N.H. v. Shariati, 2026 ONSC 4720

CITATION: N.H. v. Shariati, 2026 ONSC 4720

COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-00000828-0000

DATE: 20260817

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

N.H.

Appellant

– and –

DR. KHASHAYAR SHARIATI

Respondent

Anita Szigeti and Michael Schloss for the Appellant

Julia L. Lefebvre for the Respondent

HEARD: July 17, 2026

Ruling on appeal

c. boswell j.

I. OVERVIEW

[1] The appellant, N.H.[1], is an involuntary patient at St. Joseph’s Healthcare, Hamilton. The respondent, Dr. Shariati, is his primary care physician. Dr. Shariati wants N.H. to take antipsychotic drugs to alleviate the symptoms of schizophrenia. N.H. does not want to do so.

[2] On December 4, 2025, Dr. Shariati found N.H. incapable with respect to treatment involving antipsychotic medication. In other words, he determined that N.H. lacked the capacity to make his own decision as to whether to accept or refuse that treatment. The effect of such a finding, if upheld, is that a substitute decision-maker will be empowered to make treatment decisions on N.H.’s behalf, including decisions concerning consent to or refusal of the antipsychotic medication in question.

[3] N.H. applied, under s. 32 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sched. A (the “HCCA”), for a review of Dr. Shariati’s finding that he is incapable. A hearing was convened on December 22, 2025 before Myrna Tulandi, Senior Lawyer and Presiding Member of the Consent and Capacity Board (the “Member”).[2]

[4] At the end of the hearing, the Member confirmed Dr. Shariati’s finding that N.H. is incapable with respect to treatment involving antipsychotic drugs. N.H. appeals the Member’s ruling to this court.

[5] The appeal is brought pursuant to s. 80 of the HCCA. Pursuant to that section, a party to a proceeding before the Board may appeal the Board’s decision to the Superior Court of Justice on a question of law or fact or both. The court, on appeal, may,

(a) exercise all the powers of the Board;

(b) substitute its opinion for that of a health practitioner, an evaluator, a substitute decision-maker or the Board; or

(c) refer the matter back to the Board, with directions, for rehearing in whole or in part.

[6] N.H. asks that the court conclude that N.H. is capable with respect to treatment involving antipsychotic drugs, or alternatively, remit the matter back to the Board for a re-hearing before a different member.

Background

[7] In 2008, N.H. was charged with the offence of uttering threats. He was found not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder (schizophrenia). He has been under the supervision of the Ontario Review Board (the “ORB”) ever since.

[8] N.H. has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, stimulant use disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, predominantly inattentive presentation (“ADHD”).

[9] Until about a year ago, N.H. had been living in the community for many years, with forensic outpatient support. He had been regularly taking antipsychotic medications. He was nevertheless subject to regular readmissions to the hospital as a result of issues with his conduct in the community. These issues often involved the use of illicit substances, including crystal meth.

[10] Prior to August 2025, N.H.’s primary care physician was Dr. Prat. In September 2024, Dr. Prat recommended that N.H. taper off his antipsychotic medication because he had not presented with acute delusional ideas for many years. Initially, he appeared to be doing well without the antipsychotic drugs, but by August 2025, he had become extremely agitated in his dealings with outpatient workers. They concluded that it was no longer feasible for them to supervise him in the community. He was admitted to St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton, where he remains detained to date. The ORB has ruled that the restriction on his liberty is justified.

[11] Since his admission to hospital in August 2025, N.H. has been under the primary care of Dr. Shariati. As I noted, Dr. Shariati wants N.H. to resume taking antipsychotic medication. N.H. does not want to do so. He does not believe he suffers from schizophrenia and believes Dr. Shariati is a liar.

[12] Dr. Shariati has made a finding that N.H. is incapable with respect to making decisions about treatment involving antipsychotic drugs. The integrity of that finding, upheld by the Member, is the subject of this appeal.

The Meaning of Capacity

[13] “Capacity”, with respect to treatment, is defined at s. 4 of the HCCA. A determination of capacity involves a two-part test. Pursuant to s. 4(1), a person is capable with respect to a treatment if the person is (1) able to understand the information that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, and (2) able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision about it.

[14] The HCCA establishes, at s. 4(2), a rebuttable presumption of capacity.

