SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ADAN McINTOSH, Applicant
AND:
ANITA KIM, Respondent
BEFORE: JUSTICE K. SAH
COUNSEL: Both parties, self-represented
HEARD: January 16, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1In his Notice of Motion dated November 4, 2025, the respondent father (the “father”) brings a motion seeking that I be recused. His factum and oral submissions confirm that he asks that I be recused from hearing motions and trials in this proceeding and other proceedings involving the parties.
2On April 22, 2025, RSJ Firestone issued endorsements in the following court files: FS-20-00016188, FS-19-00012193, FS-19-00012193-0001, FS-20-00015651, FS-20-00015654, FS-20-00015656. These endorsements state: “In light of the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Kim v. McIntosh, 2023 ONCA 356 released May 18, 2023, and in keeping with the court’s duty to promote the primary objectives of the Family Law Rules (see: rr.2(2) – 2(5)), any motions brought in this proceeding shall be determined in Toronto, by Justice Kiran Sah.”
3Pursuant to the endorsement of Diamond J. dated December 2, 2025, made under court file FS-20-00016188-0001, a motion under those matters was set to be argued before me. As stated by Diamond J. “[w]hile this proceeding was not technically “caught” by the terms of the Endorsements of Regional Senior Justice Firestone, Justice Sah is clearly the judge who is most familiar with the facts giving rise to the dispute(s) between the parties, and it is in the interests of justice for Justice Sah to hear the motion with a view to guarding against a potential multiplicity of findings, and having regard to the current late-year scarcity of judicial resources in the Toronto region”.
4On consent, the decision of this court, in the court file, on this recusal motion applies equally and will be duplicated into the six above noted court files.
Legal Principles Considered
5It is appropriate for a judge to recuse himself or herself where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. In Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, at para. 58, the Supreme Court of Canada defined bias or prejudice as:
[A] leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition towards one side or another or a particular result. In its application to legal proceedings, it represents a predisposition to decide an issue or cause in a certain way which does not leave the judicial mind perfectly open to conviction. Bias is a condition or state of mind which sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable to exercise his or her functions impartially in a particular case.
6Recusal cases are, by necessity, very fact specific: McMurter v. McMurter, 2018 ONSC 7604, at para. 32.
7Judges are presumed to be impartial and the test for apprehension of bias establishes a high threshold. It requires that any apprehension of bias be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons. It asks “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly”: R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 31; McMurter v. McMurter, 2020 ONCA 772, at para. 26; Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at para. 20.
8The test contains a two-fold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable, and the apprehension of bias must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case: R. v. S. (R.D.), at para. 111.
9A reasonable person is one who has knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including knowledge of the judicial process and the nature of judging: Rogerson v. Havergal, 2020 ONSC 2164, at para. 31.
10In Wewaykum, at paras. 60 and 77, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge may be recused where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias. Bias, in this context, is evidenced by a predisposition to decide a matter in a certain way that does not leave the judicial mind open and impartial: Wewaykum, at para. 58.
11There is a strong presumption that a judge will carry out their oath of office by conducting themselves impartially. The onus on the moving party must establish that the judge suffers from “a condition or state of mind which sways judgment and renders the judicial officer unable to exercise his or her functions impartially in a particular case”: R. v. S. (R.D.), at para. 106. In other words, the moving party must demonstrate that the judge has conducted himself or herself in a way that raises a perceived or real apprehension of bias: Stephenson v. Corporation of the Town of Gravenhurst, 2012 ONSC 5368, at para. 11.
12When considering whether a judge’s presumption of impartiality has been displaced, it is necessary to consider the actions or comments of the judge in the context of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Comments or conduct must not be considered in isolation: R. v. S. (R.D.), at para. 137; Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner v. MacDonald, 2009 ONCA 805, 255 O.A.C. 376, at para. 42.
13The threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. An allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice. Where reasonable grounds to make such an allegation arise, counsel must be free to fearlessly raise such allegations. This is a serious step that should not be undertaken lightly: McMurter (2018), at para. 35; CAS v. J.J., C.M. and Six Nations of the Grand River, 2021 ONSC 1654, at para. 24.
