CITATION: Manzo v. Manzo, 2026 ONSC 4658

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00034498-0000

DATE: 20260817

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LISA MANZO

Applicant

– and –

DANIELE MANZO

Respondent

Kendra Swallow and Jackson Lenz (student at law), for the Applicant

Self-Represented

HEARD: June 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 19 and July 7, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION

DIAMOND J.:

Overview

[1] The applicant Lisa Manzo (“Lisa”) and the respondent Daniele Manzo (“Daniele”) were married on March 2, 2013, and separated 20 years later on March 1, 2023. They have two children: Savannah (born on May 3, 2015), and Benjamin (born on October 10, 2018).

[2] Regrettably, all of the issues originally raised and joined in this application remained outstanding for this Court’s disposition at trial. Those issues to be decided by this Court are as follows:

1. What parenting time order is in the best interests of Savannah and Benjamin?

2. What decision-making responsibility order is in the best interests of Savannah and Benjamin?

3. What amount of table child support and section 7 expenses is owing by Daniele to Lisa (arrears and on a go forward basis)?

4. What amount of spousal support is owing by Daniele to Lisa (arrears and on a go forward basis)?

5. What is the equalization payment owing?

[3] The trial of this application proceeded before me over a period of 10 days (inclusive of closing submissions). Both parties testified at length. Six collateral witnesses were also called: four by the applicant, and two by the respondent.

[4] At the conclusion of closing submissions, I took my decision under reserve. These are my Reasons.

Assessment of Credibility- Generally

[5] As the trier of fact, I am charged with determining the truth. This task can often be rendered more difficult when parties are motivated to offer evidence designed to “fit” within the specific theory of the case.

[6] The assessment of credibility is especially important when bearing in mind the onus of proof. As the trial judge, I must decide whether a specific proposition or fact has or has not been established on a balance of probabilities by the party bearing that onus of proof. For a party to discharge his/her legal onus of proof, I must first be satisfied with the credibility and reliability of the evidence in order to be in a position to make the relevant findings of the fact.

[7] Put another way, a moving party has the onus of factual proof of the evidence necessary to satisfy its legal burden. As stated by Justice Stinson in Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier 2010 ONSC 5810 (S.C.J.):

“In certain instances it is simply not possible to reconcile some aspects of the evidence that was presented by the witnesses at this trial. In part, I liken the situation to attempting to assemble several old jig-saw puzzles whose various parts have sat, co-mingled, in the bottom of an actively-used desk drawer for a decade: some pieces are missing, some are undecipherable, some have changed over time and no longer fit together, and some are not what they seem to be, all due to the passage of time and intervening events. In this case my task is to use the pieces of evidence to re-create as clear a picture of past events as I can give the foregoing limitations, applying the "real test of…truth" as described above, drawing inferences where appropriate, and applying the rules of burden and standard of proof, as required.”

[8] In evaluating the credibility or reliability of evidence, the Court must look to a number of interrelated factors such as its probability, a logical connection with other findings, and support from independent facts or documents. In Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702, Justice Nicholson provided a helpful summary of some of the tools available to the Court in the credibility assessment exercise:

a) The ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness' evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness' testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

b) The ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness' testimony.

c) The ability to assess whether the witness' testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is "in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions", but in doing so I am required not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behaviour.

d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanour of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution (R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 [at paras.] 70-75).

e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence. R. v. J.H., 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No.39 (OCA) [at paras.] 51-56). There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness' testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness' evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of witness’ evidence. (See R. v. D.R., 1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).

Assessment of Credibility of the Parties

[9] Before diving into my disposition of the five issues raised at the trial of this proceeding, I wish to briefly address my overall assessment of the credibility of both Lisa and Daniele. While I will have more to say about the events generally described in this section of my Reasons, I prefer the evidence of Lisa over Daniele in virtually every category and topic raised and canvased by the parties at trial.

[10] Throughout her evidence, both in chief and on cross examination, Lisa was measured, forthright, open and accurate. When she happened to make an error in her recollection of events, Lisa was contrite, revisited the issue in the face of the relevant question or document before her, and conceded the point if necessary (although such concessions were both rare and on issues of minor importance at best).

[11] On occasion, some of the questions put by Daniele to Lisa on cross examination bordered on irrelevant and appeared designed to anger Lisa for no purpose other than drawing her ire (and I will have more to say about this observation below). On each of those occasions, Lisa did not “take the proverbial bait”, remaining calm in her responses which often required repeated answers on her part.

[12] Lisa gave her evidence in an understated manner, never straying off course from the narrative objectively supported by the documents marked as exhibits at trial, and frankly common sense. Lisa was honest, patient and reliable.

[13] Conversely, Daniele’s evidence simply cannot be relied upon, especially in key, disputed areas. I agree with Lisa that at various points during the trial, Daniele’s narrative seemed to insert himself into every accomplishment that Lisa achieved, including locating, purchasing and renovating the original matrimonial home (which I find to be unsupported by the record), Lisa’s business ventures and her overall management of the home and children.

[14] Daniele came to trial having already materially breached the terms of several Court orders, including a failure to deposit his income into the parties’ joint account, make the mortgage payments as they came due, pay child and spousal support and most importantly comply with the parenting terms set out in the order dated November 21, 2023 of Justice Akazaki (“the Akazaki Order”). Again, while I will have more to say about Daniele’s breaches of the Akazaki order in my disposition of issues #1 and #2, no matter what this Court ordered in this proceeding, Daniele seemed to do what he wanted, displaying a lack of accountability which permeated his evidence at trial.

[15] Daniele’s insistence upon his own narrative, no matter how convoluted or internally/externally inconsistent, was on display when he was challenged in cross-examination with unequivocal documentation showing otherwise. When faced with financial documents such as promissory notes or mortgages which he clearly signed, Daniele nevertheless maintained that the sums referenced in those documents were somehow “gifts”.

