CITATION: Lamptey v. Suske Capital Inc., 2026 ONSC 4778
COURT FILE NO.: CL-26-00000077-0000
DATE: 20260819
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO [Commercial List]
RE: BRENT LAMPTEY, DANIELLE BLAIS, GIUSEPPE BATTISTI, RICHARD HART, DR. BRENT LAMPTEY MEDICINE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, DR. CHRISTOPHER MCLAUGHLIN MEDICINE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, DANIELLE BLAIS INTERIOR DESIGN GROUP INC. and MARCELLO BATTISTI
Plaintiffs
AND:
SUSKE CAPITAL INC., AVENIR MEMORY CARE LOS ANGELES LP, AVENIR SENIOR LIVING, STEPHEN SUSKE, AVENIR HOLDINGS LIMITED, AVENIR RETIREMENT HOLDINGS INC. and DAVID LESLIE CRAIK
Defendants
BEFORE: Justice Jana Steele
COUNSEL: John Mather, for the Plaintiffs
Chris Staples, for the Defendants
Melvyn Solmon & Nancy Tourgis, for the Defendants Suske Capital Inc. and Stephen Suske
HEARD: July 20 and 27, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The plaintiffs seek a Mareva injunction over the defendants’ worldwide assets.
[2] The plaintiffs are individuals who invested funds in certain projects that Stephen Suske (“Suske”) and David Leslie Craik (“Craik”) promoted individually or together. Collectively, the plaintiffs invested about $3.2 million in four projects.
[3] Suske is the sole shareholder and director of Suske Capital Inc. (“Suske Capital”) (collectively, the “Suske defendants”). Craik is the principal of the Avenir Group. Through the Avenir Group, Craik owns, operates, and controls a network of corporations involved in senior living projects in Canada and the United States.
[4] The main action relates to four investment projects: Avenir Los Angeles Memory Care (the “LA Project”), Family Retirement Residences (the “Family Project”), Kingsland Retirement Residence (the “Kingsland Project”), and Surprise Behavioural Hospital (the “Surprise Project”).
[5] Among other things, the plaintiffs allege civil fraud and that there was a fraudulent scheme. They claim that Suske and Craik personally guaranteed their investment in the LA Project, that they relied on the representation when investing in the project, and that the representation was fraudulent. The LA Project ultimately failed, and investors will not recover their investments.
[6] The defendants submit that the action should continue in the normal course. The Suske defendants acknowledge that the plaintiffs, as investors, may have a claim for monies to be repaid to them. However, they adamantly deny any “scheme to defraud” and assert that this is not an appropriate case for the extraordinary relief sought.
[7] For the reasons set out below, the plaintiffs’ motion for a Mareva injunction is dismissed.
Background
[8] The plaintiff, Danielle Blais (“Blais”), and her husband, the plaintiff Brent Lamptey (“Lamptey”) invested USD$612,452 and CAD$292,000 in long-term and memory care home projects that the defendants Suske and/or Craik promoted and developed. The other plaintiffs also made investments in projects promoted and developed by the defendants.
(i) The LA Project
[9] The plaintiffs’ submissions focused on the LA Project because their position is that it is the clearest and strongest prima facie case.
[10] The development of the LA Project, a proposed 88-bed facility, commenced in 2018. The plaintiffs Lamptey, Dr. Brent Lamptey Medical Professional Corporation (“BLMPC”), Richard Hart (“Hart”), Giuseppe Battisti (“G. Battisti”), and Marcello Battisti (“M. Battisti”), invested in this project.
[11] Investor capital was needed to bridge the gap between mortgage financing and the capital requirements to get the facility through to full lease up. Raising capital was under the direction of Suske Capital. Blais and Lamptey were paid a finder’s fee for finding investors in the LA Project.[1] Any amounts owing to Blais as finder’s fees were directed to be invested in other projects with Suske and Craik.
[12] While the LA Project was constructed and completed, the timing of the completion coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic negatively affected long-term care and senior care facilities and materially delayed occupancy of the LA Project.
[13] There was a second opportunity to invest in a second mortgage on the LA Project, to provide funding to maintain the first mortgage and the operations while the leasing up of the facility was ongoing. The plaintiffs G. Battisti, M. Battisti, Hart, Blais, and Dr. Christopher McLaughlin Medicine Professional Corporation (“CMMPC”) invested in the second mortgage.
[14] Ultimately, the facility could only attain about 50 percent occupancy, and the first mortgagee took over the property and sold it. There was no recovery on the second mortgage.
