CITATION: Bigras v. L’Abbe, 2026 ONSC 788

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-167

DATE: 2026/02/13

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Jessica Bigras, Applicant

AND:

Bruce L’Abbe, Respondent

BEFORE: SOMJI J

COUNSEL: M. Peter Sammon, counsel for the Applicant Christopher Deeble, counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: December 2 and 4, 2025

RE: RULING ON WHETHER MOTION BROUGHT IMPROPERLY

Overview

1The Applicant mother, Ms. Bigras, brings a motion seeking a finding that the Respondent father, Mr. L’Abbe, was in breach of a Final Parenting Order issued by Justice Minnema on November 21, 2024, related to their child B.L., aged 7 (“Final Order”). Should the court find there was a breach, the Applicant seeks relief pursuant to Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLR”), namely that the court issue a further Temporary Order with more specific and clear terms that serve to ensure the father will comply with the Final Order. The mother’s Notice of Motion was filed on October 20, 2025, under Form 14 (hereinafter referred to as the “Motion”).

2The father opposes the Motion. His counsel, who was recently retained, made a preliminary argument that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter because the Motion was improperly filed under Form 14. The father argues that in proposing additional terms, the mother is effectively seeking to change the Final Order and consequently, she should have brought a Motion to Change the Final Order based on a material change in circumstances under Form 15. Alternatively, if this court finds the matter can proceed by way of a Form 14 motion, the father argues that he has not breached the Final Order, and no further remedy is required.

3On December 4, 2025, relying principally on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, 63 R.F.L. (8th) 257, I made a preliminary ruling with oral reasons. I found that the mother could proceed by way of a Form 14 motion because she does not seek to change the Final Order but seeks to rely on the remedies available under Rule 1(8) for enforcement of the Final Order.

4Following my decision, the parties made further submissions. This decision address the merits of the Motion. The issues to be decided are as follows:

a. Did the father breach the terms of the Final Order with respect to information sharing and joint decision-making, and if so, is the proposed remedy appropriate pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

b. Did the father breach the terms of the Final Order by failing to support the child’s participation and attendance at extracurricular activities? If so, is the proposed remedy appropriate pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

c. Did the father breach the terms of the Final Order by failing to pay s. 7 expenses, and if so, is the proposed remedy appropriate pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

Issue 1: Did the father breach the Final Order with respect to information sharing and joint decision-making and if so, is the proposed remedy appropriate pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

5The Final Order states the parties shall make decisions related to their child’s health and wellbeing jointly. It further states that the parties shall engage in a discussion and/or mediation, share information and perspectives, and make best efforts to reach a decision. If after consultation a decision cannot be reached, the parties shall either follow the advice of a professional, or if a professional is not involved, the mother will have final say. More specifically, paragraph 2 of the Final Order reads:

When an important decision needs to be made for the child, [name], the parties shall engage in discussion and/or mediation, with a sharing of information and perspectives. They shall use best efforts to reach consensus when making the decision. If despite best efforts they are unable to reach consensus, the parties shall follow the reasonable advice and recommendations of the professional involved (i.e. Doctor, dentist, counsellor, educational provider, etc.). If no professional is involved, the final decision will be made by the Applicant mother, Jessica Bigras

with adequate notice, in writing to the Respondent, Bruce L'Abbe who shall be permitted to have the issue determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, if deemed necessary.

6The mother alleges that the father is not communicating with her on decisions involving the child. She provides two examples. The first is the father’s failure to communicate with her about the child’s dental appointments. The mother states that the child has acid reflux and consequently, it is very important that he regularly attend for his dental appointments. She provided the father with multiple notices of the child’s dentist appointment on December 17, 2024. He agreed to be there, but then did not show up to the appointment. He then later booked another appointment, for March 5, 2025, almost three months later, without notifying or discussing the matter with her. He also informed her that he will make his own appointments for the child on his time, and that she is “not allowed” to attend any such appointments or be advised about them.