[16] One of the key issues for this Court’s disposition of the equalization payment is the value of Daniele’s interest in a condominium unit known as 2 Fieldway Road, Unit 107 (“the Fieldway property”) which was a property originally purchased by Daniele and his brother Andre Manzo (“Andre”). Andre since sold his interest in the Fieldway property to Daniele, and Daniele’s evidence surrounding the value of his 50% and subsequent 100% interest in the Fieldway property was completely scattered, unsupported by his own closing real estate documents, and made little to no subjective, let alone objective, sense.

[17] Most importantly, Daniele’s approach to being accountable was to consistently and effectively “gaslight” Lisa, her counsel, and on occasion this Court. Instead of acknowledging events or facts which appeared to this Court to be rather obvious, Daniele would attempt to shift the blame for the alleged confusion before the Court onto Lisa, her counsel, or his own prior counsel, stating on several occasions that “it was my lawyer who did that” when being shown internal inconsistencies between his morphing narrative and independent documentation.

[18] For these reasons generally, I prefer the evidence of Lisa over Daniele in virtually every area of this trial.

Issue #1 What parenting time order is in the best interests of Savannah and Benjamin?

[19] The bulk of this trial concerned the outstanding issue of a go forward parenting schedule. Most of the evidence proffered by both parties was geared towards their respective requested parenting orders.

[20] As mandated by the relevant jurisprudence described below, in determining the best interests of Savannah and Benjamin, this Court must consider the parties’ historical roles in the family, and their relationships with their two children both during the marriage and post-separation.

[21] As recently and succinctly described by Justice Centa in Smith v. Seyoum, 2026 ONSC 3397:

“In making a parenting order, I am to take into consideration only the best interests of the child, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. In determining the best interests of L., I must consider all relevant factors, including the factors set out in s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act. Where the factors pull in different directions, I am to resolve them in favour of promoting the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being.”

[22] Section 16(3) of the Divorce Act sets out the factors to be considered by the Court when taking a child’s best interest into consideration for the purpose of fashioning an appropriate parenting/contact order. Those factors are as follows:

“In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including

a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

d) the history of care of the child;

e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

g) any plans for the child’s care;

h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.”

[23] Overall, the parties’ marriage was traditional with respect to their familial and parental roles. All of their family expenses were run through a joint bank account which they opened once they were married and moved in together. Daniele was the primary breadwinner throughout the marriage, although Lisa did hold several employment positions during that time.

[24] Daniele is a pilot. For many years prior to the parties’ separation, Daniele was employed as a cargo pilot with CargoJet. It is thus trite to state that Daniele travels for work, as his entire work is traveling.

[25] Daniele gave evidence at trial (both in examination in chief and cross-examination) that he holds a senior position with CargoJet: he has graduated from Second Officer, to First Officer, and since June 2023 Daniele has held the position of Captain. These senior positions enable him to effectively set his own flight schedule. It is thus important to review how and when Daniele’s flight schedules are set.

[26] Daniele’s employer releases a flight schedule for all available flights on a monthly basis. All pilots are allowed to bid on flights, and according to Daniele the awarding of priority flights is based upon the seniority of position of the bidding pilot. When asked under cross examination if Daniele typically obtains the flights upon which he bids, his response was “yes…almost always”. Daniele further confirmed in cross examination that mid-month changes to flight schedules are a rare occurrence.

[27] On or about the 24^th/25^th of every month, CargoJet provides each pilot his/her personal schedule for the upcoming month. In other words, by the 25^th of each month, a CargoJet pilot will know all of the flights assigned to him/her for the upcoming month.

[28] Prior to becoming a Captain, Daniele’s work as a pilot sometimes forced him to be out of the country for very long stretches of time, sometimes even for a few months. During their marriage, Daniele and Lisa would approach the bidding for Daniele’s flights on a joint basis to ensure that he was home for the family and other important events. As such, while Daniele was the family’s breadwinner, Lisa was the children’s primary caregiver as Daniele could not possibly be home with the family to take on that role. While this Court does not question Daniele’s historical and present desire to be home and present for and with his children, it is clear that the nature of his employment precludes his involvement in daily routines and ongoing scheduled events for the children.

[29] For the most part, Daniele’s bidding and obtaining of a monthly flight schedule worked for the parties during their marriage. While it precluded Daniele from being as present with the family as he likely wanted, it nevertheless established a “family rhythm” and produced sufficient income for the family to enable everyone to enjoy their time together both when Daniele was in and out of town.

[30] The issue of parenting time became hotly contested between the parties early on in this proceeding. That dispute ultimately led to a motion attendance before Justice Akazaki, who then released his decision on November 21, 2023. The salient parenting terms of the Akazaki Order are as follows:

1. The children are to reside with Daniele as follows:

i. alternating weekends from Friday (pick up from school) to Monday (drop off at school);

ii. if Daniele is working on his parenting weekend, he shall have the weekend immediately prior or after his regular weekend;

iii. in the week following Daniele’s weekend, Wednesday overnight (from pick up at school to Thursday morning, drop off at school);

iv. if Daniele is working on Wednesday, he shall have another overnight during the week from pick up at school to the following morning, drop off at school;

v. in the week following Lisa’s weekend, every Tuesday and Wednesday (from pick up at school on Tuesday to Thursday morning, drop off at school);

vi. if Daniele is working on Tuesday and Wednesday he shall have 2 other overnights during this week.

2. The children to reside with Lisa at all other times.

3. The children shall reside with the parents for Christmas Break 2023 on the following schedule:

i. with Daniele from 10:00a.m. to 9:00p.m. on December 24, 2023, Daniele to be responsible for the transportation;

ii. with Lisa for Christmas Day; and

iii. the balance of the school break to be shared equally, with no parent having one (1) full week with the children (so, for example, the parties may divide the time with the children residing with each 2 days at a time or even 3 days at a time, but not a full week away from the non-residential parent).

4. The parties shall use www.ourfamilywizard.com (“OFW”) for all communication and scheduling related to the children and that the communication shall be business-like, child focused and respectful at all times.

5. Daniele shall upload his CargoJet schedule on the 25th day of each month to OFW, or as soon as he receives it from CargoJet.

6. If Daniele needs to change his parenting time as a result of his employment schedule and he has not uploaded his CargoJet schedule to OFW within 24 hours of receipt, he shall forfeit his parenting time.

