CITATION: Lual v. Sir John A. Pub – Ottawa, 2026 ONSC 4870

COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-00102722

DATE: 2026/08/25

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: LUAL LUAL, Plaintiff

and

SIR JOHN A PUB – OTTAWA, Defendant

BEFORE: The Honourable Justice A. Doyle

COUNSEL: Self represented Plaintiff

Graeme Postma for the Defendant

HEARD: August 18, 2026, at Ottawa

DECISION ON A MOTION TO STRIKE

[1] The defendant, 284 SJA Inc., incorrectly named as Sir John A Pub - Ottawa, has brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim on the basis that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action pursuant to r. 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, or in the alternative the Statement of Claim is frivolous, vexatious and otherwise an abuse of process pursuant to r. 21.01(3)(d) and r. 25.11(b) and (c).

[2] The plaintiff opposes the motion and, in the alternative, requests the opportunity to amend the Statement of Claim.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the court strikes the Statement of Claim with leave to amend as set out below.

Background

[4] The plaintiff, a former patron of the restaurant and pub operated by the defendant, alleges that the defendant discriminated against him by refusing to serve him in October 2024. The plaintiff refused to leave the premises and police became involved and escorted him out of the premises.

[5] The plaintiff describes three events that took place:

• On October 6, 2024, he attended the defendant’s premises and gave a waitress named Sophia his business card;

• On October 9, 2024, he attended the premises and staff members Chloe, a manager, and Sophia, a waitress, said that he made them feel uncomfortable, and Chloe told him to leave; and

• On October 11, 2024, he returned to the defendant’s premises and was told by another manager, Karen, and an owner that he would not be served; the police were called and escorted him out of the premises.

[6] In his Statement of Claim, filed in January 2026, he is seeking damages of $35,000 for, among other things, defamation and discrimination, and is also seeking declaratory relief.

[7] After the Statement of Defence was filed on February 27, 2026, counsel for the defendant wrote to the plaintiff indicating that discrimination could not form the basis for a cause of action in Ontario and that the Statement of Claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and asking him to file an Amended Statement of Claim by March 19, 2026; otherwise, a motion would be brought.

[8] The next day, the plaintiff responded that he was not suing because he desired money and told counsel to “proceed as you must immediately.”

[9] The plaintiff has not amended his pleadings.

Issue #1: Does the Statement of Claim disclose a reasonable cause of action?

[10] Based on the events outlined above, which occurred in October 2024, the plaintiff has brought various claims.

[11] Rule 25.06(1) requires that a statement of claim contain a concise statement of relevant material facts relied upon to support the causes of action.

[12] As stated in Cerqueira v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 3954, the purpose of the pleadings is to give notice of the case to be met, define the issues, and assist the court to understand the material facts alleged and the legal issues in dispute.

[13] Bare allegations and conclusory legal statements in a Statement of Claim are not material facts, and the court, especially when there is a scarcity of judicial resources, must act as a gatekeeper to prevent claims that are not legally tenable.

[14] In the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 270, the Court set out the relevant principles when dealing with motions to strike:

28The essential principles governing motions to strike pursuant to r. 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules include the following:

(i) The test for striking a pleading is whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, it is plain and obvious that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and cannot possibly succeed. This is a stringent test and the moving party must satisfy a very high threshold in order to succeed: PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, 473 D.L.R. (4th) 136, at paras. 30-31, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 407; Fernandez Leon v. Bayer Inc., 2023 ONCA 629, at para. 8;

(ii) The claim should be read as generously as possible erring on the side of permitting an arguable claim to proceed to trial, since cases should, if possible, be disposed of on their merits: Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 420, at paras. 87-88, per Karakatsanis J. (dissenting, but not on this point); Tran v. University of Western Ontario, 2015 ONCA 295, at para. 16;

(iii) The facts set out in the claim must be accepted as true unless they are manifestly incapable of being proven: The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership, 2020 ONCA 272, 150 O.R. (3d) 449, at para. 45; PMC York Properties, at para. 31;

(iv) Bare conclusory statements of fact and allegations of legal conclusions unsupported by material facts are not assumed to be true for purposes of a motion to strike: Trillium Power Wind Corporation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683, 117 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 31; Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, 43 E.T.R. (4th) 173, at para. 74, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 69;

(v) The motion judge is entitled to examine documents incorporated by reference into the pleading as part of the material facts that are pleaded and accepted for purposes of the motion: McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 483, 116 O.R. (3d) 429, at para. 32; Das, at para. 74; and