II. THE HEARING

[15] The capacity hearing was conducted by Zoom. Dr. Shariati represented himself. Given the statutory presumption of capacity, the onus rested on Dr. Shariati to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that N.H. was incapable within the meaning of s. 4(1) of the HCCA.

[16] At the outset of the hearing, Dr. Shariati clarified that his finding of incapacity in relation to treatment with antipsychotic medication was based on the second component of the test for capacity: that N.H. was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision, or the absence of a decision, concerning that treatment.

[17] The hearing was relatively brief and the evidentiary record was limited. That is not unusual. Proceedings of this nature are generally conducted on an expedited basis to ensure that treatment decisions can be made without undue delay. See Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722, at para. 115.

[18] Dr. Shariati provided very concise oral evidence, which he supplemented with a modest package of documents which were collectively marked Exhibit 1. They included: his Consent and Capacity Board Summary; a History and Physical Note prepared by Dr. Prat on N.H.’s admission to hospital in December 2023; file notes of several nurses during the period August 12, 2025 to November 1, 2025; progress notes of Dr. Shariati dated between November 20 and December 4, 2025; and the hospital report to the Ontario Review Board dated March 11, 2025.

[19] N.H. was represented by counsel, Mr. Schloss, who cross-examined Dr. Shariati.

[20] N.H. elected to give testimony on his own behalf. He was subjected to brief cross-examination by Dr. Shariati.

[21] By way of summary, Dr. Shariati testified that N.H. had a history of diagnosed schizophrenia dating back to before 2008. He also experienced issues with substance abuse and methamphetamine-induced psychosis.

[22] N.H. presents, according to Dr. Shariati, as frequently agitated and exhibits disorganized speech. He has “entrenched delusions about the forensic psychiatry program.” He repeatedly expresses the belief that antipsychotic drugs will slowly kill him. He also has persecutory delusions and believes that his case managers are tampering with his urine tests.

[23] Dr. Shariati said that N.H. has refused to accept the diagnosis of schizophrenia and he becomes agitated when Dr. Shariati attempts to discuss treatment plans with him. Although N.H. has some appreciation for what the treatment for schizophrenia entails, he is unable, in Dr. Shariati’s view, to appreciate the consequences of taking versus not taking treatment. This lack of appreciation stems from his denial that he has the illness.

[24] N.H. testified that he had been taking the antipsychotic drug, Seroquel, while living in the community. Dr. Prat took him off that drug. According to him, his mental state and thinking were not affected. He began to lose weight and friends and family members told him he was looking better. Nevertheless, he ended up back in the hospital. He attributes this to a cessation in ADHD medication, which he said explains his agitation.

[25] He also testified that he has been abused in the ward at the hospital. He made a complaint about Dr. Shariati to the College of Physicians and Surgeons, which he said upset Dr. Shariati. He believes Dr. Shariati found him incapable of consenting to treatment with respect to antipsychotic drugs as retribution for the complaint. He disagrees with the diagnosis of schizophrenia because everything Dr. Shariati says to him is a lie.

The Ruling

[26] The Member concluded that N.H. failed the second prong of the s. 4(1) capacity test. She found that while N.H. had the ability to understand information about the proposed treatment, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or not taking the treatment. She accordingly confirmed Dr. Shariati’s finding of incapacity in relation to treatment involving antipsychotic drugs.

[27] The Member subsequently provided written reasons for her ruling. In the course of those reasons, she reviewed the evidence of both Dr. Shariati and N.H. in some detail. In my view, her review of the evidence was accurate.

[28] The Member then made a number of findings, which included the following:

(a) There was an animus between N.H. and Dr. Shariati. But disagreement between them was not evidence of a lack of capacity;

(b) N.H. had the right to disagree with the diagnosis of schizophrenia;

(c) N.H. did not believe he had any mental health issue apart from ADHD. He wished to take medication for ADHD and not antipsychotics;

(d) During his testimony, N.H. demonstrated agitation, disorganization, irritability, perseveration, and persecutorial delusions. His behaviour while testifying aligned with Dr. Shariati’s diagnosis of psychosis and not with ADHD;

(e) Dr. Shariati had made efforts to provide N.H. with information about treatment with antipsychotics;

(f) N.H. believed Dr. Shariati and others were lying to him, and tampering with his urine samples; and,

(g) N.H.’s objections to treatment with antipsychotics were most likely the result of his persecutorial delusions and an inability to recognize the manifestations of his mental illness.

