CITATION: Lamourie v. Clarke, 2026 ONSC 4523
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00000266-0000 (Kingston)
DATE: 20260805
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
STEPHEN LAMOURIE AND ANNE ELIZABETH BROWN
Applicants
– and –
JASON CLARKE AND JODY CLARKE
Respondents
Matthew Holmberg and Sean Davidson, for the applicants
C. Ryan Bodnar, for the respondents
HEARD at Kingston: 30April 2026
mew j.
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] This application concerns a right-of-way easement running to the shore of Mississippi Lake, and whether it permits the respondents to keep a private dock at its terminus. I find that it does not: the easement is limited to pedestrian passage to the lake, the respondents’ dock overburdens it and interferes with the applicants’ riparian rights, and the respondents must remove it.
[2] Stephen Lamourie and Anne Brown own abutting waterfront properties on Mississippi Lake, Lanark County, Ontario (the “L5 Property” and “L2 Property” respectively).
[3] Jason and Jody Clarke own a non-waterfront backlot property (the “L3 Property”) immediately behind the Brown L2 Property. Anne Brown also owns a second backlot property (the “L4 Property”) adjacent to the Clarkes’ L3 Property.
[4] The applicants’ properties extend to the water’s edge. No Crown land reserve or road allowance separates them from the lake.
[5] On 26 August 2003, an easement was registered essentially along the boundary line between the L2 and L5 Properties, down to the water’s edge. It runs approximately 35 metres long and four metres wide, and is shared between the L3 and L4 Properties (both backlots): the Clarkes and the Browns (as L4 owners) are therefore co-holders of the same right.
[6] The easement, registered as Instrument No. LC8271, states:
Easement for purposes of a Right-of-Way in perpetuity for passage and re-passage of persons, over, along and upon said Parts 1 and 2 Plan 27R-7981 for lake access.
[7] The easement was created during the subdivision’s planning phase to formalise long-standing pedestrian access to the lake. The subdivision separately provides a “Common Use Recreation Area”, about 250 metres away, for launching and removing marine vessels.
The Dispute
[8] Since purchasing the L3 Property for $250,000 in October 2016, the Clarkes have installed, each spring, a large L-shaped pole dock (over 20 square metres) with a ramp at the terminus of the easement, together with two personal watercraft lifts. They have outfitted the dock with patio furniture and tiki umbrellas, and used it to accommodate a large pontoon boat and two personal watercraft. The applicants contend that this converts what was a transitory pedestrian right of way into a private waterfront entertaining area.
[9] The respondents have also stored items (lawn furniture, storage cabinets, equipment) on the easement itself during the off-season, and for most years placed the dismantled dock on the easement over winter. On cross-examination, the respondents conceded that storing items on the easement was improper, as was the ramp extending from the dock onto the easement. They maintain, however, that they are entitled to install the dock at the water’s edge.
[10] Since the spring of 2025, the Clarkes have lived in a permanent waterfront residence elsewhere on Mississippi Lake (which has its own dock) and have rented out the L3 Property. In May 2025, they listed the L3 Property for sale, describing it as having “private docking” – a description they later removed because of this litigation.
The Evidence
[11] The applicants maintain that, prior to the Clarkes’ purchase of the L3 Property, no dock had been installed at the terminus of the easement. John Turpie, Jr., the son of the previous L3 owners, provided an affidavit to that effect. He disputes that it was ever represented to Mr. Wilson – the realtor who acted for the Turpies on the sale to the Clarkes and, subsequently, for the Clarkes when they listed their property for sale in 2025 – that a dock existed or was permitted.
[12] Jeff Wilson’s affidavit states that the dock in issue has existed as long as he can remember, and that a dock stood in the same location when he sold the L3 Property to the Clarkes.
[13] Anne Brown says her family installed and removed their own seasonal dock for years at the southern edge of the L2 Property, where it meets the northern side of the easement, and that a dock stood in that position when the respondents bought the L3 Property in 2016.
[14] When the respondents installed a dock at or over the end of the easement for the first time, in the spring of 2017, Anne Brown says the position of the Clarkes’ L-shaped dock and lifts made it difficult, if not impossible, for her to put her own dock back where it had stood in previous years.
[15] The applicants say they have objected to the seasonal installation of the Clarkes’ dock continuously since 2017. The Clarkes, by contrast, say they maintained the dock without issue from 2017 until 2025, when the dispute arose over the “private docking” description in the property listing.
