CITATION: Furtado v. De Sousa et al, 2026 ONSC 4916
COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-3358
DATE: 2026-08-27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARIA FURTADO
Plaintiff
– and –
EDWARDO DE SOUSA and YVONNE MASSCHELEIN
Defendants
Alan Rachlin, for the Plaintiff
Kieran Dickson, for the Defendant De Sousa
HEARD: March 31 to April 29, 2026 at Stratford
[1] This ruling will determine the full indemnity costs that should be deducted from the all-inclusive settlement amount of $150,000, paid to the plaintiff by the defendant Ms. Masschelein pursuant to a Pierringer agreement. The remainder of the settlement amount, after that deduction, will be deducted from the jury’s award in order to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff. The background to this ruling is laid out in my previous ruling in this case, cited as Furtado v. DeSousa, 2026 ONSC 3356.
[2] In short, the task of the court is to determine the costs component of the all-inclusive settlement, as of the date of the settlement. This should, in my view, reflect a reasonable proportion of all of the fees and disbursements that had been incurred to the date of that settlement in pursuing both defendants, plus the total of any costs that are specific to Ms. Masschelein only and do not relate to the claims against both.
[3] In this regard, I must correct counsel for Mr. De Sousa in paras. 2 and 3 of his written submissions. He referred to para. 29 of my previous decision as standing for the proposition that the costs determination I am about to embark upon should only reflect “additional expenses” that were incurred in pursuing Ms. Masschelein, such as any additional time spent on discoveries due to the involvement of two defendants instead of only one. That is a misreading of my reasons. The point I was making in para. 29 is set out in the first sentence thereof, which is that the fact that costs were actually incurred in pursuing Ms. Masschelein is “not a matter of mere speculation”. I had no intention of ruling that the only costs that could be considered would be those which incrementally increased the costs that would have been incurred anyway in pursuing Mr. De Sousa.
[4] I agree with the plaintiff that, up until the action was settled by Ms. Masschelein, there were two defendants in this action, both of whom were being actively pursued by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a passenger in Mr. De Sousa’s vehicle, was, in effect, required to sue both drivers because neither was prepared to concede any liability whatsoever for the plaintiff’s losses. It is incorrect to refer to Ms. Masschelein as an “additional defendant”, as if to suggest that the claims against her were less serious than those against Mr. De Sousa. In my view, all of the costs incurred by the plaintiff, up to the date of the settlement, should be considered by the court as the starting point in assessing Ms. Masschelein’s costs, not simply the incremental costs of pursuing two defendants instead of one.
[5] Indeed, to do otherwise would actually be unfair to Mr. De Sousa. I will offer a simple example to make that point. Let’s say that it costs $500 to issue a Statement of Claim. One could argue that the fee would be the same whether there was one defendant or two, so no part of that filing fee should be attributed to Ms. Masschelein. However, that would mean that, if this court ultimately finds itself assessing costs that are payable by Mr. De Sousa as the unsuccessful defendant, he would end up paying the entirety of that disbursement, instead of paying only a portion of it as one of two unsuccessful defendants. I use the word “unsuccessful” somewhat loosely here. Mr. De Sousa was unsuccessful because the jury found him solely liable following a trial. Ms. Masschelein was unsuccessful because she paid a substantial amount of money to the plaintiff to avoid the risk of being found liable for more than that after a trial.
[6] It follows from the above that whatever costs I attribute to Ms. Masschelein will serve to reduce the fees and disbursements that could be considered by the court if it is called upon to assess costs against Mr. De Sousa. Thus, this process is fair to Mr. De Sousa.
[7] The plaintiff suggests that such costs should be apportioned between Ms. Masschelein and Mr. De Sousa at 50 percent of the total time expended and disbursements[1] incurred, plus HST, up to the date of the settlement, which resulted in a total claim for costs of $128,263.81. While there is some logic to dividing costs equally between the two defendants, I am not persuaded that that is the just and appropriate approach. Terpstra Farms Ltd. v. Argue & Associates, 2010 ONSC 921, is a decision upon which I relied in my previous decision, in support of the principle that, where an all-inclusive settlement amount does not specify an amount for costs, the court should fix an appropriate amount for the costs incurred in pursuing the settling defendant, before applying the balance in reduction of the jury award. Bielby J. in that case noted that the jury found the settling defendant to be 15% liable, and chose to use that same figure in apportioning 15% of the plaintiff’s actual costs to the date of settlement by way of a reduction in the amount to be credited against the jury award. He did not provide any detailed analysis as to why he did so.
