Ezer v. Ezer, 2026 ONSC 769
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
DAVID EZER Applicant (Responding Party)
– and –
ASYA EZER Respondent (Moving Party)
COUNSEL:
Enio Zeppieri, for the Applicant (Responding Party)
Julie Amourgis / Andrea B. Scharf, for the Respondent (Moving Party)
HEARD: October 16, 2025; and in writing October 24 and November 18, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION – Motion for Contempt of Court
Vella J.
1In her Notice of Contempt Motion, the Respondent, Dr. Kovnat-Ezer seeks a finding of contempt of court against the Applicant, Mr. Ezer, for the following alleged intentional breaches of court orders:
(a) While not having paid the equalization award to the Respondent, the Applicant did not place her name as beneficiary on his life insurance policy; and
(b) While still paying spousal support, and not having paid the equalization amount, the Applicant did not secure his obligation against his pension.
2In her factum, Dr. Kovnat-Ezer also alleged breach of the order to pay equalization as part of her contempt motion. However, I agree with Mr. Ezer that she had to have included that alleged breach in her notice of contempt motion for me to consider a contempt finding in relation to that alleged breach of order. That said, Mr. Ezer has not disputed Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s submission that the equalization payment has been paid. The issue of non-payment is relevant to the determination of whether there is an obligation remaining after Mr. Ezer’s bankruptcy to be secured by a life insurance policy.
3Mr. Ezer, in turn, sought the following orders:
(a) An order dismissing the Contempt Motion;
(b) An order confirming that the equalization payment claim has been extinguished by his bankruptcy;
(c) An order that all financial and support issues are to be addressed through his pending Motion to Change proceeding or, in the alternative, adjourn this Contempt Motion to be heard together with the Motion to Change trial or as part of a long motion where evidence and cross-examination can be fully considered; and
(d) An order recognizing that financial disclosure and questioning are already underway, which will adequately address the Respondent’s concerns.
4The Applicant and Respondent delivered further written submissions dated October 24, 2025, and November 18, 2025, respectively.
Issues
5The preliminary issue is to determine whether the contempt motion is an abuse of process.
6If it is not an abuse process, the threshold issue is to determine the impact of the Mr. Ezer’s bankruptcy on the equalization and support orders made, and whether the subject security orders are therefore now moot.
7Third, in the event the equalization and/or spousal support orders are not extinguished by reason of the bankruptcy, is Mr. Ezer in contempt of court?
8For the reasons that follow, I find:
(a) The motion for contempt is not an attempt to “relitigate” issues that are raised in the pending motion to change and therefore, is not an abuse of process;
(b) The spousal support order is not a provable claim in bankruptcy and therefore, is unaffected by bankruptcy and is enforceable;
(c) The equalization order is a provable claim in bankruptcy. However, because Mr. Ezer remains undischarged from bankruptcy and the Trustee in Bankruptcy has been discharged, the equalization order is not extinguished, the stay is lifted, and therefore it is enforceable;
(d) Accordingly, the ancillary orders intended to secure the ongoing spousal support and the outstanding equalization orders are also in full force and effect; and
(e) The Applicant, David Ezer, is in contempt of court.
Background
9The parties were married on August 15, 1983. They separated on June 1, 1994.
10Mr. Ezer made an assignment in bankruptcy on January 14, 2000.
11Mr. Ezer retired on October 31, 2007. He remarried.
12The parties had one child of the marriage, Pauline, who tragically passed away in 2021 at the age of thirty-three.
Relevant Juridical History and Orders
13By Final Order dated June 26, 1998, Wilson, J. (as she then was) ordered at para. 3, that the Applicant pay an equalization payment to the Respondent in the sum of $36,856.73 in two installments:
(a) $18,425 to be paid within 90 days; and
(b) $18,456.73 in September 1999, which will be non-interest bearing until September 30, 1999 so long as the following three conditions have been met. If there is a default with respect to any of these three conditions, then the judgement shall be for the full amount of the net family property payment owing by the husband [Applicant] to the wife [Respondent]. These conditions are:
(i) The arrears of support should be paid in full as agreed to by the husband within 30 days;
(ii) The support payments ordered by the Honourable Madam Justice J. Wilson relating to spousal support and agreed to between the parties with respect to child support shall be paid until the matter is reviewed in September of 1999;
(iii) The amount of $18,425.00 representing half of the net family property payment is paid within 90 days. Thereafter, the balance of $18,456.73 shall bear interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act stipulated as at October 1st, 1999.