[16] The Clarkes relocated rocks previously under their dock to the other side of the easement, on the L5 Property – creating what Mr. Lamourie describes as an obstruction for anyone using the other half of the easement to reach the water.
[17] The Clarkes maintain that they use the easement to get to the water, and that nothing prohibits them from having a dock in the water.
[18] The applicants’ photographs clearly show the Clarkes’ dock extending over the land, and a ramp where the easement meets the water that facilitates access from the easement to the dock.
[19] The applicants concede that the exact location of the water’s edge is, as counsel candidly put it, a “moving target” that can change. They maintain, however, that for most of the summer the dock sits well onto the land, sometimes by several feet. The respondents point out that no survey establishes where private property ends and Crown land begins.
Issues
[20] The factual and legal issues raised by the parties cluster around five main questions, namely:
a. The scope of the easement and, in particular, whether “lake access” means pedestrian passage only, or includes docking-related activity;
b. Physical location and use: Is the Clarke dock on the easement, partly on the easement, or in the water beyond it, and what follows from each characterisation;
c. The effect on others’ rights: Does the dock and related use interfere with the shared easement rights of the L4 owner or the riparian rights of the applicants;
d. The regulatory framework, and in particular, whether the Public Lands Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.43 and related regulations permit the installation of the dock, and whether Ministry of Natural Resources (“Ministry”) or conservation authority involvement is necessary or sufficient; and
e. Equitable and discretionary considerations raised by the parties, including whether estoppel, delay, reliance, historical use, clean hands or alternative regulatory avenues affect the availability of the declaratory or injunctive relief sought by the applicants.
Preliminary Issue: Lamourie Affidavit
[21] Stephen Lamourie provided an affidavit dated 1 October 2025 in support of the application.
[22] As a preliminary issue, the respondents objected to 29 paragraphs of the Lamourie affidavit. Their principal objections are:
a. Mr. Lamourie’s failure to identify the source of some of the information that he attested to;
b. The presentation of what, in substance, amounts to opinion evidence, as fact evidence; and
c. Extensive reliance on hearsay evidence.
[23] For context, the applicants served the disputed affidavit shortly after Mr. Lamourie affirmed it, and he was cross-examined on 12 March 2026. The respondents did not raise their objection until after they delivered their factum, on 21 April 2026.
[24] Nevertheless, I agree that a number of paragraphs in the Lamourie affidavit recite facts and then stray into narrative that interprets or puts a particular gloss on them. Mr. Lamourie also asserts beliefs, or provides information outwith his personal knowledge, without identifying its source.
[25] The parties could easily have consumed the whole half-day set aside for the application arguing about whether to strike portions of the Lamourie affidavit. Rather than do that, I told counsel I was alert to the respondents’ concerns and would (and have) give less – in some cases no – weight to the evidence in issue. In the interests of efficiency, however, I declined to rake through the affidavit paragraph by paragraph to strike offending portions.
Analysis
Scope of the Easement
[26] The applicants rely on the language of the easement, which grants a “Right-of-Way in perpetuity for passage and re-passage of persons, over, along and upon [the easement] for lake access”. In their submission, this wording frames the easement as a right of transit, not a right of occupation or docking. The applicants also emphasise the subdivision history: the subdivision agreement, registered in 2002, distinguished between a nearby “Common Use Recreation Area” – where launching or removing marine vessels was contemplated – and the subject easement, created at around the same time and intended, they say, as pedestrian lake access for the backlot properties.
[27] The respondents emphasise the circumstances of their 2016 purchase. They say the property’s advertising referred to waterfront access and docking, and rely on the surrounding circumstances – listing materials, photographs, and realtor evidence – to show that dock use formed part of the factual context in which they acquired the property.
[28] The applicants characterise the dock and its use as more analogous to an over-water deck or private waterfront space than to transitory lake access. They point to the regular use of a ramp extending onto the easement, and to the previous use of the easement to store lawn furniture, storage cabinets, equipment and, in the off-season, the dock itself. On cross-examination, the respondents conceded that items should not be stored on the easement without consent, and indicated they would no longer do so. The respondents nonetheless distinguish between items placed on the easement and items placed in the water; as for the former, they say such items had previously been placed there with consent.
