Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: SULEIMAN JUNAIDU SADIQ, Applicant
AND:
MARYAM LAWAL MUSA, Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta
COUNSEL: Self-represented Applicant
Self-represented Respondent
HEARD: February 2, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1The applicant father brings this motion for an order that their child, JA, shall attend Jean Lumb Public School as well as an order for interim final decision-making authority limited to education and an interim order that the child reside with the applicant during the school week.
BACKGROUND
2The parties are the parents of JA, born September 23, 2021. They are both very accomplished professionally and academically. The applicant father works in the IT sector and earned about $208,000 in 2023. The respondent mother works as the Executive Director at the Tony Stacey Centre for Veteran’s Care in Scarborough. Her annual salary is about $110,000. They were married in April 2019, moved to Toronto from Nigeria in March 2020 and separated in November 2022. In January 2023, the applicant father commenced an application for a divorce, sole decision-making responsibility in respect of JA, and shared parenting time. By that point, the respondent mother had moved to Richmond Hill.
3A trial was held in December 2024. For reasons dated January 24, 2025, Justice Des Rosiers found that shared parenting on a 2-2-3 schedule was in the best interests of JA , and ordered that both parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach significant decisions jointly. Decision-making in relation to education was a significant point of contention at trial as both parents wanted to choose JA’s school. In this respect, the relevant provisions ordered by Justice Des Rosiers are as follows:
Both parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach significant decisions jointly.
For all significant decisions, they shall consult one another and consult and follow the recommendations of professionals.
If the parties cannot agree with each other, they shall refer the issue to a mediator. The parties shall be responsible for the costs of the mediation in proportion to their income.
For purposes of education, the child’s primary residence is in the City of Toronto.
The parties shall attempt to make decisions regarding education together as indicated in the general decision-making section. If after mediation, the parties are still unable to reach a joint decision, the mother shall have final decision-making responsibility with respect to education.
4Subsequently, the parties agreed that JA, who was about to turn four years old, would start junior kindergarten at Jean Lumb Public School in September 2025, which is the neighbourhood school in the father’s catchment area in Toronto.
5In August 2025, the respondent mother commenced a Motion to Change for various relief including: 1) that the child’s primary residence, temporarily and for purposes of education, would be Richmond Hill until the respondent mother is financially able to secure suitable housing in the City of Toronto; and 2) that the child primarily reside with the respondent mother and spend alternate weekends with the applicant father.
6On August 25, 2025, at TBST court, Justice Nakonechny addressed the applicant father’s urgent motion for an order that the respondent had breached the Trial Order by enrolling the child at Ross Dean Public School in Richmond Hill and as a consequence sought sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence to be with him in Toronto, and that the respondent’s parenting time be primarily on alternate weekends. By that point, the respondent mother had brought a Motion to Change the Trial Order and, in particular, to change JA’s residence for education purposes to Richmond Hill so that he can attend Ross Dean Public School, her neighbourhood school. In the interim, Justice Nakonechny ordered that the child not be enrolled nor attend any school other than Jean Lumb Public School in Toronto beginning September 2, 2025, pending further order of the Court. The court cautioned the respondent mother against enrolling the child in school outside of Toronto pending the motion and confirmed the consequences of doing so.
7On September 12, 2025, Justice Kraft ordered that starting on September 15, 2025 that JA shall attend junior kindergarten at Dean Ross Public School in Richmond Hill on a temporary basis. Justice Kraft found that but for the breach of the applicant father’s spousal support obligations set out in the Trial order, she would have found that there is no material change in circumstances and would have ordered the child to attend junior kindergarten at Jean Lumb Public School in Toronto. Justice Kraft stated, at paras. 43, 50 and 51:
The one circumstance which I find to meet the threshold of a material change in circumstances is the fact that the father has not paid the spousal support ordered in the sum of $1,500 [per month] since January 1, 2025. …. Accordingly, when the order was made [by the trial judge] that A’s residence for educational purposes be Toronto, it was contemplated by the trial judge that the mother would relocate to Toronto, on the understanding that she earned about $107,000 per year, that she would be receiving $733 per month in set-off child support and that she would be receiving spousal support of $1,500 per month. That did not happen. …
Given that the father has not paid spousal support to the mother as ordered as after applying the best interests factors as set out above, I find that it is in [JA’s] best interest to attend Dean Ross public school in Richmond Hill for Junior Kindergarten on a temporary basis.
Once the father is in compliance with his spousal support obligations, the mother should be able to secure housing in Toronto with [JA] as she will have this additional income and then [JA’s] residence for educational purposes can revert to Toronto.
8Justice Kraft also ordered that the applicant father pay the mother arrears of spousal support in the fixed sum of $13,500 for the period January 1, 2025, to and including September 1, 2025, within 30 days.
9On August 26, 2025, the applicant filed a response to the Motion to Change for, amongst other things, an order that he has sole decision-making responsibility for JA, that the child primarily reside with him, and that the respondent mother have parenting time during the weekends on the basis that the 2-2-3 schedule was no longer workable as the respondent made no concrete efforts to relocate to Toronto for the child to attend Jean Lumb Public School and to ensure a stable routine during the school week.