14Allegations or suspicions alone are insufficient. The facts must be addressed carefully in light of the entire context. There are no shortcuts: Wewaykum, at para. 77.
15Specifically in the context of family law proceedings, where parties may appear in court repeatedly, judicial continuity is recognized as promoting both efficiency and fairness: McMurter (2020), at para. 31.
Issue
16The issue to be determined is as follows:
- Has the father met his onus of establishing that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, think it is more likely than not that I, whether unconsciously or consciously, would not decide the matter fairly?
Analysis
17The father submits that I have released numerous endorsements in this matter since being appointed case management judge by Regional Senior Justice Firestone on April 22, 2025.
18For clarity, on April 22, 2025, RSJ Firestone released six endorsements on courts files FS-20-00016188, FS-19-00012193, FS-19-00012193-0001, FS-20-00015651, FS-20-00015654, FS-20-00015656. As set out in para. 2 above, RSJ Firestone ordered that any motions brought shall be determined by me. RSJ Firestone did not appointed me as the case management judge.
19I have released endorsements in relation to motions argued on July 15, 2025, and September 11, 2025. The father asserts that I have twice ruled in the mother’s favour and that I have taken no steps that benefit him. The father’s submissions regarding my conduct on both motions will be reviewed below.
20In his affidavit sworn October 28, 2025, the father deposes that I received an email from Justice Shore on or around January 12, 2021.
21I did not receive any such email from Justice Shore, contrary to what is suggested in the father’s October 28, 2025, affidavit. This is consistent with the father’s own admission in his affidavit sworn January 8, 2026, where he states: “The sole reason Justice Sah was appointed to this matter is because she was not sitting in the Toronto Superior Court when Justice Shore sent the email and did not receive it.”
Motion Argued July 15, 2025
22The father deposes that the July motion was originally fixed in February 2025 to be heard on March 6, but that I refused to hear the matter for over six months.
23The parties' July 15, 2025, appearance occurred on the backdrop of the following.
24The father brought an urgent 14B motion, in writing, on notice to the mother. His form 14B motion was served on the mother on July 4, 2025.
25The father asked for an order that the mother immediately return one of their children to his care. In addition, he asked for an order that the child not be removed from Ontario.
26When the motion was directed to my attention, the time frame for the mother to reply to the 14B motion had not expired. As such the mother’s position was not known. I adjourned the matter to a date to be reviewed in chambers to determine the issue or to set it down for argument in court. All of this was set out in my endorsement date of July 7, 2025.
27The father submits that I acted contrary to the endorsement of Hood J. dated December 2, 2021 (the “Hood J. order”).
28The Hood J. order was in response to a 14B motion brought by the mother to dismiss the father’s motion returnable December 7, 2021.
29The father submits that Hood J. granted the mother's 14B motion relief without allowing him any response.
30Hood J. dealt with a different 14B at a different time. Hood J.’s endorsement, findings, and disposition does not preclude me from applying the Family Law Rules as I deem appropriate to the case that was before me.
31Subrule 2(4) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “FLR”) requires the court to apply the rules in a way that promotes their primary objective and to deal with cases justly.
32Subrule 2(5) requires the court to promote the primary objectives by active case management. This subrule sets out that the court can set timetables or otherwise control the progress of a case.
33Subrule 1(7.2) provides that, for the purpose of promoting the primary objectives of the FLR, the court may make orders, giving such directions or imposing such conditions respecting procedural matters as are just. This includes ordering that oral evidence be presented, or that any oral evidence be subject to a time limit.
34The FLR explicitly provides the court with the jurisdiction to make procedural orders that promote and encourage case management.
35An informed and reasonable observer, familiar with the judicial process, the role of a judge, and the jurisdiction defined by the FLR, would not conclude that I acted contrary to the FLR or in any way that compromised my impartiality.