[29] An easement grants such ancillary rights as are reasonably necessary to its use and enjoyment, as contemplated by the grantor: MacKenzie v. Matthews (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 21 (C.A.), 1999 CanLII 19931 (ON CA), at para. 8. As a general rule, the user of a right of way cannot enlarge the burden on the servient tenement by using it for a purpose different from that for which it was created: MacKenzie, at para. 11.
[30] The applicants argue that installing a dock at the water’s edge overburdens the easement in two ways. First, it enlarges the burden beyond that for which the easement was created. Second, the dock, the stored items, the pontoon boat, the personal watercraft, and the relocated rocks have impeded the co-easement recipient’s ability to access the water as before. The dock may not completely prevent access from every point, but it materially impedes convenient access.
[31] Whether a particular use of a right of way is reasonable requires “a fact heavy inquiry considering the grant’s language and the circumstances”: Fisher v. Saade, 2021 ONSC 1241, at para. 15, citing Fallowfield v. Bourgault (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), 235 D.L.R. (4th) 263, 2003 CanLII 4266 (ON CA).
[32] In Kendrick v. Martin (2012), 23 R.P.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), 2012 ONCA 711, an easement provided “a right of way for persons, animals and vehicles”. The easement ran from the appellant’s property, across the respondent’s property, to the edge of a lake. After obtaining a permit from the local conservation authority, the appellants built a pole dock on the lake bed at the water’s edge where the right of way ended, with a set of retractable steps attached to its end. The dock itself was not attached to the land, but could be lowered to the shore to permit access from the right of way. The Court of Appeal concluded that the words of the grant were not confined to a particular use; rather, the grant made the right of way available for use by persons, animals and vehicles. The Court of Appeal further found that accessing the pole dock from the shoreline where the right of way ended did not overburden the use of the right of way. The Court stated, at para. 12:
What the user does immediately after leaving the right of way cannot be said to affect the use made of the right of way at all. Accessing the dock does not extend the right of way beyond the shoreline. This is so regardless of the proper interpretation of the use provided by the grant of right of way.
[33] In Fisher v. Saade, the Court held that an easement providing a landlocked property with access to the water did not allow for the creation of a waterfront property where none existed. That, in effect, is what the applicants argue the respondents have done here.
[34] MacKenzie is different: there, the placement of a dock was a reasonably necessary ancillary use of the right of way because the easement was specifically intended to give island owners access to their properties by boat, making the installation and maintenance of a dock implicit in the grant. No such need for a dock exists in the present case.
[35] The circumstances in Kendrick are closer to the present case. However, the easement in Kendrick provided “a right of way for persons, animals and vehicles along and over” the subject parcels of land. The easement in the present case provides for “passage and re-passage of persons, over, along and upon [the subject lands] for lake access”. The applicants argue that the wording of the subject easement is much more limited than that in Kendrick. They say that it provides a pedestrian access route to the lake – nothing more. Consistent with their position that their dock sits all, or substantially all, in the water rather than on the easement, the respondents argue that any concerns about its location fall within the authority of the Ministry of Natural Resources or the conservation authority, not this application.
[36] Nothing in Kendrick suggests that any issue was raised in that case about the dock interfering with the riparian rights, or the use and enjoyment, of the servient tenements. Nor was the easement there shared between two dominant tenements. And the local conservation authority had approved the dock’s placement.
[37] In the present case, the applicant Anne Brown owns the L4 Property, one of the two backlot properties (the dominant tenements) that benefit from the easement. Together with the applicant Stephen Lamourie, she also owns one of the abutting waterfront properties (a servient tenement) over which the easement runs.
[38] Bearing in mind Sharpe J.A.’s admonition in MacKenzie that what constitutes an unreasonable demand upon an easement depends on both the proper construction of the instrument creating it and the factual circumstances, I find that the present case is readily distinguishable from Kendrick. Whereas in Kendrick the Court of Appeal found that the easement’s general use was available to persons, animals and vehicles, the subject easement here relates only to the passage and re-passage of persons for lake access. I agree with the applicants that the subject easement was intended for transitory pedestrian access to the lake. That understanding is reinforced by the nearby common use recreation area, implemented concurrently with the registration of the subject easement, which offers a facility for launching boats onto the lake.
