CITATION: Gallivan v. Rodgers et al, 2026 ONSC 4634
COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00051220-0000
DATE: 20260811
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: MARY BETH GALLIVAN, Applicant
AND:
RONALD RODGERS, and
RONALD RODGERS ALTER EGO TRUST c/o RONALD CHARLES RODGERS AS TRUSTEE, Respondents
BEFORE: Justice K. Sah
COUNSEL: Adrienne N. Novak, Counsel, for the Applicant
Self Represented Respondents
HEARD: July 23, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Overview
[1] There are two motions before this court: 1) a contempt motion and 2) a subrule 1(8) non-compliance motion.
[2] The Applicant, Mary Beth Gallivan, seeks a finding that the Respondent, Ronald Rodgers (“the Respondent”) and the Respondent, Ronald Charles Rodgers Alter Ego Trust (“the Trust”), collectively hereinafter referred to as “the Respondents”), be found non-compliant pursuant to subrule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules and that he is in contempt of various orders of this court.
[3] As a remedy to the non-compliance and a sanction to the contempt finding, the Applicant seeks several orders, all restorative and punitive in nature, including but not limited to setting aside a transfer of property or declaring the transfer as void, the retroactive variation of several court orders to include the Trust, and the issuance of a Form 28C: Writ of Temporary Seizure.
The Respondents’ Participation
[4] The Respondent appeared on the motion. He did not file any motion material claiming he was unable to do so as he does not have access to the internet because of my previous order freezing his assets.
[5] He was permitted to make submissions on why he should be granted the right to participate. The Applicant took the position that he had no right to an audience before this court.
[6] For oral reasons provided at the motion, I did not permit the Respondents to participate in the motion.
[7] In summary, and as further detailed below, the Respondent has not purged this contempt, he is in breach of court orders, and he did not serve or file an Answer in these proceedings.
[8] Rule 10(5) of the Family Law Rules provides that where a Respondent does not serve and file an Answer, the consequences set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of r.1(8.4) apply, which include: the party is not entitled to participate in the case in any way.
Background and Litigation History
[9] The undisputed evidence before the court is summarized as follows.
[10] The parties were married on October 22, 2005, and separated on February 17, 2017. There is one child of the marriage: Tierney Julia Rodgers, born December 29, 2006 (the “child”).
[11] The child is enrolled in her second year of a five-year Kinesiology degree at the University of Waterloo and lives in residence during the school year and with the Applicant during holidays including all school breaks.
[12] Several final orders have been made in this case.
[13] The final consent order of Justice Goodman dated March 7, 2018, addressed all rights and obligations arising under Part I of the Family Law Act, including a claim for equalization of net family property and all claims for a division of, ownership of, or claims to property.
[14] The divorce order of Justice Gilmore dated December 17, 2018, addressed all issues following trial related to decision-making, parenting time, child support including s. 7 expenses, and monies owing to the Applicant from the Respondent. The Applicant was granted sole custody and final decision-making authority for the child. This order provided for shared parenting on a week-on/week-off basis and child support was not ordered given the equal-time sharing arrangement. The Respondent was ordered to pay 55 percent and the Applicant to pay 45 percent of the child’s s. 7 expenses, which were to be reconciled on a quarterly basis. The Respondent was also ordered to pay $100,000 into court as security for child support.
[15] The Final Order of Justice Shore dated January 22, 2019, permitted the release of $100,000 from trust to the Respondent in exchange for him maintaining a life insurance policy with a face value of $100,000 as security for his child support obligations. The Respondent was found in contempt of this order, pursuant to the contempt order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022 (the “Contempt Order”) and the Respondent was required to deposit $100,000 into Court. The Respondent has failed to do so. He did not purge his contempt as set out further below.
[16] The Respondent commenced a Motion to Change two months after the divorce order was issued. The Motion to Change was dismissed pursuant to the final order of Justice Paisley dated September 19, 2019. To date, the Respondent owes the Applicant her costs of $2,195.35, plus interest in the amount of $444.06 as of July 15, 2026, totalling $2,639.41.