[29] The Member concluded that it was clear that NH could not apply the information provided to him about the manifestations of his mental illness and the proposed treatment of antipsychotics to his personal circumstances. Dr. Shariati’s finding of incapacity was confirmed.

III. THE APPEAL

The Grounds of Appeal

[30] N.H. asserts that the Member erred in confirming Dr. Shariati’s finding of incapacity. Three errors are alleged:

(a) The Member incorrectly interpreted and applied the test for capacity by weighing N.H.’s explanation of his mental condition and the side effects of medication against Dr. Shariati’s to assess which was more likely;

(b) The Member erred in failing to address the clear breakdown in the relationship between Dr. Shariati and N.H.; and

(c) The Member erred in finding that Dr. Shariati satisfied his onus, in the absence of corroborating evidence.

[31] As I noted, N.H. asks that this court set aside the Member’s decision and either declare N.H. capable of consenting to (or refusing) treatment with antipsychotics or remit the question of his capacity back to the Board for a rehearing.

The Standard of Review

[32] It is common ground that, in light of the statutory right of appeal, appellate standards of review apply. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 37. In particular, the standard of correctness applies to questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation and those concerning the scope of a decision maker’s authority. The palpable and overriding error standard applies to questions of fact. See Vavilov, para. 37, and Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paras. 8 and 10.

[33] In B.L. v. Pytyck, 2021 ONCA 67, the Court of Appeal provided further clarification regarding the applicable standard of review. The court stated, at para. 22:

The Board’s identification of the proper statutory test for capacity involves a question of law reviewable on the correctness standard. The Board’s application of the statutory test for capacity to the evidence to determine whether a person is capable is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable on the deferential standard of palpable and overriding error, absent an extricable question of law in the Board’s analysis. (Citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Governing Principles

[34] The leading authority regarding the assessment of capacity under s. 4(1) of the HCCA is the Supreme Court’s decision in Starson. A number of guiding principles were identified in both the majority and minority decisions, penned by Major J. and McLachlin C.J.C., respectively. Although McLachlin C.J.C. wrote in dissent, and disagreed with the result of the appeal, the applicable principles she identified were not a departure from those identified by the majority.

[35] McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. agreed, for instance, that s. 4(1) of the HCCA confronts the challenge that arises when a mentally ill patient refuses treatment. The challenge is the result of a collision of opposing fundamental values. On the one hand is the law’s deep respect for personal autonomy. A person’s right to choose what treatments they will undergo is an essential aspect of personal autonomy and dignity and of fundamental importance to a free and democratic society. See Starson, paras. 6 and 75.

[36] On the other hand, mental illness can at times rob a person of the capacity to make an informed medical decision. Personal autonomy may give way in such circumstances, on the basis that “people who are ill should receive treatment and that illness itself should not deprive an individual of the ability to live a full and complete life”: Starson, at para. 6. The challenging part, of course, is determining when autonomy should give way in order to improve an incapable person’s functioning and ease suffering.

[37] It is clear that mental illness, on its own, does not equate to incapacity. Something more is required. In particular, s. 4(1) requires a showing, on a balance of probabilities, that the person is unable to understand relevant factors and/or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.

[38] It is not disputed in this case that N.H. is able to understand relevant factors. The focus of the dispute is about whether he is able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision.

[39] A failure to appreciate the consequences of a treatment decision is not synonymous with an inability to appreciate them. See Starson, at para. 81. A lack of appreciation may stem from factors other than an inability to appreciate. In this case, for example, counsel for N.H. submits that, to the extent N.H. may not appreciate the consequences of a decision regarding treatment with antipsychotic medication, that failure stems not from an inability to appreciate those consequences but from the deterioration of the physician-patient relationship and the consequential impairment of the transfer of information from Dr. Shariati to N.H. It is important, in the result, to inquire into the reasons for any lack of appreciation.

[40] McLachlin C.J.C. identified, at para. 18 of Starson, three “common clinical indicators” of a person’s ability to appreciate the consequences of accepting or refusing a particular treatment:

(a) whether the person is able to acknowledge the fact that the condition for which treatment is recommended may affect him or her;

(b) whether the person is able to assess how the proposed treatment and alternatives, including no treatment, could affect his or her life or quality of life; and

(c) whether the person’s choice is substantially based on delusional belief.