[39] The respondents’ installation of a dock, and their piling of rocks at the base of the easement, has inevitably affected the co-easement recipients’ access to the water. Although the respondents now appear to concede that they cannot block the easement or store items on the right of way, they maintain a right to install their dock at the base of the easement and out over the water, so long as it does not extend onto the easement itself. Setting aside one distinguishing feature of Kendrick – that the dock there had been approved by the conservation authority – the photographs of the dock alone show how it would limit the co-easement recipients’ access to the water and enjoyment of the easement.
[40] I am satisfied that the respondents’ installation of a dock, and their use of the easement to store items, overburdens the subject easement – even without considering the applicants’ riparian rights, the Public Lands Act, or the regulatory requirements of the conservation authority.
[41] Finally, I agree with the applicants that the respondents’ position, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow any non-owner to place unlimited docks in front of others’ waterfront properties, simply because those docks fell beyond the scope of the easement they adjoin – setting aside any regulatory issues with the Ministry or the conservation authority.
[42] In conclusion on this issue, I find that the right of way conferred by the easement extends to the water’s edge and enures to the use and benefit of the L3 and L4 properties for the purpose of pedestrian traffic to Mississippi Lake. It follows that neither owner of the dominant tenements (the L3 and L4 properties) may occupy the right of way for the purposes of occupation, storage, or the placement of objects.
[43] I further find that, as presently configured and used, the respondents’ dock overburdens the easement and interferes with Ms. Brown’s use and enjoyment of it as L4 owner.
Riparian Rights
[44] The applicants argue that, as owners of waterfront lands, they possess riparian rights, including access to navigable waters from the frontage of their properties. They say the respondents’ dock, related watercraft, and placement of rocks interfere with those rights by obstructing access from portions of their shoreline.
[45] In Browne v. Meunier (2022), 162 O.R. (3d) 71, 2022 ONSC 3118, varied on other grounds, 2023 ONCA 223, a boathouse situated about 50 feet from, and in front of, the plaintiffs’ shoreline was held to interfere with their riparian right to access the water. Hackland J. noted that no one may erect a structure on the shore, or otherwise permanently obstruct a riparian owner’s right of access over the shoal waters of the lake to the deeper waters where navigation practically begins. That right of access exists in a direct line from every point along the whole frontage of the riparian owner’s land on the water.
[46] The dock, and the watercraft moored alongside the dock, sit immediately in front of the applicants’ property. It matters not whether they sit in front of the property encumbered by the easement or in front of the unencumbered portions of the applicants’ property.
[47] In Day v. Valade, 2017 NSSC 175, neighbours placed a wharf and dock that crossed the line created by extending the common property boundary into a lake. The court held that this impeded the applicants’ riparian right of access if it obstructed them from placing a boat in the lake at any point along their shoreline and travelling directly out from the shore to a depth of at least three feet. Wood J. (at para. 30) was satisfied that “the riparian right of access entitles the land owner to get to navigable waters from every point on their shoreline without having to travel around a manmade obstruction”.
[48] The respondents argue that, without a dock, their use of the easement to access the water would still involve at least a temporary interference with the applicants’ shoreline. But that is not what is in issue here. The dock is what Wood J. described as “a manmade obstruction” – quite different from the respondents entering the water from the shoreline, or even launching a canoe or swimming out to a boat temporarily anchored in the lake. The respondents’ dock, as presently located and configured, violates the applicants’ riparian rights and interferes with their ability to reach navigable waters from their properties.
[49] The respondents advance a related submission: that by voluntarily granting the easement over their own land, the applicants limited their own riparian rights over the encumbered strip, and cannot now complain that the respondents’ use of that same strip interferes with rights they no longer hold in unqualified form. This has some force. The applicants’ grant of an easement for “passage and re-passage of persons … for lake access” necessarily limits their own use and enjoyment of the four-metre strip to the same extent: neither Mr. Lamourie nor Ms. Brown could lawfully erect a private dock of their own at the terminus of the easement, since doing so would be just as inconsistent with the pedestrian, transitory character of the right they granted as it is when done by the respondents.
[50] That, however, is the full extent of what the applicants gave up. By granting a right of passage over part of their shoreline, they did not surrender their riparian right to an unobstructed line of access to navigable water at that location, still less agree to tolerate a permanent structure that even they could not lawfully install there themselves. If accepted, the respondents’ submission would mean that a riparian owner forfeits riparian rights over any part of the shoreline crossed by an easement, however narrow its terms. Nothing in the case law placed before me supports so broad a proposition, and it is inconsistent with the restrictive, pedestrian-only character I have found this easement to have.