[8] Fixing costs is, of course, a highly discretionary exercise, as provided for in s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. Furthermore, the court is largely in uncharted waters in conducting the present exercise, since counsel were unable to provide any other authorities as to how the costs component of an all-inclusive settlement should be calculated. As such, I am left to craft an approach which will, hopefully, generate a fair and just result to both parties.
[9] While the approach followed by Bielby J. may be fair and just in some cases, it does not do justice to the plaintiff in a case such as the one before this court, where the jury found the settling defendant Ms. Masschelein to be 0% at fault. Using that approach would mean that no portion of the plaintiff’s costs would be attributable to Ms. Masschelein. This would mean that 100% of the settlement amount would accrue to the benefit of Mr. De Sousa, as a reduction in the damages award he must pay, despite the fact that he was wholly unsuccessful in proving any negligence on the part of Ms. Masschelein. There is no logic to such a result.
[10] More importantly, it would also mean that the plaintiff, whose lawyer sued Ms. Masschelein and ultimately negotiated what, in hindsight, was a very favourable settlement on the plaintiff’s behalf, would receive no reimbursement whatsoever for the legal costs incurred in so doing. For reasons explained in my previous decision, I am satisfied that this would be unjust, since she would end up being under-compensated.
[11] To his credit Mr. Dickson, counsel for Mr. De Sousa, does not rely upon Terpstra to suggest that 0% of the plaintiff’s costs should be deducted, but did suggest that her costs should comprise only 10 to 20% of the all-inclusive settlement amount.
[12] As I noted in my previous ruling, the settlement amount of $150,000 paid by Ms. Masschelein is the amount she would have had to contribute toward the plaintiff’s damages of $359,740 (net of collateral benefits) had the jury found her 41.7% liable. Leaving the issue of deduction of the costs attributable to Ms. Masschelein aside for the moment, her contribution toward the amount awarded would remain the same had they found her 41.7%, 30%, 20%, 10% or 0% liable, because whatever is left from the settlement amount after payment of her liability share would be deducted from the amount payable by Mr. De Sousa to avoid overcompensation. As the amount of her liability amount drops, the deduction resulting from overpayment would increase by the same amount. What this means is that, so long as the jury’s finding on Ms. Masschelein’s liability is 41.7% or less, the actual number they arrive at is irrelevant to the final result.
[13] In my view, it makes no sense to assess the costs attributable to Ms. Masschelein on an irrelevant number. What is clearly not irrelevant, though, is the amount of the jury’s total award. Comparing the amount of the settlement to the total amount awarded by the jury will, in my view, provide a highly relevant indicator as to how significant the action against Ms. Masschelein, and the settlement obtained as a result thereof, were in the context of the final result at trial.
[14] The degree to which the settlement amount contributed to the overall recovery of the plaintiff is important because the amount involved in the proceeding and the degree of success are important factors to take into account in assessing costs. Here, despite the fact that the jury ultimately found Ms. Masschelein 0% liable, the settlement was obviously based upon the premise that she was at risk of being found liable for an amount approaching $150,000, including prejudgment interest and costs, if she didn’t settle. In other words, the settlement was presumably based on the assumption that the plaintiff would probably be successful in her claim against Ms. Masschelein, not for the entire amount of her damages, but for at least $150,000 of those damages, including her share of costs. The plaintiff should, therefore, be treated as a successful plaintiff who recovered $150,000 from this unsuccessful defendant.
[15] The principle of proportionality is also important in assessing costs, and the approach I am proposing facilitates a proportionality analysis. The amount of costs attributed to Ms. Masschelein should be proportionate to the total amount she agreed to pay, bearing in mind that the court, in her case, is assessing costs on a full indemnity basis not a partial indemnity basis.
[16] Before considering the specific amounts claimed by the plaintiff, I should deal with two issues raised by counsel in their written submissions. The first deals with the fact that plaintiff’s counsel was engaged by the plaintiff under a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement. It provided for a contingency fee of 30% of the plaintiff’s settlement or award, excluding any amount specifically directed to help pay for disbursements and taxes. The issue is whether this has any impact on the costs allocation that I will be making in these reasons.
