REASONS FOR SENTENCE

J.T. Akbarali J.:

Overview

1Following a trial without a jury, I found the defendant, J.S., guilty of one count of sexual interference and one count of exposure. My reasons are set out fully in my decision reported at R. v. J.S., 2025 ONSC 2808.

The Circumstances of the Offences

2In these reasons, I summarize some of my key findings regarding the offences.

3The victim, S.S., is J.S.’s niece. Her mother and the defendant’s wife are sisters. S.S. was between 11 and 12 years old at the time the offences were committed.

4S.S.’s family was very close with the defendant’s family. S.S. was the oldest child of three, and older than J.S.’s three (now four) children; she was thus the oldest cousin of six at the time of the offences. The families saw each other regularly and frequently slept over at each other’s houses.

5J.S. was a “big man” in the family. He not only supported his own nuclear family, but contributed to the support of family abroad, including his brother and his wife, who is also the sister of J.S.’s wife, and S.S.’s mother. The families are thus intertwined in multiple ways.

6I accepted S.S.’s evidence that, on multiple occasions while she was at the defendant’s house, he sexually abused her. The abuse consisted of touching her vagina, touching her chest, both over and under her clothing, digitally penetrating her vagina, rubbing his penis against her vaginal area, and penetrating her vagina with his penis. I accepted S.S.’s evidence that, during the sexual assaults in question, the defendant would force her to look at his penis. I accepted her evidence that the defendant would hold or pin her down and hold his arm or shoulder or hand over her mouth to prevent her from making noise. I accepted her evidence that the defendant intruded upon her while she was naked in the shower at his house and watched her.

7Sometimes the sexual assaults occurred when S.S. was sleeping; she would wake up to find J.S. assaulting her. At other times, they occurred in the daytime.

8S.S. eventually disclosed the sexual assault to a friend, who told her own mother. The friend’s mother alerted S.S.’s mother, and S.S.’s mother alerted her sister, J.S.’s wife. J.S. then sent a series of text messages to S.S.’s mother. I found they conveyed a sense of guilt and desperation, and that he sent the messages which, among other things, asked for mercy, because he understood that S.S. had disclosed that he was sexually abusing her.

The Circumstances of the Defendant

9J.S. is a 38-year-old married father of four with no criminal record prior to his conviction in this case.

10A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was completed by Probation and Parole Officer Todd O’Flaherty (the “Officer”). The Officer interviewed J.S., his wife, J.S.’s sister, and two friends. S.S.’s family declined to be interviewed for the report.

11According to the PSR, J.S. was born in Afghanistan to a loving and supportive family with seven children. The family relocated to Pakistan when J.S. was four years old due to the civil war. They returned to Afghanistan in 2002. By the time J.S. was seven years old, he was helping in his father’s bakery and going to school part-time. J.S. also studied music. He completed high school in Afghanistan.

12In 2004, J.S. studied in Uzbekistan for two years. The family was not approved to migrate to Uzbekistan, so he returned to Afghanistan.

13In 2010, J.S. married his wife, S.S.’s aunt. They had a family connection; as I have noted, J.S.’s brother married his wife’s sister. J.S.’s wife came to Afghanistan from Canada for the wedding and then returned to Canada pregnant, while J.S. waited for permission to immigrate.

14J.S. received his visa to come to Canada in 2013. When he arrived, he and his wife lived for a time with S.S.’s mother. With support from a friend, he was able to buy a car and find a job. Everyone interviewed for the PSR described J.S. as a hard-working man who is committed to providing for his family.

15In Canada, J.S. worked in a convenience store, as a baker, and then for a person doing bathroom renovations. Eventually J.S. started his own bathroom renovation business. He was able to buy a house. He became a Canadian citizen.

16J.S. used to consume some alcohol socially, but no longer consumes any. He does not use recreational drugs.

17According to the PSR, J.S. was reported to be a good father to his four children. J.S. reported, but the Officer did not confirm, that the Children’s Aid Society interviewed his children, presumably due to the allegations made against him by S.S., but closed the case thereafter. J.S. has continued to live in the family home with his wife and four children. He leaves the house in compliance with his bail conditions to allow S.S.’s family to visit his wife and children.

18The Officer noted J.S. to be polite and cooperative. All of those interviewed for the PSR described J.S. as respectful, hard-working, a good father, and a generous person. His financial support of family was also mentioned. No one identified any areas of deficit where he could be supported, nor any behavioural concerns or mental health concerns.