14Wilson J. further ordered at para. 4:
This court orders that the petitioner (husband) maintain his four time earnings life insurance coverage with the wife and child as beneficiaries until spousal support is reviewed in September 1999. As well, the petitioner (husband) cover his wife on his medical and dental plan available to him through his employment so long as the wife qualifies for coverage as a divorced spouse. Written proof concerning these two conditions should be produced to the wife and a copy to the court within 14 days.
15By order dated October 9, 1999, Wilson J. ordered that spousal support would continue and all other provisions of Her Honour’s 1998 Order remained in full force and effect.
16Upon a further review, on May 10, 2000, Wilson, J. ordered a continuation of the spousal and child support and added that the spousal support obligations were to be secured against Mr. Ezer’s pension:
- THIS COURT ORDERS that the spousal support obligations ae to be secured against the Petitioner’s (husband’s) pension.
17Again, Wilson, J. ordered that in all other respects, the previous Order dated June 26, 1998 remained in full force and effect. The fact that Mr. Ezer had filed for bankruptcy by the time of this review was known to the court, as reflected in Wilson J.’s endorsement dated May 15, 2000. In the endorsement, Wilson J. noted that Mr. Ezer had not paid the equalization payment granted after full trial on June 26, 1998 with the exception of a payment of $2,000. In other words, the outstanding equalization payment and the fact of bankruptcy was raised by the parties before Wilson, J. who continued the spousal support and child support obligations and did not alter the equalization payment.
18Mr. Ezer then brought a motion to terminate spousal support, and other relief. On April 10, 2008, Paisley J. ordered the reinstatement of spousal support as of March 20, 2008 and that Mr. Ezer maintain his life insurance for the benefit of the Wife and child so long as the equalization payment remained owing. Paisley, J., in the endorsement dated April 10, 2008, rejected the Husband’s explanation for failing to pay (any of) the equalization payment ordered and declined to vary the spousal support order absent full payment of the equalization obligation. At para. 9 of the endorsement, Paisley J. wrote:
Mr. Ezer was ordered to maintain his life insurance for the benefit or the respondent and the child. It appears to me that so long as the child is a child of the marriage, and the equalization payment remains owing, that the respondent and the child should remain beneficiaries of Mr. Ezer’s life insurance policies.
Intervening Bankruptcy of David Ezer
19As stated, Mr. Ezer made an assignment in bankruptcy on January 14, 2000.
20Dr. Kovnat-Ezer filed a proof of claim with respect to the full outstanding equalization amount. In his Settlement of Affairs, signed and dated January 13, 2000, Mr. Ezer listed the full equalization amount as a liability owing to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer.
21Mr. Ezer received a conditional order of discharge from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Bankruptcy dated May 16, 2001 (the “Conditional Discharge Order”). Pursuant to the terms of that order, he was ordered:
(a) To pay fifty percent of his debts to creditors in the amount of $75,000 [this included the equalization obligation];
(b) This amount was to be paid by monthly installments of $1,250 commencing July 1, 2001, with no interest except in default whereupon interest will be charged on the outstanding balance in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43;
(c) Upon the Registrar being satisfied that the Bankrupt has paid $50,000 to the Trustee, the Bankrupt may consent to Judgment being entered against him in this Court by the Trustee for a further sum of $25,000, which shall be paid by monthly installments of $1,250 with no interest except in default whereupon interest will be charge on the outstanding balance in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act;
(d) Upon consent to Judgment, an absolute order of discharge shall issue.
22The Conditional Discharge Order also required Mr. Ezer to pay costs of the two sets of counsel acting on behalf of opposing creditors.
23Mr. Ezer has not satisfied the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order to date, as shall be discussed further under Analysis.
24However, the Trustee in Bankruptcy was released in 2005 as evidenced by the Certificate of Compliance and Deemed Discharge of Trustee dated December 12, 2005 and the Notice of Deemed Taxation of Trustee’s Accounts and Deemed Discharge of Trustee, dated July 18, 2005.
Preliminary Issue
25At the outset of the contempt motion, I confirmed that it would only proceed to the liability phase. If there is a finding of contempt, then a sentencing hearing will be scheduled, and Mr. Ezer will be given a chance to purge the contempt.
26Mr. Ezer requests that this motion is heard with the pending motion to change or adjourned to a long motion.
27At the hearing of this contempt motion, Mr. Ezer’s lawyer did not request an adjournment, per se, but rather characterized the contempt motion as an abuse of process. His primary submission was that Mr. Ezer’s motion to change should go first, as it may render this motion effectively moot if the orders for spousal support and equalization, and the ancillary security orders, are changed. He also submits that the reason Ms. Kovnat-Ezer delayed to this point in time was in retaliation to Mr. Ezer’s Motion to Change seeking termination of the spousal support.
