SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Mehroz Mahjabin
AND:
Toronto District School Board
BEFORE: Merritt J.
COUNSEL: Mehroz Mahjabin (self-represented)
Natalie Groen, for the Defendant
HEARD: January 30, 2024
ENDORSEMENT
OVERVIEW
1The Plaintiff Mehroz Mahjabin commenced this action against Defendant, Toronto District School Board (“TDSB”) in which she alleges mistreatment of her son.
2The Plaintiff seeks an order under Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure R.R.O.199, Reg. 194 to vary or suspend three outstanding cost orders against her, and the order setting aside the noting in default, on the basis that they were obtained by perjury and fraud.
3TDSB seeks an order under r. 57.03(2) and 60.12 staying the Plaintiff’s action until she satisfies the outstanding costs awards.
4The costs orders total $7,373. The Plaintiff has made partial payment totaling $3,500 and $3,873 remains outstanding. The costs orders arose from repeated default steps taken by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court.
5The Plaintiff also seeks and order to set aside the orders of Bloom J. dated October 25, 2023 and Tzimas J. dated September 9, 2024, setting aside the noting in default.
THE ISSUE
6There are two issues as follows:
Should the decisions be set aside?
Should the action be stayed until the costs awards are paid?
DECISION
7The Plaintiff’s motion to vary or set aside the costs orders and the orders setting aside the noting in default are dismissed.
8Plaintiff’s action is stayed pursuant to Rules 57.03(2) and 60.12 until the outstanding costs are paid in full. If the Plaintiff does not pay the outstanding amount of $3,873 within 30 days of this endorsement, the TDSB shall have leave to bring a motion for further relief including an order dismissing the action.
BACKGROUND FACTS
9There are two other actions against TDSB with allegations of mistreatment of the Plaintiff Mehroz Mahjabin’s son.
10The Plaintiff is the litigation guardian for her son in another Toronto action in which she is not a plaintiff. That action has progressed through examinations for discovery.
11There was also a small claims action which has been stayed.
12The Plaintiff commenced this action in Brampton on February 13, 2023. It has been transferred to Toronto.
13The Plaintiff served the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim in this matter on July 19, 2023.
14On July 31, 2023, counsel for TDSB wrote to the Plaintiff advising that TDSB intended to defend the action by bringing a motion to strike the pleading under r. 21 and asked that the Plaintiff not note the TDSB in default pending the motion to strike.
15The Plaintiff noted TDSB in default on August 28, 2023 and brought a motion for default judgment on October 6, 2023, which the court refused to hear as the counsel for TDSB had not been notified of the motion and had not been served with the motion materials.
16TDSB and the Plaintiff were scheduled to attend in court on October 10, 2023, to set a date for the r. 21 motion to strike. The Plaintiff scheduled the default judgment motion for October 6, 2023 without notice to TDSB. TDSB was unable to set a date for the r. 21 motion to strike and had to move to set aside the noting in default.
17On October 25, 2023 Bloom J. set aside the noting in default, permitted the TDSB to bring its r. 21 motion to strike prior to delivering a Statement of Defence and ordered the Plaintiff to pay costs in the cause in the amount of $3,000.
18Justice Bloom ordered the TDSB to schedule its motion in a timely manner and said that if it did not do so the Plaintiff could seek directions from the court on a motion to any judge.
19On October 25, 2026, the Plaintiff uploaded a fabricated version of Bloom J.’s order to CaseLines (now CaseCenter) which purported to require TDSB to pay the Plaintiff $295,000,000. The Plaintiff also surreptitiously recorded the hearing before Justice Bloom and uploaded it to YouTube.
20On November 21, 2023 the Plaintiff served an Amended Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.
21On November 28, 2023 the parties attended court to schedule the r. 21 motion. The Plaintiff advised that she could not attend court in-person and the presiding judge ordered TDSB to write to the Regional Senior Judge in Toronto to have the case transferred which the TDSB did.
22On December 7, 2023 Wilson J. (as she then was) issued an endorsement setting a timetable for the exchange of materials for the transfer motion.
23On December 7, 2023 the Plaintiff noted TDSB in default for a second time, notwithstanding the order of Bloom J. extending the time for TDSB to file its Statement of Defence until 30 days after the r. 21 motion in the event that the r. 21 motion was unsuccessful.
24On December 21, 2023 Ricchetti J. heard the Plaintiff’s subsequent default judgment motion and temporarily stayed the action pending the outcome of the transfer motion and invited submissions on costs.
25In the costs endorsement, Ricchetti J. ordered costs to the TDSB in the amount of $2,100 plus HST. Justice Ricchetti strongly criticized the Plaintiff’s conduct, observing that she had turned the action into a “procedural nightmare”. Justice Ricchetti found that the Plaintiff’s decision to note TDSB in default while the transfer motion was pending was “clearly and unquestionably improper and abusive”.
