SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

Court File Information

COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-00000529-0000

DATE: 2026-02-17

Parties

RE: Sharda Laskowski, Applicant

AND:

Steven Laskowski, Respondent

Before

BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice A. Pazaratz

Counsel

COUNSEL: Sandy Athwal, Counsel, for the Applicant

Nan Zheng, Counsel, for the Respondent

Hearing Date

HEARD: February 6, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

[ 1 ] “This isn’t McDonald’s. ”

[ 2 ] I sometimes use that line – out of desperate frustration – to wryly remind reckless and relentless litigants that family court is serious business. You can’t just walk up to the counter and ask the judge for whatever pops into your head. With no forethought. No rational justification. And no regard for the legal and financial consequences.

[ 3 ] But that deceptively simple non sequitur – “This isn’t McDonald’s” – may also be food for thought for even the most earnest customers family court judges deal with every day.

a. At least at McDonald’s, when you pay your money you get a burger.

b. In family court, you could pay a thousand times more – ten thousand times more -- and end up with an empty bag.

[ 4 ] In every other walk of life, people are actually careful with their money. But in family court, money seems to be no object (until, of course, the time comes to pay).

[ 5 ] Yes, everyone’s entitled to their day in court.

[ 6 ] And yes, every parent tells me “I’m doing it for the child” and/or “You can’t put a price tag on children.” (Of course you can put a price tag on a Disney World vacation, which would do most kids more good.)

[ 7 ] But in too many family court cases judges helplessly witness a predictable trajectory:

a. People start with tough talk and a shopping list of non-negotiable demands.

b. After a couple of interim legal bills – and maybe a few costs orders – they start to have doubts.

c. And by the end of the drawn-out, tortuous experience, they will have slowly, painfully morphed into regret and financial ruin.

d. Kind of like the people flying to Las Vegas are all excited. And the people flying back are all exhausted and pretending they won.

[ 8 ] “This isn’t McDonald’s.” But maybe we can learn from the fast-food giant’s marketing:

a . They’ve got Golden Arches to tell people what to expect.

b . Perhaps we should put giant neon dollar signs in front of our courthouse.

c. Anything, to help people understand the financial sinkhole they’re blindly wading into.

[ 9 ] This two-prong motion by the Applicant father is a fairly typical example of litigants who start out strong and then sort of hibernate half-way through the case, waking periodically for skirmishes that burn money but don’t really advance them to the finish line.

[ 10 ] I’ll explain in more detail, but a quick overview:

a. The parties have two children ages eight and five.

b. The first part of the father’s motion seeks to change his parenting time as currently set out in a temporary order.

i. Essentially he wants to immediately adopt the recommendations of a section 112 report prepared by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”).

ii. But this is a complicated file. With serious allegations both ways.

iii. The existing order may be labelled “temporary”, but it’s been in place for years. Because these parties keep scheduling motions and conferences – but they don’t seem to be doing much to proceed to a final hearing.

iv. So apparently the father saw the arrival of a favourable OCL report as a strategic opening. An opportunity to get what he wants through a less expensive motion, without having to bother with a trial.

v. Except, there’s no presumption that the arrival of a section 112 report should immediately result in a change to a temporary regime pending trial.

vi. And you can’t sleep on a file for years, and then suddenly insist that everything urgently needs to change.

c. Presuming success in gaining equal time with the children, the father’s motion also seeks to change child support.

i. But the existing child support regime is set out in a final order .

ii. The procedural path to change a final order is different from a motion dealing with temporary relief. The evidentiary burden is different and case management would be required.

iii. Arguably, if the father were to be successful in changing parenting time, some immediate adjustment of child support would logically follow. That would get us into the even more complicated area of temporary changes to final orders.

iv. And a question might arise about why the father consented to a final order requiring him to pay full table support, if he was still pursuing a shared-parenting regime which would have triggered a mandatory section 9 analysis under the Child Support Guidelines ?

d. But we won’t have to get into those added complications. Because on the threshold issue – changing parenting time – the father’s motion cannot succeed.

e. And the frustrating part is that less than two months earlier the father brought a similar unsuccessful motion. He was warned by a judge that he wasn’t doing things right. Costs were ordered against him. But instead of paying those costs, he brought another doomed motion.

[ 11 ] This unfinished case started in 2023.

a. Since then there have been multiple court attendances and orders.

b. Sometimes the parties have counsel of record.

c. Sometimes the parties represent themselves, and may or may not have the assistance of lawyers acting as “agent only.”

d. Sometimes one lawyer will attend when a matter is adjourned, and a different lawyer will attend on the return date.

e. “Unbundled services” may sound cheaper. But the lack of consistent legal representation has undermined efficiency and focus.