28Mr. Ezer relies on Presley v. Van Dusen, 2019 ONCA 66, 144 O.R. (3d) 305 for the proposition that courts must guard against improper use of contempt to circumvent proper procedures. With due respect, Presley does not stand for this principle. Presley dealt with a discoverability analysis under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, and does not assist Mr. Ezer’s position in this motion.
29Mr. Ezer also relies on the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, at large for the proposition that settlement conferences must be attempted before extraordinary remedies like contempt are considered. To the extent that Mr. Ezer is relying on the general proposition that contempt is a remedy of last resort and not first resort, I agree with that general proposition. However, in my view, Dr. Kovnat-Ezer is not relying on this remedy by way of first resort. She, appropriately, filed a proof of claim in relation to Mr. Ezer’s bankruptcy and waited for that process to resolve. The Conditional Discharge Order remains outstanding, notwithstanding the fact that the Trustee has been discharged. The Conditional Discharge Order, as will be discussed further, remains in effect, and while Mr. Ezer could avail himself of resolving at least the equalization obligation by satisfying the terms of that order, he has not and remains an undischarged bankrupt.
30Requiring the parties to go to a settlement conference before permitting Dr. Kovnat-Ezer to bring this motion would not enable the court to deal with this matter justly in the circumstances of this proceeding (r. 2(2) and 2(3) of the Family Law Rules). It would be unusual for the court to require that the parties attend a settlement conference to try to resolve a contempt motion.
31Dr. Kovnat-Ezer has attended with Mr. Ezer at court on a few occasions with respect to the equalization and spousal support matters, the ancillary security orders, and the timing of this contempt motion. In the case conference before Presser, J., Her Honour determined that this motion would precede Mr. Ezer’s motion to change.
More particularly, by endorsement dated September 19, 2025, arising from the case conference, Presser, J. ordered, inter alia, that her orders pertaining to questioning and disclosure for the motion to change “are to occur after the respondent’s motion to note the applicant in contempt has been heard”. Her Honour ordered the motion to change would follow this motion but did not foreclose the possibility of this motion being adjourned. If a settlement conference is warranted, it will be to deal with Mr. Ezer’s motion to change.
32There have been no new material facts or circumstances that would give rise to a reconsideration of Presser, J.’s order. Indeed, the matter is proceeding as Her Honour directed.
33Mr. Ezer has not demonstrated that proceeding with this contempt motion in advance of the motion to change would constitute an abuse of process. There is no attempt here by Dr. Kovnat-Ezer to relitigate the issues. Rather, this motion is to coerce compliance with existing orders. The prospect that a motion to change might change the litigation landscape does not offer an opportunity for Mr. Ezer to escape his current long-standing obligations.
34Furthermore, this court does not have jurisdiction to change the amount of equalization already found to be owing by him: Family Law Act, at s. 9(3); Klerides v. Klerides, 2007 ONCA 383, at para. 3; Taylor v. Taylor, [2005] 21 R.F.L. (6th) 449, at para. 27 (S.C.). The only scope for altering an equalization payment is the timing of the payment(s). However, as more than 10 years have passed since the making of the equalization order by Wilson, J. in 1998, even that limited option is not available to Mr. Ezer: Family Law Act, at s. 9(4).
35Thus, even if the spousal support obligation is terminated at the pending motion to change, the security obligation attaching to the equalization payment would remain.
36There is no reason to adjourn this motion, including the suggestion in the factum that it might better be heard as a long motion. The court had sufficient time to hear the fulsome submissions of counsel, with the benefit of the facta and affidavits filed, and received further written submissions after the hearing.
The Law and Analysis
Issue 1: What is the effect of Mr. Ezer’s bankruptcy on Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s equalization and spousal support orders, and therefore, the security orders?
37Mr. Ezer admits that the equalization payment has not been paid. He deposes that since, in his view, his bankruptcy extinguished his equalization obligation, it is no longer enforceable, and therefore the requirement that he secure that obligation through a life insurance policy became moot.
38Mr. Ezer concedes that a spousal support order is not a provable claim in bankruptcy, and thus, survives bankruptcy.
39However, an equalization payment is a provable claim in bankruptcy: Schreyer v. Schreyer, 2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 605, at para. 27. Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s proof of claim for the equalization obligation made her an unsecured creditor. As a matter of law, an equalization payment will be extinguished upon the discharge of the bankrupt: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at s. 178(2) (“BIA”).
40In Schreyer, the Supreme Court determined that an equalization obligation is a provable claim in bankruptcy under the BIA and that the creditor spouse is an unsecured creditor in that process: see also Maroukis v. Maroukis, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 137. Accordingly, upon full discharge of the bankrupt spouse, the equalization obligation is extinguished, and the creditor spouse receives whatever proportionate share of the bankrupt’s estate is available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.