[17] The Respondent then commenced a second Motion to Change in February of 2021 seeking to add post-secondary school expenses as a s.7 expense for the child and to have RESPs transferred to his sole name. The Applicant opposed the relief because the child was still three years away from her post-secondary studies. In addition, the Applicant sought to have the Respondent found in contempt for his ongoing breach of court orders. On January 20, 2022, Justice Sharma struck the Respondent’s second Motion to Change pursuant to r.1(8).
Contempt Motion
[18] Justice Sharma found the Respondent in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the Order of Justice Shore dated January 22, 2019, and the Order of Justice Sharma dated January 20, 2022.
[19] The court required the Respondent to: (a) deposit $100,000.00 into Court as security for his child support obligations by September 26, 2022; (b) pay a penalty of $10,000.00 to the Applicant by October 17, 2022; (c) pay an additional penalty of $500.00 for each day that he fails to comply with contempt order; (d) not dissipate his interest in his residential property; (e) preserve all funds in his accounts at National Bank Financial; and (f) pay costs of $57,744.16 by October 17, 2022.
[20] The Respondent has not purged his contempt, rather he has taken steps to frustrate the contempt order. None of the amounts ordered payable have been paid and the Respondent failed to deposit $100,000 into Court as security for his child support obligations.
[21] After the contempt order was made, the Respondent smashed a brick on the roof and hood of the Applicant’s car, while she was inside the vehicle, and took her cell phone from her. The Respondent was charged with two counts of mischief and theft and was subsequently charged with a breach of recognizance after he attended her home in breach of his bail conditions. The criminal charges were ultimately resolved on terms of recognizance which prohibited the Respondent from attending anywhere the Applicant lives, works or frequents, and he shall not communicate with the Applicant, except through counsel, all for a period of 12 months.
[22] The Respondent has not had parenting time since approximately February 26, 2023. The child wants to attend therapy with the Respondent, but he has not agreed to same. The Respondent has not paid any monthly child support or contributed to any of the child’s s. 7 expenses since February 2023. The Applicant financially supports the child alone.
Transfer of the Buckley Property to the Alter Ego Trust
[23] The contempt proceeding commenced on April 28, 2021, but it was ultimately heard on September 13, 2022.
[24] The Respondent’s last sworn Financial Statement was dated January 4, 2022. Within this sworn document, the Respondent discloses that his bank accounts, savings, securities and pensions total $626,300, he has a 100 percent interest in the Buckley Property with a stated value of $1,200,000, and a mortgage registered against the property in the amount of $600,000.
[25] Prior to making the contempt order, the hearing was adjourned for approximately 10 months to provide the Respondent with an opportunity to: 1) comply with his obligation to obtain life insurance of $100,000 to secure his child support obligation pursuant to Justice Shore’s Order; and 2) comply with the cost awards under the Justice Paisley’s Order.
[26] Unbeknownst to the Applicant, on April 22, 2022, the Respondent, during the adjournment period transferred his interest in the Buckley Property for $0.00 consideration to the Ronald Charles Rodgers Alter Ego Trust.
[27] At the contempt hearing, the Respondent did not swear or file a new Financial Statement and relied on his last sworn Financial Statement dated January 4, 2022.
[28] Justice Sharma permitted the Respondent to give viva voce evidence during the Motion for Contempt and the Respondent testified that here were no material changes to his Financial Statement sworn January 4, 2022. He did not disclose the existence of the Trust or the transfer of the Buckley Property.
[29] To the Applicant’s knowledge, the Respondent continues to reside at the Buckley Property, and he may be renting the basement.
Depletion of the Respondent’s Bank Accounts in Contempt of the Contempt Order
[30] Following the contempt hearing, the Respondent depleted his bank accounts with National Bank Financial and as of November 3, 2022, the six bank accounts in his name had balances of $0.00. However, his last Financial Statement sworn January 4, 2022, set out balances totalling $626,300.
[31] Meanwhile, the Respondent confirmed he received the endorsement of Justice Sharma. The endorsement provides that he had 10 days to pay $100,000 into court and he stated that the timeline is insufficient for various reasons. He did not move to set aside or appeal the contempt order.
[32] The Respondent also denied the Applicant’s requests to access funds, including the RESP, to pay for the child’s post-secondary educational expenses. This resulted in the Applicant bringing a Motion for Summary Judgment.
