.2(1) of the Divorce Act, I order that each party will have parenting time with the children on alternating weekends as follows,
i. In week one, Mr. Goja will have parenting time with A from after school on Friday until 6:00 p.m. Sunday. He shall pick up A from day care and Ms. Goja will pick up A from Mr. Goja's home;
ii. In week two, Ms. Goja will have parenting time with Z from after school on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. She shall pick up A from day care or school and Mr. Goja will pick Z up from Ms. Goja's home;
iii. If the Monday immediately following the Sunday is a holiday, the parenting time shall extend to 6:00 p.m. on Monday, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing;
f. Pursuant to s. 16.1(9) of the Divorce Act, the removal of Z and/or A from the province of Ontario is prohibited without the written consent of both parents or a court order authorizing the removal. This prohibition applies to all removals, for any period of time and for any reason, including vacations.
g. Pursuant to s.15.1 (a) of the Divorce Act and s. 8 of the Guidelines, starting on February 18, 2026, and on the first day of each following month, Ms. Goja shall pay child support for Z to Mr. Goja in the amount of $175 a month, calculated as being the difference between:
i. Ms. Goja paying Mr. Goja table child support for one child Z (DOB September 9, 2019) in the sum of $673 a month, based on her income of $72,699; and
ii. Mr. Goja paying Ms. Goja table child support for one child A (DOB May 18, 2022) in the sum of $498 a month, based on his income of $53,872.
h. The parties shall contribute to each child's special or extraordinary expenses on the basis of Ms. Goja paying 57% and Mr. Goja paying 43% of such expenses. Each party shall be consulted in advance before a special or extraordinary expense is incurred. Neither party shall incur any special or extraordinary expenses for which a contribution is sought from the other party without prior consultation and consent of the other party, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld.
i. On or before the first day of May each year, commencing May 1, 2026, each party shall provide to the other a copy of the Income Tax Return as filed for the immediately preceding year for themselves. Each party shall provide a copy of their Notice of Assessment or re-Assessment, for themselves, within ten (10) days of receipt of same from the CRA. Each party shall also provide the other party with a copy of the financial statements and income tax returns for each corporation they control within 14 days of filing same with the CRA.
j. On or before the first day of July of each year, commencing on July 1, 2026, the parties shall adjust each party's contribution to the children's special or extraordinary expenses, if necessary, based on each party's income in the immediately preceding year.
k. The parties shall review the child support arrangements on or before July 1 of each year, commencing in 2026.
l. Mr. Goja's claim for future and retroactive spousal support is dismissed.
m. Ms. Goja's claim for future and retroactive spousal support is dismissed.
n. Mr. Goja's claim for an order equalizing net family property is dismissed.
o. Ms. Goja's claim for an order equalizing net family property is dismissed.
p. I grant a divorce to the parties to take effect on the thirty-first day after the date this judgment is rendered.
q. An order shall issue reflecting the partial final minutes of settlement signed by the parties and uploaded to Case Center at page A2060.
Robert Centa J.
Released: February 12, 2026
[^1]: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 41, citing R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 526; R. v. Sanichar, 2012 ONCA 117, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 500, at paras. 36, 69-70, rev'd on other grounds, 2013 SCC 4, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 54; and Fitzpatrick v. Orwin, 2012 ONSC 3492, at paras. 62-68, aff'd 2014 ONCA 124.
[^2]: Sanichar, at para. 35; R. v. McGrath, [2000] O.J. No. 5735 (S.C.), at paras. 10-14; R. v. Stewart (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 509 (C.A.), at p. 517; R. v. Norman (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 295 (C.A.), at pp. 313-14.
[^3]: , [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 357; Phillips et al. v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. et al., [1971] 2 O.R. 637 (C.A.), at p. 645.
[^4]: Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 4.
[^5]: Rothgiesser v. Rothgiesser (2000), 46 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.); Okmyansky v. Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427, 86 O.R. (3d) 587.
[^6]: Hulli v. Hulli, 2025 ONSC 7036, at para. 99; Valerio v. Valerio, 2025 ONSC 7071, at para. 128; Predotka v. Dudek, 2023 ONSC 7025, at para. 17; Persaud v. Garcia-Persaud, 2009 ONCA 782, 81 R.F.L. (6th) 1.
[^7]: Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 16(1) and (2).
[^8]: McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 1, at para. 82.
[^9]: Divorce Act, s. 16(2).
[^10]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(e).
[^11]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(a).
[^12]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(b).
[^13]: Young v. Young, [1994] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 70-71, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting in part), and p. 117, per McLachlin J. (as she then was); F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 616, at para. 61.