7. Daniele shall make his best efforts to organize his employment schedule around his parenting time.

[31] In summary, the terms of the Akazaki Order mandated the following:

• • Daniele’s access to the children was to take place on alternating weekends from Friday after school to Monday drop off at school, together with a Wednesday overnight during the week following Daniele’s parenting weekend.
• • Daniele was to use his best efforts to bid on and organize his monthly flight schedule around the above parenting time schedule to avoid any scheduling conflicts.
• • All communication between the parties was to proceed through OFW, with communication between the parties to be “business-like, child focused and respectful at all times”.
• • Daniele was obliged to upload his flight schedule on the 25^th day of each month to OFW or as soon as he receives it from his employer, so that Lisa could plan the children’s activities and her parenting time around Daniele’s schedule, thereby hopefully avoiding any potential conflicts or disruptions each month.
• • Alternative parenting time was permitted for Daniele if he, after bidding on flights to work with the parenting schedule, was unable to secure the time off for his scheduled parenting time.
• • If Daniele needed changes to his parenting time as a result of his flight schedule, but had not uploaded his flight schedule to OFW within 24 hours of receipt, Daniele’s parenting time was to be forfeited.

[32] As described hereinafter, the interim parenting schedule set out in the Akazaki Order has caused nothing but additional layers of conflict between the parties for the last three years post-separation.

[33] While both parties agree that it is in their children’s best interests to have strong relationships with both parents, any go forward parenting schedule simply cannot ignore (a) Daniele’s historical and ongoing employment as a cargo pilot, and (b) Daniele’s unfortunate but consistent post-separation penchant for unilaterally deciding what is and is not in the children’s best interests through his lens only. This unfortunate approach was significantly exposed in the face of both parties’ compliance, and non-compliance, with the terms of the Akazaki Order. Lisa essentially complied with every obligation imposed by the Akazaki Order. Daniele, at best, picked and chose which terms worked best for him at any given time, even inserting phantom terms into the Akazaki Order that would only benefit Daniele, and on many occasions criticized Lisa for never agreeing with and implementing Daniele’s distorted views.

[34] The Akazaki Order was clearly designed to afford Daniele a consistent opportunity to “make good” on his representation to the Court that given his position of his seniority, he would be able to effectively make any potential parenting schedule work. The alternative parenting time proposed in the Akazaki Order (ie. in the unlikely event Daniele was not able to secure a requested flight schedule) was to be the clear exception to the set parenting schedule. Unfortunately, due to Daniele’s consistent and frankly unapologetic breaches of the terms of the Akazaki Order, the alternative parenting time provisions became the rule, and not the exception. For nearly three years, Daniele’s pattern of unilaterally interpreting, implementing and avoiding the terms of the Akazaki Order did nothing but create unpredictability, disruption, instability and confusion for both Lisa and the children.

[35] In Lisa’s closing submissions, she tendered the following position:

“Daniele’s evidence hinged on one core theme that re-surfaced in all of his direct evidence and a large portion of his responses under cross-examination. He has the right to time with his children. Evidence contained no focus on the children’s best interests, there was no discussion about creating predictability and there was no review of the impact the flexibility he continually demanded had on the children’s welfare.”

[36] This is a very apposite description of Daniele’s approach to parenting time. The record is replete with examples of Daniele breaching the terms of the Akazaki Order, whether by providing less than 24 hours notice to Lisa of his unilateral parenting time changes (many of which did not make objective sense in light of the flight schedule Daniele provided to Lisa, sometimes past the 25^th day of each month), ignoring Lisa’s repeated communications through OFW seeking to avoid Daniele’s repeated breaches of the Akazaki Order that caused her and the children unpredictability and disruption, or simply unilaterally deciding to take the children during Lisa’s parenting time because Daniele wanted to and could not “make good” on his representation to Lisa and the Court that he could make the parenting schedule work. On each occasion, instead of owning up to and acknowledging his breaches, Daniele would ignore them while seeking to gaslight Lisa and accuse her of parental alienation, an accusation which this Court soundly rejects.

[37] While it took Daniele several weeks to comply with his obligation to register with and communicate through OFW, once he finally did, his tone and approach to communicating with Lisa was intermittent, curt, dismissive and often non-responsive. It seemed that Daniele only wanted to communicate about he deemed to be important, while ignoring the facts on the ground clearly spelled out by Lisa. The following are some of the various incidents grounding this Court’s conclusions on this issue:

• In mid-January 2024, and without providing Lisa any notice, Daniele unilaterally demanded to see the children on a P.A. day that fell within Lisa’s parenting time. There was no provision in the Akazaki Order for “P.A. day exceptions”. Lisa had already made plans for her and the children, and politely declined Daniele’s demands. He then responded by stating “you’re attempting to alienate me from the children and you cannot see it through your anger. The children love me and feel safe with me. You are attempting to destroy this bond.” This is pure gaslighting: Daniele refuses to comply with the Akazaki Order, Lisa does as usual, and Daniele chastises her for supposedly alienating the children from him by complying with the Akazaki Order.

• In February 2024, Daniele did not upload his flight schedule to OFW, and then spent the rest of the month unilaterally demanding to see the children on an ad hoc basis.

• In July 2024, after Daniele had uploaded his flight schedule to OFW, he then made a unilateral demand for a weekend parenting schedule change. Objectively, that change did not align at all with his CargoJet flight schedule. Lisa pointed this out to him as she did not understand why she needed to change the schedule at all. In response, Daniele did not engage on the merits of Lisa’s request (which was quite common) and simply accused Lisa of further alienating him from the children.

• In September 2024, Lisa asked Daniele more than a month in advance about sharing parenting time with Benjamin on his birthday. Daniele never responded, and Lisa was forced to send follow up communications through OFW. Instead of working cooperatively with Lisa, Daniele’s ultimate response was “plans have been made on my weekend”. While there was technically no obligation upon the parties to share parenting time on the children’s birthdays, Daniele went further by stating “you’re now harassing me with email. Because your (sic) called out on your shit. You think trying to humiliate me in front of others then clearly see your intentions is a good idea?”