41While in Schreyer, the Supreme Court was considering the family law property regime in Manitoba, Ontario’s regime is similar as it is also based on an equalization scheme (resulting in a payment of money), as opposed to property division (resulting in a proprietary interest in the family assets) which the Supreme Court found would be subject to a different analysis.
42However, in this case, Mr. Ezer was never discharged from bankruptcy because of his failure to abide by the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order, including payment of one-half of the equalization claim to Ms. Kovnat-Ezer, as an unsecured creditor.
43In the Trustee’s Statement of Receipts and Disbursements (Final) dated June 23, 2005 (filed by Mr. Ezer as an exhibit to his affidavit), the Trustee reports that Mr. Ezer only paid three installments of $150 each, totalling $450 towards his Conditional Discharge Order. The Trustee’s stated opinion is that there is little or no possibility of the bankrupt ever meeting his conditional discharge order, and hence, the Trustee applied for its discharge.
44Importantly, in this Statement of Receipts and Disbursements received by Mr. Ezer, the Trustee confirms that the bankrupt, Mr. Ezer, remains undischarged.
45The Trustee in Bankruptcy was discharged in 2005 after not hearing from Mr. Ezer who largely ignored the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order and immediately defaulted on the monthly installments he was required to pay. The effect of the Trustee’s discharge in these circumstances is governed by s. 69.3(1) and (1.1), of the BIA.
46The material provisions of the BIA states:
Stays of proceedings — bankruptcies
69.3 (1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2) and sections 69.4 and 69.5, on the bankruptcy of any debtor, no creditor has any remedy against the debtor or the debtor’s property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy.
End of stay
69.3(1.1) Subsection (1) ceases to apply in respect of a creditor on the day on which the trustee is discharged.
47As a result of the plain reading and application of these provisions, the automatic stay in favour of Mr. Ezer under s. 69.3(1) of the BIA was lifted as a result of the discharge of his Trustee in Bankruptcy. Accordingly, the equalization payment is an obligation that is enforceable at the suit of Dr. Kovnat-Ezer (a creditor), and remains outstanding: Bank of Nova Scotia v. Avramenko, 2020 SKQB 54, at para. 16; Frost (Re), 2021 NSSC 296, at paras. 10 – 11.
48Without ruling on this issue, I note that Mr. Ezer may be able to avail himself of the extinguishment of this obligation if he satisfies the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order and becomes discharged. Doing so would include his payment of one-half of the equalization payment plus interest. However, he has failed to do so and has shown no indication whatsoever that he has any intention to honour the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order. While Mr. Ezer now pleads that he cannot afford to pay Dr. Kovnat-Ezer anything towards the equalization obligation due to his retirement, fixed income status, and medical conditions, he was not retired until 2007 – after the date of both the Conditional Discharge Order and the discharge of the Trustee in Bankruptcy. Section 69.3(1.1) of the BIA came into force on September 18, 2009. Therefore, by September 18, 2009, at the latest, the stay was lifted.1
49Mr. Ezer has ignored his obligations under the bankruptcy scheme and appears to have played “a catch me if you can” with Dr. Kovnat-Ezer. He cannot now rely on the fact of his bankruptcy, as an undischarged bankrupt where the Trustee in Bankruptcy was discharged 20 years ago in the face of his flouting of the Conditional Discharge Order, to escape the equalization obligation plus the accruing interest stipulated in Wilson, J.’s respective Orders of six percent per year with respect to any payments that are in default (from the date of default).
50I find that the stay that was imposed upon any proceeding seeking payment of the equalization obligation was therefore lifted as a result of the Trustee’s discharge by 2009 at the latest, and in the face of the fact that Mr. Ezer has not been discharged from bankruptcy. Accordingly, there is no impediment to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s proceeding to enforce the equalization obligation and this obligation has not been extinguished
51Mr. Ezer’s request for a declaration that his equalization payment claim has been extinguished by operation of the bankruptcy is dismissed. Instead, I declare that the equalization payment ordered by Wilson J., after a full trial, has not been extinguished, and is enforceable at the suit of Dr. Kovnat-Ezer. Accordingly, the ancillary orders requiring Mr. Ezer to secure the equalization payment and spousal support payments are also enforceable at the suit of Dr. Kovnat-Ezer.
Issue 2: Is Mr. Ezer in Contempt of Court?
52Rule 31 of the Family Law Rules governs motions for contempt in family law proceedings.
53The test for contempt of court is the same in family law proceedings as in civil proceedings.
