Court File and Parties
CITATION: R. v. X.Y., 2026 ONSC 584
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
X.Y.
Ms. H. Somal, for the Crown
Mr. P. Brauti, Ms. A. Banister-Thompson and Ms. A. Longo, for the Accused
HEARD: January 26-28, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
conlan J.
1The accused, X.Y., a police officer, was charged with several criminal offences allegedly committed against his spouse (“complainant”): (i) assault with a weapon (a saucepan), (ii) sexual assault, (iii) assault, and (iv) uttering a death threat against both the complainant and the couple’s unborn baby.
2The trial commenced, judge-alone, on January 26th and concluded on January 28th of this year. One witness testified – the complainant. On the morning of day three of the trial, mid-cross-examination of the complainant by defence counsel, Mr. Brauti, the Crown elected not to call any further evidence. The defence called no evidence. The Crown made no submissions. The defence made very brief submissions. The Court entered verdicts of not guilty on all counts.
3I promised some very brief reasons in support of those verdicts. What follows are those reasons.
4I do not know what happened between the complainant and the accused. What I do know is that this case would not meet the civil standard of proof and, hence, falls well short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
5None of this is meant to be disparaging of the person that the complainant is. She appeared to me to be intelligent, articulate, and accomplished, and a devoted mother and daughter. Her evidence, however, was not something that any judge could safely rely on.
6In cross-examination at trial, the complainant:
i. denied that she tried to “exclude” the accused from the baby’s ultrasound, but she clearly did as she admitted that she told him, “I don’t want you there”, and that she also told him that she would not let him inside the room if he came to the medical building where the ultrasound was being done;
ii. denied that she was “upset” about the accused expressing some hesitancy about wanting to have a child at that time, but she clearly was as she admitted that she had to leave mid-way through a movie at the cinema and cried outside because of the sadness and the hurt that she was feeling about the accused’s sentiments;
iii. stated, for the first time in her trial evidence, that there were all kinds of non-consensual sexual activity between her and the accused quite apart from that which formed the basis of the charge that was laid;
iv. acknowledged that in none of the correspondence that she had her family law counsel send to the accused or his counsel was there any mention of any abuse or threats towards her or the child at the hands of the accused, even though the said correspondence post-dated all of the alleged offence dates and post-dated the couple’s separation;
v. acknowledged that she never told her private social workers anything about the alleged saucepan incident (which gave rise to the assault with a weapon charge) or the alleged death threats against her or the unborn baby or the alleged sexual assault;
vi. admitted that she knowingly omitted material facts from and did not tell the whole truth to her private social workers;
vii. acknowledged that she continued to not mention anything to her private social workers about the alleged death threats even after one of the workers told her that, based on what she had disclosed, that worker had no safety or child protection concerns;
viii. acknowledged that, during the children’s aid society (“CAS”) investigation that began at the instance of the complainant, she did not mention anything to the CAS about any of the allegations that underlie any of the criminal offences that were ultimately laid against the accused, even though the said investigation post-dated all of the alleged offence dates and post-dated the couple’s separation;
ix. acknowledged that, during the Peel Regional Police investigation that came after the CAS investigation, she did not mention anything to the police about any of the allegations that underlie any of the criminal offences that were ultimately laid against the accused;
x. stated that all of the following three things are correct: (i) she told the Peel Regional Police that “no physical altercations” ever occurred between her and the accused, and (ii) that was the truth, and (iii) it is also the truth that physical altercations occurred between her and the accused, when it is plain and obvious that all three of those things cannot possibly be correct;
xi. acknowledged that, in her sworn affidavit in the family law proceeding that post-dated all of the alleged offence dates and post-dated the couple’s separation, the part of the form that expressly asks about family violence and/or abuse was left entirely blank;
xii. admitted that she knowingly withheld important facts from the family court;
xiii. acknowledged that, in her signed and certified application in the same family law proceeding, the part of the form that expressly asks about “cruelty” was left entirely blank, even though she had told defence counsel earlier that she considered the actions of the accused to have been ones of “cruelty”;
xiv. admitted that she was not “forthright” with the family court;
xv. admitted that, “depending on the circumstances”, she “may lie or tell the truth”;
xvi. acknowledged that she offered to the police the name of the accused as a suspect in the vandalism of her father’s motor vehicle, yet she explained that her main reason for not disclosing certain things to the authorities and to the family court was because she was afraid to provoke the accused (and, clearly, accusing X.Y. of possibly having vandalized her father’s motor vehicle would likely have not sat well with the accused); and
xvii. acknowledged that, in her signed and certified complaint filed with the Office of Independent Police Review Director, which complaint post-dated both the CAS and the Peel Regional Police investigations, she did not mention anything about any of the allegations that underlie any of the criminal offences that were ultimately laid against the accused except for something related to the simple or common assault matter.
7Victims of intimate partner violence and abuse are not expected to react in a formulaic way. They are not to be held to some caveman standard of how we think they should have reacted, and that includes whether and how and when we think they ought to have told others about their victimization.
8In lengthy, sometimes diatribal and unresponsive, answers to questions in cross-examination, the complainant explained to this Court that she was afraid of the accused and wanted to stay free from his consequences and repercussions.
9There is some potential authenticity to that. At the end of the day, though, as she said herself, she may or may not tell the truth, even under oath to a court; it depends on the circumstances.
10I am not at all sure that these circumstances are ones where she told the truth.
11None of the allegations was proven. The accused, accordingly, was swiftly acquitted on all counts.
Conlan J.
Released: January 29, 2026