• • In June 2025, Lisa tried (again) to explain to Daniele through OFW that his non-compliance with the terms of the Akazaki Order was making co-parenting with him somewhat impossible, and while she was willing to adjust her schedule to afford him yet another last minute demand for parenting time, she asked that he “please adhere strictly to the guidelines outlined in the Court order to help ensure clarity and reduce unnecessary disruption”. Daniele’s response was “your full offensive is suspicious and inaccurate. You dismissed my monthly and breadcrumb information. Thank you.”

[38] Daniele’s non-compliance with the Akazaki Order, and short-sighted approach to parenting time, was on full display in March 2025. The terms of the Akazaki Order spelled out a holiday schedule for the (then) upcoming 2023 Christmas break. There were no terms in the Akazaki Order addressing the children’s March break parenting schedule. While Lisa reasonably assumed that the 2025 March break would be split between herself and Daniele, with no notice at all Daniele unilaterally took the children for the entirety of the 2025 March break to Vancouver. He booked standby flights for himself and the children, as that was the approach he used historically being a First Officer and ultimately Captain. While Daniele gave evidence initially intended to return with the children on March 13 (i.e. in the middle of the 2025 March break), his and the children’s return was delayed by four days, with the children being forced to sleep in the Vancouver airport for two nights while Daniele attempted to sort out their return home. When Daniele arranged for the children to Facetime Lisa from the Vancouver airport, he then accused her of looking sad for the purpose of manipulating the children. Again, Daniele breached the Akazaki Order and then blamed Lisa for challenging his right to proceed as he pleased.

[39] While there are other examples of Daniele’s conduct, there is one final episode that, in this Court’s view, solidifies Lisa’s position on a go forward parenting schedule. Based upon the flight schedule uploaded to OFW by Daniele, in the fall of 2023 Lisa was scheduled to take an annual trip to Austin, Texas with her friends. Daniele was not working that weekend (based on his flight schedule), and Lisa asked him via OFW to confirm that he had childcare covered. In response, he indicated to Lisa that he in fact was not available and she “needed to figure it out”. Faced with this last-minute snafu caused by Daniele, Lisa enlisted the help of her best friend Susanna Gazzeloone, who also testified as a witness at trial. The children were to be dropped off for the entire weekend with Susanna and her husband Dave. Once the children were dropped off, Lisa left for her annual trip but Daniele arrived home on Friday (again, providing no notice of yet another change in position as he had indicated hours earlier that he was not available that weekend only in response to Lisa’s inquiries). Daniele started sending OFW messages, texts and made phone calls to Lisa, Susanna, Dave, and even Lisa’s mother demanding that the children be returned to him as he was now back in town. Daniele gave zero thought to the children being excited to spend the weekend with Susanna, and the children already having started their weekend there. All that mattered was that Daniele got what he wanted regardless of what others may feel, including his own children. Susanna gave evidence that Daniele’s communications were incessant that entire weekend, and Susanna and Dave ultimately arranged for Daniele to pick up the children before the end of the weekend for fear of escalating the matter further and placing the children in an even more uncomfortable situation.

[40] Daniele consistently places his own needs and interests ahead of the children’s best interests. Even when answering this Court’s clarification questions during his testimony, Daniele never took accountability and simply sought to distance himself from whatever frustrating narrative was being presented to him and the Court.

[41] For these reasons, the interim schedule set out in the Akazaki Order cannot be ordered on a final basis. In his closing submissions, Daniele sought a week on, week off equal parenting time schedule going forward. I agree with Lisa that such a proposed schedule is not only not in the children’s best interests, but even if the evidentiary record supported such a parenting schedule, there is no factual basis to support Daniele being available to accommodate it. The implementation and compliance with the parenting schedules set out in the Akazaki Order have been somewhat of a disaster. Even though the Akazaki Order contemplates Daniele being able to exercise 43% of the available parenting time, he only ended up exercising approximately 30% of that available parenting time. Now Daniele believes that his parenting time ought to increase to 50%. There is no evidentiary basis to support that request.

[42] Instead, I believe that Lisa’s proposed parenting schedule far better serves the children’s best interests. The children’s primary residence shall remain with Lisa, and her residential address shall be used as the children’s address for all registration, enrolment, medical documentation, health cards, birth certificates and passports.

[43] Daniele shall have parenting time every other weekend from Friday after school to Monday morning school drop off. On the alternate weeks, Daniele shall have parenting time from Wednesday after school until Thursday morning school drop off. All parenting exchanges shall happen after school (or 3:00 p.m. if there is no school) and shall continue to take place at the children’s school.

[44] Lisa’s proposal is that Daniele continue to provide his monthly flight schedule on the 25^th day of every month, and that in the event either party is unable to care for the children during his/her parenting time, they will first offer the parenting time to the other party by way of a right of first refusal. This would include work commitments (which are far more prevalent for Daniele). In my view, while Lisa’s proposal is commendable, the evidentiary record at trial does not support it. The alternative parenting time proposed in the Akazaki Order created far too much conflict and was abused by Daniele on too many occasions, as he failed to not only upload his flight schedule to OFW on a consistent basis, but adhere to both the parenting schedule and the alternative parenting schedule on too many occasions.

[45] As such, it is my view that the above parenting terms (every other weekend and alternative Wednesday overnights) should remain fixed, and I leave it in Lisa’ sole and unfettered discretion whether to afford Daniele any makeup or alternative parenting time in the event he cannot obtain a flight schedule to fit within the above fixed parenting schedule. In other words, there is no obligation upon Lisa to provide Daniele with a right of first refusal or alternative/makeup parenting time. She may do so if she chooses, but Daniele will no longer be able to make unilateral demands of her.

[46] As far as the summer vacation and other holiday schedule proposal from Lisa, I have no issue with those terms and they are so ordered.

Issue #2 What decision-making responsibility order is in the best interests of Savannah and Benjamin?

[47] Lisa seeks an order that she be granted final, sole decision-making responsibility over Savannah and Benjamin. Daniele opposes this request, and asks that the Court grant a final order for joint decision-making responsibility over both children.