(ii) The Surprise Behavioural Hospital Investment
[15] The Surprise Behavioural Hospital Investment involves a 32-bed inpatient psychiatric hospital and licensed detoxification centre in Arizona.
[16] Blais, Lamptey, and Hart invested in the Surprise Project.
[17] There was a delay in the project due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the hospital was ultimately built.
[18] The investors were repaid their principal and interest (at a rate that was 3 percent lower on a mutually agreed to basis[2]) except for Blais and Pete Donkers (who is not a party to this action).[3] Blais’ investment in the Surprise Project was moved into the second mortgage on the LA Project. The defendants’ evidence is that this was done on Blais’ express direction.
[19] Craik was only involved in the LA Project and the Surprise Project, not the other two projects.
(iii) The Kingsland Project
[20] The Kingsland Project is a 109-suite senior housing community in Calgary, Alberta. Suske is involved with this project (not Craik).
[21] BLMPC, G. Battisti, and M. Battisti invested in this project.
[22] Although the Kingsland Project was delayed by COVID-19, mezzanine financing (from Chartwell) and construction financing (from KingSett) has been obtained and the project is in the midst of construction. Chartwell has a right of first refusal to purchase the project at the end.
[23] Certain of the investors sought to have their invested money returned early. On or about March 2, 2026, investors were provided with two options: (i) receive their principal amount immediately and release the project; or (ii) continue their investment until the project is completed, at which time principal and interest would be paid. The Kingsland Project is expected to be completed in two to three years.
[24] For the plaintiffs, an agreement was previously reached for the funds that would be required to pay the plaintiffs the principal amount (i.e., option (i)) to be held in the bank account of the Kingsland limited partnership.
[25] The plaintiffs take the position that the principal and interest are due on the Kingsland Project and seek an order that the principal on the project be paid to the plaintiffs without release of their interest claims.
(iv) The Family Project
[26] The Family Retirement Residences Inc. IPO could not obtain underwriters’ support. Subsequent attempts to obtain private financing were unsuccessful.
[27] Blais and Lamptey invested in the Family Project.
[28] All investors lost their investment in this project.
Analysis
Should the Court grant a Mareva Injunction?
[29] The plaintiffs seek the extraordinary remedy of an interim and interlocutory Mareva injunction freezing the defendants’ worldwide assets and restraining them from, among other things, selling, encumbering, or disposing of any of their assets. In Neville v. Sovereign Management Group Corp., 2022 ONSC 3466, at para. 32, Perell J. summarized the purpose of a Mareva injunction:
A Mareva injunction is an extraordinary remedy because as a general policy of civil procedure, a remedy that allows prejudgment execution against the defendant’s assets is not favoured, but where there is a strong case that the defendant has defrauded the plaintiff the law’s reluctance to allow prejudgment execution yields to the more important goal of ensuring that the civil justice system provides a just and enforceable remedy against such serious misconduct.
[30] For the Court to grant a Mareva injunction, the plaintiff must establish the following:
a. A strong prima facie case;
b. The defendants have assets in the jurisdiction;
c. There is a serious risk that the defendants will remove or dissipate their assets to avoid judgment;
d. The plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;
e. The balance of convenience favours granting the injunction; and
f. The moving party must provide an undertaking as to damages:
Chitel v. Rothbart (1983), 1982 CanLII 1956 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Alexander v. 5048941 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONSC 2360, at para. 17; 10390160 Canada Ltd. v. Casey, 2022 ONSC 628, at para. 3, leave to appeal refused, 2022 ONSC 1219.
[31] The main issues in dispute on this motion are whether the plaintiffs have established a strong prima facie case and whether there is a serious risk of dissipation by the defendants.
[32] I am not satisfied that there is a strong prima facie case or a serious risk of dissipation.
(a) Is there a strong prima facie case of civil fraud or a fraudulent scheme?
[33] In Neville, at para. 33, Perrell J. described a strong prima facie case as “one that will probably prevail at trial or is likely to succeed at trial.”
[34] The plaintiffs argue that they have a strong prima facie case of civil fraud regarding, among other things, the LA Project.
[35] They also submit that there was a fraudulent scheme.
[36] The tort of civil fraud, which is based on the same test as the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, has four elements:
a. A false representation made by the defendant;
b. Some level of knowledge of the falsehood of the representation on the part of the defendant (whether through knowledge or recklessness);
c. The false representation caused the plaintiff to act; and
d. The plaintiff’s actions then resulted in a loss:
Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8 at para. 21.
