CITATION: Handa v. Cordiero, 2026 ONSC 4672
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Vivek Handa
George Gligoric, for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
Lucia Maria Cordeiro and Gil Manuel Cordeiro
Sumit Tangri, for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: July 13, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Associate Justice J. Kriwetz
Background
[1] The plaintiff commenced this mortgage action by issuing a statement of claim under the simplified procedure on June 25, 2019. The claim seeks payment of amounts allegedly due under a mortgage, together with various fees, interest and costs, and an order for possession of the mortgaged property, which is located at 140 Picton Street East, Hamilton, Ontario (the “Property”), of which the defendants are the registered owners.
[2] For the reasons set out below, I wish to make it clear that my comments in this endorsement are not to be construed as having made any findings of fact in this action.
[3] Although this is not clearly set out in the materials, it appears the defendants engaged the services of a mortgage broker called Metro Financial Planning Ltd. (“Metro”), the principal of which is Dinesh Khanna (“Mr. Khanna”), to arrange for the refinancing of the Property. The intention of the refinancing was to pay the existing first mortgage, which had been held by The Effort Trust Company (“Effort Trust”) and replace it with one from Home Trust Company (“Home Trust”). It also appears that Home Trust was not prepared to advance enough to pay the amounts owing to Effort Trust. Therefore, Metro arranged for a second mortgage with the plaintiff, who is Mr. Khanna’s nephew, to cover the shortfall. It is this second mortgage which is the subject of this action and will be referred to hereafter as the “Mortgage”.
[4] The defendants’ signatures appear on a commitment letter dated May 18, 2011, for a mortgage in the principal amount of $39,000.00 and a net amount of $31,000.00.
[5] The defendants’ signatures also appear on an Acknowledgement and Direction to Mr. Khanna and Metro dated May 18, 2011, authorising the registration of the Mortgage on the Property in favour of the plaintiff.
[6] The Mortgage was registered on title to the Property on May 20, 2011, as instrument number WE760518.
[7] Some of the material terms stated on the registered Mortgage document included that, it was for the principal sum of $39,000.00, it bears interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, it was for a one-year term, with the balance due date of May 5, 2012, and it incorporated standard charge terms 200033.
[8] The plaintiff alleges that default in payment of the Mortgage occurred on February 5, 2015, and that the default continues. As noted above, the statement of claim was not issued until more than four years after the date of the alleged default.
[9] The defendants delivered a statement of defence dated August 12, 2019. The statement of defence is not evidence, but I will briefly summarise its contents. There is a general denial of the plaintiff’s allegations or no knowledge of them. They allege that they had no dealings with the plaintiff and that all their dealings were with Mr. Khanna of Metro. They also allege that they trusted Mr. Khanna, that he took advantage of their trust, that they did not truly understand all the documents they were signing, and that there was a language barrier between the parties. They further allege that, at the time of execution of the various documents at Metro’s office, Mr. Khanna advised that there was a “shortfall”, but he would give them a second mortgage to assist with the refinancing. They state that they were confused by what that meant, but trusted Mr. Khanna and felt that they had no other choice but to sign the documents. They also allege that they made the payments on the Mortgage, “with the last payment made sometime in 2017”. They plead that they were surprised when they were contacted by the plaintiff in or about 2018 advising them that it was his mortgage and that the amount claimed to be outstanding was more than the amount of the original loan. They also plead that this was the first time they had been contacted by the plaintiff.
The Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion
Overview
[10] The plaintiff now moves for “partial” summary judgment, seeking payment of outstanding principal, interest and costs, and an order for possession of the Property. At the beginning of the hearing, the plaintiff stated that he intended to reserve the remainder of his claim for the various fees claimed in the statement of claim, but then later in the hearing, his counsel advised the Court that the plaintiff was abandoning that part of the claim.
[11] The defendants submit that the evidence put forward by the plaintiff does not entitle him to summary judgment, and, in any event, there are genuine issues requiring a trial. Therefore, they ask that the motion be dismissed.
[12] The plaintiff filed two affidavits in support of his motion. The defendants also filed two affidavits responding to the motion. Each of the parties filed factums and books of authority.
[13] I have reviewed all the materials filed and have considered the submissions of the parties.
Law and Analysis
[14] I am guided by the principles on a summary judgment motion set out in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, which both parties referenced in their factums. In short, there will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (a) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (b) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (c) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
[15] The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Only after the moving party has discharged its evidentiary burden does the burden shift to the responding party to establish there are issues requiring a trial.
[16] On a motion for summary judgment, “each side must ‘put its best foot forward’ with respect to the existence or non-existence of material issues to be tried”: Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764, at para. 56.
[17] At paragraph 57, Combined Air provided the following caution regarding the “best foot forward” principle:
“However, we add an important caveat to the "best foot forward" principle in cases where a motion for summary judgment is brought early in the litigation process. It will not be in the interest of justice to exercise rule 20.04(2.1) powers in cases where the nature and complexity of the issues demand that the normal process of production of documents and oral discovery be completed before a party is required to respond to a summary judgment motion. In such a case, forcing a responding party to build a record through affidavits and cross-examinations will only anticipate and replicate what should happen in a more orderly and efficient way through the usual discovery process.”