36The father has not demonstrated that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and considering it fully, would conclude that it is more likely than not that I am unable to decide the case fairly on this basis.
37In his factum, the father then refers to an endorsement made by Audet J. dated May 26, 2022, which he claims was an appeal of the Hood J order.
38The father provided the court with Audet J.’s endorsement. Audet J. concluded that the father’s motion for leave to appeal the Hood J. order was moot since the proceeding was now subject to a final order and therefore, the operative part of the Hood J. order had no continuing force.
39The father failed to establish how the Audet J. endorsement connects to his claims on this motion. He has not demonstrated that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and considering it fully, would conclude that it is more likely than not that I am unable to decide the case fairly on this basis.
40On July 8, 2025, I issued another endorsement. The mother had emailed the court. She was cautioned about the inappropriateness of such conduct and the parties were referred to r. 1(12.2) of the FLR.
41On July 8, 2025, I concluded that there was expected opposition to the father’s motion and directed the parties to appear before me the following week, on July 15, 2025.
42Given the alleged urgency and limited evidence from the parties, the court permitted the parties to provide oral evidence limited to ten minutes each pursuant to r. 1(7.2) (j) of the FLR.
43The father alleges that my actions were contrary to Myers J. who, on August 30, 2019, granted the mother an ex parte restraining order which stayed in effect until a final order was made on October 1, 2021, (The “Myers order”).
44The father claims that the Myers order was made ex parte without the father being allowed to make submissions.
45Myers J. dealt with a separate 14B motion on a separate occasion. The Myers order does not preclude me from applying the FLR as I deem appropriate to the case that was before me.
46With respect to the July 15, 2025, motion and resulting endorsement, the father further refers to an endorsement of Somji J. dated August 9, 2024 (the “Somji J. endorsement”).
47The father submits that he sought to recuse Somji J. who dismissed the motion without allowing him to provide submissions, despite the motion not being confirmed and the court stating that it would not proceed.
48The father has not demonstrated that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and considering it fully, would conclude that it is more likely than not that I am unable to decide the case fairly on the basis of the father’s comparison of the Myers J. order or the Somji J. endorsement to endorsements made by me.
49Both parties appeared before me on July 15, 2025. The purpose of the attendance was to determine the father's motion for the return of one of the children to his care and an order preventing the child from being removed from Ontario. The father also requested make up parenting time.
50In accordance with my July 8, 2025, endorsement, I considered the father’s affidavit dated July 3, 2025, as well as the oral evidence of the parties, which was limited to ten minutes.
51I found that there had been a failure to obey the court order on the part of the mother. I then moved to determine if it was appropriate to exercise discretion in favour of the mother.
52The mother agreed to produce the child on July 16 and the court ordered that the mother facilitate compliance with the parties’ agreement for parenting time from July 16 to August 27, 2025. The court further ordered the mother to explain to the child that his parenting time with the father should be made a priority.
53During the motion, their father did not present a proposal with respect to make up parenting time and no evidence was presented to support that make up parenting time outside the structure of the final order was in the children's best interest pursuing a section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. In my decision, I noted that the children would likely be returning to school in September, less than one week after the end of the agreed to parenting time.
54A paragraph 43 of my endorsement I state"Given the lack of evidence to support that the request for make-up parenting time is practically possible or in the child's best interest, the request is denied".
55The father argues that I afforded the mother an opportunity to give evidence that I did not provide to him, and that I permitted unsworn evidence without notice.
56However, my July 8, 2025, endorsement clearly advised both parties that each would have ten minutes to give oral evidence, and both were sworn at the July 15, 2025 motion.
57With respect to the costs of the motion, the father claimed that he was successful in the motion, but he did not ask for an order for costs. The mother submitted that she was successful, and she sought costs in the amount of $100.
58The mother's request for costs was opposed to by the father who pointed out that she did not file any material, she provided oral submissions, and the cost amount is inappropriate. I exercised my discretion to not order costs in the circumstances of the case and the outcome of the motion.