[17] The Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15 contains several provisions which dictate how such agreements affect the recovery of costs as against the other party. Section 20 provides as follows:
20 (1) Such an agreement does not affect the amount, or any right or remedy for the recovery, of any costs recoverable from the client by any other person, or payable to the client by any other person, and any such other person may require any costs payable or recoverable by the person to or from the client to be assessed in the ordinary manner, unless such person has otherwise agreed.
(2) However, the client who has entered into the agreement is not entitled to recover from any other person under any order for the payment of any costs that are the subject of the agreement more than the amount payable by the client to the client’s own solicitor under the agreement.
[18] Section 20.1(1) also provides that a court shall not reduce the amount of costs only because the client’s solicitor is being compensated in accordance with a contingency fee agreement.
[19] I take from these provisions that I should assess costs in the usual manner, pursuant to the general principles in r. 57.01, without regard to the fact that plaintiff’s counsel is being paid under a contingency fee agreement, subject to the proviso that any costs award I make cannot exceed the amount payable under that agreement.
[20] That is the general approach outlined by Corbett J. in Mantella v. Mantella, 2006 CarswellOnt 3176 (S.C.J.) at para. 7:
The actual fees charged by counsel are not the starting point of a costs analysis. Costs are an indemnity, and thus may not exceed the client's total liability to her solicitor; the client may not gain a windfall as a result of a costs award. However, in fixing partial indemnity costs, the court does not look at the actual fee arrangement between solicitor and client and discount that arrangement to ensure that recovery is "partial". Rather, the court considers the pertinent factors laid down in the rules in fixing the amount of recovery appropriate on a partial indemnity basis. So long as the amount is equal to or less than the actual fees and disbursements charged, then the amount arrived at by reference to the factors listed in the rules will be the amount of the award — whether that represents 50% of actual fees, 75% of actual fees, or even 100% of actual fees. If counsel is prepared to work at rates approximating partial recovery costs, that is counsel's choice. There is no reason why the client's fee recovery ought to be reduced because she has negotiated a favourable rate with counsel, so long as the total of the indemnity does not exceed the fees actually charged.
[21] Here, the full amount of the contingent fee cannot be calculated until prejudgment interest and costs are determined. However, I agree with the plaintiff that the contingent fee will at least be 30% of the jury’s award, net of collateral benefits, of $359,740. This amounts to $107,922. For present purposes, that will represent a cap on any award that I make.
[22] As pointed out by Mr. De Sousa in his written submissions, the contingency agreement provides for compensation of plaintiff’s counsel on the basis of overall recovery, rather than on a “per defendant” basis. Thus, the cap on the costs attributable to Ms. Masschelein is not 30% of the amount recovered from her of $150,000, but rather 30% of the total award.
[23] The second issue relates to whether costs incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing statutory accident benefits should be considered in assessing costs. Those costs amounted to $5,552. Those efforts resulted in recovery of $55,760, which amount was deducted from the jury award as collateral benefits, to the ultimate benefit of Mr. De Sousa.
[24] The Court of Appeal, in Cadieux v. Cloutier, 2018 ONCA 903, discussed whether the costs of pursuing statutory benefits can be visited upon the unsuccessful defendant in an award of costs. The court said this, at paras. 129 and 132:
The court has jurisdiction, under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, to award “costs of and incidental to a proceeding”. Legal fees and disbursements in pursuing SABs can reasonably be considered incidental to the proceeding where the SABs have reduced the damages payable by the tortfeasor.
A trial judge considering whether to award such costs, and if so, the amount of the award, will have regard to all the circumstances, including: (a) the fees and disbursements actually billed to the plaintiff in pursuit of the SABs; (b) relevant factors in Rule 57.01, including whether the litigation of the SABs claim involved particular risk or effort; (c) the proportionality of the legal costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff to the benefit of the SABs reduction to the defendant; (d) whether the SABs were resolved by way of settlement or by arbitration; (e) any costs paid as a result of the settlement or arbitration; (f) whether all or any portion of the costs were incurred as a result of unusual or labour-intensive steps that should not reasonably be visited upon the tort defendant; (g) whether or not plaintiff’s counsel was acting on a contingent fee basis and, if so, the terms of the arrangement; and (h) the overall fairness of the allocation of the costs of pursuing SABs as between the plaintiff and the SABs insurer and as between the plaintiff and the tort insurer.