7The father alleges that he was simply unable to attend one of the dental appointments and it had to be rescheduled. Not wanting to create a dispute between him and the mother, he simply rescheduled the appointment, and the dental procedure was completed the next time he attended. He does not understand why this was a point of contention. The father notes that he has already spent $5,800 for the child’s dental care, including for a root canal due to poorly managed dental hygiene in the child’s first five years, which he claims is the mother’s fault.

8The father also admits in his affidavit dated October 23, 2025, that:

I find it extremely difficult to communicate with Ms. Bigras and would rather not communicate unless it is for emergency purposes. A mediator or councillor once per month may assist in a smoother more controlled communication process.

9I find the father did breach the Final Order with respect to his requirement to share information and make decisions jointly. While the father claims he was diligent in rescheduling the missed appointment, it was made for almost three months later which can be a long time if the child requires regular check ups. The father offers no explanation for why he did not contact or inform the mother about the missed or rescheduled appointment. On the contrary, in his text message to the mother, he states that he does not want to be with her at the dental office at the same time, that she should communicate through his father going forward, and that he will no longer answer any of the mother’s texts. Consequently, I find this is not a situation of the father

being unable to attend one particular appointment as he suggests in his affidavit, but rather a deliberate attempt by the father to bypass the mother on the management of the child’s dental care.

10The father’s counsel suggests that this is a high-conflict file, and the mother has not met the onus of establishing breaches. I disagree. The father’s own admission of his unwillingness to communicate with the mother corroborates the mother’s claims that the father has not been communicating with her about issues related to the child’s health and wellbeing. The Final Order was issued on the basis of Minutes of Settlement. If the father desired joint decision-making, then he would have understood that this would entail communication with the mother. If he was unwilling to communicate with her within months, if not weeks, of the Final Order being issued, he ought not to have consented to this term as part of the Final Order. He also did not seek to appeal the Final Order.

11In this regard, it is important to note that the parties were engaged in six years of litigation before they were able to secure a consent Final Order. The mother is not inclined to incur further litigation costs and for this reason, has chosen an avenue of relief that allows for enforcement of the Final Order. The father was represented by counsel at the time he agreed to the terms of the Final Order. He would have been aware of and understood the obligations that arose from joint decision-making. He cannot now unilaterally ignore the term. If he wishes to change the Final Order, then the onus is on him to bring such a motion. He has not done so. Instead, the burden has fallen on the mother to ensure his compliance to ensure the child’s personal, physical, emotional, and developmental needs are met.

12The Final Order allows for mediation in the event of disagreement. While the father’s suggestion for a mediator or councillor once a month is a positive suggestion, there are some practical challenges. First, the mother’s counsel points out that parenting coordinators are not easy to access in the Pembroke area and it is unclear if one would be readily available. Second, it is unclear if the father would be willing to incur these costs. As discussed below, the father has not respected all his financial obligations relating to the child and has explained that he has been unable to do so because of his other financial commitments and reduced work hours.

13In addition, while some major decisions relating to the child could benefit from the assistance of a mediator, having to see a mediator to make decisions around the child’s attendance

at various appointments and daily activities is costly and unworkable given these decisions have to be made quickly. If the father feels he is unable to communicate with the mother and joint decision-making is unworkable, I agree with the father’s counsel that there may be a benefit to each parent having spheres of decision-making responsibility. However, that would require a significant change in the decision-making responsibilities of the parents and the father has not sought a Motion to change the Final Order.

14Rule 1(8) provides:

1(8) If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including:

(a) an order for costs;

(b) an order dismissing a claim;

(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;

(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;

(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;

(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and

(g) on motion, a contempt order. [emphasis mine].

[15] Where a party has breached a court order, Rule1(8) allows for the court to make any order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter. The itemized list is not exclusive and provides judges broad discretion to make orders it considers necessary to fully address non- compliance: Bouchard at paras 49-51. Courts have ordered a variety of remedies for breach of parenting orders including, as proposed by mother’s counsel, the imposition of a temporary order with terms that would facilitate compliance of an existing parenting order: C v. S, 2023 ONSC 2551, at para. 63; Dunn v. Shaw, 2021 ONSC 8286, at paras. 32-33; KM v. JR, 2024 ONSC 1338,

at paras. 255, 259-260.