10By October 13, 2025, the applicant states he obtained a line of credit and paid the full $13,500 in spousal support arrears. Subsequently, the respondent mother began looking for new accommodations in Toronto.
11On October 13, 2025, the parties exchanged the following messages:
Respondent mother: My relocation to Toronto does not mean I will be living in close proximity to Jean Lumb. The school [JA] will attend will be determined based on my Toronto address, not Jean Lumb.
Applicant father: You may also confirm [for] Jean Lumb if it makes more sense to return now/earlier than January since its only been weeks since he left to Doan Ross in Richmond Hill. In any case, please reach out to the school to confirm these and initiate his return.
12In November-December, 2025, the parties exchanged the following messages regarding where JA should attend school:
Respondent mother (November 30, 2025): Could you please confirm your position regarding [JA]’s school placement in Toronto? My understanding from our previous discussion on Family Wizard was that, should I relocate to Toronto, [JA] would be expected to attend Jean Lumb. Kindly confirm whether this remains your position. I also need to know whether you would like me to proceed with arranging a mediator at this time. Your clarification will help ensure we take the proper next steps.
Applicant father (November 30, 2025): To clarify my position: where you choose to live is your decision. However, [JA]’s schooling should be in Toronto. I expect that [JA] returns to school in Toronto for the January term. As I noted in our October 13th conversation on Our Family Wizard, you had previously raised mediation, and I confirmed that I was in agreement for you to arrange it. That remains my position.
Regardless of mediation, with January approaching, please confirm by December 5, 2025, what steps you have taken and are taking in relation to Amin’s return to school in Toronto beginning in January so that I am aware of the arrangements being made. …
Respondent mother (December 1, 2025): Thank you for the clarification. Although the court order states that [JA]’s placement in Richmond Hill is temporary, it does not specify January 2026. However, I want to assure you that I am taking active steps to relocate to Toronto. I just wanted to clarify whether [JA]’s school must specifically be Jean Lumb, as that was my understanding based on your message on Our Family Wizard but in your previous email it states Toronto. Please confirm this so I can proceed appropriately with his school registration in Toronto.
Applicant father (December 3, 2025): My position is that [JA] should return to Jean Lumb Public School. I am open to considering a different Toronto school if we both agree and it stops unreasonable commuting for him. Please do not register him at any school in Toronto or elsewhere without my agreement or a plan reached through mediation.
Respondent mother (December 9, 2025): [JA] will be attending school in Toronto by Jan 2026, and his school placement will be based on the location of the accommodation I secure. As you know, I am actively looking for suitable housing, and the school will be determined by that address, consistent with TDSB requirements. [Emphasis added].
13It is clear from those messages that the applicant father did not authorize the respondent mother to unilaterally choose a new school for JA nor did he waive mediation.
14On December 15, 2025, the parties appeared before Justice Diamond in TBST court. The respondent mother had moved into the Don Mills Road and Lawrence Avenue catchment area and had enrolled the child in Greenland Public School. There had been no mediation regarding this choice of school. The applicant father submitted that Greenland Public School is quite far from his residence and not much further than when the child was enrolled in a Richmond Hill school. The applicant father indicated that he wished to bring a Motion to Change the child’s school to somewhere in between the parties’ current residences. The court scheduled his motion, which is the present motion, to be heard on January 8, 2026.
15The respondent mother’s Motion to Change for an order to temporarily changing the child’s residence to Richmond Hill for purposes of schooling no longer has any basis given that she moved to Toronto following the applicant father’s payment of spousal support arrears.
16On December 19, 2025, the child was enrolled at Gateway Public School in Toronto.
17On January 19, 2026, the parties appeared before Justice Kraft in TBST court. The court stated that the motion did not proceed on January 8, 2026, because the respondent served her motion materials late. The respondent did not appear at TBST court. The applicant’s motion regarding the child’s school placement starting January 2026 was scheduled for February 2, 2026.
18On this motion, the applicant father submits that the respondent mother:
… has treated “conditional educational authority” as unilateral discretion, proceeding without requiring good faith mediation. This has produced uncertainty and instability, including multiple school changes or proposed changes within months. The court should not permit a parent to create a new schooling “status quo” by unilateral action.
19The applicant father submits that Jean Lumb Public School is the only jointly agreed school aligns with the Toronto as the educational residence under the existing order,and provides stability. He states that if the court is not prepared to grant him decision-making authority over JA’s education, then the court prevent any school registration, transfer, withdrawal, or change without mediation and written agreement or a further court order. The applicant further submits that if regular attendance at Jean Lumb cannot be achieved under the current arrangement, interim school-week residence with the Applicant is a reasonable, without prejudice measure to ensure consistent attendance and reduce excessive commuting, pending mediation or further court order.
