Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
Court File No.: FC-15-47556-02
Date: February 11, 2026
Between: LYUBOV BABINETS, Applicant – and – ALEXANDER BABINETS, Respondent
Counsel: A. Sam Zaslavsky, counsel for the Applicant; Helen Fernandes, counsel for the Respondent
Heard: November 12, 2025
Ruling on Motion
d.a. jarvis, J.
[1] On October 15, 2025, the court dealt with four motions relating to Motion to Change proceedings brought by the respondent ("the husband")[^1]. The principal motion involved setting aside a final support order. The applicant ("the wife") then brought a cross-motion to, among several other requests, consolidate a civil action started by the husband with these proceedings and for an order that the husband not be heard until he complied with the support order. The husband brought a further motion to dismiss the wife's cross-motion and, just before the hearing date, another motion to adjourn so that he could retain a lawyer. The court adjourned the motions to November 12, 2025, on terms, two of which stayed the civil action pending the motions being heard and ordering the husband to pay $1,250 costs.
[2] Counsel for the Director of the Family Responsibility Office ("the Director") appeared on a watching brief as there were outstanding enforcement proceedings scheduled to be heard in December 2025.
Further adjournment request
[3] When the October adjournment order was made, the husband, who had been representing himself, advised the court that he just had a Legal Aid Certificate approved. Ms. Fernandes, who appeared for the husband, advised that she had just been retained about two days before the November motion; she sought an adjournment so that she could familiarize herself with the file. There was no explanation why the husband had waited until almost two days before the hearing date to engage a lawyer. He had not paid the $1,250 adjournment costs. The wife opposed the request on the basis that the husband was purposely delaying a final resolution of this proceeding; at least ten default hearings had been adjourned with no appreciable progress. After argument, the husband's motion was dismissed. The motion was dismissed because:
(a) The husband was in default of virtually every payment order made by the court since early 2020 and had utterly failed to provide the accounting ordered by MacPherson J. on at least three occasions. The payment orders included the return of the withdrawn $160,000, spousal support and costs;
(b) The husband had brought his motion on June 30, 2025. He sought to adjourn that motion on the morning of its return date to retain counsel. He had plenty of time before October 15, 2025, to engage a lawyer;
(c) The motions were adjourned for a month to November 12, 2025, so that the husband could retain a lawyer. After the October date adjournment, there was no evidence about the husband's efforts to obtain legal assistance after until a couple of days before the November return date; and
(d) The husband had not paid the $1,250 costs ordered as a term of his October 15th adjournment request.
[4] The court proceeded to hear the parties' motions.
Relief Sought/Final Order background
[5] The husband seeks the following relief[^2]:
(a) That the court set aside all prior support-related endorsements and orders since March 25, 2020;
(b) That the court terminate spousal support retroactive to June 1, 2020;
(c) That the court rescind support arrears;
(d) That the court direct the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) to cease enforcement pending recalculation/termination; and
(e) That the court recognize the legal effect of his discharge from bankruptcy on all non-support claims.
[6] This is the relief sought by the wife:
(a) An order consolidating the civil action under court file no. CV-25-2478-0000 with this proceeding under court file no. FC-15-47556-0002;
(b) An order that the husband not be entitled to any audience before the Court until he complies with paragraph 11 of the order of Justice Macpherson, dated January 31, 2022 ("the final order");
(c) Alternatively, an order that if the husband failed to pay the sum of $160,000.00 as per paragraph 11 of the final order, his pleadings should be struck out and he would be barred from taking any further steps in these proceedings, including the civil action under court file no. CV-25-2478-0000; and
(d) In the further alternative, an order that the husband post security for costs in the amount of $50,000.00 within thirty (30) days, failing which his pleadings would be struck out.
[7] Paragraph 11 of the final order provides as follows:
The Respondent (Alexander Babinets) shall pay to the Applicant (Lyubov Babinets) the sum of $160,000 towards equalization of net family property, immediately.
[8] Also relevant is paragraph 6 of the order:
This court orders that Alexander Babinets pay to Lyubov Babinets spousal support in the amount of $3500 per month starting on December 1, 2019.