16In this case, the mother seeks the following term in a Temporary Order to facilitate compliance with the information sharing and decision-making component of the Final Order:

A. That medical and dental appointments for B.L. shall be discussed and agreed upon by the parties, and failing agreement, shall be arranged by the mother who shall notify the father of the date and time of such appointment. The parent that has the child in his or her care at the time of the appointment shall ensure the child attends at the appointment.

B. Both parents may attend at B.L.'s medical or dental appointments.

17I find the proposed provisions do not seek to change the Final Order and both parents continue to have joint decision-making. The proposed terms simply complement the Final Order by making clear what each parent’s responsibilities are, as it relates to the child’s dental care. There will be a Temporary Order incorporating the relief requested.

18The mother provides a second example of the father’s unwillingness to abide by and follow through on joint decisions. In 2025, school professionals advised the parents that their child is not meeting the recommended reading comprehension standard and sent the mother a notice recommending the child attend summer school to assist him with his literacy development. The program would have been for half days in the morning for three weeks in July. However, the father refused to engage with the mother on any discussion regarding the child’s attendance at summer school or adjust his vacation schedule to allow the child to attend such programming.

19The father takes the position that the child does well in French and math and that while he may not be excelling in English, he otherwise has a decent report card. The father believes the email regarding summer school went to all children, and he did not think attendance was necessary. He explained he could not accommodate the summer schedule in 2025 because he had already booked a trip to Prince Edward Island with his son and could not change it. He offered, in his text to the mother, to get the child a tutor instead. However, there is no evidence that he did so.

20The father indicated at the motion hearing that he is amenable to the child attending summer school next year if the problem persists. He suggests that the month of August be kept free so that he can organize his holiday time accordingly with the child.

21The father is agreeable to the term proposed by the mother on a Temporary Order that obliges him to follow the recommendations of the school regarding education but argues that both parents should have the same obligation.

22Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the following term will be ordered as part of a Temporary Order to facilitate the parties’ ability to make decisions around their child’s education jointly.

In the event that the child’s teachers or educational advisors recommend tutoring or summer school for the child, the parents shall comply with the recommendation unless both parents agree that such a recommendation is not in their child’s best interest.

If the child is enrolled in any educational programming, both parents will ensure the child attends during their respective parenting time.

The parties will discuss by April 30th of each year what summer programming and/or camps the child intends to attend and shall organize their summer parenting time with the child to accommodate for such summer programming.

In making decisions around the child’s summer schedule, the parents shall take into consideration the child’s wishes and interests as well as the parties’ respective work schedules.

Issue 2: Did the father breach the terms of the Final Order by failing to support the child’s participation and attendance at extracurricular activities? If so, is the proposed remedy appropriate pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

23Paragraph seven of the Final Order provides: “…The parties shall ensure that the child is able to attend all schedule[d] extracurricular activities and events. Currently, extracurricular activities for B.L. include Hockey and Soccer.” The mother explains that the provision was specifically worded to ensure the father understood which activities were important to the child, which activities the parents agreed the child would attend, and to ensure that the father took the child to those agreed upon activities during his designated parenting time.

24However, the father often refused to take the child to hockey or soccer practices during his parenting time in 2024-2025. The child missed eight hockey games and a final year-end event for the team. The mother attended the event to collect the child’s prizes. He also missed all his summer soccer practices and games while in the father’s care in 2024.

25The father’s explanation for the refusal to attend these activities at the time was that he “can’t afford the gas” to drive the child to and from the activities. The mother filed a text message from the father indicating this. As the mother notes, the father went on extended vacations both within and out of province. Since the Final Order was issued, he has gone fishing to Bryson Lake in Quebec twice; travelled to PEI for a Blue Nose trip for a week; to Kingston a few times; to Toronto for a Blue Jays game; to the CN Tower; to Quebec City to a water park for a several days; and took a boat tour of the 1000 Islands – and these are only the trips the mother is aware of.