19J.S. has a close and supportive network of friends and family. It appears that none were aware that he was committing the offences.

The Parties’ Positions

20The defence seeks an order staying the exposure conviction on the basis of the Kienapple principle. With respect to the conviction for sexual interference, the defence seeks a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

21The Crown seeks a sentence of 14 years in the penitentiary for the sexual interference charge, and a sentence of one year concurrent in respect of the exposure charge. The Crown denies that the Kienapple principle applies in this case.

Does the Kienapple principle apply?

22Before turning to the sentence, I must first determine whether the Kienapple principle applies such that I should stay the conviction for exposure. The Kienapple principle prevents multiple convictions for a single criminal matter.

23In R. v. Prince, 1986 CanLII 40 (SCC), at para. 17, the Court highlighted that Kienapple does not prohibit a multiplicity of convictions, each in respect of a different factual incident. It is thus “a sine qua non for the operation of the rule against multiple convictions that the offences arise from the same transaction.”

24To apply the Kienapple principle, there must be a degree of factual identity between the charges: Prince, at para. 17. At para. 20 of Prince, the Court indicated that, in most cases, the factual nexus requirement will be satisfied if there is an affirmative answer to the question: Does the same act of the accused ground each of the charges? The Court noted, however, that it will not always be easy to define when one act ends and another begins.

25Once it is established that the factual nexus between the charges is sufficient, it is necessary to determine whether there is sufficient legal nexus between the offences to sustain the rule in Kienapple: Prince, at paras. 22-23.

26The Court, at para. 31of Prince, acknowledged that the rule against multiple convictions in respect of the same cause, matter, or delict is subject to an expression of Parliamentary intent that more than one conviction be entered when offences overlap. The presence of additional, distinguishing elements is an expression of such an intent. “No element which Parliament has seen fit to incorporate into an offence and which has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt ought to be omitted from the offender’s accounting to society, unless that element is substantially the same as, or adequately corresponds to, an element in the other offence for which he or she has been convicted.”

27Where offences are of unequal gravity, Kienapple may bar a conviction for a lesser offence, provided that there are no distinct additional elements in the lesser offence: Prince, at para. 33.

28The defence argues that the Kienapple principle applies in this case because of the manner in which J.S. was charged. While acknowledging that exposure and sexual interference are separate offences under the Criminal Code, the defence argues that a single count of sexual interference was laid with respect to the time period from July 1, 2020 to June 27, 2021. I found that a number of acts occurred on multiple occasions during that time frame which were part of the sexual interference conviction. The defence argues that it is difficult to imagine a scenario where sexual interference involving penile penetration of the vagina is committed, but there is no exposure, given that penile penetration of the vagina necessarily involves exposing the penis. The defence argues that there is only one continuing act.

29The Crown argues that there is no factual nexus established. In the context of the exposure conviction, I found that J.S. forced S.S. to look at his penis while he put on the condom. I found that he forced her to look at his penis by holding her head with his hands. The Crown argues that this conduct is distinct from J.S.’s penile penetration of S.S.’s vagina.

30The Crown also argues that J.S. committed two distinct legal wrongs: first, penetrating S.S.’s vagina with his penis, and second, forcing S.S. to look at his penis. The Crown argues that the offences prohibit different consequences and are designed to protect different societal interests.

31Under s. 151 of the Criminal Code, the Crown was required to, and did, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.S. intentionally touched a part of S.S.’s body for a sexual purpose while knowing she was under the age of 16. In contrast, under s. 173(2) of the Criminal Code, the Crown was required to, and did, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.S. exposed his penis to S.S., a person under the age of 16 years, for a sexual purpose.

32Both offences involve a person under the age of 16 years, and conduct engaged in for a sexual purpose, but the element of J.S. exposing his penis is different than him touching S.S.’s body.

33In R. v. Rusk, 2021 ONCJ 343, the defendant was convicted of exposure and invitation to sexual touching relating to conduct wherein he asked the complainant if she wanted to see his penis and without waiting for a reply, pulled it out and showed it to her. He asked her to “give him a blow job.” She said no, and he put his penis back in his pants.

34In R. v. Wills, 2018 ONSC 1153, the defendant was convicted of exposure and invitation to sexual touching. In that case, the defendant exposed his penis to the victim and asked the victim to touch his penis. The victim declined.