[37] Unlike cases where there has been clear fraud, this case involves investments made by relatively sophisticated investors who are unhappy with the outcome. This is not the type of case where the extraordinary remedy of a Mareva injunction is appropriate.
[38] The structure of investments in the LA Project was that investors subscribed for units of Avenir Memory Care US Feeder Fund LP (US) (“Feeder Fund LP”).[4] Feeder Fund LP offered limited partnership shares at a subscription price of $1,000 with a minimum subscription amount of $100,000.
[39] The general partner for Feeder Fund LP is AMC US Feeder Fund GP Inc. (US) (“Feeder Fund GP”), a Delaware corporation. Suske controls Feeder Fund GP.
[40] Feeder Fund LP loaned money to ALA South LP (US) to be used for the LA Project in exchange for promissory notes (the “Promissory Notes”). The Suske defendants and Craik provided a personal guarantee on the Promissory Notes from ALA South LP to Feeder Fund LP.
[41] Feeder Fund GP is the entity that could enforce on the personal guarantee that the Suske defendants and Craik gave on the Promissory Notes. However, Suske controls Feeder Fund GP, which has not yet enforced on the personal guarantee.
[42] Among other things, the plaintiffs allege that Suske made oral representations at a presentation for potential investors that Suske and Craik were personally guaranteeing directly the investments made by the investors in the LA Project. The plaintiffs say that the alleged promise of the personal guarantees persuaded them to invest in the LA Project.
[43] However, Suske and Craik deny saying that they would provide a direct personal guarantee to the plaintiffs. Craik was not in attendance when the oral presentation was made. Craik says that none of the allegations regarding fraud or asset dissipation are true and that he “vehemently den[ies] same.” Craik’s evidence is that he did not tell anyone that he or Suske would be guaranteeing their investment in the Fund. Craik states that the notes offered a high rate of return in respect of the LA Project (15 percent) because the investment “bore palpable risk.”
[44] The handout that attendees received at the presentation contained a description of the nature of the guarantee (the “Presentation Handout”). As described above, the guarantee was not a personal guarantee by the Suske defendants and Craik to the investors in the LA Project (including certain of the plaintiffs). Instead, it was a personal guarantee by them on the Promissory Notes.
[45] The deck for the oral presentation and the “green sheet” refer to the investment and return as being personally guaranteed by Suske and Craik (without any reference to whether the guarantee is direct or indirect). These are the high-level summary/overview documents. It is unclear whether the structure was described orally at the presentation. Further, the “green sheet” specifies that “[t]he information contained herein is derived from the investor presentation dated September 2018 (the “Investor Presentation”) [the Presentation Handout]. This document does not provide full disclosure of all material facts relating to the Preferred Units. Investors should read the Investor Presentation, for disclosure of those facts before making an investment decision.”
[46] The messaging in the oral presentation and “green sheet” appears to be designed to attract investors to consider investing in the LA Project. As the defendants noted, the attractive high rate of return on the project is commensurate with a riskier investment.
[47] However, the detailed documents specify the structure of the investment and the nature of the guarantee. The plaintiffs were provided with the relevant documents detailing the nature of the written guarantee before they invested their money.
[48] I cannot find on the paper record before me that there is a strong prima facie case that the defendants made false representations. The Presentation Handout, the Offering of Limited Partnership Units (the “Offering”), and the Limited Partnership Agreement (the “LPA”) provide that the guarantee was to the Feeder Fund LP. Certain investors, including Blais, took the investment documents to their legal counsel for review. Investors who chose not to get legal advice had the documents to review before investing.
[49] It appears that in this case, sophisticated investors chose to make investments that had risks and that they are unhappy with how the investments ultimately fared. The evidence is that investors were kept up to date on the projects. For the LA Project there were about 23 investor updates that were provided to investors. Further, as noted above, Blais was involved in recruiting investors for certain of the projects.
[50] The “risk factors” section of the Presentation Handout (the detailed document that was provided to potential investors following the presentation) provides:
Enforcement of the Personal Guarantees: Stephen Suske and David (Les) Craik will each provide a several, personal guarantee for 50% of the obligations under the Avenir LA Promissory Notes. Such guarantees may be subject to enforceability by the courts or may not be limited by the financial ability of Stephen Suske and David (Les) Craik to repay Unitholders. Unitholders have not been provided with any financial information of Stephen Suske and David (Les) Craik to independently assess the financial stability of the guarantors.