[51] I should add a point of clarification arising from the evidence. In 2025, Ms. Brown positioned a second, smaller dock immediately beside the respondents’ dock, in addition to her own longstanding dock further to the north. The respondents characterise this as a provocative and retaliatory act, coinciding with the breakdown in relations caused by the 2025 listing, rather than a continuation of past practice, and I am prepared to accept that characterisation. Whatever view is taken of that conduct, addressed further below, it forms no part of my conclusion on riparian interference. My finding that the respondents’ dock, watercraft and rocks interfere with the applicants’ riparian rights rests on the effect of those objects alone; it does not depend on, and is not reinforced by, whatever separate obstruction Ms. Brown’s 2025 dock may have created. I have left that dock out of account in reaching my conclusions on interference.
Regulatory Authorisation
[52] The applicants say that the lakebed is Crown land, and that s. 21.1 of the Public Lands Act and O. Reg. 161/17 govern the installation of docks on public land. In their submission, the respondents are neither owners nor occupiers of the adjacent waterfront properties and are therefore not authorised to install a waterfront structure. They also say that, even if the respondents were otherwise authorised, they have not obtained the necessary letter of clearance from the conservation authority.
[53] The respondents submit that the applicants have not identified any specific conservation authority regulation that is being contravened. The record shows that both sides have communicated with the Ministry or the conservation authority, without either agency requiring the Clarkes to obtain a permit or remove the dock. Because no evidence shows that the respondents are authorised to place their dock where and as it presently sits, I infer that they are not. I agree with the respondents, however, that granting what the applicants seek would require the court to enforce a regulatory scheme the responsible agencies have not themselves invoked. I am not satisfied that the record is complete enough to support such a determination, nor have I had the benefit of input from either the Ministry or the conservation authority.
[54] The respondents also rely on the principle that the availability of an alternative means of resolving a dispute, or protecting a right, is itself a reason for a court to decline to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory or injunctive relief: Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165, at para. 81. I accept the principle but do not think it assists the respondents. The declarations I am prepared to make do not resolve, and are not dependent on the resolution of, any question reserved to the Ministry or the conservation authority; they rest on the scope of a private easement and the applicants’ riparian rights, both squarely matters for this court. Nor does the injunction that follows foreclose the regulatory route the respondents say remains open to them. As set out below, the injunction is expressly subject to the respondents obtaining authorisation from the Ministry of Natural Resources, or other competent regulatory authority, to install a dock at this location; should such authorisation be granted, the injunction accommodates it without further order of this court. The relief granted therefore respects, rather than displaces, the regulatory scheme the respondents say ought to be left to operate.
[55] Regardless, given my findings on the nature and extent of the easement and the applicants’ riparian rights, I need not determine the effect, if any, of the Public Lands Act or the conservation authority’s requirements.
Estoppel and Longstanding Acceptance
[56] The respondents advance a broader equitable argument based on the parties’ historical conduct. They say everyone operated for years on the understanding that a dock was permissible, that the property was bought and sold on that basis, and that it would be unfair to reverse course after the respondents relied on that understanding when purchasing the property.
[57] Part of the difficulty with that argument is that the parties dispute what the respondents were told when they acquired the property. John Turpie Jr., the son of the previous L3 owners, challenges the assertion that a dock had ever been installed at the terminus of the easement by the previous owners of L3. He also disputes that it was represented to Mr. Wilson – the realtor who acted on the sale to the Clarkes, and subsequently for the Clarkes when they relisted the property in 2025 – that a dock existed or was permitted. Indeed, Mr. Turpie states that the property would have been listed for a considerably higher price had it carried the right to a private dock.
[58] The applicants were, of course, not parties to the Turpie/Clarke sale. Furthermore, any alleged representations by Ms. Brown could not bind Mr. Lamourie, the co-easement holder. Nor could mere acquiescence, if there was any, create a permanent legal right. For an estoppel to arise, both parties must be of a like mind: Ryan v. Moore, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53, 2005 SCC 38, at paras. 61 and 62; Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc. v. Romandale Farms Limited (2021), 32 R.P.R. (6th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), 2021 ONCA 201, at para. 354.