26The mother also notes that the father could “afford” to purchase a side-by-side all-terrain vehicle, insure it, and keep it gassed up ready for use, but will not incur the costs to drive his son from his new, recently-built home to the hockey rink or soccer field. According to the mother, the child is hurt by the father’s conduct, particularly having to miss the year-end hockey event, and doesn’t understand why he is unable to go to hockey or soccer when he is with his father. Furthermore, the mother submitted at the motion hearing that if the father had reduced hours at work and was concerned about gas costs, he never sought assistance with driving. He simply did not take the child to the activity.

27The father does not dispute that he has breached this term of the Final Order in 2024 during the child’s 2024-2025 hockey season. He states that he did not attend games to avoid confrontation with the mother. He also states that he did not know of the end of year party. I do not accept the father’s evidence on this point. Most children’s hockey programs have schedules to keep parents informed of all practices, games, and team events, and I understand in this case that the father had downloaded a hockey App that would have informed him of the event in question.

28The father provided no explanation for why the child missed his soccer practices. In his text message to the mother where she asks him to take the child to his Wednesday practice, the father replies, “I told you I can’t afford it I’m hardly working and it cost you don’t listen it’s 20 minutes each way and my car is almost done I have to worry about other more life Critical things than soccer.” When the mother offered to drive, the father replied, “Just forget about it it’s not fair that you but me in these situations…” and “whatever do it on your days pick something you can do when he is with you like I did skiing.”

29The father states that since the 2025-2026 hockey season commenced, he has ensured the child’s attendance at hockey practices and games and has coordinated with the child’s maternal grandfather to assist where necessary.

30Upon review of the materials filed and submissions of counsel, I am satisfied that the father breached the term of the Final Order related to his obligation to ensure the child’s attendance at extracurricular activities. The Final Order was entered on consent in November 2024, during the child’s hockey season. The father would have been well aware of his obligations to ensure the child’s attendance to both hockey practices and games and if he could not meet that obligation because of financial challenges (i.e. slower construction season in the winter) or for any other reason, he ought not to have come to that agreement or should have determined a parenting schedule that would not interfere with the child’s activities.

31Furthermore, his text messages to the mother in relation to attending soccer demonstrates complete disdain for the parties’ agreement that they would enroll the child in two activities and both would take the child to those activities. Presumably, these activities were selected because the child enjoys them. The father’s text response does not appear to take his child’s preferences or wishes into account, suggesting each parent should just do whatever they want on their own time, contrary to what the parties agreed to.

32Finally, with respect to the father’s financial challenges, paragraph 14 of the Final Order makes provision for the parties to exchange income tax information annually by June 1st of each year and vary support accordingly without the need for court intervention unless the parties dispute the change. There is no evidence before me that this occurred in the summer of 2025, several months before the motion hearing date. There is no evidentiary basis to find the father could not afford to take his child to his soccer games and practices.

33I find that in these circumstances, the mother’s request for the following term in a Temporary Order is an appropriate remedy for the breach, pursuant to r. 1(8):

As provided for in paragraph 7 of the Final Order, the father shall ensure that the child attends all hockey games and practices, and all soccer games and practices, during the father's parenting time, without fail, except where the mother agrees in advance that the child is ill or injured and unable to attend a game or practice

because of such illness or injury. Both parents may attend at any of the child’s hockey or soccer games or practices.

Issue 3: Did the father breach the terms of the Final Order by failing to pay s. 7 expenses, and if so, is the proposed remedy appropriate remedy pursuant to Rule 1(8)?

34The father presently pays monthly child support in the amount of $958/month on his 2023 income of $105,971. He was also ordered to pay child support arrears of $14,475 minus any overpayments as part of the Final Order. It is unclear what of this has been paid. The provision makes clear that the failure to pay support has been an ongoing concern.