[ 12 ] The existing parenting regime which the father seeks to change is set out in Justice Chappel’s September 12, 2023 consent temporary order. The father has time with the children on a four-week rotating schedule.

a. Week 1: Friday after school to Sunday 6 p.m.

b. Week 2: Saturday 5 p.m. to Sunday 6 p.m.

c. Week 3: Mother has children.

d. Week 4: Friday after school to Sunday 6 p.m.

e. (There are additional provisions for Thanksgiving, Halloween, and winter school break.)

[ 13 ] The OCL then prepared a section 112 report. At a March 6, 2025 Settlement Conference Justice Kril requested the OCL to provide an updated report, preferably by the same clinician Alison Young.

[ 14 ] About two weeks later, on March 18, 2025, Justice Misheal made a consent final order based on minutes of settlement the parties had executed on November 21, 2024. That order included:

a. Father to pay mother child support at $1,781.74 per month commencing November 1, 2024 based on his 2023 income of $125,395.00.

b. Father to pay child support arrears fixed at $9,405.00, with a payment schedule.

c. Net sale proceeds of $8,128.26 to be released to mother.

d. November 27, 2024 motion vacated.

e. No costs.

f. Annual disclosure.

[ 15 ] On September 18, 2025 the father brought a somewhat complicated motion seeking to deal with equalization and child support arrears. Justice Standryk’s October 3, 2025 motion endorsement includes the following:

a. The father seeks to vary a final consent order of Justice Misheal.

b. Several issues are outstanding which need to be addressed.

c. The father seeks relief from FRO without having served FRO.

d. The father’s motion is dismissed, without prejudice to his ability to pursue relief under the proper procedure.

e. The father is to pay costs of $1,750.00 inclusive of HST.

[ 16 ] On December 12, 2025 the father brought this motion which includes requests for:

a. Immediate implementation of a 2-2-5-5 parenting schedule as recommended by the OCL.

b. Exchanges at school, with alternatives for non-school days.

c. Father to pay interim set-off child support of $800.00 per month based on his $119,460 2022 income, and based on $80,000 income imputed to the mother.

d. Section 7 expenses to be shared 50/50.

e. Costs.

[ 17 ] The father’s Dec 12, 2025 affidavit includes the following narrative:

a. The parties separated January 14, 2023.

b. The mother made serious allegations. Soon after, CAS closed its file and confirmed no safety concerns about the father.

c. After their Hamilton matrimonial home was sold, the mother moved to Caledon and the father moved to London.

d. Since separation there have been many court attendances.

e. Justice Chappel’s September 12, 2023 temporary parenting order was based on geographic distance between their homes.

f. That schedule has remained in place despite the father subsequently relocating to Brampton in February 2025, closer to the mother, making shared parenting more feasible. He now lives ten minutes from the children’s school, and has proper accommodation for the children.

g. After the father moved to Brampton the OCL completed a second investigation in October 2025.

h. The OCL recommended implementing a 2-2-5-5 shared parenting schedule.

i. The father attached the pages setting out the OCL’s recommendations – but not the whole report .

j. The mother is selective about which OCL recommendations she will agree to.

k. The children enjoy their time with the father and they are well cared for.

l. The father’s work schedule allows a 2-2-5-5 schedule to be successful.

m. The father seeks to change support based on shared parenting and based on $80,000.00 income being imputed to the mother.

n. Although the mother claims to be unemployed, she is well educated and previously earned $120,000 annually.

[ 18 ] The mother’s January 5, 2026 affidavit includes the following narrative:

a. She asks that the father’s motion be dismissed or adjourned to case management.

b. She wants an order that the father obtain leave before bringing further motions.

c. In October 2025 the father brought a motion to change child support and “pause” child support enforcement. That motion was dismissed for procedural reasons. The father was advised to comply with the proper procedure to vary a final order but he has not done so.

d. The father has now brought substantially the same motion.

e. He has not paid $1,750.00 costs ordered in October 2025.

f. The children have resided primarily with the mother since January 2023. They are well settled.

g. She denies limiting the father’s time.

h. The father characterizes past CAS involvement as irrelevant but there were serious concerns.

i. The October 23, 2025 OCL report does not recommend immediate or unconditional implementation. The report identifies ongoing high conflict; concerns about the father’s emotional regulation and use of discipline; and the need for parenting programs and counselling. It recommends that the father refrain from physical discipline, complete parenting programs, and engage in conflict-resolution and emotional-regulation supports.

j. The father has selectively quoted from the report, omitting important information.

k. The children are not ready for equal time.

l. The OCL report is advisory. More evidence and credibility determinations are required.

m. The current child support order is final, so the father must bring a motion to change.

n. The mother is unemployed and in full-time attendance upgrading her education. She disputes any basis for imputing income.

o. The father owes $11,972.18 in arrears of child support as of September 2025.

[ 19 ] The father’s January 6, 2026 affidavit includes the following narrative:

a. He has been discussing parenting issues with the mother but without success.

b. The mother was aware of his intention to bring his motion.

c. FRO is now garnishing his wages so arrears have been reduced to $8,804.00

[ 20 ] When this motion initially came before me on January 9, 2026, the father consented to a brief adjournment because the mother said the date hadn’t been canvassed with her, and she had a medical procedure scheduled for that day.

a. On January 9th the father attended without a lawyer.

b. I asked if he had received legal advice prior to bringing this most recent motion. He assured me he had.

c. Having read the file, I urged him to get additional legal advice prior to the return of the motion. He promised he would.

d. When the motion returned for hearing on February 6, 2026 he was once again represented by a lawyer appearing as “agent only.”

[ 21 ] With respect to parenting time, the father seeks a temporary variation of a temporary order.

[ 22 ] Temporary orders are inherently imperfect insofar as they are typically based on limited and untested affidavit evidence. Chaitas v. Christopoulos ; Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002 (SCJ).

[ 23 ] Since temporary orders are intended to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a difficult problem that will get full airing at trial, requests to change temporary orders should be rare and discouraged. Temporary orders are intended to remain in effect until final disposition of the issues at trial, and parties should be encouraged to proceed to trial in a timely fashion. Lusted v. Bogobowicz 2021 ONSC 269 (SCJ) ; E.N. v. S.N. 2023 ONSC 4480 (SCJ); Fatima v. Agha , 2024 ONSC 1441 (SCJ); Serryus v. Serryus , 1982 CarswellOnt 305 (ON CA) ; Tremblay v. Landry , 2024 ONSC 4445 (SCJ). Reeve v. Larson , 2025 ONSC 6497 (SCJ).

[ 24 ] Once a temporary arrangement is in place, the court must be cautious about potentially “replacing one imperfect solution with another imperfect solution.” Boissy v. Boissy , 2008 CarswellOnt 4253 (SCJ) ; Nicholson v. Nicholson , 2021 ONSC 7045 (SCJ).

[ 25 ] To make significant changes to parenting arrangements on a temporary motion creates the risk of a child going through successive major changes: one after the temporary motion and another at trial. That would create more -- not less -- instability in the child’s life. Southorn v. Ree , 2019 ONSC 1298 (SCJ). Adding additional temporary variations pending trial only increases the potential upheaval and disruption from the child’s perspective. H.S. v. D.N ., 2025 ONSC 4032 (SCJ).

[ 26 ] The status quo is particularly important on a temporary motion because the court is often not in a position to make factual findings based on incomplete and untested evidence. R.C. v. L.C ., 2021 ONSC 1963 (SCJ); C.C. v. I.C. , 2021 ONSC 6471 (SCJ). Once a temporary order is made, that quickly becomes (or continues) the status quo which the court should be cautious about disrupting.

[ 27 ] Disrupting the status quo becomes even more significant when the parties consented to the present parenting agreement, and it has continued for some time. This factor applies whether the existing agreement is de facto or de jure. Greve v. Brighton, 2011 ONSC 4996 (SCJ); Papp v. Papp ; Tremblay v. Landry , 2024 ONSC 4445 (SCJ).

[ 28 ] A party seeking to vary a temporary parenting order must establish a material change in circumstances since the previous order was made, that compels a change in parenting arrangements in the best interests of the child. Radojevic v. Radojevic , 2020 ONSC 5868 (SCJ); Thomas v. Wohleber , 2022 ONSC 1258 (SCJ) .

[ 29 ] The material change must raise exceptional circumstances where immediate action is required, and where it would be contrary to the child’s best interests to allow the temporary order to continue pending trial. The evidence must clearly and unequivocally establish that the present arrangement is not in a child’s best interests and the proposed arrangement would be. Green v Cairns . Innocente v Innocente , 2014 ONSC 7082 (SCJ); Treuman v Wegrynowski , 2022 ONSC 3937 (SCJ); Clarke v Denyes , 2023 ONSC 3984 (SCJ)

[ 30 ] A party wishing to disturb a temporary status quo or vary a temporary order faces a strong onus to produce cogent and compelling evidence to show that the physical, mental and moral welfare of a child would be in danger in maintaining the status quo . Miranda v. Miranda , 2013 ONSC 4704 (SCJ); Ford v. Milne , 2024 ONSC 5263 (SCJ). If the Court is prepared to consider a change on this more stringent test, a best interests analysis is still undertaken. F.K. v. A.K., 2020 ONSC 3726 (SCJ); H.S. v. D.N ., 2025 ONSC 4032 (SCJ).

[ 31 ] The onus is very high. Any lower standard would encourage parents to continuously litigate by way of motion rather than going to trial. The test cannot be so loose as to amount to a simple reconsideration of a child’s best interests. It cannot leave it open to deep pocketed and litigious parents to continuously litigate without having to bother to go to trial. Children require some stability in their parenting arrangements, even on a temporary basis. Radojevic v. Radojevic , 2020 ONSC 5868 (SCJ); Thomas v. Wohleber , 2022 ONSC 1258 (SCJ) ; Reeve v. Larson , 2025 ONSC 6497 (SCJ).

[ 32 ] The father seeks an immediate and significant change to parenting times, based on the recommendations of an updated section 112 report. The problems with his motion are both specific and general.

[ 33 ] The specific problem:

a. The father doesn’t attach the whole of the report to his affidavit.

b. Instead, he only attaches three “recommendation” pages from the end of the report.

c. He tells us what the OCL clinical investigator recommended, without telling us why .

d. If you want to rely on a professional report as the basis for making a profound change to children’s lives, you can’t just cherry-pick the pages from the report which are helpful to you.

e. At the very least, the whole of the report should have been produced.

[ 34 ] But more generally, even if the father had attached the whole report, in this case it likely wouldn’t have made any difference.

[ 35 ] The case law overwhelmingly urges courts to be cautious before relying upon an assessment or OCL report at an interim stage of the proceedings. Batsinda v. Batsinda , 2013 ONSC 7869 (SCJ): Zantinge v. Abdulrahman 2022 ONSC 1159 (SCJ); Denomme v. Denomme , 2022 ONSC 5205 (SCJ); B. v. D. 2022 ONSC 1352 (SCJ); Slaght v. Taylor , 2016 ONSC 1904 (SCJ); S.M. v. J.M., 2025 ONSC 4648 (SCJ).

[ 36 ] At the motion stage the court should not presume that an assessor's recommendations would or should inevitably prevail at trial. Batsinda v. Batsinda , 2013 ONSC 7869 (SCJ); Marcy v. Belmore , 2012 ONSC 4696 (SCJ).

[ 37 ] Interim use of an assessment or section 112 report is a fact driven inquiry. Parties should not perceive the arrival of such a report as creating an automatic strategic opportunity to secure a more favourable status quo , heading into trial. Marcy v. Belmore , 2012 ONSC 4696 (SCJ). Clearly, the facts of each case will be critical and will guide the exercise of the court’s discretion. Jonczyk v. Tilsley 2021 ONSC 2546 (SCJ); Lamacchia v. Carullo , 2022 ONSC 687 (SCJ); Churchill v. Elliot and Ward , 2024 ONSC 1907 (SCJ).

[ 38 ] An assessment or section 112 report is only one piece of evidence in a proceeding, intended for use at trial . At the motion stage the report is untested. It should generally not be adopted without a trial, where the judge will have the opportunity to:

a. Observe cross-examination of the author.

b. Undertake a thorough analysis and evaluation of all aspects of the assessor's report, including the assessor's credentials, methods, observations, findings, theories, and recommendations.

c. Observe the testimony and cross-examination of the parties and their witnesses

d. Consider all of the other relevant evidence in the case.

Zantinge v. Abdulrahman 2022 ONSC 1159 (SCJ) ; Batsinda v. Batsinda 2013 ONSC 7869 (SCJ) ; Marcy v. Belmore, 2012 ONSC 4696 (SCJ) ; B. v. D. 2022 ONSC 1352 (SCJ) ; Mayer v. Mayer , [2002] O.J. No. 5303 (S.C.J.) ; Kirkham v. Kirkham , 2008 CarswellOnt 3644 (SCJ) .

[ 39 ] In general, interim implementation of OCL reports and assessments should be discouraged, as such motions require the court to make profound and often disruptive decisions based on incomplete and untested information. This is particularly the case where both parties have filed multiple affidavits and key facts remain in dispute. S.M. v. J.M. , 2025 ONSC 4648 (SCJ).

[ 40 ] In some cases, the evidence and observations set out in a professional report may justify immediate court action, particularly if the evidence suggests an immediate change is required to protect children from physical or emotional harm, or otherwise promote their best interests. M. v. S. et al. 2022 ONSC 1687 (SCJ). But as stated, in this case the father didn’t attach the whole section 112 report. He only referred to the recommendations at the end. There is nothing in his affidavit which would suggest that there is any urgency to his request.

[ 41 ] All of which brings us to an even more frustrating aspect of this case:

a. These parents separated in January 2023. And they started this court case immediately.

b. That was more than three years ago.

c. Why are they still litigating by temporary motions?

d. At least twice since 2023 they adjourned to the timelines – effectively.putting the case “on hold” -- resulting in many months of nothing being accomplished.

e. Most recently they elected not to proceed with a June 30, 2025 Trial Scheduling Conference because they were waiting for that updated section 112 report. But even after the report was received in October 2025, nobody did anything to get the main application back on track.

[ 42 ] In Bourque v Luker , 2025 ONSC 941 (SCJ) this court warned against litigating by endless interim motions rather than proceeding to trial for a final order.

1 If you start it, finish it.

17 Motions for temporary relief are appropriate at the early stages of a court case. But once a temporary order is in place, that should be the end of the “motion stage.” Gafanha v. Gafanha , 2022 ONSC 1613 (SCJ) ; Crozier v. Nolin , 2024 ONSC 4343 (SCJ) ; Sham v. Lee , 2024 ONSC 6598 (SCJ) ; Persaud v. Jeffrey , 2024 ONSC 6678 (SCJ) .

a. The older the court file – the longer the period since the initial temporary orders were granted – the greater the onus on lawyers and parties to explain why they are still litigating by motion and affidavit.

b. Late-stage motions are unfair to judges, parties and children, because the inevitably voluminous materials are untested, and the court is unable to make necessary factual and credibility determinations based on affidavits.

c. Where parties have had enough time to schedule a trial for a final order, they should no longer be litigating by motion seeking more temporary orders.

d. Our court system barely has enough resources to accommodate unavoidable motions. Unnecessary motions clog up the system and cause delay for families who truly require interim relief.

e. Endless motions for temporary orders with no apparent interest in proceeding to trial — this emerging trend is protracting litigation, driving up costs, frustrating litigants, and needlessly placing judges in the untenable position of having to decide complex issues based on inadequate information.

[ 43 ] The father’s motion for a temporary change to the temporary parenting order is dismissed.

a. His reliance on snippets of an untested section 112 report contributes little to the required best interests analysis, and certainly fails to establish any urgency or compelling circumstances.

b. His second argument – that he now lives closer to the children – is one of many complex considerations best left to the trial judge.

[ 44 ] Which brings us to the second part of the father’s motion: his request to change a final child support order. And even here, there have been mis-steps.

a. Obviously, the father didn’t obtain an increase in parenting time. So quite apart from procedural issues, there’s no current basis for the set-off he was hoping to achieve pursuant to section 9 of the Guidelines .

b. Indeed -- during submissions -- the lawyer appearing as his agent suddenly advised that the father wouldn’t be pursuing that part of his motion.

c. But in the motion confirmation form dated January 30, 2026, that same lawyer confirmed that the father was indeed proceeding with his child support claim.

d. Which of course meant that the mother’s lawyer still had to respond to the whole of the father’s motion, even if he didn’t really intend to pursue all of it.

e. “This isn’t McDonald’s” where you can just order those extra fries and it’s no big deal if you decide not to eat them.

f. It is a big deal if you bring a motion to take away child support – and if you keep saying you’re pursuing that claim – only to reveal at the last minute that you’ve changed your mind.

[ 45 ] We need to get this file back on track:

a. The Respondent father’s motions are dismissed.

b. To re-activate the main application I am scheduling a combined Settlement Conference/Trial Scheduling Conference for March 9, 2026 at 3:30 p.m. by Zoom. Updated Settlement Conference Briefs will be required, and a jointly prepared Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form is to be filed.

c. To resolve procedural complications and spare the parties from having to prepare even more materials, the father’s application shall be deemed to include a request to change the final child support order, to allow judges at the Settlement Conference and Trial to deal with all issues.

[ 46 ] I urged both parties to be more sensible and try to bring this matter to an efficient resolution. And perhaps they got the message, because at the end they were able to agree on costs.

[ 47 ] On consent the Respondent shall pay $2,500.00 in costs of this motion within 60 days. In addition, the $1,750.00 costs ordered against him on October 3, 2025 shall be paid within 90 days.

Pazaratz J.

Date: February 17, 2026