26The Plaintiff appealed Ricchetti J.’s decision. The Divisional Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal on February 23, 2024, and awarded costs to TDSB in the amount of $2,500.
27On February 8, 2024 Wilson J. ordered that the TDSB’s r. 21 motion to strike be heard in Brampton and then, depending on the result, the action would be transferred to Toronto.
28On May 9, 2024, the Plaintiff attempted to bring a default judgment motion without notice to TDSB, which Ricchetti J. refused to hear.
29On September 7, 2024, after the parties argued a motion to set aside the second noting in default but before Tzimas J. released her decision, the Plaintiff scheduled another default judgment motion for October 4, 2024.
30On September 9, 2024, Tzimas J. set aside the second noting in default and awarded costs to the TDSB in the amount of $2,500. Justice Tzimas said the motion was unnecessary, “the Plaintiff’s overall behaviour was designed to obstruct the Defendant’s efforts to proceed with its motion to strike” and the Plaintiff’s actions had “resulted in wasted time, resources and money”.
31TDSB’s r. 21 motion to strike was heard on November 27, 2024. Justice Stewart dismissed the motion and awarded costs to the Plaintiff in the amount of $2,000. Justice Stewart proposed that the costs owed to the Plaintiff be set off against the outstanding costs owed by the Plaintiff to TDSB. The Plaintiff did not agree to the set-off.
32On March 25, 2025, the Plaintiff uploaded a version of her draft order that awarded additional costs to her, and included findings that the TDSB had breached various sections of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.
33On March 25, 2025 Stewart J. rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to use the order to make criminal allegations against TDSB.
34TDSB paid the Plaintiff costs in the amount of $2,000 pursuant to the order of Stewart J.
35The Plaintiff seeks to vary the following costs orders made in this action;
the cost order of Ricchetti J. dated January 23, 2024 in the amount of $2,373 ($2,100 plus HST),
the cost order of the Divisional Court dated February 23, 2024 in the amount of $2,500 all inclusive, and
the cost order of Tzimas J. dated September 9, 2024 in the amount of $2,500 all inclusive.
36The costs orders total $7,373. The Plaintiff has made partial payment in the amount of $500 each between March 14, 20024 and June 10, 2024 totaling $3,500.
37TDSB applied the payments to the oldest outstanding costs order. Justice Ricchetti’s costs award in the amount of $2,373 has been satisfied in full. The Divisional Court’s costs award in the amount of $2,500 has been partially paid and $1,373 remains outstanding. Justice Tzimas’s costs award in the amount of $2,500 is unpaid.
38The outstanding amount owed by the Plaintiff is $3,873.
39The Plaintiff has not made any payments since June 10, 2024 and has stated that she will not pay because the costs awards were obtained through fraud and lies.
40The Plaintiff submits that the TDSB ought to have explained to the court on its r. 21 motion to strike that the Plaintiff first wanted to add herself to her son’s existing action, and only commenced a second action when the TDSB refused to consent to an amendment of her son’s action to add her as a plaintiff.
41The Plaintiff submits that the TDSB lied to the court about wanting to bring a r. 21 motion to strike while failing to schedule the motion.
42The Plaintiff submits that the TDSB should not have accepted the Plaintiff’s payment of costs awards after they lied to the court and doing so constitutes fraud under s. 380(1) the Criminal Code.
43The Plaintiff submits that counsel for the TDSB committed perjury.
44In the evidence filed on this motion the Plaintiff does not say that she is impecunious.
ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Should the decisions be set aside?
45The Plaintiff submits that her noting in default of the Defendant was set aside on two occasions by Bloom J. and Tzimas J. because the Defendant wanted to bring a motion to strike the claim. The Defendant’s motion to strike was ultimately unsuccessful and therefore, the Plaintiff submits that the orders setting aside the noting in default was “granted by fraudulent pretense”.
46The Plaintiffs also submits that the costs awards of Ricchetti J., Tzimas J. and the Divisional court should be set aside on the grounds of fraud.
47Rule 59.06 provides as follows:
(2) A party who seeks to,
(a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made;
may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed.
48The court will generally only exercise its discretion under r. 59.06 in “exceptional circumstances”, “sparingly” and “with the greatest of care” because of the important public policy goal of finality in litigation: Active Security and Cable Inc. v. Rogers Communications Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5844at para. 16.
49Where the order being attacked arises from a motion as opposed to a trial, as it the case here, the test is generally applied more stringently against the moving party because motions do not generally determine the outcome of the litigation: Active Security and Cable Inc. at para. 18.
50Perjury involves lying under oath. The submissions of counsel cannot constitute perjury.