[48] There has never been an interim decision-making responsibility order in place throughout this proceeding. As explained in this Court’s disposition of Issue #1, there has been very little (if any) productive post-separation communication between Lisa and Daniele.

[49] As held by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 CanLII 1625 (ONCA), the Court must bear the following principles in mind when determining the appropriateness of a joint decision-making responsibility order:

1. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents, and appropriate communication between them.

2. Joint decision-making authority cannot be ordered in the hope that it will improve communication between the parents.

3. Even when both parents are fit, that does not mean that a joint decision-making responsibility order necessarily flows.

4. Conversely, the fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint decision-making responsibility.

5. No matter how detailed a joint decision-making responsibility order may be, there will always be gaps and unexpected situations and when such situations arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis by the parents.

6. The younger the children are, the more important appropriate communication between the parents is.

[50] Obviously, a standard of perfection of communication is not expected or required between separated parents. The Court does not expect communication between separated parents to be easy or comfortable, or necessarily free of conflict. However, mutual trust and respect between parents are basic, required elements for any joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively. As held in T.P. v. A.E. 2021 ONSC 6022, a joint decision-making responsibility order requires “a neutral commitment between parents to cooperate on matters pertaining to the raising of their child, and an ability for the parents to put their own differences behind those of the child’s best interest”.

[51] As noted in this Court’s disposition of Issue #1, for several years Daniele has prioritized his own interests and his own time with the children above all other considerations and at every turn. Despite Lisa’s overall efforts to comply with the terms of the Akazaki Order through (a) keeping Daniele informed at all times of her plans with the children and (b) seeking confirmation from Daniele of his plans with the children, Daniele typically ignored Lisa’s requests, took obstinate and argumentative positions that were simply not cooperative, or insulted Lisa for allegedly alienating Daniele from the children (a position which this Court has already rejected).

[52] Lisa is no doubt an involved parent. There was evidence at trial that Savannah suffers from obsessive compulsive disorder and anxiety issues. While no formal medical evidence was tendered, Savannah has attended therapy for such underlying issues for several years. Daniele referred to these underlying issues as Savannah’s “so called anxiety”, and suggested that Lisa passed her own anxiety on to Savannah.

[53] Benjamin suffers from certain reading and eyesight difficulties, and Lisa sought Daniele’s cooperation to obtain support for Benjamin from his school. Daniele took a different view with respect to Benjamin’s struggles, and Daniele did not believe that Ben needed the same support that Lisa sought.

[54] Lisa consistently sought to try to work together with Daniele. Regrettably, Daniele remains steadfast in his opinions, and simply acted unilaterally whenever he had parenting time with Benjamin. Despite Benjamin’s objective struggles in school, Daniele tied such suffering to Lisa’s alleged parental alienation.

[55] When Daniele took the children to Vancouver during the 2025 March break, he unilaterally chose to fly on standby (presumably to reduce costs) without notifying Lisa in advance of his trip/itinerary, and this ultimately cost Lisa all of her holiday parenting time that week. This was over and above the stress Lisa experienced worrying about the welfare of her children as they slept on airport chairs for two of the four extra nights spent in Vancouver.

[56] Most importantly, Daniele refused to be accountable for such unilateral actions. This not only breached the terms of the Akazaki Order, but exhibited a significant lack of judgment. At no time during his trial testimony did Daniele seek to apologize for such conduct, and this clearly placed the welfare of the children at some risk.

[57] While Lisa has repeatedly attempted to keep Daniele informed of child-centered information, Daniele has either ignored such efforts or chastised Lisa for (as put by counsel for the applicant) “not doing more and not doing it sooner”.

[58] In implementing the guidelines set forth by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Kaplanis, I find that Lisa and Daniele are simply not viable candidates for a joint decision-making responsibility order. The historical, post-separation communication from Daniele has been inappropriate, and the order sought by Daniele will not improve that damaged communication. It is not in the children’s best interests for Lisa and Daniele to continue to be engaged in conflict over important decisions that impact the children. As such, an order for Lisa to have sole decision-making responsibility is the proper result.

[59] During Lisa and Daniele’s respective parenting time, each of them may make day to day decisions regarding the children’s routines and activities without needing approval or notification of the other. However, given my findings surrounding the repeated examples of a lack of judgment, responsibility, accountability and self-awareness on the part of Daniele, this Court concludes that a sole decision-making responsibility order in favour of Lisa, with consultive obligations with Daniele, is appropriate for Savannah and Benjamin. Lisa shall consult on any major decisions to be made with Daniele, but in the event of any disagreement, Lisa shall have final decision-making responsibility.

Issue # 3 What amount of table child support and section 7 expenses is owing by Daniele to Lisa (arrears and on a go forward basis)?

[60] While Daniele remained in significant breach of the child support terms under the Akazaki Order for an extended period of time, with the assistance of enforcement efforts carried out by the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”), Daniele’s child support arrears have been extinguished and his child support obligations are now current.

[61] There is one small adjustment that needs to be made given Daniele’s increase in T4 income between the date of the Akazaki Order and the trial of this proceeding. The need for such an adjustment does not appear to be in dispute between the parties, but the amount at issue is slightly disputed.

[62] Under the terms of the Akazaki Order, Lisa’s income was set at $40,000.00 per annum. Daniele’s income from 2024-2025 has been as follows:

Year

Daniele’s T4 Income

2024

$155,824.00

2025

$189,020.00

2026 (as of June 30, 2026)

$189,020.00 (based on 2025)

[63] Lisa’s calculations show an outstanding net amount of $5,076.00 in child support arrears. Daniele argues that he only owes $4,940.00 in child support arrears under the Akazaki Order.

[64] Daniele submits that Lisa should have $40,000.00 in annual income imputed to her for the purpose of calculating any support orders (ie. a continuation of the amount under the Akazaki Order). For her part, Lisa is prepared to accept an imputed annual income of $31,200.00.

[65] Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines permits the Court to impute income to a spouse as the Court may consider appropriate in the circumstances, including where a spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed (other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or the health needs of the spouse).