Clean Hands, Delay and Related Discretionary Considerations
[59] The respondents submit that the applicants do not come to this court with clean hands and that this should lead the court to decline to exercise its discretion to grant relief. They point to two matters: first, that before commencing this application, Mr. Lamourie and Ms. Brown’s husband removed the respondents’ dock on two occasions without the respondents’ consent, desisting only after police were called; and second, Ms. Brown’s positioning, in 2025, of a second dock immediately beside the respondents’ dock, which was likely a provocative response to the deteriorating relations between the parties.
[60] I do not accept that this conduct disentitles the applicants to the relief sought. Their claim rests principally on the proper construction of a registered easement and on riparian rights that are an incident of their ownership of waterfront land: legal, rather than equitable, rights. The maxim that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands has no application to a declaration of an existing legal right, and only limited application to the injunctive relief that follows from it. Even in relation to an injunction, the maxim bars relief only where the applicant’s own misconduct bears an immediate and necessary relation to the very right asserted; general bad behaviour in the course of a dispute is not enough. In any event, the respondents’ submission lacks mutuality: the applicants’ self-help, however improper, was a reaction to what they maintained was a structure installed without right on or immediately adjacent to their own land – a position I have now substantially accepted – and not conduct calculated to secure any advantage beyond vindication of that position. None of this is to condone self-help, and had the applicants sought an interim order restraining reinstallation of the dock pending this application, their conduct might well have told against them on such a motion. It does not, however, disentitle them to the final declaratory and injunctive relief reflecting the rights I have found them to have.
[61] The respondents also point to the absence of any objection to the dock, other than in words, before 2025, and suggest the applicants delayed unreasonably in bringing this application, some eight years after the dock was first installed. The evidence on this point is not one-sided: the applicants say they objected from the outset in 2017, while the respondents say the relationship was untroubled until the 2025 listing. I need not resolve that conflict. Even accepting the respondents’ account, delay of this kind does not bar a declaration of the parties’ rights under a registered easement, which runs with the land and remains enforceable notwithstanding a period of quiescence, particularly where nothing suggests that the respondents changed their position in reliance on the applicants’ inaction, beyond what I have already addressed under estoppel above. Delay, whether of eight years or otherwise, does not provide an independent basis to withhold the relief sought.
Relief Sought
[62] The respondents say the applicants have advanced no basis for injunctive, as opposed to purely declaratory, relief. I disagree. A declaration alone would settle the scope of the easement and the parties’ rights as a matter of law but would carry no mechanism of enforcement. Given the history of this dispute – the respondents’ reinstallation of the dock and related structures each spring since 2017 notwithstanding the applicants’ objections, and their stated intention to continue doing so – I am satisfied that a bare declaration would be unlikely to bring the dispute to an end, and that injunctive relief is necessary to give the applicants’ rights practical effect.
[63] In light of my findings, I am satisfied that the respondents are not entitled to install a dock abutting, or immediately adjacent to, the end of the shared easement. The applicants are therefore entitled to the following relief:
a. A declaration that the easement in the nature of a right of way registered on title to the applicants’ properties is for the purpose of pedestrian access to Mississippi Lake, which right of transit only is enjoyed in common between Lots 3 and 4 of Plan 27M-6, as filed with the Land Titles Office for the Land Titles Division of Lanark;
b. A declaration that the respondents are not permitted to occupy the right of way through placement and/or storage of objects upon the subject lands, including the placement of a dock attaching to, or immediately adjacent to, or otherwise interfering with the applicants’ riparian rights;
c. A permanent injunction preventing the respondents from using the right of way for the purposes of occupation, storage, and/or the placement of objects, including a dock at the terminus of the right of way, unless expressly authorised by the Ministry of Natural Resources (or other competent regulatory authority) to do so.
[64] The applicants also ask for an order requiring the respondents to remove, immediately and at their own expense, any dock installed at the terminus of the right of way in future – failing which the applicants would be permitted to do so themselves. I decline to make such an order. If the respondents breach the injunction I have ordered, the applicants are at liberty to seek further remedies as the circumstances may warrant.
[65] The parties have agreed that the successful parties will receive costs of $20,000.
Graeme Mew J.
Date: 5 August 2026
CITATION: Lamourie v. Clarke, 2026 ONSC 4523
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00000266-0000 (Kingston)
DATE: 20260805
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
STEPHEN LAMOURIE AND ANNE ELIZABETH BROWN
Applicants
– and –
JASON CLARKE AND JODY CLARKE
Respondents
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mew J.
Date: 5 August 2026