35In my view, for the reasons below, the Kienapple principle does not apply in this case.

36First, exposure and sexual interference have different elements. Exposing a penis to a child is not a necessary element of sexual interference. Sexual interference can occur without exposure.

37Second, in this case there is no factual nexus between the offences; there is only a temporal nexus which is not sufficient. While I understand the defence’s argument that penile penetration of a vagina requires the penis to be exposed, as in outside of one’s clothes, that is not the same thing as exposing the penis to the victim. Exposure includes an element of making something visible. Sexual interference involving penile penetration can occur without exposure. For example, it could occur in a dark room. What makes the conduct distinct in this case is that J.S. forced S.S. against her will to look at his penis while he put on the condom. That is a factually separate indignity to S.S. that increased her feelings of confusion and shame.

38In these circumstances, Kienapple does not apply. Rather, J.S. must account to society for both wrongs, sexual interference and exposure.

The Principles of Sentencing

39 Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the objectives of sentencing as follows:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

40Pursuant to s. 718.1 of the Code, “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” Imposing a proportionate sentence is a highly individualized exercise, tailored to the gravity of the offence and the blameworthiness of the offender: R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 40.

41The sentencing judge must also consider:

a. any aggravating and mitigating factors, including those listed in s. 718.2(a)(i) to (vii) of the Code;

b. the principle of parity, in that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (s. 718.2(b));

c. the principle of totality, meaning that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh (s. 718.2(c)); and

d. the principle that courts should exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment (ss. 718.2(d) and (e)).

42The principles of parity and individualization mandate that a sentence must both be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences and highly individualized: s. 718.2(b); R. v. Parranto, [2021], 2021 SCC 46, 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 12.

43Recently, Nishikawa J. described the principles of sentencing that apply specifically to sexual offences against children in R v. F.S., 2025 ONSC 5372, at paras. 29-33 as follows:

29The sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence should be the main animating sentencing factors in cases involving the sexual abuse of children: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 101. Section 718.01 of the Code also directs that in cases involving the abuse of a person under the age of 18, sentencing courts must give “primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct” when imposing a sentence.

30In Friesen, at para. 114, the Supreme Court of Canada called for “substantial sentences” in cases involving child sexual abuse. The Supreme Court held that a proportionate sentence in cases of child sexual abuse must account for the weighty societal interest in protecting children and the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against them:

Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large: Friesen, at para. 5.

31The Supreme Court emphasized that sexual offences against children “always put children at risk of serious harm”, and held that sentences must recognize

(i) The inherent wrongfulness of these offences;

(ii) The potential harm to children that flows from these offences; and

(iii) The actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences: Friesen, at para. 76. [Emphasis added.]

32The fact that the victim is a child increases the offender's degree of responsibility. Put simply, the intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of children is highly morally blameworthy because children are so vulnerable: Friesen, at para. 90. The Court articulated that “substantial sentences” means that mid-single digit penitentiary sentences are the norm, and upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary sentences are not exceptional or rare: Friesen, at para. 114.

33In addition, it is an error to assess the degree of physical interference in terms of a hierarchy of acts because “there is no type of hierarchy of physical acts for the purposes of determining the degree of physical interference”: Friesen, at para. 146.

The Appropriate Range

44In seeking a sentence of 14 years, the Crown acknowledges that it does not have a similar case in which such a sentence was imposed. It argues it does not need one: Friesen signaled that sentences for sexual abuse of children must increase, and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary sentences are not exceptional or rare. The Crown provided a number of cases, of which two appear to support the Crown’s argument for a 14-year sentence most strongly.

45First, the Crown cites R. v. R.S., Ont. Sup. Ct. [unreported], June 29, 2023, where the victim was sexually abused from the age of 11 to the age of 23 or 24 by her stepfather. The abuse included vaginal and oral penetration and masturbation. The accused had been physically, sexually, and emotionally abusive towards the victim. The accused had no criminal record. He was in his 50s at the time of sentencing and had significant health issues. He received a sentence of 12 years.

46The Crown also cites R. v. A.C., Ont. Ct. J. [unreported], June 27, 2025. In that case, the accused was the victim’s biological father. He pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. The victim was between the ages of six and ten during the abuse. The abuse included vaginal penetration and attempted anal penetration. The accused’s prior criminal record was dated and unrelated to sexual offences. He received an 11-year sentence.