20The respondent mother states that:
- Her agreement on Jean Lumb Public School was conditional as, at that time, she did not have a Toronto address which is required for enrolment;
- There is no court order that restricts where she may reside within Toronto;
- Her current residence was selected based on affordability, suitability for the child, and housing availability;
- The child’s school placement is determined based on her residential address in accordance with School Board requirements given that she has final decision making authority;
- Gateway Public School is about 11 kilometres from the applicant’s residence whereas Ross Doan Public School was about 32 kilometres away;
- The applicant father could relocate his home if he is concerned about travel time;
- Multiple rental applications in Toronto were rejected; and
- All decisions regarding residence and school placement were made in good faith and in the best interests of the child.
ANALYSIS
21A child’s best interests govern what school that child should attended. As noted by Audet J. in Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712, at para. 57, the choice should promote the stability of the child and the child’s interests rather than the parents’ interests.
22On this motion the applicant father seeks to enforce JA’s enrollment at Jean Lumb Public School and for an order that the applicant father have interim final decision-making authority limited to education on a without prejudice basis and that the child reside with the applicant during the school week to support stable school attendance and minimize commuting.
23The granting of a temporary variation of a final parenting order only occurs in exceptional circumstances. A court must be satisfied that the circumstances are so compelling and exceptional, such as when a child’s physical and/or emotional well-being is in jeopardy, that it would be unfair to the child to delay implementation: S.H. v. D.K., 2022 ONSC 1203, at para. 40, per Dambrot J. In my view, the circumstances fall short of this threshold and thus the applicant father’s motion for a temporary variation on this basis is dismissed.
24The only other juridical basis for the applicant father’s motion is Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules which provides that “… [i]f a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter…”: O. Reg. 114/99.
25In Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, 63 R.F.L. (8th) 257, Justice Paciocco stated at para. 51:
… The relevant substantive right is created by the order that is being enforced, while r. 1(8) serves to provide the means of enforcement so that those substantive rights may be realized. The rule therefore provides broad discretion to courts to make orders it considers necessary to fully address a party's failure to comply, a flexibility that is of particular importance when the orders address the well-being of children: Children's Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. J.H. and M.H., at para. 127. Stated simply, if the remedy ordered addresses or "[deals] with the failure" to comply with the substantive order and the remedy ordered is found to be necessary to achieve the enforcement of the order being breached, that remedy is prima facie authorized by r. 1(8).
26In Oliver v. Oliver, 2020 ONSC 2321, at para. 37, Justice Tranquilli described the three-part test for applying Rule 1(8) as follows:
- The court must ask whether there is a triggering event of non-compliance with a court order that would allow it to consider the wording of sub-rule 1(8).
- If the triggering event exists, the court should then ask whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party by not sanctioning that party under sub-rule 1(8).
- In the event the court determines it will not exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party, it is then left with the very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy under sub-rule 1(8).
27I find that the respondent mother breached the Final Order by enrolling JA at Gateway Public School without consulting the applicant father and without referring the issue to a mediator as required by the Final Order. Instead, she relied on the right to final decision-making responsibility with respect to education given to her in the Final Order without satisfying these two preconditions.
28Sanctioning the respondent mother by requiring JA to attend Jean Lumb Public School would make little sense from the perspective of the child given that it would once again disrupt the child’s schooling and require him to spend about ½ hour each day more in travel time. Travel time and distance from the applicant father’s residence to Jean Lumb Public School is about six minutes and 1.2 kilometres away, whereas travel time and distance from the applicant father’s residence to Gateway Public School is about 17 minutes and 12.5 kilometres away. On other hand, travel time and distance from the respondent mother’s residence to Gateway Public School is about eight minutes and 2.2 kilometres away, whereas travel time and distance from the respondent mother’s residence to Jean Lumb Public School is 34 minutes and 15.1 kilometres away.
29However, the respondent mother’s self-help approach to the selection of JA’s school and her failure to comply with the Final Order warrants sanction. I find it appropriate to suspend the respondent mother’s right to final decision-making responsibility with respect to education with the result that both parties have joint decision-making responsibility in respect of education for JA pending the hearing of their respective motions to change. Further, in respect of any disagreement that relates to decision-making responsibility for JA, the parties shall seek the mediation services of mediate393 (see https://www.mediate393.ca) or any other mediation service that specializes in resolving family law disputes. These orders promote the best interests of the child and should avoid a repeat of the circumstances that resulted in numerous urgent appearances before this Court regarding the choice of the child’s school.
30No costs were sought in the Notice of Motion and no costs submissions were filed. Accordingly, I make no order as to costs of this motion.
31Order to go as follows:
(a) Pending the hearing of the parties’ Motion to Change, or until otherwise directed by this Court, the last sentence of paragraph 17 of the Final Order (at page A248 of Case Center) which reads “If after mediation, the parties are still unable to reach a joint decision, the mother shall have final decision making responsibility with respect to education” is suspended.
(b) In respect of any disagreement that relates to decision-making responsibilities for JA, the parties shall seek the mediation services of mediate393 or any other mediation service that specializes in resolving family law disputes.
(c) There shall be no order as to costs.
Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta
Date: February 20, 2026