[41] McLachlan C.J.C. cautioned, at para. 19, that it is important not to substitute a best interests standard for capacity. A capable person may disagree with professional advice or choose to forego treatment that other reasonable persons may consider to be in their best interest. Moreover, disagreement with a professional opinion is not itself evidence of incapacity. A patient does not need to agree with the diagnosis of the attending physician in order to be able to apply the pertinent information to his or her circumstances. See Starson, para. 79.

[42] Competent patients have the right to make decisions that other reasonable persons would deem foolish. See Starson, at para. 76 and Koch (Re) (1997), 1997 CanLII 12138 (ON CTGD), 33 O.R. (3d) 485 (Gen. Div.), at para. 17.

[43] That said, where it is demonstrated that a person has a particular condition, they must be able to recognize that they may be affected by that condition. If the condition renders the person unable to recognize that they are affected by it, they will be unable to apply the relevant information to their circumstances and unable to appreciate the consequences of a decision to accept or decline treatment. See Starson, at para. 79.

[44] Major J. instructed, at para. 80 of Starson, that a determination of capacity should begin with an inquiry into the person’s “actual appreciation of the parameters of the decision being made: the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment; the foreseeable benefits and risks of treatment; the alternative courses of action available; and the expected consequences of not having treatment.” If the person demonstrates an appreciation of these factors then they have the ability to appreciate the decision being made.

[45] A lack of actual appreciation, as I noted, does not necessarily equate with incapacity. Where a lack of actual appreciation is demonstrated, an inquiry must be made as to the reason(s) for that lack. Only where the evidence demonstrates that the person’s mental illness prevents them from having the ability to appreciation the foreseeable consequences of their decision is incapacity established.

The Diagnosis of Schizophrenia

[46] A decade after Starson was released, Rosenberg J.A., writing for a unanimous panel in Anten v. Bhalerao, 2013 ONCA 499, 309 O.A.C. 28, held, at para. 23, that before embarking on a determination of capacity, the inquiry should begin with a review of the evidence about the foreseeable benefits and risks of treatment and the expected consequences of not having treatment. A risks/benefits analysis can only be meaningfully conducted once a proper diagnosis has been made.

[47] The Member was satisfied that N.H. suffers from schizophrenia. That factual finding is entitled to deference. The record before the Member adequately supports it. N.H. was diagnosed with schizophrenia almost two decades ago. He was found not criminally responsible on account of it. He has been treated for it for most of his adult life. Dr. Shariati confirms the diagnosis.

[48] Beyond Dr. Shariati’s evidence, however, the record supports a finding that N.H. was able, while taking prescribed antipsychotic medication, to manage in the community for extended periods of time. While he undoubtedly had a number of rehospitalizations over the past decade, those appear to be related to the manifestations of illicit drug use. The record also supports a finding that some time after he stopped taking antipsychotic medication his behaviour became too challenging to manage in the community. Symptoms of agitation and persecutorial delusions have since flourished. These facts support the conclusion that he indeed suffers from schizophrenia. The Member committed no palpable or overriding error in reaching that conclusion.

The Reasonably Foreseeable Consequences of Treatment or a Lack of Treatment

[49] Dr. Shariati provided evidence regarding the reasonably foreseeable consequences of accepting versus rejecting treatment of schizophrenia with antipsychotic medication. He said that N.H.’s mental health is declining. Without treatment with antipsychotic medication he will have ongoing delusional thoughts and they may become more prominent. He will continue to be paranoid about the members of his healthcare team and will resist working with them. His psychosis is going to fluctuate. He may have further restrictions on his liberty and seclusions because of his behavior. He is not going to be able to move forward and it will be very difficult to get him to a functional level, where he may be dischargeable back into the community.

[50] N.H. also suffers from diabetes. He refuses to permit the medical staff to do blood work. In the result, his psychosis is preventing him from getting optimal treatment for his diabetes, which is going to continue to damage his health on an ongoing basis.

[51] Dr. Shariati has an expectation, of course, that N.H.’s psychotic symptoms will be alleviated with treatment. He acknowledged certain possible side effects of treatment, which can include sedation, weight gain, and a negative impact on diabetes. He said, however, that there are available drugs that have less of a sedating effect than others. And diabetes can be managed.

[52] The Member found that Dr. Shariati attempted to convey information about treatment to N.H., sometimes in the face of his refusal to engage. The record supports such a finding. There is also agreement that N.H. had the capacity to understand information relevant to making a decision about the treatment.