[33] The final order of Justice Myers dated November 12, 2024, varied the divorce order to include post-secondary educational expenses to the list of s.7 expenses and removed the Respondent from the RESP account and investment account to provide the Applicant with sole authority. This order also required the Respondent to pay the Applicant costs in the amount of $19,105 which remain outstanding.
[34] The Respondent owes a total amount of $17,575.55 in payment for his 55 percent share of s. 7 expenses pursuant to the divorce order and the final order of Justice Myers dated November 12, 2024, for the period up to and including December 31, 2025.
Temporary Preservation of the Buckley Property, Assets of the Respondent and the Trust and Disclosure Orders
[35] On an ex parte motion for preservation orders and financial disclosure against the Respondent, I ordered a preservation order against the Buckley Property and all assets and accounts of the Respondent and the Trust. Several disclosure orders were made requiring the Respondent and the Trust to produce financial information. This order has been registered against title to the Buckley Property
[36] On the return of the ex parte motion, Justice Wassenaar ordered the continuation of my order and further ordered that the Respondent pay costs of $16,000.
[37] The Respondents, both Mr. Rodgers and the Trust have not complied with any aspect of the disclosure orders set out at paragraph 8 of my order.
[38] The Applicant remains unaware of which banking institutions the Respondent has relationships with.
[39] All but one bank, set out in paragraph 9 of my order have not provided the Applicant with details concerning the specific accounts held in the names of the Respondent and/or the Trust.
[40] It is possible that there are accounts held by the Respondent and the Trust that have not yet been frozen.
[41] The Respondents have not made any payments towards his outstanding court ordered obligations.
Issues to be Determined
[42] The issues to be determines are as follows:
Are the Respondents in contempt of the Contempt Order?
If the answer to issue #1 is yes, what is the appropriate sentence?
Has there been a triggering event that would allow the court to consider the working of r. 1(8)?
If the answer to issue #3 is yes, should the court exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party by not sanctioning that party under subrule 1(8), or by ordering that r. 1(8) does not apply?
If the answer to issue #4 is no, what is the appropriate remedy pursuant to the provisions of r. 1(8)?
Analysis
Issue #1
[43] An order, other than a payment order, may be enforced by a contempt motion made in the case in which the order was made, even if another penalty is available. Subrule 31(5) of the Family Law Rules provides the sanctions available upon the finding of contempt, which include orders that the contemnor;
a. be imprisoned for any period and on any conditions that are just;
b. pay a fine in any amount that is appropriate;
c. pay an amount to a party as a penalty;
d. do anything else that the court decides is appropriate;
e. not do what the court forbids;
f. pay costs in an amount decided by the court; and
g. obey any other order.
[44] Under r. 31(6), the court may order the issuance of a Writ of Temporary Seizure against the contemnor’s property.
[45] If a corporation is found in contempt, the court may also make an order under rr. (5), (6), or (7) against any officer or director of the corporation under r. 31(11).
[46] Under r. 31(12), the court may, on motion, change an order, give directions, and make any other order that is just.
[47] Three criteria should be satisfied in order to find a party in contempt of court:
(a) The order that has not been complied with must clearly and unequivocally state what must be done or not done;
(b) The party criticized for violating the order must actually be aware of its existence; and
(c) The party who disobeys the order must have done so in a deliberate and voluntary manner.
See: Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 SCR 79, paras 32-35,57.
[48] The power to issue a contempt order is discretionary. The court may not wish to exercise its discretionary power where an alleged contemnor acted in good faith in taking reasonable steps to comply with the order, or where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case: see Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 SCR 79, paras 37,58.
[49] The Applicant has satisfied the three criteria required to find a party in contempt of court.
[50] First, the orders that the Respondents breached clearly and unequivocally state what must be done or not done.
[51] The order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, required the Respondent to deposit $100,000 into court within 10 days, pay a penalty of $10,000 within 30 days, and if he failed to comply with these orders, the Respondent was ordered to pay an additional $500 penalty per day for each day that he failed to comply. The Respondent was further required to preserve all funds in his accounts held at National Bank Financial.
[52] The order of Justice Myers dated November 12, 2024, required the Respondent to pay costs of $19,105 plus interest.