54The three-part test for contempt of court, derived from Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R 79, at paras. 33-35, is as follows:
(a) The order that was breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done;
(b) The party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it; and
(c) The party allegedly in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do the act that the order compels.
55The standard of proof is the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt: Carey, at para. 38. The moving party must establish each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of clear and unequivocal evidence. Any doubt must clearly be resolved in favour of the alleged contemnor: Fisher v. Fisher, [2003] 37 R.F.L. (5th) 108 (S.C.), at para. 15.
56As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carey, at para. 36, the contempt power is discretionary. The court will not resort to it as a mere enforcement mechanism. Accordingly, it will be exercised with caution and restraint and should be used sparingly. It is a remedy of last resort and should not be brought in family proceedings where other adequate remedies are available: Hefkey v. Hefkey, 2013 ONCA 44, 30 R.F.L. (7th) 65, at para. 3; Townsend v. Marti, 2023 ONSC 5223, at para. 25. It is an error of law to decline to consider whether the court ought to exercise its discretion to find contempt: Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, 33 R.F.L. (8th) 19, at para. 12.
57In Hefkey, at para. 3, the Court of Appeal also emphasized the need to exercise “great caution” before finding contempt in family law proceedings:
Contempt findings in such cases should be made only sparingly and… as a last resort “where conferences to try to resolve access problems or motions for enforcement have failed”.
58A finding that a party has breached a court order is insufficient, in and of itself, to ground a finding of contempt. Parties should be mindful of the difference between a breach of court order (which on its own can attract certain remedies) and a finding of contempt of court which has heightened requirements beyond the fact of a breach of a court order and can attract additional remedies such as incarceration.
Element 1: The subject orders were clear and unequivocal
59The material provisions of the Wilson, J. and Paisley, J. Orders are clear and unequivocal in stating what was to be done by Mr. Ezer. The Paisley, J. Order reinforced the Wilson, J. Orders. There is no suggestion that Mr. Ezer did not understand them and what he was required to do by these Orders.
Element 2: The alleged contemnor knew of the subject orders
60Again, there is no suggestion that Mr. Ezer was unaware of the material provisions of the Wilson, J. and Paisley, J. Orders. He was present before Wilson, J. and Paisley, J., has been represented by lawyers from time to time, and received subsequent correspondence from Ms. Kovnat-Ezer demanding compliance. The equalization payment was listed by him in his statement of affairs and filed in relation to his bankruptcy.
Element 3: The alleged contemnor intentionally failed to do that which the subject orders required
61It is not enough that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Ezer failed to designate Dr. Kovnat-Ezer as beneficiary on a life insurance policy to secure the equalization payments, and failed secure the spousal support payments against his work pension. Dr. Kovnat-Ezer must demonstrate that Mr. Ezer intentionally failed to do so beyond a reasonable doubt.
62Mr. Ezer admits that he has not paid the equalization payment and has not secured this obligation with a life insurance policy designating Dr. Kovnat-Ezer as the beneficiary.
63Mr. Ezer also admits that his ongoing and arrears of spousal support are not released by bankruptcy but deposed that he has been “fully compliant” through the Family Responsibility Office in maintaining this obligation. However, he does not dispute the fact that his spousal support payments are not secured by his pension.
64Indeed, to the contrary, Mr. Ezer transferred part of his pension monthly income with his second wife at source. This is notwithstanding evidence that he signed a prenuptial agreement with his second wife stating that they are separate as to property and financially independent from each other. Again, Mr. Ezer did not dispute this evidence.
65Paisley, J.’s endorsement dated April 10, 2008, is revealing of Mr. Ezer’s view of his obligations to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer:
Para. 4: Mr. Ezer’s explanation for failing to pay the equalization payment ordered is that he made a misguided attempt to acquire the funds by gambling, and had to declare bankruptcy, that he was unaware of the possibility of paying the equalization over time, and that he was unable to borrow…
Para. 7: There is no evidentiary basis for accepting that Mr. Ezer’s failure to pay the equalization ordered is justifiable. I would not vary the spousal support order absent payment of the equalization ordered.
I quote these paragraphs to show that Mr. Ezer has made arguments about the equalization ordered by Wilson, J. after he made an assignment in bankruptcy, demonstrating that he was fully aware of these obligations.
66In response to this motion, Mr. Ezer has not provided any explanation as to why he failed to abide by the material provisions of the subject Orders, including payment of the equalization obligation, before he made an assignment in bankruptcy. Since filing his assignment in bankruptcy, Mr. Ezer’s reason for noncompliance is his alleged inability to afford to pay the equalization or even an insurance policy to secure this obligation, as well as his fundamental belief that the equalization debt was extinguished. As justification for not securing the obligation against his pension, he deposed that he is in compliance with FRO’s demands and therefore is up to date with his spousal support. However, this is not an answer as to why he failed to secure the spousal support as ordered by Wilson, J.