[51] The Offering indicates the following “Indirect Use of Proceeds” and “Guarantees”:
Indirect Use of Proceeds: To loan to ALA Sought LP (“Avenir Los Angeles LP”) up to USD$7,700,000, pursuant subordinated promissory notes (the “Avenir LA Promissory Notes”), and Avenir Los Angeles LP will use the net proceeds to, indirectly through AMCLA LP, acquire the property located at 7420 La Tijera Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, and own, develop, construct, lease, operate and manage an 88-bed memory care facility to be constructed by Avenir Construction, LLC and operated by Avenir Senior Living (the “Project”).
Guarantees: Stephen Suske and David (Les) Craik will each provide a, several, personal guarantee for 50% of the obligations under the Avenir LA Promissory Notes.
[52] The LPA provides in section 4.4 that “Stephen A. Suske and David Craik, principals of the General Partner, will each provide a personal guarantee for 50% of the obligations under Note 1 and Note 2.” (Note 1 and Note 2 are defined in section 2.3 in the “Purpose” section of the LPA.)[5]
[53] The terms and conditions of the subscription for Fund units provide the following acknowledgements and agreements by the subscribers (including the plaintiffs):
a. That they have not relied upon any verbal or written representations as to facts made by or on behalf of the Fund, other than those in the Presentation Handout (section 6.1(v));
b. That there are no representations, warranties, terms, conditions, undertakings or collateral agreements or understanding, express or implied, between the parties other than those expressly set out in the subscription agreement (section 11.6);
c. That there are significant risks associated with the purchase of units in the Fund and the subscriber may lose his, her, or its entire investment (section 6.2(p));
d. That the units are highly speculative in nature and that there are significant risks associated with the purchase of the units (section 6.2(s));
e. That no person has made any written or oral representations that any person will refund the subscription amount (section 6.1(x));
f. That they have knowledge in financial and business affairs, are capable of evaluating the merits and risks on an investment in Fund units, and are able to bear the economic risk of the investment even if the entire investment is lost (section 6.1(a));
g. That the subscriber has had a full opportunity to review such information about the Fund and the business as the subscriber has deemed necessary and appropriate in connection with the subscriber’s decision to purchase the units and to discuss the information with their legal and financial advisors prior to execution of the subscription agreement (section 6.1(d));
h. That they have had the opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel or such other advisors as the subscriber requires in order to evaluate the investment and to fully understand the rights of unit holders, as described in the limited partnership agreement (section 6.1(bb));
i. That they have had the opportunity to review and read a copy of the limited partnership agreement in its entirety setting out the rights of holder of units in the Fund (section 6.2(d)(i));
j. That the terms and conditions of the limited partnership agreement shall be binding upon the subscriber as a limited partner (section 6.2(d)(ii));
k. That the Fund is relying on an exemption from the requirement to provide the subscriber with a prospectus and, as a consequence, subscribers have significantly fewer rights and remedies available to them as investors who acquire securities offered by prospectus and that the common law may not provide investor with an adequate remedy in the event that they suffer losses in connection with the units acquired (section 6.2(m));
l. That they are responsible for obtaining such legal and tax advice as they consider appropriate in connection with the execution, deliver, and performance of the subscription agreement and are not relying on the Fund, its affiliates or their counsel in this regard (section 6.2(n)); and
m. That the Fund is relying on the representation, warranties, covenants and acknowledgements of the subscriber in determining the subscriber’s eligibility to purchase units under securities laws (section 6.3).
[54] The plaintiffs say that they were promised something different from what the executed documents provide – which documents they were provided with in advance of signing. On the paper record before me on this interlocutory motion, I am unable to find that there is a strong prima facie case that the defendants made a fraudulent misrepresentation.
[55] As the defendants noted, it is possible that there may have been a misunderstanding or a negligent misrepresentation, but there is not a strong prima facie case of a fraudulent misrepresentation or civil fraud.
[56] There also does not appear to be any fraudulent scheme here. There were different projects and investment opportunities – the LA Project was one of the projects and it has unfortunately failed. Each of the four projects had different investors. All funds from investors were invested in the projects, as agreed to in the respective subscription agreements. Funds do not appear to have been paid out other than as required by the various agreements. There does not appear to be any evidence to support a scheme or conspiracy.
(b) The plaintiffs’ new claims
[57] The plaintiffs filed a proposed amended statement of claim with their reply materials including/adding proposed new parties and allegations related to the LA Project. Among other things, the plaintiffs want to seek leave to bring a common law derivative action on behalf of Avenir Memory Care US Feeder Fund LP for enforcement of the guarantee and indemnity agreement by the proposed new defendant, AMC US Feeder Fund GP, Inc. The proposed amended claim alleges that Feeder Fund GP breached the contract and that Suske breached his fiduciary duty to the company by not enforcing on the guarantee.