[53] My order dated February 5, 2026, required the Respondent to preserve assets and produce financial assets set out in the order within 14 days.
[54] The order of Justice Wassenaar dated March 17, 2026, continued my order and required the Respondent to pay costs of $16,000 within 30 days.
[55] Second, the Respondents are aware of the orders.
[56] Third, the Respondents have deliberately and voluntarily disobeyed these orders.
[57] The endorsement of Justice Myers confirmed at paragraph four that the Respondent does not deny that he emptied his National Bank accounts in breach of the order made by Justice Sharma, and he is likely in contempt of a contempt order.
[58] Further, the Respondent confirmed that he did not pay the security ordered to be paid by the court, and the endorsement of Justice Wassenaar dated March 17, 2026, confirmed at paragraph 10 that the Respondent “acknowledged that he has not provided any disclosure, arguing that he could not provide all of it so he should not provide just some of it as he might be accused of being misleading.”
[59] The Respondents wilfully and intentionally failed to comply with the order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, and my order dated February 5, 2026.
[60] This Court finds that the Respondent’s ongoing breach of these orders is deliberate.
Issue #2
[61] The Court has considerable discretion when it comes to sentencing for contempt, as set out in r. 31(5) of the Family Law Rules.
[62] The use of the word “may” in r. 31(5) indicates that the seven enumerated possible “sentences” do not represent a closed list. As well, the seven sentences are not mutually exclusive and may be levied in any number and combination found to be just and appropriate. See Geremia v. Harb, 2007 CanLII 30750 (ON SC), 2007 CarswellOnt 4956 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 11.
[63] Sentencing should be restorative to the victim and punitive to the contemnor. The primary objective in sentencing for civil contempt is to coerce the offender into obeying the court judgment or order. Deterrence and denunciation are also important objects of sentencing. The purpose of penalties is not to compensate the wronged party, per se. It is to punish the wrongdoer. Ultimately, the court is given very broad discretion to order what it considers appropriate when a person has been found to be in contempt.
[64] Rule 31(5) states that the court may “do anything else that it decides is appropriate” when it finds a person in contempt. The court has held that this provision confers “the broadest discretion”. See: Webster v. Merritt, 2018 ONSC 7590 at paras. 56-61.
[65] Ideally, a sentence for contempt in family law should be comprised of two components: one, restorative (to the victim of the contempt), the other, punitive (to the contemnor). See: Geremia v. Harb, 2007 CanLII 30750 (ON SC), 2007 CarswellOnt 4956 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 21.
[66] The penalty for each contempt should increase in that significance for each subsequent breach after the first. “Continued or multiple contempt’s of court orders should attract increasing sanctions in order to dissuade those inclined to use this behaviour as a litigation strategy or tactic or in order to gain advantage over a litigant who is compliant with court orders.” See: Roby v. Roby, 2003 CarswellOnt 4581 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 34.
[67] Courts have used the following considerations to determine an appropriate sentence for a finding of contempt: proportionality of the sentence to the wrongdoing; the presence of mitigating factors; the presence of aggravating factors; deterrence and denunciation; similarity of sentences in like circumstances; and the reasonableness of a fine or incarceration. See: Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation 145, 2014 ONCA 574, 121 O.R. (3d) 670, at para. 90.
[68] Courts have imposed unique contempt orders that are appropriate given the facts of the case, including seizing and selling a contemnor’s property as a tool of last resort. Ref: College of Chiropractors of Ontario v. Dies, 2015 ONSC 2828, aff’d 2016 ONCA 2.
[69] It is appropriate, on the facts of this case, to increase the significance of the penalty because of ongoing and consistent breaches.
[70] Consequences that would be most significant to the Respondent includes a penalty that affects the Property that the Respondent has gone to great measures to protect.
[71] The repeated and continuing findings of contempt warrant increased sanctions with a view to restoring the Applicant.
[72] This court has historically considered least restrictive sanctions, however, the Respondent’s ongoing and unrepentant defiance of orders made by this court justify a harsh sentence.
[73] The Respondent has taken no steps to purge his contempt. The fines imposed under the Contempt Order have not deterred him from contemptuous conduct, nor have they been punitive to the or restorative to the Applicant.