[66] In Drygala v. Pauli 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), Court of Appeal for Ontario set out a three-part test for the imputation of income due to under-employment:

a) Is the spouse intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

b) If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of the spouse’s reasonable educational needs, the needs of a child or reasonable health needs?

c) If yes, what income should be appropriately imputed in the circumstances of the case?

[67] Obviously, intentional under-employment requires a voluntary act. The onus of proving intentional under-employment is on the party requesting the imputation of income, and that party has an obligation to establish an evidentiary basis for a finding of imputation.

[68] At trial, Lisa was not asked in cross examination by Daniele about her income, her skillset, or any employment opportunities. I agree with Lisa’s submission that Daniele offered no evidence about why Lisa should have any income imputed to her. The only basis upon which Daniele seems to be requesting income imputed to Lisa is the fact that her previous business, PurEnergy, was successful but unfortunately succumbed to the financial realities caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

[69] Given Daniele’s irregular employment schedule, Lisa needs to be available for Savannah and Benjamin, especially to coordinate pickups to and from school and other extra-curricular activities. There is no doubt that Lisa remains the primary caregiver for Savannah and Benajmin. Lisa’s post-separation reality requires her to be available for the children, at least until they enter high school. The final parenting schedule ordered by this Court will only serve to continue that reality.

[70] As such, I agree with Lisa that her income should be imputed to $37,336.00 being minimum wage ($17.95 per hour). Given the small disparity between the amount of arrears submitted by each party, I am fixing Daniele’s child support arrears in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.00.

[71] On a go forward basis, child support shall be due and owing from Daniele to Lisa commencing on September 1, 2026 and on a monthly basis thereafter in the amount of $2,611.00 per month for the two children based on Daniele’s current annual income in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.

[72] Section 7 expenses shall be apportioned by way of a split of 84% to Daniele and 16% to Lisa. Any additional section 7 expenses not currently being incurred shall require the consent of the other parent, with such consent not being unreasonably withheld.

Issue #4 What amount of spousal support is owing by Daniele to Lisa (arrears and on a go forward basis)?

[73] The terms of the Akazaki Order imposed spousal support payment obligations upon Daniele in the amount of $1,700.00 per month.

[74] Using the same income figures for 2024-2026 set out above in this Court’s disposition of Issue #3, there is an amount owing from Daniele to Lisa for spousal support arrears due to Daniele’s increased income during that time period. On a net basis, and using Daniele’s actual T4 income for 2024-2026 along with imputed income to Lisa of $37,336.00, I am fixing Daniele’s spousal support arrears owed to Lisa in the all-inclusive amount of $6,000.00.

[75] Daniele did not oppose Lisa’s entitlement to ongoing spousal support. The focus of Daniele’s evidence, and his closing submissions, was quantum and duration.

[76] The starting point for any spousal support order is a review of the objectives set out in section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, which includes an assessment of the presence of any economic advantages or disadvantages to spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage. Against the background of those objectives, the Court must then consider the factors set out in section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act including non-compensatory factors such as the means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, the length of time the spouses cohabited, and the functions performed by each spouse during the marriage. While the Court must consider all of the section 15.2(4) factors, no one factor is paramount.

[77] It was proper for Daniele to concede Lisa’s entitlement to spousal support, but this Court finds such an entitlement in any event as Lisa has both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis for ongoing spousal support. Lisa and Daniele were married for ten years, and Lisa assumed the primary parenting role from 2015 until separation. Lisa’s sacrifices contributed to Daniele’s ability to move through the pilot ranks until he became a captain, a position which he still maintains now and for the foreseeable future.

[78] With respect to quantum, the exact same income figures set out in this Court’s disposition of Issue #3 apply to the calculation of go forward spousal support. Lisa’s income is imputed to $37,336.00 per year, and as a result Daniele shall pay Lisa the sum of $2,128.00 on a monthly basis commencing on September 1, 2026 being the mid-range spousal support amount (with child support payable) pursuant to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAGs”).

[79] With respect to duration, Lisa asks that the spousal support order be indefinite pending a material change in circumstances. Both parties are currently 43 years of age. They were married for ten years. This is not a “without child support formula” as that term is defined in the SSAGs, and thus the “Rule of 65” would not strictly apply. Under the SSAGs, using the “with child support formula” there are still time limits but they are to be applied in a softer and more flexible manner, typically implemented through variation and review.

[80] I am not persuaded that this is a case where a termination date for spousal support should be ordered. Rendering Daniele’s spousal support obligations to be paid for a definite period of time requires sufficient evidence supporting a finding that Lisa will, or at least will likely, achieve self-sufficiency by any such termination date. Even choosing a termination date of ten years, which would conclude in 2033, Savannah and Banjamin will be 18 and 15 respectively at that time. Given my findings, I do not find a realistic enough expectation that Lisa will be in a sufficiently higher income range during the next seven years.

[81] By ordering spousal support payable on an indefinite basis, I find the objectives of the Divorce Act are properly met. Naturally, spousal support shall be variable upon any material change in circumstances.

Issue #5 What is the equalization payment owing?

[82] This Court’s determination of the equalization due from one party to the other was tied to the determination of specific, disputed issues between the parties as to various items included (or not) on the net family property statements. At the conclusion of this section, I would ask the parties to insert my findings into the existing net family property statement, and thereafter arrive at the bottom-line equalization payment.

The date of marriage value of the Templar property

[83] The parties agree with Lisa’s appraisal of the Templar property as of their separation date ($1,325,000.00). Unfortunately, no date of marriage appraisal for the Templar property was obtained, and each party led evidence to support their respective positions as to the value of the Templar property in 2013.

[84] Lisa purchased the property in late 2011 for the sum of $425,000.00. It is clear that significant renovation work was undertaken and carried out at the Templar property prior to Lisa and Daniele moving in once they were married. The Court heard evidence from both Lisa’s brother Stephen and Daniele’s brother Andre that renovations began almost immediately after the Templar property was purchased.