67In his affidavit, Mr. Ezer deposed that he maintained a life insurance policy for “a period of time”. However, due to his retirement and the insurance policy’s guidelines, “the insurance policy ended in 2011”. He inquired with “other Insurers” for a new/private life insurance policy but the monthly cost was $631.53 compared to his prior cost of $67 per month. He deposed that in 2011, at the time of his inquiry, his monthly income was $3,345.75 per month. However, it is clear that he only made one inquiry, and it was a restricted one.
68Mr. Ezer attached as an exhibit to his affidavit, a letter from a financial security advisor dated November 10, 2011, which states that the cost to convert $100,000 of his group life insurance to an individual plan would result in a monthly premium of $631.53 with the explanation that the high costs was attributed to his age and the fact that the only plan he “can convert to is a whole life plan which is very expensive at his age”. The letter adds that any other life insurance that he may wish to look at would require a medical to qualify for but is silent as to the cost of such policies.
69There is no evidence that Mr. Ezer took steps to investigate other life insurance options, such as term life insurance, or the cost of such insurance products.
70After the conclusion of the motion, Mr. Ezer’s lawyer delivered a letter via email dated October 24, 2025. In it, Mr. Zeppieri states that he is confirming that Mr. Ezer reinstated Dr. Kovnat-Ezer as a beneficiary to his life insurance policy held by the Ontario Pension Board on January 2, 2009. It then enclosed what purported to be a letter from the OPB dated December 18, 2008, acknowledging that Mr. Ezer had changed both his basic life and supplementary life insurance beneficiary to his new wife and his (now deceased) daughter, Paulina. However, Dr. Kovnat-Ezer had apparently alerted the OPB to the Paisley, J. Order and the OPB sent a Change of Beneficiaries form to permit Mr. Ezer to come into compliance with this court order.
71As well, Mr. Ezer’s lawyer attached a Designating Life Insurance Beneficiaries form for the OPB dated January 2009 purporting to be executed by Mr. Ezer and showing that both Paulina and Dr. Kovnat-Ezer were each described as 50 percent beneficiaries. Coverage states it is up to $2,000 (for non-LCBO employees) which is far below the amount required to secure the equalization obligation. There is no indication as to the current status of this life insurance policy except for the 2011 insurance inquiry and Mr. Ezer’s admission that he has not secured the equalization payment through a life insurance policy.
72In any event, Mr. Ezer’s lawyer characterized these documents as a “submission”. They are not tendered by way of an affidavit or sworn evidence and therefore, are not evidence for purposes of this motion. He did not seek leave to file further evidence and as such, I shall not consider the attachments to his letter, though have noted his submission.
73Furthermore, while Mr. Ezer had the advantage of the statutory stay provided by the BIA from 2000 to 2005 (or September 2009), the only explanations he provided for failing to obtain life insurance in an amount sufficient to provide security for the outstanding (undischarged) equalization payment were his health status and “precarious” financial circumstances.
74However, aside from making bald allegations about his inability to pay, he has not adduced evidence about his income to contradict the evidence adduced by Dr. Kovnat-Ezer in the form of his recent sworn Financial Statement. In that statement, Mr. Ezer listed his 2024 income at $92,997, as per his 2024 Notice of Assessment.
75In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Ezer was turned down for life insurance due to his medical condition.
76Mr. Ezer states that he believed (and continues to believe), in good faith, that he is shielded from having to pay his equalization obligation by reason of the bankruptcy. However, even if the court accepted this explanation as legitimate (and I do not), there is no explanation for failing to initially abide by the equalization order which required half to be immediately paid and the other half to be paid within 90 days. He also did not provide any explanation for failing to subsequently pay out one half of the equalization payment permitted under the Conditional Discharge Order. Mr. Ezer may have at some time been operating under a misapprehension of the law that as soon as he filed for bankruptcy, his equalization claim would be extinguished, but that explanation strains credulity in light of the fact that the Conditional Discharge Order explicitly requiring him to pay one half of the equalization obligation, and the subsequent letter from the Trustee in Bankruptcy which Mr. Ezer received in 2005 and clearly states in the last line of the letter that Mr. Ezer remains undischarged.
77Mr. Ezer knows he did not abide by the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order, and knows that as a result, Dr. Kovnat-Ezer has not received half of the equalization payment Wilson, J. ordered in 1998 to be paid.