51The test for fraud under r. 59.06(2) involves a consideration of the following factors:
The fraud alleged must be proved on a reasonable balance of probability;
The proved fraud must be material;
The evidence of fraud must not have been known to the moving party at the time of the original proceeding;
The moving party applied reasonable or due diligence at the original hearing. Applying an objective test: what did the moving party know, and what ought the moving party reasonably have known?
The motion to set aside must be bought without delay.
Lam v Chen, 2019 ONSC 2510 at para. 22.
52Fraud as that term is used in r. 59.06 means “a false representation made either knowingly, or without belief in its truth or else recklessly, careless as to whether it is true or false”: Lam at para 24 citing Meridian Credit Union Ltd. v. Baig, 2016 ONCA 942 at para. 7.
53There is no evidence to support the Plaintiff’s allegation that the orders were obtained through “fraud” and “lies”. The Plaintiff’s allegation of “fraud” is based on the assertion that the TDSB ought not to have moved to set aside the noting in default to pursue the r. 21 motion because the r. 21 motion was ultimately unsuccessful.
54The TDSB moving to set aside a default proceeding in order to bring a motion to strike which is ultimately unsuccessful does not constitute fraud. Advancing unsuccessful legal arguments in not fraud. Even if the TDSB’s motion to strike was a waste of time as the Plaintiff alleges, that does not mean it was based on fraud.
55The TDSB accepting payment for outstanding costs is not fraud.
56I understand why the Plaintiff is upset. She initially wanted to add herself as a party to the action in which only her son is a plaintiff and she is a litigation guardian. The TDSB took the position that she could not be both a litigation guardian for her son and a plaintiff in the same action. Then, when she started her own action the TDSB said it would bring a motion to strike based on multiple proceedings. As Stewart J. said the TDSB’s position that a litigation guardian cannot also be a plaintiff in an action, is not correct in law. It is possible that the TDSB was foreshadowing a possible conflict of interest if it intended to make allegations in a counter claim that the Plaintiff was negligent. However, even if the Plaintiff is correct that the TDSB ought to have explained to the court on its r. 21 motion to strike that the Plaintiff first wanted to add herself to her son’s existing action and the TDSB took that position that she could not, the TDSB’s failure to do so is not fraud and was not material to the court exercising its discretion to make costs awards against the Plaintiff based on her improper conduct in taking default proceedings while the r. 21 motion was pending.
57The Plaintiff should have addressed all of her arguments about what the TDSB should have done in the context of the r. 21 motion to strike, in her costs submissions on that motion. Similarly, any concerns the Plaintiff had about the TDSB’s alleged delay in scheduling its r. 21 motion should have been addressed by the Plaintiff in her submissions regarding costs on that r. 21 motion.
58The costs orders Ricchetti J. and Tzimas J. were made because the Plaintiff took default proceedings against TDSB in default when it was inappropriate to do so. The costs decisions flowed from the courts’ assessment of the Plaintiff’s conduct, not from any fraud or false representations made by the TDSB.
59Plaintiff’s motion invites the court to reassess whether TDSB’s procedural steps were justified, whether certain legal arguments should have succeeded, and whether the resulting cost consequences were fair.
60Rule 59.06(2) does not allow this court to revisit the findings and discretionary costs decisions of Ricchetti J., the Divisional Court and Tzimas J. where there is no evidence of fraud.
61The proper avenue to challenge the orders is by way of an appeal. The Plaintiff demonstrated she understands that an appeal is the proper route, when she unsuccessfully appealed Ricchetti J.’s Order to the Divisional Court.
62Rule 59.06(2) does not allow a Superior Court judge to revisit appellate decisions of the Divisional Court.
63The Plaintiff’s motion to set aside or vary the orders of Bloom J., Ricchetti J., Tzimas J., and Divisional Court under r. 59.06 is dismissed.
Issue 2: Should the action be stayed until the costs awards are paid?
64Rule 57.03 provides as follows:
(2) Where a party fails to pay the costs of a motion as required under subrule (1), the court may dismiss or stay the party’s proceeding, strike out the party’s defence or make such other order as is just.
65Rule 60.12 contains a similar provision giving the court similar powers where a part fails to comply with interlocutory orders generally.
66The civil justice system relies on the expectation that court orders will be followed. When a litigant treats court orders as optional suggestions, the court must intervene to prevent its process from being exploited. Failure to enforce court orders “risks rendering the court a paper tiger” and is “ultimately corrosive of the entire justice system”: Rana v Unifund Assurance Company 2016 ONSC 2502 at paras. 2, and 50
67In Rana, at para. 50 Dunphy J. set out the following considerations relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion under rr. 57.03(2) or Rule 60.12:
a. Where there has been non-compliance with an order of the court, the court should be alive to the possibility that its process is being abused; failing to act may deprive the moving party of justice according to law and risks rendering the court a paper tiger.