[85] Lisa’s brother Stephen, and her other brother Paul, were and remain employed in the construction industry. Stephen oversaw the Templar property renovation but did not charge for any of his or Paul’s time. All of the materials were paid for by Lisa, along with any subcontractors retained by Stephen and/or Paul.

[86] Almost all of the internal walls were removed and reframed. The basement was converted into a separate apartment, which was rented for most of the marriage to help Lisa and Daniele with the cost of the mortgage.

[87] Stephen gave evidence that the renovation work took approximately eight months, and then Lisa moved into the Templar property. Daniele never disputed that the scope of the renovation work was quite extensive, as he described it as a “full reno” in his evidence. While the parties did not agree upon the date of the completion of the basement renovation, it appears that the basement unit was fully rented out by late 2014.

[88] Most of Daniele’s evidence dealing with the renovation of the Templar property focused on his contention that he and his brother Andre were also significantly involved in carrying out that renovation work. That position was denied by both Lisa and Stephen. However, given that Daniele’s original constructive trust claim to the Templar property was abandoned in Daniele’s opening submissions (and throughout the trial), the extent of Daniele’s contributions to the renovation of the Templar property do not really assist this Court in determining its value as of 2013, and in fact serve to highlight the extensive scope of the renovation work itself.

[89] As stated, there was no expert evidence tendered by either party as to the value of the renovation work. When asked for his lay opinion as a professional contractor, Stephen estimated that the renovation cost between $300,000.00 - $350,000.00.

[90] When asked in cross examination what value he would assign to the renovations, Daniele effectively attributed no dollar value to the renovations as he maintained that the Templar property was only worth $425,000.00 as at 2013, which was after most, if not all, of the renovations were completed. Such a position makes no sense, especially given Daniele’s continuous assertions as to the value he provided himself in assisting with the extensive renovation work to the Templar property.

[91] Obviously, the post-renovation value of the Templar property is more than $425,000.00. However, given the lack of expert evidence on this subject at trial, the Court in placed in the unenviable task of “guesstimating” the property’s historical real estate value. While the Court must come to some conclusion, there is little in the record to ground any such conclusion.

[92] A simple application of the estimated renovation costs (which themselves are a guesstimate) cannot suffice, as there are many other factors in play such as market forces, property demand, the location of the property, etc.

[93] Lisa asks that the property be valued at $725,000.00. This would amount to a $300,000.00 increase in value as a result of the renovations. Those renovations did change the nature of the property into an income-producing property.

[94] Mindful of this Court’s obligation to “do its best” in finalising the equalization payment owing between the parties, I conclude that the value of the Templar property as at the date of marriage was $625,000.00. This figure takes the renovation work into account, including the new income-producing nature of the property.

The date of marriage and date of separation values of the Fieldway property

[95] Daniele and his brother Andre jointly purchased the Fieldway property for $434,269.00 on June 30, 2010. Daniele did not obtain date of marriage and date of separation appraisals for the Fieldway property, even though he was asked to do so by way of undertaking. Again, no expert evidence was tendered on this issue at trial.

[96] In Daniele’s trial materials, he lists the date of marriage value of the Fieldway property as $600,000.00. There is no evidentiary foundation for that position.

[97] Daniele swore six financial statements in this proceeding. In the first four financial statements, he valued the Fieldway property as at separation at $1,000,000.00. Then in his two financial statements sworn a few months prior to trial, he valued the Fieldway property as at separation at $500,000.00. No explanation was provided for this change of position, which the Court does not accept in any event. Of note, around the same time he listed the date of separation value of the Fieldway property at $500,000.00, Daniele obtained a mortgage for $650,000.00 registered against the title of the Fieldway property.

[98] Again, the date of marriage valuation for the Fieldway property is no more than a guesstimate. Given that it was purchased approximately three years before marriage for $434,269.00, and no renovation work was undertaken at the Fieldway property, any increase in value three years later would not be as substantive as the Templar property. Such an increase in value would only be due to typical market forces in the Greater Toronto Area. I thus find the date of marriage value for the Fieldway property to be $500,000.00

[99] As for the date of separation value for the Fieldway property, counsel for the applicant did present several MLS sales for comparable units in the Fieldway building. Those sales comparables matched the number of bedrooms and bathrooms in the unit owned by Daniele and Andre. The value of those comparables ranged from $860,000.00 to $1,000,025.00 with sales occurring in 2022-24.

[100] Of note, Daniele purchased his brother Andre’s 50% share of the Fieldway property in April 2025, two years after separation. This Court could normally use the value of that transaction as a possible aid in determining the date of separation value for the Fieldway property. However, Daniele’s evidence surrounding his purchase of his brother’s interest in the Fieldway property made little to no sense at all.

[101] Daniele would not provide the exact amount he paid to Andre. The reporting letter from that transaction lists a transfer of funds to Andre of $237,700.00, yet the Land Transfer Tax affidavit notes consideration for the transfer being only $174,901.17. Daniele was unable to explain this obvious irreconcilable discrepancy.

[102] Daniele described the purchase of Andre’s 50% interest in the Fieldway property as a “handshake deal between brothers”, and yet could not confirm the salient term of that handshake deal - the purchase price.

[103] When Andre testified, he could not provide an exact amount received from Daniele but estimated it was between “$230,000.00 - $250,000.00”.

[104] As stated above, Daniele decided to refinance the property with a private mortgage lender. In discharging a prior BMO mortgage and re-mortgaging with a private lender, the new mortgage was $650,000.00. It is somewhat trite to state that a mortgagee would not advance a loan for more than 80% of the value of a property, unless the property had mortgage insurance. There is no evidence that Daniele obtained mortgage insurance, and the reporting letter for the closing of the purchase of Andre’s 50% interest in the Fieldway property makes no mention of any mortgage insurance.

[105] The only person with firsthand knowledge of the true value of the purchase of Andre’s 50% interest in the Fieldway property is Daniele. This was an event that occurred post-separation, and Lisa would have no knowledge of the particulars of the transaction. Daniele refused to comply with his disclosure obligations and obtain a date of separation appraisal of the Fieldway property. The confusing and irreconcilable positions advanced by Daniele surrounding the purchase of Andre’s 50% interest only serve to obfuscate this issue further, and since it was Daniele’s onus to prove the two values of the Fieldway property, this Court draws the adverse inference against Daniele that the date of separation valuation of the Fieldway property is far more than what Daniele submitted to this Court.