78As noted above, Mr. Ezer did not provide evidence of any cost of life insurance other than having received some advice that conversion of $100,000 from his group life insurance to a whole life insurance plan would be cost prohibitive. There is no explanation whatsoever for the failure to secure his spousal support obligations against his pension. As stated, to the contrary, in the face of the Wilson, J. and Paisley, J. Orders, Mr. Ezer did the opposite and split his pension income with his new wife at source.
79Furthermore, when Paulina tragically died in Australia in 2021, she left an insurance death benefit behind. The death benefit proceeds were paid entirely to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer, who was determined to be Paulina’s dependent, after Mr. Ezer commenced legal proceedings to increase the initial allocation (determined at first instance) of 60 percent and 40 percent in Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s favour. He was represented by counsel during that process who became concerned about Mr. Ezer’s competency, but after a capacity assessment, it was apparently determined he was competent and able to give instructions.2 Mr. Ezer suggests that because Dr. Kovnat-Ezer received this death benefit, she does not need either the equalization payment or spousal support. However, the fact that Dr. Kovnat-Ezer received a death benefit is irrelevant to the analysis at hand.
80In addition to the death benefit, Paulina left a cash estate of about $33,000 which was divided equally between the parties. However, Mr. Ezer did not use his share of about $16,500 to pay down the equalization or pay down his obligations under the Conditional Discharge Order. He did not respond to this evidence to provide an explanation as to why he did not do so.
81The overwhelming inference, based on the evidence before me, is that Mr. Ezer did everything he could to avoid his obligations under the subject Orders, including filing for bankruptcy without meeting the conditions for discharge in over 20 years, and taking steps to thwart Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s attempts to enforce and secure her family law statutory entitlements. He has done so in an effort to delay this matter so long that Dr. Kovnat-Ezer will eventually not be able to collect the equalization payment from him and will have no security to fall back on.
82The whole point of ordering security is to protect the recipient spouse in the event that the payor spouse either refuses to comply with their financial obligations or becomes unable to comply with their financial obligation – the very situation that Dr. Kovnat-Ezer may come to find herself in without an order that will coerce Mr. Ezer into compliance.
83For these reasons, I do not accept that Mr. Ezer genuinely believed he had escaped paying some or all of the equalization payment and that he therefore, did not need to obtain the ordered life insurance as security as a result of filing bankruptcy, other than between the period of his filing and the Trustee in Bankruptcy’s discharge while the automatic stay applied. Furthermore, ignorance of the law is not a defence.
84To a great extent, Mr. Ezer has authored his own misfortune. The Wilson, J. Order required him to pay half of the equalization payment immediately, and the other half within 90 days. Had he done so, he would not have run into the difficulty he claims regarding purchasing affordable life insurance after his retirement. As stated, he has not provided proof of attempts to purchase life insurance or the cost other than the one option he explored in 2011 to convert his workplace group life insurance into whole life insurance which he qualified for but chose not to purchase due to the high premiums. However, had he purchased the life insurance policy as required, he might have been in a stronger position in his motion to terminate the spousal support which he brought before Paisley, J.
85Dr. Kovnat-Ezer has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ezer is in contempt of court as pleaded.
Residual Discretion: Ought the Court Declare Mr. Ezer in Contempt of Court?
86As stated, whether or not to issue a contempt order is ultimately within the discretion of the court: Carey, para. 36. Indeed, the court may ultimately decline to make a finding in contempt notwithstanding its finding that the three elements of contempt have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The purpose of a contempt order is primarily to coerce compliance with court orders rather than punishment.
87Indeed, in its decision of North Elgin Centre Inc. v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited, 2021 ONCA 173, 479 C.R.R. (2d) 53, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at para. 45,
As the contempt power is discretionary, courts have consistently discouraged its routine use to obtain compliance with court orders. It should be used cautiously and with great restraint; it is regarded as an enforcement power of last, not first, resort. So, where an alleged contemnor acted in good faith in taking reasonable steps to comply with the order, the judge entertaining a contempt motion generally retains some discretion to decline to make a finding of contempt. As well, a judge may properly exercise his or her discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case: Carey, at paras. 36-37.
88In the circumstances of this case, I have found that Mr. Ezer intentionally breached the Wilson J. and Paisley J. Orders. He has not secured his ongoing spousal support obligations against his pension and may have reduced the value of that pension by splitting the income at source with his second wife. He has also avoided making any contribution to the equalization order made in 1998, and reinforced by subsequent court orders since then, and then declined to abide by the terms of the Conditional Discharge Order to make partial payment towards the equalization payment. He has not provided evidence of his attempts abide by the Wilson, J. Orders, the Paisley, J. Order, or the Conditional Discharge Order, despite continuing to receive any income and having received an inheritance from his late daughter. To echo the Court of Appeal, Mr. Ezer has shown no effort to take reasonable steps to comply with the order but rather filed for bankruptcy and then did not comply with the Conditional Discharge Order.