[18] With respect to this point, it is, once again, noted that this action is governed by the simplified proceeding under rule 76. As such, cross-examinations of a deponent on affidavit are prohibited under subrule 76.04(1) 2. Therefore, neither party has been unable to test the evidence put forward by the opposite party. Also no examinations for discovery have taken place.
[19] Having reviewed the materials, considered the submission of the parties, and applied the relevant law, I am of the view that the plaintiff has failed to put his best foot forward. The evidence put forward by him fails to address or does not fully address some key issues. Therefore, I find that the plaintiff has not met the evidentiary burden to establish that he is entitled to summary judgment.
[20] The plaintiff’s supporting affidavits are sworn, not by the plaintiff himself, but by Mr. Khanna, who was, through Metro, the mortgage broker involved in this transaction.
[21] Rule 20.02(1) states:
“An affidavit for use on a motion for summary judgment may be made on information and belief as provided in subrule 39.01 (4), but, on the hearing of the motion, the court may, if appropriate, draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to provide the evidence of any person having personal knowledge of contested facts.”
[22] As will be described in further detail below, there are several important contested facts in this action which should have been addressed by the plaintiff himself.
[23] There is no evidence that the plaintiff, in fact, advanced any funds to the defendants, or if he did, when the advance was made. Such evidence would be important because the defendants assert that they never had any dealings with the plaintiff and only dealt with Mr. Khanna, including making cash Mortgage payments to Mr. Khanna.
[24] Related to the previous point is the fact that there is no proper accounting from the plaintiff showing if he, in fact, received the Mortgage payments which appear to have been paid to Mr. Khanna, and if so, when he received them. In his first affidavit dated September 12, 2019, Mr. Khanna swears that the plaintiff advised him that the Mortgage fell in default on February 5, 2015, and that the default continues. Yet, there is evidence, albeit incomplete, put forward by the defendants in their supplementary responding affidavit, showing that several payments were made after the date of the alleged default, receipts for which were provided by Mr. Khanna. In submissions, the plaintiff’s counsel advised that the subsequent payments were applied to the arrears. One of the exhibits appended to Mr. Khanna’s first affidavit is a mortgage calculation statement which purports to show the amounts due and owing for principal and interest. This document is far from satisfactory because it does not show any of the payments made by the defendants, when the payments were made, or how the payments were applied. Furthermore, the defendants’ responding affidavit asserts that they made all the Mortgage payments and that it has been paid in full. Therefore, based on the materials before me, I am unable to determine whether the plaintiff’s calculations are accurate or whether there is any basis for the defendants’ assertions.
[25] In addition, with respect to the alleged default, there is no evidence of any demand being made upon the defendants after the alleged default. Although the issuance of demand may not have been technically necessary, considering (i) it appears that defendants continued to make payments subsequent to the date of the alleged default, (ii) that the plaintiff took no action for more than four years after the alleged default, (iii) the lack of a proper accounting from the plaintiff, as noted above, and (iv) all the defendants’ allegations, including that they paid the Mortgage, I am unable to determine on these materials whether there was a default as alleged.
[26] I also note that the plaintiff claims interest from the date of default at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, and that this motion was heard more than six years after the claim was issued, such that, based on the updated calculation provided by the plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing, he is seeking judgment for principal and interest in the amount of $181,628.53 as of July 13, 2026.
[27] Another issue which is related to whether the Mortgage was in default is the issue of the renewal of the Mortgage. As noted above, on its face, the initial term of the mortgage was one year, with a balance due date of May 5, 2012. The plaintiff’s counsel conceded there was no formal renewal but stated that the plaintiff continued to accept payments after the balance due date. I am unable to determine on the material before me, whether the Mortgage was renewed, and if so, what the renewal terms were, and whether there was a breach of those terms.
Disposition
[28] Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I cannot make the necessary findings of fact to reach a just and fair determination on the merits.
[29] The plaintiff’s motion is dismissed.
[30] This action is to proceed to trial expeditiously. The parties are to schedule a case conference before me to consider whether directions and terms are to be made in accordance with subrule 20.05(2).
Costs
[31] If the parties are unable to agree upon the costs of this motion, they may make written submissions, of no more than three pages in length, not including costs outlines. The written submissions should be e-mailed to HamiltonSopinka.SCJJA@ontario.ca within 14 days of the date of the release of this endorsement.
___________________________
Associate Justice J. Kriwetz
Released: August 12, 2026
CITATION: Handa v. Cordeiro et al., 2026 ONSC 4672
COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-69732
DATE: 20260812
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Vivek Handa
Plaintiff
- and –
Lucia Maria Cordeiro and Gil Manuel Cordeiro
Defendants
ENDORSEMENT
Associate Justice Kriwetz
Released: August 12, 2026