47The defence distinguishes the Crown’s cases noting, among other things, that the period of abuse in both R.S. and A.C. were longer. The defence notes that the court must always ensure a sentence is fit in the circumstances of the offence and the offender.

48The defence relies on case law, not so much to demonstrate support for its request for a conditional sentence of two years less a day, but to highlight the individual nature of the sentencing assessment. The defence argues that the decision in Friesen instructs that the range for sexual offences against children is generally in the mid-single digit range.

49The defence acknowledges that to pronounce a conditional sentence of two years less a day requires exceptional circumstances; it would otherwise be outside the appropriate sentencing framework identified in Friesen. It argues, however, that a conditional sentence is a sentence of imprisonment, and urges me to consider it for J.S., taking into account the context that he is the only financial support for his young family, and a financial support for his extended family abroad. In other words, a lot of people rely on him, and a conditional sentence would allow me to denounce J.S. and deter him and others from committing sexual offences against children, while not punishing those who rely on him.

50In effect, in asking me to depart from the range, the defence is asking me to consider the collateral consequences a significant carceral sentence would have, not just on him, but on his nuclear and extended family.

51In R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, the Court of Appeal provided some guidance on this subject. It characterized the challenge presented by the appeal, at para. 1, as “balancing the profound harm caused by sexual violence with the significant collateral consequences incarceration imposes on offenders and their families.”

52In D.B., the accused sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old co-worker. The Court of Appeal noted that the evidence at sentencing established that a penitentiary term was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offence, but it would also cause severe collateral consequences, including separating the offender from his spouse and their two children, eliminate the family’s sole source of income, and likely result in the loss of their home: at para. 1.

53At para. 2, the court held that denouncing and deterring sexual violence against young people under 18, which exploits their vulnerability and causes devastating harm, has to be prioritized, and a conditional sentence would not, in that case, achieve those objectives. However, the court also held, at para. 3, that in setting the length of the penitentiary sentence, the trial judge had to consider the collateral consequences for the offender and his family.

54The Court of Appeal reiterated settled principles governing collateral consequences that were defined by Moldaver J.A. in R v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, holding, at para. 12:

First, collateral consequences humanize and individualize sentencing by accounting for its effects other than the criminal sanction itself: Pham, at para. 19, quoting R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 158; see also Suter, at para. 48 n.2. These impacts can be severe. In Pham’s words, “[p]eople lose jobs; families are disrupted; sources of assistance disappear,” which “make[s] the rehabilitative path harder to travel,” hinders “future re-integration,” and can reduce the need for denunciation and deterrence: at para. 12 (quotation omitted); see also Suter, at para. 48 n.2. Likewise, Suter underscored that “a particular sentence [can] have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances”: at para. 48. Suter thus affirmed cases which recognize the heightened impact of collateral consequences on people who already face marginalization and disadvantage, including due to financial insecurity, mental health challenges, and precarious immigration status: at para. 56 (citing cases).

55The court then noted that considering collateral consequences is mandatory, not optional, because they enable the judge to craft a proportionate sentence: at para. 13. Moreover, collateral consequences are defined broadly to include any consequence arising from the commission of, conviction of, or sentence for, an offence, including common and foreseeable consequences such as the loss of work.

56The Court of Appeal, at para. 29, directed sentencing judges to do their best to consider family separation consequences with the information available to them, finding that evidence of the consequences need not “meet an onerous specificity threshold to be considered or to justify a sentence reduction” because “that would impose unnecessary evidentiary burdens.”

57In this case, the collateral consequences of a carceral sentence are significant. J.S. operates his own business. I can infer that the business will not be able to operate while he is incarcerated. J.S. is the sole financial support for his family, including four children. One of his children was born after J.S. was arrested in 2021, and so is very young. The other three are all younger than S.S., who herself is still a teenager. The family moved into their house in 2020. Given the circumstances of the family, I infer that the house is subject to a mortgage. It is possible that the family home will be lost without J.S.’s income.

58In addition to being the sole financial support for his young family, J.S. is a financial support to his extended family abroad. They too will suffer because of J.S.’s incarceration.

59Apart from the financial consequences, I can infer that J.S.’s wife and children will experience other forms of hardship from a carceral sentence. J.S.’s wife would be the single parent to four children, ranging across ages that can be challenging in different ways. The PSR reflects that J.S. is a good father, and that the Children’s Aid Society did not have concerns about the children in J.S.’s care (albeit that was not confirmed with the Children’s Aid Society). I infer that the children and J.S. will suffer emotionally from their family separation.