[74] This Court grants leave to issue a Writ of Temporary Seizure (Form 28C) against the property pursuant to r.31(6) of the Family Law Rules.
[75] The terms of the Writ of Temporary Seizure attached to the Applicant’s motion material provides that the Sheriff is directed to seize and hold the property now in the name of the Trust. It further directs the Sheriff to collect and to hold any income from the property until the writ is withdrawn or until further court order. This last term is a standard term on the form and is acceptable and suitable in the circumstances of this case as it is the Applicant undisputed evidence that the basement might be rented.
[76] However, notwithstanding the discretion afforded under r. 31(5)(d) and 31(12), this Court declines to set aside the transfer of the property to the Trust or to declare that transfer void, as requested by the Applicant.
[77] First, in light of the Writ of Temporary Seizure being granted, the purpose and practical utility of the requested relief may be largely moot.
[78] Second, I am of the view that this form of relief is not appropriately granted on an interim motion. Rather, it is relief of a final nature that should ordinarily be determined at trial or upon a final adjudication of the issues, if warranted.
[79] Finally, I cannot sufficiently connect the transfer of the property to the contempt for which I now find the Respondent to be in further contempt. The transfer occurred before the contempt hearing before Justice Sharma. It is evident that the Respondent failed to disclose this transfer when he was given the opportunity to provide viva voce evidence. Such conduct is unacceptable and demonstrates a disregard for, and disrespect of, the Court and its processes.
[80] While the Respondent should not be permitted to benefit from misleading the Court or withholding material information, the remedy sought, namely setting aside the transfer or declaring it void, is disproportionate to the relief properly available on this contempt motion. In my view, the Applicant's request reaches beyond what is necessary to restore on this contempt motion, pending a final determination. The Writ of Temporary Seizure adequately addresses the immediate concern.
Issue #3
[81] There is no dispute and, in fact, the Respondent conceded that there has been a triggering event that would allow the court to consider the working of r.1(8).
[82] The Respondent has not complied with various orders of this court, including but not limited to, the order of Justice Shore dated January 22, 2019, the order of Justice Sharma dated January 20, 2022, Contempt order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, my Order dated February 5, 2026, and the order of Justice Wassenaar dated March 17, 2026.
Issue #4
[83] Once a triggering event has been identified, the onus is on the non-complying party to show why it would be appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion in their favour by not sanctioning that party. This discretion should only be exercised in the non-compliant party’s favour in exceptional circumstances. The court’s decision as to whether or not to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party should take into account all relevant history of the litigation and, more specifically, the conduct of the non-complying party: K.M. v. J.R., 2024 ONSC 1338; Price v. Putman, 2018 ONCJ 86; C.J. v. E.J, 2021 ONSC 4853.
[84] This court will not exercise its discretion in favour of the Respondents by not sanctioning them under r. 1(8), or by ordering that r. 1(8) does not apply.
[85] First, the Respondents have not discharged their onus. Second, considering all the relevant history on, including non-compliance and contempt, the court can confidently find that this is not an exceptional circumstance for which discretion should be afforded.
Issue #5
[86] Turing now, to the appropriate remedy. Subrule 1(8) has been broadly applied. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, at paras. 49-52, the list of remedies is inclusive not exhaustive and stated: “[t]he reach of the remedial orders that can be made is governed not by the itemized list in that rule, but by the general and broad language of the chapeau that precedes it, which provides that ‘the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter’”.
[87] Further, in Bouchard, the Court noted at para. 50, that the rule is not confined to purely procedural remedies and said: “[s]tated simply, if the remedy ordered is found to be necessary to achieve the enforcement of the order being breached, that remedy is prima facie authorized by r. 1(8).
[88] On the contempt motion, I have granted leave to issue a Writ of Temporary Seizure. I have explained why I decline to set aside or declare the transfer of the property to the Trust void. I further expressed my reservation about making a vesting order at this interim stage. At the motion, I also expressed my concern regarding the Applicant's request that the Respondent and/or the Trust pay the Applicant monies owed for s. 7 arrears.
[89] The only other relief sought on this motion pertains to varying previously made final orders to provide that they apply both to the Respondent in his personal capacity and as trustee of the Trust and/or to the Trust.