[53] The Member found, however, that, because of his untreated schizophrenia, “N.H. could not apply the information regarding the manifestations of his mental condition and the proposed treatment of antipsychotics to his own circumstances.” She therefore concluded that he could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision about treatment.

[54] N.H.’s counsel submits that the Member’s conclusion resulted from a flawed analysis. I turn now to the specific grounds of appeal advanced in support of that submission.

Issue One: Did the Member err by incorrectly interpreting and applying the test for capacity?

[55] There is no doubt that the Member correctly stated the applicable test under s. 4(1) of the HCCA.

[56] N.H. argues that, although the Member identified the correct statutory test, she nevertheless applied a different test – one that involved an assessment of who, as between N.H. and Dr. Shariati, was more likely right about N.H.’s diagnosis. She focused, the argument goes, on a comparison of N.H.’s explanation of his mental condition to that of Dr. Shariati to assess which was more likely. Indeed, she spent roughly two-thirds of her analysis on whether N.H. was more likely suffering from schizophrenia, as Dr. Shariati contends, as opposed to ADHD, as N.H. contends. Once she concluded that Dr. Shariati was probably right, she leapt to the conclusion that N.H. did not have an ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision. This approach was, N.H. says, a legal error and subject to review on a correctness standard.

[57] I do not accept N.H.’s assertion that the Member applied the wrong test.

[58] Starson makes clear that where it is demonstrated that a person has a particular condition, they must be able to recognize that they may be affected by that condition. The Board must assess whether the condition results in an inability on the part of the patient to recognize that he or she is affected by its manifestations, thereby rendering him or her unable to apply the relevant information and appreciate the consequences of his or her decision, or lack of decision.

[59] N.H. vigorously contended that he has ADHD and not schizophrenia. His position was that Dr. Shariati was lying about the diagnosis of schizophrenia. As a starting point, it was necessary for the Member to come to grips with whether N.H. indeed suffers from schizophrenia. Obviously, the treatment regimen for schizophrenia will be significantly different than the treatment for ADHD.

[60] The Member spent time assessing the issue of N.H.’s proper diagnosis because (1) the balance of the analysis is grounded in the assessment of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or not taking treatment for that condition, and (2) the impact on the reasoning abilities of N.H. was also a function of the nature of the condition he suffers from.

[61] I am satisfied that the Member not only articulated the correct legal test, but she applied it. Her application of the statutory test to the evidence to determine whether N.H. is capable is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable on the deferential standard of palpable and overriding error, absent an extricable question of law in her analysis. See Pytyck, at para. 22.

[62] In my view, she made no palpable or overriding error in her assessment of the facts or in her application of the facts to the statutory test.

[63] N.H. refuses to accept that he has schizophrenia, despite having been diagnosed with it almost two decades ago, having been declared not criminally responsible on account of it, having successfully been treated with antipsychotics for a lengthy period of time, and despite his mental functioning having deteriorated significantly since the cessation of antipsychotics a year or so ago.

[64] N.H., against a substantial body of evidence to the contrary, maintains that Dr. Shariati is lying to him about his diagnosis.

[65] The Member concluded that Dr. Shariati is not lying to N.H. about his condition. Instead, N.H. is suffering from persecutorial delusions, which are leading him to conclude, incorrectly, that Dr. Shariati is not being truthful.

[66] N.H. has taken antipsychotics for many years. He appreciates and was able to articulate some of their side effects: possible sedation and weight gain. But his view is that he should not take antipsychotics because he does not suffer from schizophrenia. While he does not have to accept that diagnosis, he does need to be able to appreciate that he suffers from a condition that has certain manifestations. And he needs to be able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences, as they relate to those manifestations, should he accept or refuse treatment.

[67] The Member concluded that N.H.’s objection to taking antipsychotics was “less about potential side effects and related more to his persecutorial delusions and inability to recognize the manifestations of his condition.” She further found that “it was clear N.H. could not apply the information regarding the manifestations of his mental condition and the proposed treatment of antipsychotics to his own circumstances.” There was ample evidence in the record to support these findings. They do not reflect palpable or overriding error.

[68] Indeed, I agree with the Member’s conclusion.

[69] Applying McLachlin C.J.C.’s three “common clinical indicators” of a person’s ability to appreciate the consequences of accepting or refusing a particular treatment, the record supports the following conclusions:

(a) N.H. is unable to acknowledge the fact that the condition for which treatment is recommended may affect him;

(b) N.H. is unable to assess how the proposed treatment and alternatives, including no treatment, could affect his quality of life; and

(c) N.H.’s choice, as the Member identified, is substantially based on delusional belief.