60Thus, when considering the appropriate range of sentence in this case, I must be alert to the collateral consequences of a carceral sentence on J.S. and his nuclear and extended family. I must also be alert to the guidance in Friesen that sentences for child sexual abuse must increase and must reflect the serious harm that child sexual abuse can and does cause. I also note again the guidance in Friesen that mid-digit penitentiary sentences are appropriate in cases of child sexual assault, and upper single digit and double-digit sentences for such offences are not rare or exceptional.

Aggravating Factors

61 Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code identifies circumstances that are statutorily recognized to be aggravating, some of which apply in this case.

62First, under s. 718.2(a)(ii.1), it is aggravating that S.S. was under 18 when J.S. sexually abused her.

63Second, under s. 718.2(a)(ii), it is aggravating that J.S. abused a member of his family.

64Third, under s. 718.2(a)(iii), it is an aggravating factor that J.S. abused a position of trust in relation to S.S. As her uncle, and as a “big man in the family,” J.S. abused a position of trust in relation to S.S. when he sexually abused her. In Friesen, at para. 126, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “a child will likely suffer more harm from sexual violence where there is a closer relationship and a higher degree of trust between the child and the offender.” Moreover, a breach of trust increases the offender’s degree of responsibility and is especially morally blameworthy: Friesen, at para. 129.

65Fourth, under s. 718(2)(a)(iii.1), it is aggravating where there is evidence that the offence has a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances. Although neither S.S. nor anyone in her immediate family provided a Victim Impact Statement, at trial I heard evidence from S.S. about how she was and is impacted by the sexual abuse.

66In this case, S.S. was between 11 and 12 when the abuse occurred. She gave evidence of how she felt confused and upset by J.S.’s actions. She testified to having experienced physical pain. She explained that she was worried for her aunt and cousins, and did not want to be the reason their life was ruined if J.S. went to jail. She testified that her mother was crying when she found out about the sexual abuse, so S.S. tried to smile so that her mother would not feel bad. Although none of the consequences of J.S.’s actions on S.S.’s mother, aunt, or cousins are her fault, she felt she was shouldering the responsibility. She also testified that she is not interested in men at all.

67The consequences of the sexual abuse to S.S. are the type of consequences the Court in Friesen referred to, at para. 58. J.S.’s sexual abuse of S.S. has interfered with her self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood.

68Fifth, the duration of the sexual abuse lasted 9 to 10 months, and there were multiple instances of it. Moreover, the sexual abuse became increasingly intrusive as the degree of physical interference of S.S.’s body by J.S. grew. This was not an isolated act, but repeated abuse, each instance of which added to S.S.’s trauma.

69Sixth, the sexual assault included elements of physical violence and threats, including J.S. telling S.S. to shut up, covering her mouth, pinning her down, and threatening her to keep her from disclosing the abuse. It also included elements of embarrassment and humiliation, such as when he intruded on her while she was naked in the shower to watch her.

70Seventh, given the closeness of the two families, when J.S. abused S.S. in his home, he was abusing her in a place where she spent a lot of time surrounded by people with an obligation to keep her safe, and where she should have felt safe and comfortable. This is an aggravating factor because J.S. harmed S.S.’s sense of security in an environment that was like her home.

71Eighth, at times J.S. abused S.S. while she was sleeping. Abusing a sleeping child is abusing a helpless child. The fright and confusion of a child waking up to abuse will be heightened. A child who feels unsafe when they are sleeping cannot find security in rest: Friesen, at para. 178.

Mitigating Factors

72It is a mitigating factor that J.S. has no prior criminal record. However, as the Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29, at para. 95, “the mitigating effect of a blameless record is appropriate to an isolated criminal act or one that is committed on the spur of the moment, but the lack of a record loses much of its force when the offending is repeated and occurs over a lengthy period of time.”

73It is a mitigating factor that J.S. is a hard-working member of society.

Application

74As I have stated in these reasons, I am required to give primary consideration to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence and recognize the need for substantial sentences for sexual offences against children. At the same time, I must bear in mind the collateral consequences of a carceral sentence in order to ensure that the sentence I pronounce is fit.