[90] I have previously found that the Respondent, Rodgers, exercises control over and is the beneficiary of the Alter Ego Trust. The Alter Ego Trust and Mr. Rodgers are essentially one and the same.
[91] Given the Respondent's underhanded transfer of property from his name into the name of the Trust, I find that it is within the broad discretion afforded to me under r.1(8) to vary the final orders to include the Trust.
[92] The orders extending to the Trust relate to the payment of costs and penalties previously ordered on the contempt motion, together with accrued interest.
[93] Having regard to the history of this matter and the evidence before the court, as outlined above, I find that the relief sought is proportionate to the Respondents' conduct.
[94] There is a sufficient connection between the relief sought and the conduct at issue, as the costs and penalties owed by the Respondent ought properly to extend to the Trust he established for the purpose of defeating the obligations imposed by this court.
Costs
[95] The Applicant seeks her costs of this motion on a full indemnity basis in the amount of $14,250.07.
[96] I have reviewed submitted and found that the hourly rate and the time spent is reasonable having regard for the material prepared for the motion and attendance in court. The disbursements are also reasonable and relevant to the issues to be determined.
[97] The Applicant was not completely successful in obtaining all of the relief sought in her notice of motion. Nevertheless, she should be entitled to significant costs given the conduct of the Respondent.
[98] I have reviewed all the material prepared for this motion and considered the factors set out in r.24 of the Family Law Rules. I have considered the fundamental purposes set out in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867.
[99] I find that a fair, reasonable, and proportionate cost award is $13,000, payable by the Respondents within 30 days.
Orders
[100] For the reasons set out above, this court orders as follows:
Pursuant to rules 10(5) and 1(8.4) of the Family Law Rules, the Applicant is permitted to proceed to an uncontested trial which may proceed on filing affidavit evidence.
The Respondent, Ronald Rodgers and/or the Respondent, Ronald Charles Rodgers Alter Ego Trust are hereby found in contempt of the Order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, the Order of Justice Sah dated February 5, 20026, and the Order of Justice Wassenaar dated March 17, 2026.
The Respondent, Ronald Rodgers and/or the Respondent, Ronald Charles Rodgers Alter Ego Trust are found to be non-compliant and in breach of the Order of Justice Shore dated January 22, 2019, the Order of Justice Sharma dated January 20, 2022, Contempt order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, Order of Justice Sah dated February 5, 2026, and the Order of Justice Wassenaar dated March 17, 2026.
The Final Order of Justice Sharma dated September 15, 2022, shall be amended as follows:
(a) The Respondent, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of the Trust, and the Trust shall pay to the Applicant a penalty in the amount of $10,000 plus interest totalling $1,125.21 as of July 15, 2026.
(b) The Respondent, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of the Trust, and the Trust shall pay an additional penalty to the Applicant in the amount of $500 per day effective as of September 25, 2022, and for each day until the relief in paragraph 4(a) above is complied with.
(c) The Respondent, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of the Trust, and the Trust shall pay costs to the Applicant in the amount of $57,744.16 plus interest totalling $6,497.06 as of July 15, 2026.
The Final Order of Justice Myers dated November 12, 2024, shall be varied to provide that the Respondent, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of the Trust, and the Trust shall pay costs to the Applicant in the amount of $19,105.00 plus interest totalling $1,821.52 as of July 15, 2026.
The Final Order of Justice Paisley dated September 19, 2019, shall be varied to provide that the Respondent, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of the Trust, and the Trust shall pay costs to the Applicant in the amount of $2,195.35 plus interest totalling $444.06 as of July 15, 2026.
Leave is granted to issue a Writ of Temporary Seizure, attached hereto as Schedule “A”, directing the sheriff to take possession of and hold the property known municipally as 33 Buckley Crescent, Toronto, Ontario, M9R 3K4 (LT 60, PL 6075; S/T EB239494; ETOBICOKE; CITY OF TORONTO) (the “Buckley Property”) and any income from the Buckley Property until the Writ is withdrawn or the Court Orders otherwise.
The Respondent, Ronald Rodgers and/or the Respondent, Ronald Charles Rodgers Alter Ego Trust, shall pay, within 30 days, the Applicant total costs of $13,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.
Date: August 11, 2026 K. SAH J.