[70] This ground of appeal fails.

Issue Two: Did the Member err in failing to address the clear breakdown in the relationship between Dr. Shariati and N.H.?

[71] Implicit in the Member’s reasons is a conclusion that N.H. did not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making or not making a decision about treatment with antipsychotic drugs. As the jurisprudence makes clear, such a conclusion does not inexorably lead to a finding that N.H. lacked the ability to appreciate those consequences. The Member was required to consider whether there were reasons, apart from a lack of ability, that informed N.H.’s lack of appreciation.

[72] Here the suggestion is that the breakdown of the physician-patient relationship offered an explanation for N.H.’s lack of appreciation. The Member was required to consider that explanation but, in N.H.’s submission, she failed to do so.

[73] I am not persuaded that N.H. is correct. The Member was alive to the animus between N.H. and Dr. Shariati. She mentioned it specifically in her review of the evidence. And she mentioned it when she noted that Dr. Shariati had attempted to discuss treatment with N.H. “sometimes in the face of his refusal to engage.” In other words, she was alive to the fact that sometimes, not always, the animus between N.H. and Dr. Shariati posed an impediment to the transfer of information.

[74] The record supports the conclusion that N.H. does not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or not taking antipsychotic drugs. He is aware of some of the side effects but also believes that they will slowly kill him over time, which they will not. He did not appreciate that without them, he will continue to have persecutorial delusions, continue to be agitated, and continue to present behavioural challenges that will impair his ability to be discharged back into the community.

[75] It was necessary, of course, for the Member to consider the reason why N.H. did not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision about treatment.

[76] While the Member did not expressly reject that a relationship breakdown was an explanation for N.H.’s lack of appreciation, she implicitly rejected it when she concluded that it was more likely than not that N.H.’s objection to antipsychotic drugs was a function of his persecutorial delusions and his inability to recognize the manifestations of his medical condition. Again, there was ample evidence in the record to support that conclusion.

[77] The strained relationship between N.H. and his entire team of healthcare professionals, his impression that they are all lying to him and tampering with his urine samples, and his inability to appreciate the impact of his condition on his decision-making all appear to be manifestations of his schizophrenia.

[78] Again, I see no error in the Member’s analysis and this ground of appeal fails.

Issue Three: Did the Member err in finding that Dr. Shariati satisfied his onus, in the absence of corroborating evidence?

[79] Section 14 of the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, provides as follows:

An opposite or interested party in an action by or against one of the following persons shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on the party’s own evidence, unless the evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence:

2. A patient in a psychiatric facility.

[80] N.H. is a patient in a psychiatric facility. In the result, Dr. Shariati could not obtain a ruling in his favour on the basis of his own evidence, absent corroboration. There is some debate about whether the documentary evidence filed by Dr. Shariati was corroborative of the live issue before the Board. I need not resolve that debate.

[81] In Bhalerao, Rosenberg J.A. held, at para. 30, that “in an appropriate case, a physician’s evidence can be corroborated, within the meaning of s. 14, by the patient’s own evidence.” See also J.C. v. Maldeniya, 2021 ONSC 8540, at para. 11.

[82] Symptoms of N.H.’s schizophrenia were manifest in his evidence and demeanour as he testified before the Member. She relied on that evidence not only to conclude that N.H. was suffering from schizophrenia, but also that the manifestations of the disease were impairing his ability to appreciate how his personal circumstances would be affected if he did or did not consent to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

[83] She noted, specifically, that he testified that his health care team were all lying to him and that they were tampering with his urine samples. She observed agitation, disorganization, irritability, perseveration, and persecutory delusions as he testified.

[84] I am satisfied that N.H.’s own evidence, and his demeanour under questioning, tended to corroborate Dr. Shariati’s evidence and thereby satisfied the conditions of s. 14 of the Evidence Act.

[85] This ground of appeal fails.

[86] In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

C. Boswell J.

Released: August 17, 2026

1At the request of the appellant, and not opposed by the respondent, I will refer to him only by his initials, in an effort to support his dignity and privacy.

2The Consent and Capacity Board is established under the HCCA. It is an independent tribunal whose primary responsibilities include conducting reviews of a patient's involuntary status in a psychiatric facility under the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7 and reviews of capacity issues under the HCCA and the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30.