[106] I find that on date of separation, the Fieldway property had a value of $925,000.00, and thus Daniele’s interest is $462,500.00 for the purpose of equalization.

The $125,000 loan from Lisa’s mother Sandra Vocella

[107] Daniele and Lisa signed a promissory note in favour of Lisa’s mother Sandra evidencing a $125,000.00 loan advanced by and owing to Sandra. There is no dispute that Daniele signed that promissory note, which is prima facie evidence acknowledging a debt owed to Sandra.

[108] The $125,000.00 was advanced by Sandra to Lisa and Daniele. They made interest payments on the $125,000.00 to Sandra. Notwithstanding, Daniele maintained at trial that the loan was in fact a gift, and the interest payments were simply “goodwill gestures”. Such a position is rejected by this Court. Daniele’s attempt to explain the $125,000.00 as being “not a loan” was to suggest that the funds were a repayment of a previous $100,000.00 that the parties had invested in the Vocella family business. There are no documents whatsoever to support such a theory, and both Lisa and Sandra were unshaken in their respective cross-examinations when this bald theory was put to them.

[109] There is no dispute, and this Court finds, that $125,000.00 is still owing on a joint basis from Lisa and Daniele to Sandra.

[110] In addition, I also find that Sandra advanced the parties $50,000.00 to assist them with paying the Land Transfer taxes on the purchase of the matrimonial home. Daniele’s attempts to The net family property statement should reflect this finding.

Daniele’s alleged student loans

[111] In his most recent sworn financial statements, Daniele lists (flight school) student loan debt in the amount of $80,000.00 as at the date of marriage, and $62,500.00 as at the date of separation.

[112] To begin, Daniele did not provide any documentation to support the alleged value of student loans incurred in the amount of $80,000. No tuition invoices, bank statements, transfers or any other financial documentation were tendered to support Daniele’s position in this regard.

[113] In addition, the loans used to allegedly fund the flight school costs were in the names of Daniele’s parents, Sebastiana and Vincenzo. As such, the amount of any such liability is in the name of Daniele’s parents, and not Daniele (or Lisa).

[114] Even accepting Daniele’s evidence as true and accurate, the only documentation produced to support the existence of this loan showed $80,000.00 still owing on his parents’ credit line as at 2018, which is several years after the parties were married. Daniele gave evidence that he owed $80,000.00 as at 2013, but yet made monthly payments (approximately $1,000.00 per month) towards that loan for years. How is there still $80,000.00 owing on the loan after 5 years of monthly payments? Daniele offered no explanation in his cross examination, but then changed his evidence to say that he only began making $1,000.00 payments in 2018. In the face of Daniele’s original evidence that he regularly paid $1,000.00 on a monthly basis towards the line of credit, and made such payments for nearly 5 years, the amount of the line of credit in fact increased by January 2018.

[115] Daniele also gave evidence that he used his parents’ line of credit to finance his 2011 purchase of a 2008 Audi vehicle (adding a further $23,000.00 to the line of credit). In the face of the approximate $45,000.00 worth of payments from 2018-2023 Daniele said he and Lisa made towards his parents’ line of credit, it is simply not possible for this Court to conclude that any amount should be attributed towards this outstanding debt as at the date of the marriage.

[116] Daniele could have called his parents as witnesses at trial (they were originally listed as trial witnesses on the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form), but he chose not to which can only, once again, lead to the appropriate adverse inferences being drawn against him. Daniele’s parents were obviously the best evidence available to this Court on this subject. Daniele chose to not call his parents at trial, and gave evidence on this subject which was convoluted at best, and nonsensical at worst.

[117] I do not ascribe any value to these student loans as part of the equalization payment calculation.

The value of the vehicles

[118] As stated, Daniele purchased a 2008 Audi in or around 2011. The purchase price was $27,000.00, and he claims the full value as a date of marriage asset despite it being a used car and having depreciated for up to two years. The Canadian Red Book value of the Audi was $16,425.00, but Daniele claimed at trial that he had a different version of the Audi (an “S-line” version) which according to the same Canadian Red Book had a value of $20,000.00.

[119] I ascribe a $20,000 value to Daniele’s 2008 Audi as at the date of marriage.

[120] Lisa owned a 2008 Mazda-3 as at the date of marriage, but there is no evidence about the car’s value. In cross examination, Daniele did admit that a value should be allotted for Lisa’s 2008 Mazda-3 as at the date of marriage and the Canadian Black Book lists a conservative value of $6,500.00 which I find to be the value for equalization calculation purposes.

Summary

[121] I would ask the parties to insert the various findings in these Reasons into the equalization calculation for the purpose of arriving at an equalization payment.

[122] With respect to the draft order prepared by counsel for the applicant, to the extent that any of the specific terms referenced therein are not addressed in these Reasons, I find those specific terms to be reasonable and adopt them as part of these Reasons (i.e. the parenting holiday schedule, the summer vacation schedule, the continued use of OFW for communication etc.).

[123] If necessary, I am prepared to review a revised draft order incorporating these Reasons at the parties’ request.

Costs

[124] I would urge the parties to exert the necessary efforts to try and resolve the issue of the costs of this proceeding. If such efforts prove unsuccessful, written costs submissions (totalling no more than five pages exclusive of a Costs Outline) may be served and filed by parties in accordance with the following schedule:

a) the applicant’s written costs submissions to be served and filed within 14 business days of the release of these Reasons; and

b) the respondent’s written costs submissions to be served and filed within 14 days of the receipt of the applicant’s costs submissions.

Diamond J.

Released: August 17, 2026

CITATION: Manzo v. Manzo, 2026 ONSC 4658

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00034498-0000

DATE: 20260817

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LISA MANZO

Applicant

– and –

DANIELE MANZO

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Diamond J.

Released: August 17, 2026