Background facts
[9] The history of this case has been well documented by previous endorsements and orders of the court, the most relevant facts of which are these:
(a) The parties began a common law relationship in or about 2000, married on September 17, 2005 and separated on November 23, 2019 (which is also their valuation date);
(b) During their relationship the parties operated two fitness companies (i.e., gyms), one solely owned by the respondent and the other jointly owned. The company jointly owned by the parties was the most profitable;
(c) After the parties separated, the husband incorporated two new companies without the wife's knowledge and began to deposit gym membership fees into accounts which he had set up for those companies;
(d) The parties owned a joint bank account that held their life savings. Around the time when they separated, the husband withdrew almost the entirety of the funds from the account. The wife was unaware that he had done this. In an urgent motion heard by MacPherson J. on March 25, 2020, the wife claimed that the husband had withdrawn $272,921.61 from the account; the husband acknowledged that he withdrew $250,000, depositing $70,000 into accounts for his new companies and hiding $160,000 in the trunk of a car in the wife's possession (which the wife denied). The husband was ordered, among other things, to transfer $160,000 back into the parties' joint account. In his endorsement, MacPherson J. commented (at para. 29) that he found the husband's explanation "hard to accept, and, if true, was completely irresponsible. He withdrew the parties' life savings from a secure location, the bank, without the consent of [the wife].";
(e) The husband did not redeposit the withdrawn funds;
(f) On March 22, 2021, MacPherson J. dealt with motions by the parties. The wife sought orders finding the husband in contempt for non-compliance with earlier orders made in March and April 2020 (these dealt with disclosure, preservation, an accounting and uncharacterized support) and for spousal support, whereas the husband wanted to set aside an order noting him in default. Among other terms of the ruling made that day, the husband was again directed to transfer the $160,000 he had withdrawn in November 2019, this time to a trust account administered by the wife's lawyer. The husband was given 30 days to make the transfer, failing which his Answer could be struck, and the wife would be entitled to proceed by way of an uncontested trial;
(g) MacPherson J. reiterated that court orders were not suggestions and noted (at para. 72 of the ruling) that the husband's "blatant disregard for the court Orders is obvious." Contrary to those orders, the husband had (among other examples of order non-compliance) not paid monthly spousal support, failed to make an uncharacterized support payment to the wife, and did not set up a bank account for the deposit of gym membership and company revenues. He had neither appealed nor moved to set aside the orders. He ignored them. MacPherson J. also observed this (at para. 63 of his ruling):
It is noteworthy that Ms. Yulia Shikan deposed an affidavit sworn November 2, 2020. She indicates that she was in a relationship with the Respondent from April 2020 through mid-July 2020. She states that in March 2020, when the Respondent was leaving the country, he asked her to look after a large bag of money for safekeeping.
(h) The husband did not transfer the withdrawn funds to the solicitor's trust account;
(i) The husband sought leave to appeal the March 22, 2021 order of MacPherson J. On July 5, 2021, his appeal was dismissed by the Divisional Court. Costs of $4,700 were awarded to the wife. Those costs were never paid;
(j) On October 13, 2021, the husband made an assignment in bankruptcy. His Statement of Affairs disclosed an estimated unsecured debt of $2,588,767.98 and monthly net social assistance income of $1,800;
(k) On January 31, 2022, MacPherson J. formally struck the husband's pleadings and proceeded to hear an uncontested trial. Among other terms, the husband was ordered to pay $3,500 in monthly spousal support starting on December 1, 2019; $160,000 toward the equalization of the parties' net family properties; and $6,000 costs to the wife. The husband has not complied with any of these terms. At no time has he made any voluntary support payments; about $5,332 was garnished by the Director between January 2023 to January 2025. It is unclear whether MacPherson J. was aware of the husband's bankruptcy when the final order was made;
(l) At all material times up to and including the uncontested trial, the husband was represented by senior family law counsel;
(m) The husband was discharged from bankruptcy on October 17, 2023;
(n) He began a Motion to Change on or about October 24, 2023;
(o) A case conference proceeded before a Dispute Resolution Officer on November 2, 2023. Nothing was resolved;
(p) A further case conference was held by Finlayson J. on January 16, 2025. The issues involved disclosure, spousal support and scheduling the next procedural step. Finlayson J. suggested the following roadmap for the respondent to demonstrate compliance with the final order:
The husband's brief says he wants to bring a motion to stay the support order; I expressed opinions about the likelihood of success with that. I also expressed some views about what the husband will need to do to get himself into compliance, which may very well include providing the disclosure that ought to have been provided in round #1, before the pleadings were struck, an updated accounting about the whereabouts of the funds that he took, which MacPherson J. ordered returned, efforts to comply with the financial terms that MacPherson J. ordered on a final basis, and an updated narrative about what happened with the businesses, with documentary support. His disclosure would also have to include the ODSP file, and medical evidence.