[58] As the defendants noted, it was only with the reply materials that the plaintiffs included an amended notice of motion with the added request for leave to bring a derivative action related to Feeder Fund GP. The defendants have not consented to the proposed amendments, and leave is required because the plaintiffs propose to add additional defendants: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 26.02. I agree with the defendants that the plaintiffs are required to deal with their Mareva injunction motion based on the statement of claim as currently constituted.
[59] In any event, as discussed below, the Mareva motion fails because I am not satisfied that there is a serious risk that the defendants will remove or dissipate their assets.
(c) Is there a serious risk that the defendants will remove or dissipate their assets?
[60] Even if I am incorrect regarding whether there is a strong prima facie case, there does not appear to be any serious risk that the defendants will remove or dissipate their assets.
[61] Evidence of an intention to remove or dissipate assets to avoid paying the judgment should the plaintiff succeed is key. As Penny J. explained in Casey at paras. 43 and 44:
43The sine qua non of the Mareva injunction is the requirement that there be evidence of an intention to put assets beyond the reach of the court for the purpose of defeating any judgment that might ultimately be granted in the plaintiff’s claim. This requirement has been variously described in decisions of Canadian courts commencing with Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 1982 CanLII 1956 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.) and Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, 1985 CanLII 55 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2. As stated by Estey, J. in Aetna Financial, at pp. 24 and 27:
The overriding consideration qualifying the plaintiff to receive such an order as an exception to the Lister rule is that the defendant threatens to so arrange his assets as to defeat his adversary, should that adversary ultimately prevail and obtain judgment, in any attempt to recover from the defendant on that judgment.
In summary, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized Lister as the general rule, and Mareva as a “limited exception” to it, the exceptional injunction being available only where there is a real risk that the defendant will remove his assets from the jurisdiction or dissipate those assets to avoid the possibility of a judgment ... [Emphasis added.]
44The Court of Appeal has explained that the “purpose of the defendant is the decisive question. In other words, it is only if the purpose of the defendant when removing assets from the jurisdiction or the dissipating or disposing of them is for the purpose of avoiding judgment that a Mareva injunction should be issued”: R. v. Fastfrate (1995), 1995 CanLII 1527 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (3d) 564 (C.A.), applied in RBC Dexia Investor Services Trust v. Goran Capital Inc., 2016 ONSC 1138, at para. 11(b). [Emphasis in original.]
[62] In the recent case of Petix v. Shroff, 2023 ONSC 1366, the Court found that there was no serious risk of dissipation of assets. In circumstances that have similarities to the matter before me, the Court explained at paras. 20, 22 and 26:
What the Plaintiffs have provided in the Motion Record is evidence that the Defendants owe them money. While they allege that the money is owed to them as a result of fraud, that is far from certain. What the evidence really demonstrates is that there is a financial dispute over a risky investment gone bad. ...
Whether the allegations in the Statement of Claim amount to fraud or any other cause of action will be established at another stage of this litigation. But there is nothing here that would suggest that the Defendants are the type of fraudulent actors who are avoiding judicial process or dissipating their assets in advance of a ruling on the merits. What the Plaintiffs appear to be doing is to be quantifying their specific contract claims and seeking to seize funds in advance of trial or judgment.
This evidence on the merits is itself contested in the Responding Record. More to the point, it does not demonstrate that “the defendant threatens to so arrange his assets as to defeat his adversary”: 10390160 Canada Ltd. et al v. Casey et al, 2022 ONSC 628, at para. 43, citing Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, 1985 CanLII 55 (SCC), [1985] 1 SCR 2. There are no vanishing bank accounts, no movements of funds or assets offshore, and no instability or questionable activity on the Defendants’ part from which a flight of assets could be inferred. Furthermore, there is not the type of strong prima facie case of fraud on the merits – as opposed to a financial/contractual dispute – that would allow one to conclude that the conditions for a Mareva injunction are present. [Emphasis added.]
[63] I agree with the defendants’ submissions that the above comments apply to the instant case.