(vi) The court should always consider whether a deficiency in the pleadings can be addressed through an amendment, and leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases where it is clear that the deficiencies in the pleading cannot be cured: Spar Roofing & Metal Supplies Limited v. Glynn, 2016 ONCA 296, 401 D.L.R. (4th) 318, at paras. 35-37; Fernandez Leon, at para. 5. However, although the general rule is that amendments are presumptively approved, there is no absolute right to amend pleadings and the court has a residual right to deny amendments where appropriate: Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, 280 O.A.C. 251, at para. 19; McFadden v. Psutka, 2024 ONCA 203, at para. 12.

Analysis

[15] I will only consider the pleadings in determining this issue.

[16] I will deal with each cause of action claimed and whether material facts have been pleaded to support the cause of action.

Intentional infliction of mental suffering

[17] As set out in Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, 2002 CanLII 45005 (ON CA), 60 O.R. (3d) 474, at para. 48, there are three elements to this tort:

• Conduct must be flagrant and outrageous;

• Conduct must be calculated to produce harm; and

• Conduct must result in a visible and provable injury.

[18] At para. 45, the Court of Appeal stated that with respect to the second element of this cause of action, the requirement “is met where the actor desires to produce the consequences that follow from the act, or if the consequences are known to be substantially certain to follow.”

[19] I find that the Statement of Claim is entirely lacking material facts in support of the required three elements for this cause of action.

[20] It is plain and obvious that the claim of intentional infliction of mental suffering (the plaintiff calls it “negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress) stands no reasonable chance of success and hence will be struck.

Defamation

[21] In the leading case of Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at para. 28, the Supreme Court set out the requirements that a plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, to obtain judgment:

28A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to obtain judgment and an award of damages: (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.

[22] The tort of defamation is one of strict liability as the plaintiff is not required to establish that the defendant intended to do harm or even that the defendant was careless. See Grant, at para. 28

[23] In The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Veritas Investment Research Corporation, 2017 ONCA 85, 136 O.R. (3d) 23, at para. 23, the Court of Appeal emphasized that material facts must be pleaded to establish the cause of action of defamation. The court elaborated on the requirements of material facts:

23Like any pleading, a statement of claim in a defamation action must set out "a concise statement of the material facts on which the [plaintiff] relies": rule 25.06(1). And, of course, the material facts must be sufficient, if proved, to establish a cause of action. In libel actions (defamatory statements in writing, as in this case), the material facts to be pleaded are (i) particulars of the allegedly defamatory words; (ii) publication of the words [page29] by the defendant; (iii) to whom the words were published; and (iv) that the words were defamatory of the plaintiff in their plain and ordinary meaning or by innuendo. See, generally, Alastair Mullis and Richard Parkes, eds., Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), at paras. 26-1 to 26-26; Lysko v. Braley (2006), 2006 CanLII 11846 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 721, [2006] O.J. No. 1137 (C.A.), at para. 91; Metz v. Tremblay-Hall, 2006 CanLII 34443 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 4134, 53 C.C.E.L. (3d) 107 (S.C.J.), at para. 13.

[24] In the Statement of Claim, there is a reference to Chloe and Sophia saying he made them feel uncomfortable, but there are no material facts pleaded setting out to whom the words were published and how the words were defamatory of the plaintiff in their plain and ordinary meaning or by innuendo.

[25] The plaintiff has failed to plead that the words were published and to whom they were published. Hence, he does not satisfy the second and third of the four requirements listed in Catalyst.”

[26] Also, the pleading fails to satisfy the fourth requirement listed in Catalyst that the impugned words, in their plain and ordinary meaning or by innuendo, would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.

Trespass and Wrongful Denial of Service

[27] In the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff states that the police arrived and removed him from the defendant’s premises..

[28] He also alleges that he was denied any service in the establishment.

[29] These do not give rise to causes of action.

[30] This is actually an allegation of discrimination, which should be made to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

[31] In Seneca College v. Bhadauria, 1981 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, the Supreme Court of Canada found that there is no common law right to sue for discrimination given the comprehensive Code and enforcement scheme which exists in Ontario.