59This is contrary to the father’s claims that I always ruled in favour of the mother. I also did not conclude that she was successful on the motion, and I found that she failed to obey an order and thereby triggered subrule 1(8). I then made orders to facilitate compliance and prioritize the father’s parenting time.
Motion Argued September 11, 2025
60The parties appeared before me again on September 11, 2025, for the father’s motion to set aside the endorsement of Shore J. dated August 13, 2020, pursuant to rule 25(19)(a) of the FLR. I dismissed his motion.
61The mother did not file any material in response to the motion. She made brief oral submissions to the court.
62The order sought to be set aside was a cost order made following the release of the court’s decision on the father’s application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, 1343, U.N.T.S. 89, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the “Hague Convention”). Shore J. dismissed the father’s Hague Convention application. Shore J. then ordered costs payable by the father in the sum of $18,000, payable forthwith in addition to the $8,500 owing in costs from a prior court order.
63On the motion, the father took the position that the mother obtained the cost order by fraud. He relies on the mother's retainer agreement and an invoice the mother received from her lawyer.
64On the motion, the father also relied on a Request to Admit he served upon the mother. The mother did not respond to the Request to Admit. The Request to Admit set out various facts that the father sought to be admitted as true.
65In my decision, I recited various legal principles and cite numerous cases wherein courts have interpreted the rule that the father was relying on in support of his position. I then set out the facts that were not in dispute.
66I concluded that the alleged falsification and alleged intentional profit, on the record before me related to two of 94 entries on the bill of costs. I found this did not rise to the high threshold required to prove fraud on a balance of probabilities, citing that the totality of the evidence presented must be considered, not just the entries the father flagged.
67I then addressed the Request to Admit. I found that, notwithstanding the deemed admissions, there was no evidence presented to conclude that the father paid the cost award, and therefore, I could not conclude that the mother profited as alleged. I also found that since the deemed admission was tied to only two of the 94 entries, it did not go to the foundation of the case.
68On this motion, the father raises the following.
69He claims the mother was not sworn in and did not make oral testimony. The father deposes he did not respond to the above noted claims as they were not sworn, and he was not provided with notice or a chance to prepare a response, and I had already explicitly stated that I did not rely on such claims that were not properly before the court.
70The father claims I relied on unsupported evidence and conjecture, contrary to the fundamental principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, and that I relied on the mother’s claims and ignored her admission. This is inaccurate on a plain reading of my endorsement released on October 21, 2025.
71I set out the evidence I relied on in my endorsement. I did not place weight on the oral submissions of the mother when concluding that the father failed to meet his onus.
72Further, the father claims that I hid the legal test, kept it secret, and that I did not give the parties an opportunity to respond to it.
73Judges are presumed to know the law. Applying the law to the facts of each case is inherent to the judicial function; it is foundational to what judges do daily. The fact that the father did not know how to prove his case and now disagrees with my decision is not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
74The father advised that he appealed my decision. This is the proper recourse if he disagreed with the outcome.
75The father claims I intentionally refused to accept evidence in the Request to Admit. As set out above, I considered the evidence but found that it was not foundational to the allegation of fraud. The father’s allegation does not lead to a conclusion that I am biased.
76The father claims that he does not feel safe or secure appearing before me on any other matter before the court to which he is a party and that it is his subjective feeling that my conduct is abusive.
77The father has led no admissible evidence to corroborate his allegation that I lack objectivity towards him and the issues I determined.
78The father’s submissions – which are speculative assertions – have not rebutted the presumption that I am impartial and objective.
79The father’s motion for my recusal is dismissed.
80The father has acknowledged in his affidavit that he has brought recusal motions in relation to approximately 20 judges. This pattern speaks for itself. His latest claim is without merit, and the blatant misuse of judicial resources must come to an end.
81If a party seeks costs, they shall file cost submissions in accordance with Rule 24(19) of the FLR. If cost submissions are not received within the timelines set out in the FLR, costs shall be deemed settled.
K. SAH J.
Date: February 9, 2026