35The mother’s income is considerably less, and section 7 expenses are shared proportionately. Paragraph 12 of the Final Order provides:

…The parties shall share the child's section 7 expenses in proportion to their respective incomes with the Respondent's proportion being 70% and the Applicant's portion being 30%. Expenses include reasonable childcare for the purposes of education, employment or illness, medical/dental not covered by benefits and agreed upon extracurriculars in addition to hockey and soccer (which are agreed upon). Consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

36The mother alleges that the father failed to pay for the two activities – hockey and soccer, which he agreed to. The father’s share of the soccer registration for 2025 was $105 and $437.50 for the 2025-2026 hockey season . The father complained to the mother that he is paying too much in child support and “can’t afford” these special expenses notwithstanding that his share is based proportionate to his income.

37In addition, the father has refused to pay for the child’s extra school fees such as for school trips. He refuses to provide the child money for pizza or milk at school or participate in any way with school fundraisers. The father has little interest in discussing with the mother matters related to the child’s well-being and best interests and is hostile to her when she tries to engage in such discussions. The mother feels the father harbors deep seated resentment towards her because he has to pay child support.

38The father indicated that his hours were cut resulting in a reduced income. He also has four other children from another marriage and pays child support for a 19-year-old daughter who is currently attending Algonquin College. He notes that he had to pay lawyer fees after the parties

were in court with respect to the Final Order. He also suggests that he was under the impression that hockey was being paid for by the paternal maternal grandfather.

39At the motion hearing, the father acknowledged he has now paid the outstanding hockey and soccer expenses.

40The father denies in his affidavit that he is “hostile” to the mother because he simply does not communicate with her and communicates directly with teachers and professionals. I find this statement problematic given that the parenting conditions he consented to in November 2024 require him to engage in discussions with the mother about the child. As already noted, if it is not his intention to communicate with the mother, he ought not to have consented to conditions requiring discussion, information sharing, and joint decision-making.

41I find the father did breach the Final Order by failing to pay for his proportionate share of the s. 7 expenses. While the mother might solicit the assistance of her parents to pay for her proportionate share of expenses, particularly if the father is not paying his, that does not absolve the father of responsibility to pay for his share.

42Furthermore, given the father failed to pay his portion of s. 7 expenses within months of the Final Order and his willingness to finally pay only after the mother initiated an enforcement motion, I find that both child support and s. 7 expenses shall be enforced by the Director of Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) as proposed by the mother. I note that paragraph 15 of the Final Order allows for enforcement of support by FRO and agree that this can include s. 7 expenses.

43I find the additional term proposed by the mother as part of a Temporary Order is appropriate relief pursuant to Rule 1(8) to ensure the father’s compliance with the Final Order.

Specifically with respect to special expenses for the child’s extracurricular activities of hockey and soccer, as provided for in paragraph 10 of the Final Order, the father shall pay to the mother his proportionate share of 70% of such expenses within 30 days of being provided copies of the receipts of the payment of such expenses. In the event the father fails to pay his proportionate share of such expenses within this 30 day period, in addition to any other remedy the mother may have, the mother may enforce such outstanding payment through the Director, Family Responsibility Office, in the same manner as child support, by filing an affidavit with the Director, attaching copies of the receipts and setting out the

failure of the father to comply with this order (and the Final Order) on payment of these special expenses.

Order

44The mother’s request for a Temporary Order is granted. Counsel for the mother will provide a Draft Order consistent with this decision.

Costs

The mother is the successful party on the motion and presumptively entitled to costs. The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs. If the parties cannot resolve the issue of costs for this proceeding, they may file brief written submissions not exceeding two pages exclusive of Bills of Costs. The mother shall file her submissions by February 27, 2026 and the father shall file his submissions by March 13, 2026. Costs submissions are to be sent to scj.assistants@ontario.ca and to my attention.

Somji J.

Date: February 13, 2026

CITATION: Bigras v. L’Abbe, 2026 ONSC 788

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-167

DATE: 2026/02/13

BETWEEN:

Jessica Bigras

– and –

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Applicant

Bruce L’Abbe

Respondent