75In this case, the moral blameworthiness of J.S. is high. He repeatedly sexually abused his niece, who was just 11 and 12 years old. The degree of physical interference with S.S.’s bodily and sexual integrity was very high. It included multiple incidents of penile penetration, physical force to restrain her and keep her quiet, and threats to keep her from reporting the abuse. J.S. occupied a position of trust in S.S.’s life and in her family. He made her feel responsible for the damage and pain his actions would cause her mother, her aunt, and her cousins if it were discovered. He has interfered with her development into a healthy and autonomous adult.

76The sentence proposed by the defence is manifestly unfit. It is not proportionate to the seriousness of J.S.’s offences or their impact on S.S. Nor is it consistent with the law, or society’s understanding of the harms wrought by the sexual abuse of children.

77At the same time, the sentence the Crown seeks is too long, especially in view of the collateral consequences of a carceral sentence in this case on J.S.’s nuclear and extended family.

78Based on all of circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors I describe above, and applying the principles of totality and restraint, I find an appropriate sentence is as follows:

a. For the conviction for sexual interference: 6 years.

b. For the conviction for exposure: 1 year concurrent.

Ancillary Orders

79The Crown requested a number of ancillary orders, most of which were not contested, or are mandatory. One issue between the parties was whether the SOIRA order should be for life or for twenty years, the answer to which turned on the question of whether the conviction for exposure ought to be stayed.

80I have not stayed the conviction for exposure. As a result, the SOIRA order shall be for life.

81The other issue that arose relates to the Crown’s request for an order under s. 161(1) of the Criminal Code to prohibit J.S. from being in the presence of anyone under the age of 16 unless in the company of someone over the age of 18, and to prohibit J.S. from attending any public park, or public swimming area, where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre.

82Although originally not generally objected to, at the pronouncement of sentence, the defence raised the hardship that such an order would cause to J.S., given that he is the parent to four children, in respect of which no allegations of improper behaviour have been levied. It also notes that there is no indication that J.S. has ever behaved inappropriately in public. The defence argues that a two-year period for a s. 161(1) order is sufficient.

83The Crown seeks a twenty-year order under s. 161(1), arguing that based on my findings, other children, including J.S.’s own, are at risk because J.S. is sexually attracted to children.

84I agree that a twenty-year order under s. 161(1) is warranted. A lengthy period advances the goal of deterring child sexual abuse and recognizes the substantial harm to children and society caused by child sexual abuse. The inconveniences that such an order may cause to J.S.’s family are outweighed by the need to protect his and other children from potential harm.

Disposition

85J.S. is sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for the conviction for sexual interference, and one year for the conviction for exposure, to run concurrently.

86The following ancillary orders shall be made:

a. Pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code, a DNA order;

b. Pursuant to s. 490.012(1) and s. 490.012(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, an order to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2007, c. 10, for life;

c. Pursuant to s. 743.21(a) of the Criminal Code, an order not to communicate with S.S. for the duration of the sentence;

d. Pursuant to s. 161(1) of the Criminal Code, an order not to, for a period of twenty years after his release from prison:

i. Seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether remunerated or not, or become a volunteer where it involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under the age of 16 years;

ii. Be within 200 m of anywhere S.S. is known to live, work, worship, attend school, or otherwise known to be;

iii. Attend any public park, or public swimming area, where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre;

iv. To be in the presence of any person under the age of 16 unless in the company of a person over the age of 18.

e. Under s. 109 of the Criminal Code, not to possess any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years after his release from imprisonment.

J.T. Akbarali J.

Released: February 11, 2026

CITATION: R. v. J.S., 2026 ONSC 830

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-40000001

DATE: 20260211

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

– and –

J.S.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

J.T. Akbarali J.

Released: February 11 2026

R. v. J.S., 2026 ONSC 830

Case Summary

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Overview

The Circumstances of the Offences

The Circumstances of the Defendant

The Parties’ Positions

Does the Kienapple principle apply?

The Principles of Sentencing

The Appropriate Range

Aggravating Factors

Mitigating Factors

Application

Ancillary Orders

Disposition

CITATION: R. v. J.S., 2026 ONSC 830

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

R. v. J.S., 2026 ONSC 830

Case Summary

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Overview

The Circumstances of the Offences

The Circumstances of the Defendant

The Parties’ Positions

Does the Kienapple principle apply?

The Principles of Sentencing

The Appropriate Range

Aggravating Factors

Mitigating Factors

Application

Ancillary Orders

Disposition

CITATION: R. v. J.S., 2026 ONSC 830

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT