CITATION: R. v. Manoj Govindbalunikam, 2026 ONSC 658

COURT FILE NO.: 9051/24

DATE: 2026-04-21

L. Mucciarelli, Counsel for the Crown

and -

J. Belisle, Counsel for the Accused

Accused

HEARD: May 21, October 30, 2025; February 24, 2026

1On August 15, 2023, Mr. Manoj Govindbalunikam abducted a child. Mr. Govindbalunikam drove his yellow Camaro from his home in Brampton, Ontario to Thessalon, Ontario in order to look for properties to purchase as part of his real estate business. In the process, he picked up a nine-year-old victim and drove him around Thessalon until the victim’s father pulled Mr. Govindbalunikam’s vehicle over.

2On May 21, 2025, Mr. Govindbalunikam plead guilty to the offence of abduction of a person under the age of 14. I heard sentencing submissions on two occasions. The Crown sought a sentence of 18 months custody, while Mr. Govindbalunikam asked for a conditional discharge.

3For the reasons that follow, and despite some misgivings, I hereby sentence Mr. Govindbalunikam to 18 months custody, followed by three years probations. I also impose ancillary orders that are described later in these reasons.

FACTS

The Incident

4On August 15, 2023, Mr. Govindabalunikam drove from Brampton, Ontario to Thessalon, Ontario. Thessalon is a small town. He was driving a yellow Chevrolet Camaro with black racing stripes. He arrived in Thessalon and went to the mouth of the Thessalon River.

5Two individuals were kayaking in the Thessalon River when they noticed the yellow Camaro. They observed Mr. Govindabadinkum exit the vehicle and take pictures of the river where the pair were kayaking. Mr. Govindbalunikam returned to his vehicle and left.

6Mr. Govindbalunikam returned to the mouth of the river and approached the then-nine-year-old victim. He had a conversation with the child and offered him a fidget spinner toy as well as his business card. Mr. Govindabalunikam told the victim that he was a realtor.

7The victim left the mouth of the river carrying his fishing gear. Mr. Govindbalunikam drove towards the victim’s destination and stopped him at the curling club in Thessalon. He offered the victim a ride home. The victim accepted the ride. Mr. Govindblalunikam told the victim to leave his bicycle and fishing gear at the curling club because there was no room for them in the vehicle. Mr. Govindbalunikam drove to the Sinton Tavern where he purchased an ice cream for the victim. The pair exited the tavern.

8Allison and Casey Lawrence were in the Sinton Tavern and saw Mr. Govindbalunikam with the victim. They instantly became concerned because they did not recognize Mr. Govindbalunikam. They got into their pickup truck and drove to the victim’s residence. They spoke with the victim’s father who indicated that he did not know anyone who had a yellow Camaro. The victim’s father asked the pair for a ride to the location where they last saw the victim.

9Around the same time, the victim gave Mr. Govindbalunikam his address in Thessalon. Mr. Govindbalunikam drove towards that residence and, when they reached the home, the victim told Mr. Govindbalunikam to stop the vehicle. Mr. Govindbalunikam slowed down but did not stop. He continued past the residence.

10The Lawrences and the victim’s father arrived near Federation Street and saw the Camaro. The Camaro was driving down Federation Street. The Camaro turned up Maple Street. The pickup carrying the Lawrences and the victim’s father pulled up to the Camaro and the father approached the driver side of the Camaro. He observed the victim in the front passenger’s seat eating ice cream. As the father approached, Mr. Govindbalunikam pulled away. The father reached into the driver’s side of the vehicle in order to get the vehicle to stop. Mr. Govindbalunikam identified himself as a realtor and stated that he was looking for houses in the area. Mr. Govindbalunikam gave the father his business card. The father told Mr. Govindbalunikam to leave the community and told his son to exit the Camaro. The son exited and the father and son went to their residence.

11The Lawrences called East Algoma Thessalon Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) to make a report that same day. The OPP were able to trace Mr. Govindbalunikam’s residence based on the license plate of the Camaro.

12On August 16, 2023, an OPP officer spoke with Mr. Govindbalunikam on the phone. The latter indicated that he was in Sault Ste. Marie. The officer indicated that the pair needed to speak. Mr. Govindbalunikam offered that he would like to speak with the officer. Mr. Govindbalunikam stated that he was a realtor, and that the situation was “a misunderstanding with the boy’s father”.

13Mr. Govindbalunikam was arrested on August 16, 2023, and the OPP seized his cell phone which contained a number of pictures including a picture of himself and the victim by the Thessalon River, as well as a photo of the victim eating ice cream in the Camaro.

14On May 21, 2025, Mr. Govindbalunikam plead guilty to the charges before the court. On October 30, 2025, I heard sentencing submissions from the parties. The Crown asked for 18 months of incarceration and Mr. Govindbalunikam asked for a conditional discharge. I indicated to counsel that these positions might not fit within the sentencing range and I asked for further submissions as per R. v. Hagan, 2011 ONCA 749; R. v. Gamble 2017 ONCA 610, and R. v. R.O., 2017 ONCA 987. I specifically asked about the sentence if I were to reject the defence’s argument that the events in question were simply a “cultural misunderstanding”. On February 24, 2026, I heard further sentencing submissions as a result.

The Victim

15The victim filed a Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”) which was penned by an adult on his behalf. Although some of the diction used in the VIS is beyond that which I would expect of a young person, the thrust of the VIS was clear. The young person, although not physically harmed by the incident, was psychologically hurt by it. He is bullied at school as a result of this incident, and he suffers from trust issues, panic issues and sleep issues.

16The victim’s mother also filed a VIS which corroborates the victim’s statements as regards his wellbeing. The victim took a long time to get back into a sleeping pattern, and he gets bullied at school. For her part, mother indicated that her physical and mental health has declined since the incident and that she worries all the time.

The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”)

17During the course of sentencing, I received two PSR’s. The first PSR states that Mr. Govindbalunikam has no criminal record. He comes from a good family in India where his father was a positive role model. He arrived in Canada in 2012 and was granted Permanent Resident status in 2017. In 2021, he was engaged to be married but he ended that relationship. He appears to have strong family support from his family in India.

18The PSR writer indicated that Mr. Govindbalunikam has a degree in aerospace engineering from India and has a master’s degree in that subject from the University of Toronto. Mr. Govindbalunikam stated to the PSR writer that he “worked at one of the largest aerospace companies in Ontario from 2019 – 2023. Unfortunately, he was dismissed then laid off after a periodic criminal record check conducted by his company”. The PSR writer also noted that “[t]he subject reported that he has always valued excelling in education”.

19Mr. Govindbalunikam communicated to the PSR writer that Mr. Govindbalunikam views the offence as “a huge misunderstanding of cultural differences”. Mr. Govindbalunikam stated that such differences “can be demonstrated in various forms, such as customs, social norms and even business practices”. Specifically, Mr. Govindbalunikam described the incident to the PSR writer as follows:

The subject appears to have demonstrated some insight by acknowledging that his ignorance for allowing an underaged person in his vehicle without parental consent was inappropriate and unlawful. He has expressed being devastated to think that driving his sports car into the town of Thessalon, Ontario for business could have resulted in a criminal occurrence. The subject reported that his purpose for being in Thessalon was to purchase a property which he had researched at his company prior to visiting. The subject admitted being distracted when he noticed the victim and commenced a conversation regarding the child’s fishing techniques. The subject also admitted offering the victim a toy and food as a kind gesture with no intention or desire to do something wrong or harmful. In fact, the subject informed that he has never experienced racial discrimination until his arrest. He claims that conversing with any individual and offering transportation would be considered acceptable in his culture. As such, he claims that this offence is misinterpreted on how authorities have perceived his actions.

20Mr. Govindbalunikam’s sister reported to the PSR writer that, as regards the incident, the subject did what he thought was culturally “normal”. The PSR writer stated that, “[s]he explained that [Mr. Govindbalunikam]’s cultural upbringing and past financial status allowed him to portray his benevolence without any judgment”.

21Two of Mr. Govindbalunikam’s friends spoke with the PSR writer. One friend stated that Mr. Govindbalunikam was a good person and that Mr. Govindbalunikam “should not conduct himself based on his cultural and traditional norms as the repercussions have been devastating”. The other friend stated that, “[i]n his view, the subject’s actions in the offence were “naïve and stupid”.

22The second PSR describes Mr. Govindbalunikam as a person who has participated meaningfully in counselling with the Canadian Mental Health Association and has undertaken such therapies as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. He has also volunteered extensively at his religious temple in Brampton, Ontario.

The Affidavit, The Apology and The Letters of Support

23Mr. Govindbalunikam filed both an affidavit with the court, as well as a letter of apology. In the affidavit, he outlined the fact that his restrictive bail terms required him to adhere to a curfew of 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. daily. He also indicated that he lost his employment at both Remax Realty and Collins Aerospace as a result of these charges. He deposed that his inability to go to India resulted in the termination of his arranged marriage and that his inability to attend that wedding and other family events has affected his mental health and wellbeing.

24In his letter of apology, Mr. Govindbalunikam apologized to both the victim and his parents:

I am writing with a heavy heart to offer my deepest and most sincere apologies for my actions involving the 9-year-old child whom I tried to drop off at his home without the knowledge or consent of his parents. I now realize how serious and inappropriate my actions were, and I am truly sorry for the fear, confusion, and distress I caused to the child and his family.

At the time, I made a decision that I thought was helpful, but I now understand how incredible wrong and misguided it was. My intent was never to cause harm or alarm, but I fully acknowledge that good intentions do not excuse poor judgment. I deeply regret not considering the serious implications of my actions and the rightful concerns they raised.

I cannot begin to imagine the worry and fear the child’s parents must have felt, and I am profoundly sorry for putting them in that position. I accept full responsibility and offer no excuses. I was thoughtless in not seeking proper permission, and I deeply regret the emotional impact my actions may have had on the child.

Since the incident, I have done a great deal of reflection. I understand now, more than ever, the importance of respecting the rights of parents and the critical need to follow clear boundaries when it comes to interacting with minors. I am committed to never making such a mistake again and to ensuring that my future actions are always guided by respect, caution and a firm adherence to Canadian laws and values.

25Counsel for Mr. Govindbalunikam filed letters of support for Mr. Govindbalunikam, as well as letters confirming his involvement in counselling and his post-offence efforts at self-improvement.

Impact Upon Immigration Status

26I received a letter of opinion from Ms. Veena C. Gupta, Barrister and Solicitor, as regards the impact of sentencing upon Mr. Govindbalunikam’s immigration status. Mr. Govindbalunikam is an Indian citizen with Permanent Resident status in Canada.

27Ms. Gupta opined that, given section 36 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”), sentences would impact Mr. Govindbalunikam as follows:

a. A conditional discharge or peace bond would not affect Mr. Govindbalunikam’s immigration status;

b. A term of imprisonment of less than six months less a day would render Mr. Govindbalunikam inadmissible under the IRPA and he could face deportation, but that he would have a right of appeal to the Immigration Appeals Division (“IAD”); and

c. A term of imprisonment of six months or more would render Mr. Govindbalunikam inadmissible under the IRPA and he could face deportation, but that he would NOT have a right of appeal to the IAD.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

28Mr. Govindbalunikam submits that he ought to receive a conditional discharge in this case. He submits that the taking of the child was a “cultural misunderstanding” and that he ought not be punished excessively for an innocent mistake. He has pleaded guilty and taken full responsibility for his actions.

29The Crown submits that the range of sentences for similar cases appears to run between 18 months and three years for similar offences. Given Mr. Govindbalunikam’s plea, I ought to impose a sentence of 18 months plus three years probation which would be the appropriate balance of the competing sentencing principles. This sentence meets the need to denounce and deter while at the same time represents an exercise in judicial restraint.

THE RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE

Collateral Consequences

30In R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the impact that collateral consequences ought to have upon a sentence in a given case. At paras. 13 to 16 of its decision, the court stated:

Therefore, collateral consequences related to immigration may be relevant in tailoring the sentence, but their significance depends on and has to be determined in accordance with the facts of the particular case.

The general rule continues to be that a sentence must be fit having regard to the particular crime and the particular offender. In other words, a sentencing judge may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

The flexibility of our sentencing process should not be misused by imposing inappropriate and artificial sentences in order to avoid collateral consequences which may flow from a statutory scheme or from other legislation, thus circumventing Parliament's will.

These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.

Child Abduction Sentences

31The sentencing range for child abduction cases appears to be, as yet, undefined. While there are a number of cases dealing with situations where a child is abducted by a non-custodial parent, there is not a lot of jurisprudence dealing with cases where non-parents abduct a child.

32In R. v. Koroluk, [2013] S.J. No. 217, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench dealt with the following fact set, as described in the case’s headnote:

Sentencing of an accused who pleaded guilty to child abduction. While at a fair with her mother and brother, the complainant, a 10-year-old child, encountered the accused. The accused invited the complainant to return with him to his car to get money so they could play games at the fair. The complainant agreed and the two left the fair and walked to the accused's car. Once at the car, the accused told the complainant that it was too hot to walk back to the fair and that they would drive back. Rather than return to the fair, the accused drove to an isolated area on a gravel road. Once there, he told the complainant that he would give her money if she was nice. He told the complainant to lie down and when she refused he hit her on the cheek. The complainant was able escape by climbing out of a car window and running through a field. The accused left the area without reporting the incident to police.

33The presiding judge noted that the offender had no criminal record and came from a supportive family. The offender was sentenced to two years less one day.

34In R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, the Court of Appeal for Ontario imposed a two-and-a-half-year sentence on a woman who abducted a baby from a hospital. The baby was located unharmed seven hours later. The offender was an Indigenous woman who had suffered a difficult life and who was suffering from serious mental health issues at the time of the offence. She plead guilty and showed remorse. A majority of the court found that the offender’s mental health issues diminished her moral culpability in a significant way.

35In R. v. Marini, 2014 BCPC 288, the court dealt with a situation where the offender had been placed on a conditional sentence order for having sexually assaulted a teenage boy. While subject to that order, the offender attempted to abduct a child from a public library. He received a 14-month sentence.

36In R. v. Rodrigues, [2019] ONSC 2752, the offender abducted his own child and drove from Aurora to Pembroke at a high rate of speed. He was ultimately involved in a single motor vehicle accident in Pembroke where both he and his daughter were injured. Edwards J. considered the jurisprudence and separated child abduction cases involving parents who take their own children into three broad categories: impulsive abduction, retribution abduction and the hospital abduction. The presiding justice found that Mr. Rodrigues was suffering from a mental disorder and he indicated at para. 77 of his reasons that “[e]ven if Mr. Rodrigues had not been suffering from a mental disorder when he abducted his daughter, a sentence of 15 months would have been, in my view, at the low end of the range of an acceptable sentence this court could have imposed.”

37In R. v. Balasooriyan, 2025 ONCJ 68, the court convicted the offender of a variety of offences including the attempted abduction of a 12-year-old girl. The offender stole a car from a repair shop. On the same day, he attempted to abduct the girl from a public park by engaging her in conversation and by trying to lure her to his car with the promise of listening to music. She refused and called the police. When the offender was arrested, he was found in possession of cannabis, a pocketknife and other items. He had a meaningful record and was on release at the time of the offence. The presiding justice examined the relevant factors of sentencing and imposed a 420 days sentence, although at para. 77 of his reasons he stated, “The position of the Crown [420 days] is generous, very generous”.

38Finally, in R. v. Thompson, [2025] O.J. No. 1479, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld a global ten-year sentence on an elderly man who abducted a four-year-old girl from her driveway. He drove away and forced the child onto his lap and pulled his pants down. The abduction was witnessed by two people who followed the appellant. The offender returned the child to her home. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of ten years for the sexual assault, and eight years for abduction and kidnapping (served concurrently). The court stated at para. 4 of its reasons that, “[a]lthough the sentence appears to be at the high end, it is not demonstrably unfit on that account”. At paras. 12 to 15 of its reasons, the court elaborated:

The appellant argues that the 10-12 year range cited by the sentencing judge was arbitrary and inconsistent with the caselaw and offended the principles of proportionality and totality. The appellant cites several cases but emphasizes R. v. Belbin, 2015 ONSC 1714, aff'd [2017] O.J. No. 3939 (C.A.). That case involved the kidnapping and sexual assault of a young child, whom the appellant took from her bed after breaking into the family home. The offender was found across the street a few minutes later, crouched over the naked child. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

We were not asked to establish a sentencing range and do not do so. As the sentencing judge recognized, most of the cases cited by the appellant in which lower sentences were imposed, including Belbin, pre-date the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424. In that case the Supreme Court noted that Parliament has prioritized denunciation and deterrence and instructed that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase.

The sentencing judge found that the child and her family had been severely harmed by the offences. She found, further, that although the appellant was a 65-year-old first offender, he was unable to accept the court's findings and unwilling to take responsibility for the harm he caused. This led her to express "grave concerns" about his prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentencing judge considered the relevant factors and the totality principle in imposing a global sentence of 10 years rather than the 7-year term proposed by the appellant. The sentence imposed is indeed a high one, but it appropriately emphasized the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence having regard to the egregious nature of the offences and the harm the appellant inflicted. In all of the circumstances, it cannot be said to be demonstrably unfit.

Conditional Sentences

39 Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada describes situations where conditional sentences can be imposed:

Imposing of conditional sentence

742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising The offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if

(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2;

(b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;

40In the seminal case of R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, the court enunciated the principle that holds that a conditional sentence is a punitive sanction. When imposing a conditional sentence, a judge must consider the likelihood of the offender to re-offend, and the fact that a conditional sentence can meet the needs of denunciation and deterrence particularly where onerous conditions are imposed.

ANALYSIS

Cultural Misunderstanding

41The first matter I must determine is whether I accept that Mr. Govindbalunikam abducted the victim as a result of a “cultural misunderstanding”. Mitigating facts need to be proven by the defence on a balance of probabilities: see R. v. Gardner, 1982 30 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368.

42In this case, the defence position has consistently been that this was an innocent mistake with terrible consequences. Specifically, Mr. Govindbalunikam submitted that his abduction of the victim was as a result of a “cultural misunderstanding” which is proven by the following:

a. He did not hide his identity (he gave the victim and his father a business card);

b. He bought the child ice cream at a restaurant, thereby publicly displaying his proximation to the child. The defence submits that this fact is inconsistent with surreptitious abduction for criminal purposes since publicly displaying child abduction would ensure that the accused is caught;

c. Mr. Govindbalunikam took pictures of the child, which created a record that can be used to prove Mr. Govindbalunikam’s guilt;

d. He was driving a yellow Camaro around a small Northern Ontario community which was sure to attract the attention of the local population. This suggests that Mr. Govindbalunikam was not going to abscond with the child; and

e. Leaving the child’s fishing gear and bike behind also suggest that Mr. Govindbalunikam was not engaged in nefarious conduct because it left visible proof that the child was gone, which would in turn attract attention.

43While I accept that these facts suggest that Mr. Govindbalunikam was not hiding the fact that the child was with him, they do not rise to the level of proof on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Govindbalunikam was operating under a “cultural misunderstanding”.

44First, the jurisprudence described in these reasons contains examples of offenders engaging in public conduct with their victims. As such, the fact that certain public activities occurred does not get much weight when I consider how such matters can unfold.

45Secondly, Mr. Govindbalunikam is an intelligent and successful man. He has worked as a professional in a very demanding field, and has a master’s degree in aerospace engineering. He therefore has the intellectual capacity to understand Canadian cultural norms. Also, Mr. Govindbalunikam has worked as a real estate agent where he would presumably have come into contact with the general public. He therefore undoubtedly has experience dealing with Canadian cultural norms. This is not a case where an offender arrives in this country shortly before committing an offence. Rather, Mr. Govindbalunikam has been here for over a decade and has worked in two demanding fields. I do not accept that this abduction was as a result of a “cultural misunderstanding” whereby he mistakenly believed that it was acceptable to take a child.

46He has been a resident of Canada for too long to suggest that this was an innocent error.

47I do not wish these reasons to be taken as a tacit acceptance that taking a child for an unauthorized drive is acceptable in India. I have no expert or viva voce evidence on that subject. But even if I accepted such evidence (assuming that it exists), the fact that Mr. Govindbalunikam has been in Canada for more than 12 years demands that he would have been well aware of this country’s cultural norms. Any suggestion to the contrary – especially for someone of Mr. Govindbalunikam’s ability and experience – would constitute willful blindness at the very least.

48As such, I reject the defence position that this case amounts to a “cultural misunderstanding”.

Grooming

49The Crown must prove all aggravating facts on a beyond reasonable doubt basis, either via direct evidence or via permissible inference: see R. v. Gardner, at p. 414; R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55 at paras. 31 to 33.

50In this case, the Crown asks me to find that Mr. Govindbalunikam was engaged in sexual grooming behaviour with the victim when he purchased ice cream, gave him a fidget spinner, and the like.

51The defence submits that I do not have the evidential foundation to make such an inference.

52I agree with the defence position.

53The reality is that, had there been evidence of sexualization in these facts, I would have readily found that Mr. Govindbalunikam was engaged in sexualized grooming. However, there is no such evidence in this case. Giving the child ice-cream and a fidget spinner suggests that Mr. Govindbalunikam was attempting to gain the child’s trust, but I do not have any evidence suggesting that he did so for sexual purposes. Unlike other cases described in these reasons where an offender drives the child to a secluded area or is in the process of sexually abusing the child when discovered, there is no evidence before me pointing to Mr. Govindbalunikam’s intentions. Given that evidential vacuum, I cannot make any findings with respect to sexualized grooming.

54Ergo, and despite my strong suspicions about the accused’s intentions, I am unable to find that Mr. Govindbalunikam engaged in grooming for sexual purposes because I have no evidence before me from which to draw that inference.

The Aggravating Factors

55The aggravating features of the case are:

a. The age of the victim. He was young enough that he clearly did not appreciate the seriousness of the offence before the court;

b. The seriousness of the facts. Driving around the community of Thessalon, slowing down in front of the victim’s house and then driving away is an inherently frightening phenomenon; and

c. The impact upon the victim has been great. He is being bullied, he suffers from anxiety and panic.

56The mitigating factors in this case are:

a. Mr. Govindbalunikam is 37 years old with no criminal record;

b. Mr. Govindbalunikam has taken responsibility for this offence by pleading guilty, although the import of this phenomenon is somewhat lessened by the fact that Mr. Govindbalunikam continues to minimize the offence as a “cultural misunderstanding”;

c. Mr. Govindbalunikam has taken courses and therapy aimed at self-improvement; and

d. Mr. Govindbalunikam is a highly intelligent and successful person who has a lot to contribute to society if he is not deported.

The Balance

57I am guided by the principles of sentencing as described in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Of particular note, section 718.02 states:

When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

58Although I am not explicitly finding that this is a case involving “child abuse” per se, it is certainly a case where a child was the victim of a serious crime that had a significant impact upon that child’s mental health¹.

59I am also mindful of the broader impact of R. v. Friesen, that is that courts must consider the impact that serious criminal offences have upon children. Although, strictly speaking, the ratio of Friesen applies only to sexual cases and I have no evidence pointing towards sexual intent, the view that serious crimes committed as against children must attract the full weight of denunciation and deterrence cannot be ignored. As such, denunciation and deterrence will be the primary considerations when I impose sentence in this case.

60To the extent that rehabilitation is a principle that can be applied in this case, its already secondary importance is muted severely because Mr. Govindbalunikam continues to minimize the offence as a “cultural misunderstanding.” He has not accepted the full gravity of his actions.

61As regards the impact of my sentence upon Mr. Govindbalunikam’s immigration status, this concern does not affect my analysis. Simply put, the crime was of such a magnitude that giving this factor any meaningful weight would only serve to achieve exactly that which the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned against: It would create another, lighter sentencing regime for non-citizens.

62Upon consideration of the foregoing, the defence position does not adequately address the need to denounce and deter Mr. Govindbalunikam’s conduct. Society cannot allow adults to simply abscond with young children and drive them around for their own purposes. Accordingly, my sentence must send a clear message to both Mr. Govinbalunikam and to society at large that those who abduct our most vulnerable citizens (in this case, children) need to be held accountable for their actions. Anything less than a meaningful custodial sentence would not accomplish this aim.

63The bigger issue is whether the Crown’s position is appropriate. Normally, I would have found that a penitentiary sentence was necessary to protect society’s most vulnerable people: our children. The Court of Appeal for Ontario appears to be sending such a message with its decisions in Batisse and Thompson, where penitentiary sentences were given to first-time offenders (although I acknowledge that there are meaningful differences as between the facts of those cases and the facts of this case). The sentences imposed in those cases suggest that child abduction must be punished with a heavy sanction in order to reflect society’s opprobrium. Had the Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, I would have imposed same.

64With that being said, there is caselaw that supports the Crown position. I believe that this jurisprudence is inconsistent with the broader principles described in Friesen and that child abduction cases should normally attract penitentiary sentences, even on a plea. Nonetheless, and while I might suspect that the accused’s intentions were sexual in nature, I have no evidence from which I can infer that the accused intended to sexually assault the victim and I am thus not willing to go so far as to suggest that an 18-month sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute in this case.

65Accordingly, and given that there are cases that support the Crown position, I will not “jump the Crown” since the position taken by the Crown has some jurisprudential grounding.

CONCLUSION

66I hereby sentence Mr. Govindbalunikam to 18 months custody. The need for denunciation and deterrence demand that Mr. Govindbalunikam be incarcerated. A conditional sentence would not satisfy the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing because a message needs to be sent to Mr. Govindbalunikam and to the community that the courts will protect society’s children. While Mr. Govindbalunikam’s case has some mitigating features – his otherwise pro-social life, his lack of a criminal record, his plea, and his efforts at self-improvement – the aggravating factors of this case are so powerful that a jail sentence is necessary in order to give adequate weight to denunciation and deterrence.

67Following the sentence, Mr. Govindbalunikam shall be subject to three years of probation with the following terms:

a. He shall have no contact with the victim;

b. He shall not attend within 50 metres of any place you know the victim to live, attend school, or otherwise frequent; and

c. He shall complete such counselling as directed by probation.

68I also hereby impose the following corollary orders:

a. A DNA order as per s. 487.051; and

b. A s. 109 order for 10 years.

69Given my findings, I invite counsel to schedule a hearing date to determine if the SOIRA legislation is applicable in circumstances where I did not find any sexual intent.

Varpio J.

Released: April 21, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Manoj Govindbalunikam, 2026 ONSC 658

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

MANOJ GOVINDBALUNIKAM

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Varpio J.

Released: April 21, 2026

Footnotes

It is not clear whether the term “abuse” as it is used in this section of the Criminal Code necessitates that repeated conduct occur or whether prolonged victimization or physical violence is necessary to engage this section. I was not provided any jurisprudence on this point.