b. The right of access to the courts must be accompanied by the responsibility to abide by the rules of civil procedure and to comply with orders of the court - to exempt impecunious parties from the enforcement of costs orders when made would amount to granting “carte blanche to continue to ignore the rules and orders of the court and take unsupportable steps in the action without fear of consequences”.
c. The court ought not to sit in appeal of the prior costs awards – the respondent will have had the opportunity to make submissions about impecuniosity at the prior hearings that resulted in the costs orders and seeking to relieve against prior costs orders constitutes a collateral attack on orders previously made.
d. The court may have regard to a pattern of unnecessary and unreasonable steps taken in the proceeding, including appealing numerous orders without chance of success or knowing the risk thereby imposing costs upon the other party.
e. If the orders of the court are “cavalierly ignored” and if a litigant “continuously fails to comply with her obligations as a litigant and then fails to abide by the costs consequences attendant upon that behavior, the court is justified in bringing some finality to the action”.
f. Impecuniosity is not a shield for unreasonable conduct of litigation and a dismissal order may be made even if it resolves the matter on procedural rather than substantive grounds.
g. Self-represented litigants, while entitled to some accommodation and assistance to ensure a fair hearing, are not entitled to abuse the system or the party opposite and failure to enforce orders once made against self-represented parties is unfair to the parties opposite and undermines respect for the court and the civil justice system.
h. Courts usually talk in terms of prejudice that cannot be compensated for by costs. But, at some point, costs themselves become an inadequate form of compensation for prejudice, especially where the party on whom they are imposed refuses to pay them” (citations omitted).
68While costs orders of appellate courts are not encompassed by r. 57.03(2) and r. 60.12, they are a relevant factor to consider in determining the consequences of a party’s non-compliance under the Rules: Rana at para 42.
69In this case the Plaintiff has repeatedly misused the court’s process. The costs awards of Ricchetti J. and Tzimas J. were made to sanction the Plaintiff’s misconduct. She has used court resources to advance her claim in an improper manner and denies the court’s authority to sanction her misconduct.
70The Plaintiff’s conduct in this litigation meets the high threshold for a stay. The Plaintiff has uploaded a fraudulent order purporting to award herself $295,000,000, surreptitiously recorded court proceedings, filed documents accusing TDSB and its counsel of breaching the Criminal Code, and improperly invoked the default process as a tactical device by noting TDSB in default when a r. 21 motion was pending and again when a transfer motion was pending.
71The Plaintiff told the TDSB she is “not paying for cost orders which were gained by committing fraud. There is not one cost order made for TDSB in which the TDSB did not commit fraud”.
72The Plaintiff also confirmed in her oral submissions that she is not paying the costs awards because she was, according to her, perfectly within her legal rights to note the TDSB in default judgment and she was then, and is now, entitled to default judgment.
73The Plaintiff insists she has done nothing wrong, that she has followed the law throughout, the fact that the TDSB’s r. 21 motion was unsuccessful proves that she is right and was right all along.
74The Plaintiff’s persistence that it was her right to proceed with default judgment and that she was “100% right to do so” even though she has been told by the court that it was not appropriate to do so, demonstrates her lack of respect for court orders.
75The Plaintiff refuses to pay the costs associated with her misconduct and seeks to continue the litigation without bearing the consequences imposed by the court because in her view the costs orders are improper.
76A stay is necessary to signal that such behaviour will halt the progress of litigation entirely.
77As set out above, there is no basis for the Plaintiff’s challenge to the orders under r.59.06(2).
78The Plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate or undermine orders that have already been adjudicated by competent courts to avoid complying with them, cannot be countenanced. Allowing parties to disregard or challenge binding orders outside proper appellate channels would erode the integrity of the justice system and encourage disregard for judicial authority.
79The Plaintiff did not say that she is impecunious when the orders were made, and she did not say so in the affidavits she filed on these motions in order to explain her failure to comply with them. The evidence demonstrates that her refusal to comply is deliberate and grounded in her belief that the orders are illegitimate having been based on “fraud” and “lies”.
80The prejudice to TDSB does not arise as a result of the amount of outstanding costs which is relatively small. The prejudice here is that the Plaintiff has demonstrated a pattern of improper conduct forcing repeated court attendances, advancing improper motions and making scandalous allegations against the TDSB and its counsel.
81In this case a stay of the action is appropriate. The Plaintiff must understand that her actions have consequences. The Plaintiff must comply with the orders of the court or her action will not proceed. A stay is necessary to enforce compliance and preserve the integrity of the court’s process.
COSTS
82The parties have agreed that costs shall be fixed at $2250 “all-inclusive” per motion (i.e., up to $4500 in total if one party is unsuccessful on both motions), payable by the unsuccessful party to the successful party.
83The Plaintiff shall pay costs in the amount of $4,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST to the Defendant within 30 days of this order.
Merritt J.
Date: February 02, 2026