[64] In Casey, Penny J. further noted, at para. 45, that the risk of dissipation of assets can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The plaintiffs submit that the inference can be drawn in the instant case because the structure of the LA Project has made it difficult for the plaintiffs to enforce on the guarantees. I am not satisfied that such an inference can be drawn on that basis. There may be business, tax, or other reasons for the structure. As noted above, although the guarantees were provided on the Promissory Notes (consistent with the documents), and not to the individual investors, there may be other means for the plaintiffs to seek redress, such as contractual claims or derivative actions.
[65] With regard to Craik, the plaintiffs note that he has structured his assets in such a way that he does not own most of them (family trusts hold them). However, the original Craik family trust was established in 2006. There is no evidence that Craik has, since the projects commenced, structured his assets to shield them from the plaintiffs.
[66] With regard to Suske, the plaintiffs point to the fact that he sold his home. Suske explains that he and his wife sold their home to downsize in part due to their age and physical condition. He states that it made financial sense as well because the mortgage was at a high interest rate. Suske is 75 years old and continues to carry on business in the normal course, which he has done for about 40 years in Canada.
[67] The plaintiffs also point to other litigation involving the defendants, including a claim by Computershare Trust Company of Canada against Suske Capital and Craik, in his capacity as trustee of the David Leslie Craik Family Trust. Computershare has not been repaid despite a settlement having been reached in July 2024. Computershare is continuing to pursue its judgment and is enforcing it through garnishment.
[68] None of the evidence points to “vanishing bank accounts,” “movements of funds or assets offshore,” or “instability or questionable activity [by the defendants] from which a flight of assets could be inferred”: Petix, at para. 26. Craik and Suske are sophisticated businesspeople who have completed numerous projects. There are some investments or projects that have resulted in litigation, some of which is ongoing. However, the fact that they have been involved in other litigation in Canada and may have required some creditors to take enforcement steps, does not equate to them transferring money offshore or otherwise hiding assets so as to avoid paying the plaintiffs should they succeed at trial.
[69] A Mareva injunction is an exceptional remedy. It is execution before judgment. There must be strong evidence that such a remedy is appropriate. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the defendants have been taking steps to move or dissipate their assets to avoid paying the plaintiffs if they succeed at trial.
[70] Based on the record before me, there is no serious risk of dissipation or removal of assets such as would justify the imposition of the extraordinary relief of a Mareva injunction.
Is the Kingsland Investment due and owing?
[71] As set out above, investors in the Kingsland Project were given the option of being repaid their principal (and provide a release re interest) or continue their investment in the project. The parties agreed to provide the plaintiffs with additional time to exercise the option of being repaid their principal (tied to the release of this decision).
[72] The Suske defendants take the position that the investment is not due, and they can only release the principal if the plaintiffs release any claims they have to interest. The plaintiffs seek an order that the full principal be paid without a release.
[73] The Suske defendants argue that there is a triable issue as to when the money is due under the Kingsland LP agreement and subscription agreement. The maturity date was set as December 2, 2024. The subscription agreement provides that principal and interest were due on the maturity date (with no reference to the need for the Kingsland Limited Partnership to have no debts). However, the Kingsland Limited Partnership agreement provides that it cannot make distributions until “any and all debts have been repaid and are no longer outstanding obligations of the Partnership.”
[74] There appears to be a triable issue related to when the principal and interest is due under the Kingsland LP agreement and subscription agreement.
Disposition and Costs
[75] The plaintiffs’ motion for a Mareva order is dismissed.
[76] The plaintiffs shall pay: (i) costs fixed in the amount of $40,000 (inclusive of taxes and disbursements) to Craik, and (ii) costs fixed in the amount of $90,000 (inclusive of taxes and disbursements) to the Suske defendants.
Justice Jana Steele
Date: August 19, 2026
1The finder’s fee was set at 8% of gross proceeds from investors, split as 5% to Blais and 3% to Suske.
2The lenders had been promised an interest rate of 18%. The rate that was subsequently negotiated and paid was 15%.
3Mr. Donker’s claim in the Surprise Project was initially in litigation, which has since settled, and he is being paid.
4The investment was initially a 4-year investment with interest payable at 15% per year, of which 4% was to be payable annually with the remaining 11% deferred to be paid at the redemption date. Feeder Fund LP was established to raise up to $7.7 million to assist with the land purchase and certain development costs.
5Purpose: The nature of the business and of the sole purpose to be conducted and promoted by the Partnership shall be to: (i) provide an initial loan to ALA South LP (“Avenir Los Angeles LP”) in an amount up to Seven Million Seven Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($7,700,000.00), pursuant to certain subordinated promissory notes, as approved in form by General Partner (individually, “Note 1” and “Note 2”), [...]