[25] Here, I have been provided with almost none of the information I would need to conduct the analysis outlined by the Court of Appeal. I do not know the fees and disbursements actually billed to the plaintiff for these services. Pursuing a claim against the accident benefits insurer does not appear to be covered by the contingency fee agreement. It retains plaintiff’s counsel “to sue the responsible motorist for compensation”, but says nothing about pursuing a claim against the accident benefits insurer. I do not know whether pursuing the claim involved litigation, or any particular risk or effort, nor whether the claim was resolved by settlement or arbitration. All I am able to conclude is that the amount claimed is not disproportionate to the benefit of the SABs reduction that accrued to the defendant. That is insufficient.
[26] Furthermore, the statutory accident benefits recovered accrued entirely to the benefit of Mr. De Sousa, by reducing the award that he was found 100% liable to pay. It did not reduce the amount contributed by Ms. Masschelein whatsoever, because that settlement was paid before collateral benefits were even calculated, and was not adjusted thereafter. Given that we are assessing costs attributable to the action against Ms. Masschelein, it is my view that it would not be fair to notionally visit any of the costs incurred in pursuing SABS upon her since she did not benefit from the amounts recovered.
[27] Accordingly, that claim is disallowed. This is without prejudice to the plaintiff revisiting this issue when and if the court is called upon to consider costs as against Mr. De Sousa.
[28] I will now turn to the fees and disbursements claimed by the plaintiff, beginning with disbursements.
[29] The plaintiff has docketed disbursements incurred to the date of settlement totalling $79,179.04, and has provided supporting invoices. Mr. De Sousa does not dispute that these identified disbursements were actually paid, in the amounts stated. However, he does not concede that they are properly recoverable in relation to pursuing the claims against Ms. Masschelein, nor does he concede the reasonableness of the individual amounts.
[30] Having said that, Mr. De Sousa identifies only three specific objections to the disbursements: that HST was included twice on some disbursements; that a specific disbursement for Dr. Friedlich dated January 17, 2024 for $2,545.33 does not correspond with any known report in the litigation; and, that a report from Innovative dated May 1, 2023 for $800 and one to initiate a LAT application, dated June 9, 2023 for $106, were included, both of which related to the claim for accident benefits.
[31] As to the first objection, the plaintiff responds that, as per the CRA’s rules for lawyer disbursements, all disbursements “not incurred as agent” must have GST or HST charged when billed to others, including the client. She relies on policy statement P-209R. She further indicates that where non-agency disbursements paid by plaintiff’s counsel had a component explicitly listed for HST, further HST was not charged. However, where a disbursement paid by plaintiff’s counsel did not explicitly list a component for HST, counsel was required to charge HST when billing to someone else, including the plaintiff.
[32] On reviewing the invoices filed, and policy P-209R, I accept the plaintiff’s explanation.
[33] As to the disbursement for Dr. Friedlich, the plaintiff concedes that he did an assessment of the plaintiff but did not provide a report for use in the litigation. That disbursement is, accordingly, disallowed.
[34] As to the disbursements related to the plaintiff’s pursuit of accident benefits, totalling $906, they are disallowed, for reasons already given.
[35] After deducting the disallowed items, the plaintiff’s disbursements total $75,727.71.
[36] Of that amount, there are two disbursements that, the plaintiff argues, specifically relate to the claims against Ms. Masschelein and do not address Mr. De Sousa’s liability. Two reports were prepared for the plaintiff by Joe Correia of HBC Engineering that cost a total of $28,681.66. The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff paid those sums, but does dispute their recoverability. I have reviewed the reports, and I am satisfied that they relate exclusively to the potential liability of Ms. Masschelein, and not to the case against Mr. De Sousa. Given their content, there is little doubt that they played a role in inducing Ms. Masschelein to settle. This is a disbursement that, in my view, should be borne entirely and exclusively by Ms. Masschelein. Thus, the costs to be allocated to Ms. Masschelein will include those disbursements of $28,681.66.
[37] Mr. De Sousa does not specifically challenge any other disbursements, other than making a blanket denial that they are recoverable, which is entirely unhelpful. In assessing full indemnity costs, I am proceeding on the presumption that disbursements actually incurred by experienced counsel are appropriate and reasonable, in the absence of any specific complaint raised by the opposing party.