(q) The husband brought his motion that is now before the court on June 30, 2025. He was acting on his own behalf. The motion was returnable on October 15, 2025;
(r) The husband issued a Statement of Claim ("the civil claim") against the wife on July 7, 2025. He sought $250,000 for "prolonged emotional abuse, psychological trauma, physical suffering, permanent loss of quality of life directly caused by the [wife's] sustained manipulative conduct, compensatory support" and an injunction restraining the wife from continuing "any litigation, enforcement, or collection efforts related to previously discharged support or equalization orders." The claim was served on the wife on July 14, 2025;
(s) On August 28, 2025, Charney J. dismissed a motion by the husband to have the wife noted in default. As a copy of the Statement of Claim had not been provided to the court, Charney J. noted that he didn't know whether the facts it alleged entitled the husband to judgment. In addition, the court observed that "given the little that I can glean from the Plaintiff's affidavit, there is real question whether the Plaintiff has pled a valid cause of action and whether the present action constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on earlier family court decisions.";
(t) The wife brought her cross-motion (as above) on September 16, 2025; and
(u) According to the Director's Statement of Arrears filed with the court, the support arrears totalled $140,563 as of September 18, 2025. By November 12, 2025, the arrears totalled $147,310.30 plus $400 for the Director's enforcement fee. The husband has not paid the $1,250 costs ordered on October 15, 2025.
[10] In two affidavits (June 30, 2025, and September 17, 2025) the husband purported to follow the roadmap suggested by Finlayson J. He didn't. Notably, he did not provide the disclosure that had been ordered by MacPherson J. before his pleadings were struck, did not include an updated accounting about the management of the parties' business affairs and the withdrawn $160,000, did not provide any information about efforts made to comply with the financial terms of the final order, and did not provide any medical evidence except for a February 29, 2024 decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal. That decision found that the husband was disabled, his impairment was unlikely to improve, and he was found to be eligible for benefits was based principally on a letter from a family physician whom the husband consulted after the March 22, 2021, order of MacPherson J. While styled as a "Medical Report", the letter is little more than a summary of the husband's self-reporting. No patient file. No ODSP file. No other medical evidence.
Analysis and discussion
[11] Pursuant to s. 121 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act[^3] ("BIA"), the $160,000 equalization payment award made by MacPherson J. to the wife was a debt owing by the husband provable in his bankruptcy as were the cost awards made by the Divisional Court ($4,700) and by MacPherson J. ($6,000). Pursuant to s. 178 (2) of the BIA, these award/debts were extinguished when the husband was discharged. The cost awards were also extinguished by the bankruptcy unless they expressly formed part of, or were deemed to be, a support order by the court; neither was.
[12] The husband's support obligation is not a debt provable in bankruptcy and, it follows, arrears of support owing by the husband were not extinguished by his bankruptcy. Nor is the ongoing support obligation extinguished. Section 178(1) (c) of the BIA provides as follows:
178(1). An order of discharge does not release the bankrupt from
(c) any debt or liability arising under a judicial decision establishing affiliation or respecting support or maintenance, or under an agreement for maintenance and support of a spouse, former spouse, former common-law partner or child living apart from the bankrupt;
[13] It follows that the full amount of owing for spousal support pursuant to the final order is enforceable.
[14] Family Law Rules[^4] r. 1(8) deals failure to obey orders and permits the court to make any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,
(a) an order for costs;
(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case.
[15] Time and again, this court is asked to relieve a party of the consequences of their litigation behaviour. Many times there is a reasonable explanation that will attract the favourable exercise of the court's discretion. In those cases, terms can be imposed to address any unfairness or prejudice to the other party. There is accountability. But where the court's rules or orders are unambiguous and ignored, where indulgences (often several) are granted, also unambiguous, and still ignored, and where delay is weaponized prejudicing the rights of other parties, accountability becomes meaningless, and the administration of justice is brought into disrepute.