[^14]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(j).
[^15]: Divorce Act, s. 16(4).
[^16]: There was no evidence at trial to suggest that the sister involved in this incident was Nosa George. Counsel for Michael did not raise the incident on May 5, 2023, during her cross-examination of Nosa.
[^17]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(k).
[^18]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(i).
[^19]: Divorce Act, s. 16(3)(c).
[^20]: McBennett, at para. 98.
[^21]: Divorce Act, ss. 16(1)(d), (g), and (h).
[^22]: Divorce Act, s. 16(1)(f).
[^23]: Divorce Act, s. 16(1).
[^24]: Proulx v. Proulx, 2022 ONCA 428, at para. 12.
[^25]: Divorce Act, s. 16(2).
[^26]: T.Q. v. A.L.B. and D.L., 2020 NBQB 240, at para. 124.
[^27]: L.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47, at para. 19; H. (P.R.) v. L. (M.E.), 2009 NBCA 18, 71 R.F.L. (6th) 235, at para. 24.
[^28]: L.D.M., at para. 19.
[^29]: D.J.F. v. J.L.F., 2004 BCSC 1800, at paras. 60, 70; J.P. v J.P., 2016 SKCA 168, 89 R.F.L. (7th) 92, at para. 57.
[^30]: Vaillancourt v. Pratt, 1996 CarswellOnt 222, at para. 28 (Prov. Div.).
[^31]: Vaillancourt, at paras. 27-30.
[^32]: Cormier v. Cormier, 2010 ONSC 870, at para. 47; Woloshyn v. Woloshyn (1996), 22 R.F.L. (4th) 129 (Man. Q.B.), at paras. 8-14 and 27, aff'd (1997), 28 R.F.L. (4th) 70 (Man. C.A.).
[^33]: Milleker v. Milleker, 2005 SKQB 455, 21 R.F.L. (6th) 381, at para. 35.
[^34]: Peterson v. Scalisi, 2001 CarswellOnt 2404 (S.C.), at para. 13.
[^35]: Jesmer v. Delormier, 2010 ONSC 5856, at paras. 79-85.
[^36]: RJF v. CMF, 2014 ABCA 165, 100 Alta. L.R. (5th) 219, at paras. 30-31.
[^37]: Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at para. 121.
[^38]: V.M.S. v. S.R.M.S., 2016 BCSC 1158, at para. 28; Divorce Act, s. 16(4).
[^39]: D.J.F., at para. 70.
[^40]: Divorce Act, s. 16(6).
[^41]: S.V.G. v. V.G., 2023 ONSC 3206, 93 R.F.L. (8th) 77, at para. 107.
[^42]: McBennett, at paras. 97-98; S.V.G., at paras. 107-12; see also Predotka, at para. 30.
[^43]: Watson v. Reiter, 2011 ONSC 3309, at paras. 51-52.
[^44]: Predotka, at para. 26, citing Kaplanis v. Kaplanis (2005), 249 D.L.R. (4th) 620 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 11; Ladisa v. Ladisa (2005), 11 R.F.L. (6th) 50 (Ont. C.A.).
[^45]: Roth v. Halstead, 2017 ONCJ 593, at para. 299.
[^46]: Roy v. Roy, 2004 CarswellOnt 8591 (S.C.), at para. 2, rev'd in part (2006), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 44 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 6.
[^47]: Berman v. Berman, 2017 ONCA 905, at para. 5.
[^48]: Lawson v. Lawson (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 15, citing Kaplanis.
[^49]: Predotka, at para. 30(j) and the cases cited therein.
[^50]: K.H. v. T.K.R., 2013 ONCJ 418, at paras. 58-59.
[^51]: Belisle v. Poole (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 717 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at para. 19.
[^52]: Schaafsma v. Eaton, 2019 ONCJ 423; Skoglund v. Dimmery (1989), 59 Man. R. (2d) 154 (K.B.); and Belisle.
[^53]: Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 83, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the "Hague Convention").
[^54]: Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175 (the "Guidelines").
[^55]: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, at paras. 38-40, 48 and 54.
[^56]: D.B.S., at paras. 2, 62-74.
[^57]: D.B.S., at paras. 100-16.
[^58]: Guidelines, s. 18(1).
[^59]: Guidelines, s. 18(1).
[^60]: Guidelines, s. 21(1)(f).
[^61]: Guidelines, s. 19(1)(f); Daud v. Temor, 2026 ONCA 83, at paras. 20 to 21.
[^62]: Guidelines, s. 9.
[^63]: Guidelines, s. 3(1)(a).
[^64]: Guidelines, s. 17(1).