[38] The balance of the plaintiff’s allowable disbursements therefore amount to $47,046.05. The portion of those disbursements that will be allocated to Ms. Masschelein will be determined below.
[39] I now move to a consideration of fees.
[40] The dockets provided by the plaintiff show the time spent pursuing the litigation against both parties, up to the date of settlement, to be $111,227, which excludes any time attributable to the accident benefits claim. Lead counsel, Mr. Rachlin, was called to the bar in 1987, is certified by the Law Society as a specialist in civil litigation, and was editor of Carswell Consolidated Ontario Insurance Statues and Regulations from 2005 to 2021. He is billed out at $900 per hour on these dockets. He asserts that this court has previously accepted his hourly rate for plaintiff’s work up to $1,000 per hour.
[41] Other billable time is reflected in the dockets for three other individuals. They are Diana Romano Reid, identified as DRR2, who is a 1999 call, and is billed out at $425 per hour; Josef Horvath, identified as JFH, who is a 2021 call, and is billed out at $300 per hour; and Samantha McSween, identified as SLK3, who is a law clerk, and is billed out at $230 per hour.
[42] Mr. De Sousa submits that plaintiff’s counsel will be paid pursuant to the contingent fee agreement, and that, in the absence of a contractual obligation to pay her lawyers at an hourly rate, it is not appropriate to use such rates to ensure that the plaintiff is not undercompensated. I disagree. I have already noted, above, that costs are not to be reduced only by reason of the fact that counsel is being paid pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. Instead, costs should be assessed in the ordinary manner, subject to the cap identified above. That can only be done by considering the time spent by counsel, as well as the value of that time, as reflected by their customary hourly rates, along with other relevant factors as set out in r. 57.01.
[43] Mr. De Sousa also points out that the full indemnity rates claimed are all in excess of the full indemnity rates of Ms. Reid, Mr. Horvath and Ms. McSween in a Costs Outline dated February 3, 2026, which related to a procedural motion. There, full indemnity rates for these three individuals were stated to be $350, $220 and $181 respectively, as opposed to $425, $300 and $230 as claimed in the dockets now before the court.
[44] The plaintiff’s response to that is that the previous Costs Outline was in error in referring to “full indemnity rates”. It was intended to refer to “substantial indemnity rates”, which are defined in r. 1.03(1) as 1.5 times what would otherwise be awarded on a partial indemnity basis. The Costs Outline filed does, indeed, confirm that the full indemnity hourly rates being claimed there are 1.5 times the partial indemnity rate.
[45] While the total costs said to have been incurred by the plaintiff are high, the rates charged are not, in my view, far outside what would be considered to be reasonable market rates for these services. I am satisfied that a modest rounding down, to $105,000, is all that is warranted.
[46] The final, and most important task, is to determine what portion of those fees, and the disbursements discussed above, should be attributed to Ms. Masschelein.
[47] I have already concluded that, as a practical matter, the plaintiff has been successful in recovering $150,000 from Ms. Masschelein. This amounts to 36% of the total amount awarded by the jury of $415,500, and 41.7% of the net amount awarded of $359,740, after accident benefits were deducted. However, that contribution includes components for costs and prejudgment interest, so these numbers would have to be discounted to account for that, since the jury award consisted of damages only.
[48] I have already noted that substantial disbursements of $28,681.66 were incurred that relate to the claim against Ms. Masschelein alone, and should be fully allocated to her. This reduces the portion of the settlement agreement that can be attributed to the remaining costs, prejudgment interest and the damages component to about $122,000. This is roughly 34% of the net damages award.
[49] In considering the principles in Rule 57.01, the first consideration is the result. As stated above, I am of the view that the plaintiff should be considered to have been successful as against Ms. Masschelein to the extent of $150,000 including costs and prejudgment interest. She should be considered to have been successful as against Mr. De Sousa for the balance of her jury award.
[50] Clearly, Mr. De Sousa is the most unsuccessful of the two defendants. He was completely unsuccessful in shifting any liability onto Ms. Masschelein, but despite that he still benefits financially from a deduction of the settlement amount, net of the costs attributable to Ms. Masschelein. Even so, he will still end up paying far more than Ms. Masschelein toward her damages, and the issue of costs as against him has yet to be addressed. At this point I have received no input from counsel as to costs, and am completely unaware as to whether any offers to settle might be relevant in that determination.