[32] As stated in Brown v. WeirFoulds LLP, 2024 ONSC 3429, at para. 37, discrimination is not an actionable tort unless the alleged breach is closely connected to another cause of action:

37It may be, however, that a breach of the Code is relevant to a claim based on breach of contract or some other private law cause of action. In fact, the Court of Appeal has upheld pleadings that incorporate allegations of discrimination in constructive dismissal actions: see L’Attiboudeaire v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1996 CanLII 1411. Accordingly, a human rights claim may proceed against a defendant in a civil action if, but only if it is closely connected with another reasonable cause of action; otherwise, the human rights claim will be struck with the other causes of action: Jaffer v. York University, [2010] OJ No. 252, at para. 44.

[33] I find that these claims are not tenable and should be struck.

Economic Loss

[34] This claim requires an intention to injure, interference by illegal or unlawful means, and economic loss.”

[35] Although economic loss is pleaded, there are no material facts pleaded to support an intention to injure the plaintiff’s economic interests or interference by illegal or unlawful means. Hence, this claim will be struck.”

Conclusion

[36] The court finds that the claim should be struck as it is plain and obvious that the causes of action as pleaded have no reasonable chance of success and, on that basis, they are all struck.

Issue #2: Should the Statement of Claim be struck on the basis that it is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process within the meaning of r. 21.01(3)(d), or vexatious or scandalous within the meaning of r. 25.11?

[37]  Both Rule 21.01 and Rule 25.11 provide a basis for courts to strike out claims asserting untenable pleas, arguments, and insufficient material facts to support the allegations made. They also provide grounds to challenge pleadings that are prolix, vague, repetitive, or that contain spurious allegations and/or allegations included in order to impugn the behaviour or character of the opposing party.

[38] In Howell v. Cullen, 2025 ONSC 1449, at para. 8,the court stated that a frivolous action is one that lacks a legal basis or merit, has been brought without reasonable grounds, or will necessarily or inevitably fail.

[39] A vexatious action is one taken to annoy or embarrass the opposing party or conducted in a vexatious manner. The defendant points to some comments made by the plaintiff in communications, including that he was “not suing for money.”

[40] I do not find that the defendant has satisfied its burden to strike the claim on the basis of r. 21.01(3)(d) or r. 25.11. Although the trespass and failure to serve are grounded in discrimination and are properly before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the other claims have potential merit as the plaintiff is alleging he lost business income as a result of the actions taken by the defendant’s employees.

[41] Although he has not pleaded that the defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, clearly, that was his intent.

[42] I also find that the Statement of Claim is not vexatious, as it advances allegations that may support legitimate claims for damages

[43] Therefore, the Statement of Claim will not be dismissed under these rules.

Issue #3: Will the plaintiff be entitled to leave to amend the Statement of Claim?

[44] The plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend his pleadings by the defendant soon after the defendant filed its Statement of Defence.

[45] I note that the plaintiff is self-represented, but he is aware that he has a responsibility to familiarize himself with the legal procedures and practices.

[46] He has requested, as an alternative relief, an opportunity to amend his pleadings within 14 days.

[47] The plaintiff alleges serious mistreatment by the defendant’s employees, and he must plead the elements of each cause of action.

[48] I find that proper amendments to plead the material facts will address the flaws in the current Statement of Claim with respect to economic loss, intentional infliction of mental suffering and defamation.

[49] With respect to defamation, I refer to McIntosh v Shore, 2023 ONSC 3124, at para. 61, which acknowledges that a self-represented litigant can face challenges when “attempting to navigate the complexities of a claim based in defamation.”

[50] I find that he is making efforts to familiarize himself with the legal practices and has prepared a lengthy and comprehensive factum to respond to this motion. He demonstrated a willingness to amend his pleadings to ensure compliance with the rules.

[51] As stated in Hartman, at para. 28(vi), “leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases where it is clear that the deficiencies in the pleading cannot be cured.”

[52] However, I find the causes of action for trespass and refusal to serve are unlikely to be salvageable, as they are essentially discrimination cases, and the court will not grant leave to amend those causes of action. Those claims are therefore struck without leave to amend.

[53] The plaintiff will be granted until September 11, 2026, to file an Amended Statement of Claim. The defendant will have 30 days after service of the amended Statement of Claim to file an Amended Statement of Defence.

[54] The defendant is entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $3,941.25, which are payable within 90 days. The costs claimed are reasonable given the nature of the issues and that motion materials had to be prepared and filed.

Justice A. Doyle

Date: August 25, 2026

CITATION: Lual v. Sir John A. Pub – Ottawa, 2026 ONSC 4870

COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-00102722

DATE: 2026/08/25