[16] In Manchanda v. Thethi[^5], a 2016 case, Myers J. observed that a culture shift was needed to hold accountable litigants who choose to ignore court orders. While that case involved the striking of pleadings, Myer J.'s observations are equally apt where there is a history of order non-compliance as demonstrated by the facts in this case:
- Implementing a culture shift to enhance access to justice by promoting efficiency, affordability, and proportionality requires the court to re-draw the line between limiting drastic measures and applying the law robustly. In my respectful view, a little less judicial diffidence, a little less reluctance to hold accountable those who would deny justice to their former spouses, and a little more protection of abused parties from abusers, might be a better fulfillment of our critical responsibility…
[17] In Aslezova v. Khanine[^6], the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in upholding a lower court's ruling adverse to a party, commenting that the party's "pattern of litigation behaviour appears tactical, strategic and obstructionist…he is focused on delaying the matter and causing financial difficulty for [the wife] … The position that the appellant finds himself in is entirely of his own making." More recently the Court of Appeal has made clear that litigation conduct involving disobedience of court orders, failure to pay support and deceit and obstructive behaviour "will not be tolerated or taken lightly, given the resulting harm caused to spouses and/or children as well as to the administration of justice."[^7]
[18] It is difficult to have any sympathy for the respondent. The situation in which he finds himself is, like Aslezova, " entirely of his own making." He has disobeyed numerous court orders, delayed enforcement of the wife's rights and failed (notwithstanding the sensible roadmap suggested by Finlayson J.) to led sufficiently credible evidence that warrants him any relief.
Disposition
[19] While the husband's motion seeks to change the final order, it and the parties' other motions were scheduled as a combined regular motion. None was scheduled as a summary judgment motion. There has been no settlement conference.
[20] None of the change order relief sought by the husband dealing with spousal support and its enforcement as set out in paras. 5(a) to (d) above is available to the husband on a regular motion. It is clear the wife's equalization award, and the cost orders made before his bankruptcy, are discharged.
[21] The husband does not come to court with clean hands. There is nothing in the evidence before this court that warrants any indulgence. Moreover, I am persuaded that, in the circumstances of this case, the husband's civil claim should be consolidated with these Motion to Change proceedings as requested by the wife and that the husband should be required to post security for costs pursuant to Family Law Rules r. 24, subrules (20) 2 and 4 which provide as follows:
Order for security for costs
(20) A judge may, on motion, make an order for security for costs that is just, based on one or more of the following factors:
A party has an order against the other party for costs that remains unpaid, in the same case or another case.
There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time, a nuisance or an abuse of the court process, and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.
[22] The husband has failed to pay the costs relating to the adjournment granted to him on October 15, 2025 (i.e., $1.250)[^8] and, having had an opportunity to review the husband's Statement of Claim (unlike Charney J.), I share his view (without commenting further on the claim's merits) that the action may be an impermissible collateral attack on the final order and, further, a waste of time or nuisance brought by a party with insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.
[23] Accordingly, a temporary order shall issue as follows:
(a) The relief sought by the husband as set out in paras. 5 (a) to (d) above is dismissed.
(b) The relief set out by the husband in para. 5(e) is granted.
(c) Civil action CV-25-2478-0000 shall be consolidated with this proceeding under court file number FC-15-47556-2.
(d) The husband shall pay the wife costs of $1,250 and $4,000 (as set out below), both inclusive of HST by March 20, 2026. Both awards shall be deemed to be a support order pursuant to the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act 1996.[^9]
(e) The husband shall post security for costs in the amount of $10,000 by March 20, 2026, failing which the wife may move by 14B motion to strike the husband's pleadings.
(f) SDO to issue.
[24] The wife was the successful party and is presumptively entitled to her costs. She seeks $5,000. Given the number of motions brought by the husband (at least three), five affidavits, and an adjournment (which was argued), a fair and reasonable award in the circumstances is $4,000, inclusive of HST. This also considers the fact that the wife should have recognized that the husband's bankruptcy extinguished her equalization claim (including non-support ordered costs) which she, implicitly if not explicitly, chose to disregard when she relied on the award as a basis for striking the husband's pleadings.
Justice D.A. Jarvis
Released: February 11, 2026
[^1]: The parties shall be referenced as husband and wife for convenience. There was no evidence whether they had been divorced.
[^2]: The husband brought his original motion on June 30, 2025. It asked for additional relief, but he reframed his request in a revised motion dated November 4, 2025, as above.
[^3]: R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
[^4]: O.Reg. 114/99.
[^5]: 2016 ONSC 3766, 131 O.R. (3d) 393, aff'd 2016 ONCA 909, 84 R.F.L. (7th) 374.
[^6]: 2023 ONCA 153, at paras. 17 and 18.
[^7]: Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29, at para. 71.
[^8]: The cost awards made by the Divisional Court and MacPherson J were extinguished by the husband's bankruptcy. Not so for the award made on October 15, 2025.
[^9]: S.O. 1996, c. 31.