[51] As to the other factors identified in r. 57.01, the apportionment of liability justifies a higher than normal assessment of costs in favour of the plaintiff. The fact that her counsel was able to negotiate a settlement with Ms. Masschelein for $150,000 on a case where the jury ultimately found her to be 0% at fault amounts to a smashing success, and justifies a substantial award in costs. In other words, the 0% finding of liability does not mean that the plaintiff was unsuccessful, but instead reflects an extraordinary level of success by her counsel, in extracting $150,000 from a defendant who was ultimately exonerated from any liability by the jury. This was a classic example of good lawyering.
[52] The court is also directed to consider the amount claimed and the amount recovered in the proceedings. The amount claimed in the Statement of Claim was $1,000,000 in general damages and special damages of $250,000. The amount recovered from Ms. Masschelein amounts to only 12% of that. However, the significance of this factor is greatly reduced by reason of the jury’s ultimate verdict that Ms. Masschelein bore no liability for the accident, for reasons just expressed. 12% is far better than nothing. More relevant is the fact that the plaintiff settled with Ms. Masschelein for $150,000 when her total claim exceeded $1,000,000. This suggests that the primary target of the litigation was Mr. De Sousa and not her, and supports a lower allocation of costs toward Ms. Masschelein.
[53] The proceedings were of medium complexity, and were complicated by the fact that the plaintiff was 69 years of age at the date of the collision yet was still working almost full-time hours at work. She was 73 years old at the time of trial. This created challenges with respect to the claims for lost of past and future income.
[54] The issues were of paramount importance to the plaintiff, given the seriousness of her injuries and their impact on her lifestyle.
[55] I have no other information before me that is relevant to the other factors listed in r. 57.01(1).
[56] Assessing costs is more of an art form than a mathematical exercise in many cases, and particularly in this one. In considering the amounts that both unsuccessful defendants will ultimately contribute to this action, as well as the other factors discussed above, I am of the view that 25% of the costs incurred to the date of settlement should be attributed to Ms. Masschelein.
[57] Applying this apportionment to the numbers arrived at above, and using the HST figures for the Correia disbursements provided by the plaintiff, leads to the following result:
Fees: $26,250 (at 25% of $105,000);
Disbursements for Correia reports: $28,681.66 (at 100%);
Other disbursements: $11,761.51 (25% of $47,046.05);
HST on fees: $3,412.50;
HST on Correia disbursements: $3,299.66;
HST on other disbursements: $1,529.00
Total: $74,934.33
[58] One could argue that this amount is disproportionate to the amount recovered. I agree that it appears so at first blush, but that is due to the Correia disbursement, which is very high on its own and has been allocated to Ms. Masschelein at 100% because it only concerns her liability issues. Taking that out of the calculation, the fees and disbursements allocated to Ms. Masschelein would amount to roughly 25% of the amount recovered from her. That is entirely proportionate for full indemnity costs.
[59] Accordingly, I find that the amount of full indemnity costs that should be deducted from the settlement amount of $150,000, to compensate the plaintiff for costs incurred in pursuing Ms. Masschelein, is $74,934.33. This means that the amount that must be deducted from the jury award in order to avoid overcompensation is $75,065.67.
[60] I will not do that final calculation now, because counsel agree, and I concur, that the plaintiff is entitled to have prejudgment interest added before this deduction is made. I will leave it to counsel to do the necessary calculations.
[61] Once that is done, the only remaining issue is costs as between the plaintiff and Mr. De Sousa. My previous attempts at encouraging counsel to resolve issues such as this have so far been unsuccessful, but I will make the attempt anyway. If they cannot arrive at a resolution, I will accept written submissions from the plaintiff within 20 days, with Mr. De Sousa’s response within 15 days thereafter, and any reply within 10 days thereafter.
[62] If I have made any calculation errors in the reasons above, counsel are free to bring them to my attention in their submissions.
T. A. Heeney J.
Released: August 27, 2026
CITATION: Furtado v. De Sousa et al, 2026 ONSC 3356
COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-3358
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARIA FURTADO
Plaintiff
– and –
EDWARDO DE SOUSA and YVONNE MASSCHELEIN
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON QUANTIFICATION OF MASSCHELEIN COSTS TO BE DEDUCTED FROM SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
Heeney J.
Released: August 27, 2026
1Except for the Correia disbursements, which are claimed at 100%, as discussed below