89This is one of those rare family law cases in which it is incumbent to decline to exercise my discretion in Mr. Ezer’s favour.
90This is because declining to declare Mr. Ezer in contempt would send the wrong message to others; namely, that if you wait out your former spouse long enough, you can eventually escape your obligations. It must be remembered that when the subject orders were made and the equalization payment Mr. Ezer owed was fixed, the amount was based on the equalization of net family properties under the FLA when he was still gainfully employed for some years following the order, and his Ontario Service Pension Plan was, and remains, intact. Furthermore, Mr. Ezer’s sworn financial statement reveals a substantial income for 2024 and when he received a lump sum inheritance from his late daughter, he did not pay it towards his obligations.
91Mr. Ezer has not taken any good faith steps to attempt to comply with the subject orders. He has not demonstrated he took any steps to obtain life insurance other than securing a quote to convert his existing former employer’s policy. He has not demonstrated that he ever took any steps to attempt to secure the spousal support against his pension. Instead, he took steps to divide his pension income with his new spouse. He took steps to stay Ms. Kovnat-Ezer’s equalization claim by filing for bankruptcy, and then took no significant steps to pay the amounts stipulated by the Conditional Discharge Order which required him to pay half of his unsecured debts, including the equalization debt, in monthly installments. Since he did not pay these amounts, the Trustee was discharged, and Mr. Ezer remains undischarged himself.
92Mr. Ezer also claims to suffer “numerous serious medical conditions” that prevent him from working. However, he did not adduce any admissible medical or other evidence to support his bald allegations.
93Furthermore, while this is a high conflict family matter, the parties’ conflict has no bearing on the family unit. This is purely a financial matter now. Therefore, one of the main policy reasons favouring the exercise of discretion to decline to declare contempt is not applicable in this case.
Disposition, Orders and Sentencing Phase
94I find that the Applicant has proven the requisite elements of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and that, in the circumstances of this case, it is not appropriate to exercise my discretion to decline to issue a finding of contempt. Accordingly, this court finds Mr. Ezer in contempt of court in relation to the Orders of Wilson, J. and Paisley, J. requiring him to maintain Dr. Kovnat-Ezer as a beneficiary to a life insurance policy to secure his equalization payment so long as it is outstanding, and to secure his ongoing spousal support obligations against his pension.
95The Applicant is ordered to do the following within 30 days:
(a) Purchase a life insurance policy in an amount equal to four times his 2025 earnings to secure the outstanding equalization claim, with accrued interest, as per the Order of Wilson, J. dated June 26, 1998 (and the subsequent orders affirming this order), and produce written proof to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer that he has done so or, in the alternative, pay the equalization plus accrued interest thereby alleviating the need to secure it; and
(b) Take the requisite steps to secure Dr. Kovnat-Ezer’s ongoing spousal support against his OPB pension, as per the Order of Wilson J., dated May 10, 2000, and produce written proof to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer.
96Fulfillment of these orders will give Mr. Ezer an opportunity to purge his contempt.
97The next phase of this motion is the sentencing hearing. This hearing shall be in person and the parties may seek leave to call viva voce evidence, in addition to filing affidavit evidence. The purpose of the hearing will be to determine the appropriate disposition or sentence, pursuant to r. 31(5) of the Family Law Rules: Cassidy v. Cassidy, 2010 ONSC 2707, 85 R.F.L. (6th) 148, at para. 8.
98The parties will contact the Family Trial Office to obtain a date for the sentencing hearing, which must be scheduled on a day that I am available. The sentencing hearing will be no earlier than 60 days from the release of this decision.
99Costs will be reserved to the conclusion of the sentencing hearing: r.31(5)(f), Family Law Rules.
Justice S. Vella
Released: February 9, 2026
Footnotes
- It is arguable that s. 69.3(1.1) of the BIA codified the common law; see Frost (Re) for a thorough analysis. If this interpretation is correct, and I am in agreement with it, then the automatic stay in Mr. Ezer’s bankruptcy lifted upon the discharge of the Trustee in 2005. However, the exact date at which the stay was lifted is not critical to my analysis, since by the time of this motion, the stay had been lifted for well over a decade, and Mr. Ezer has not been discharged from bankruptcy.
- I say apparently since the capacity assessment report was appended as an affidavit to Dr. Kovnat-Ezer. Accordingly, it is hearsay. However, Mr. Ezer did not address this report in his responding affidavit, and I accepted this letter (without objection from Mr. Ezer) for the fact that such an assessment was done after which Paulina’s death benefit was paid out.