CITATION: R. v. Jones, 2026 ONSC 4513
COURT FILE NO.: 9055/24
DATE: 2026-08-25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
T. Wilson/A. Allen, Counsels
for the Crown
- and -
STEVEN JONES
A. Furgiuele, Counsel for the Defendant
Defendant
HEARD: August 05, 2026
VARPIO J.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
BACKGROUND
[1] On or about September 1, 2023, Mr. Steven Jones travelled to Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario from Toronto by bus. He was abusing crystal methamphetamines and was suffering from an apparent mental health crisis. While in Sault Ste. Marie, Mr. Jones stayed with his father and, on September 6, 2023, he fell into the St. Mary’s River and decided to swim to the United States. He was ultimately apprehended in that country and returned to Canada on September 7, 2023. Upon being released at the border, he walked over to Ms. Taylor Marshall’s apartment which was located near the border. He did not know Ms. Marshall. He broke into her apartment and stabbed her with a screwdriver over 100 times. She died an awful death.
[2] Mr. Jones left the apartment and proceeded to the Sault Ste. Marie boardwalk where he happened upon Mr. Liam Frenette, an unsuspecting stranger. Mr. Jones began stabbing Mr. Frenette. Fortunately, Mr. Frenette was able to ward off the attack.
[3] Mr. Jones then walked towards the Station Mall (which is located beside the boardwalk) where he was detained by police.
[4] Mr. Jones was arrested for the attempted murder of Mr. Frenette. He was later arrested for murder when Ms. Marshall’s body was discovered. He has been in custody since September 7, 2023.
[5] On January 05, 2026, Mr. Jones commenced a judge-alone trial before me and, part-way through the trial, he pleaded guilty to attempted murder and second-degree murder.
[6] On sentencing, the Crown and Mr. Jones made a joint submission for a life sentence with no chance of parole for 15 years on the count of second-degree murder, and 14 years (minus time served) for the count of attempted murder.
[7] For the following reasons, I accept that joint position.
THE VICTIMS
[8] Ms. Taylor Marshall was a young woman whose life tragically ended on September 7, 2023. She was living with her boyfriend in an apartment. On the day she was murdered, she had interviewed for a job at a fitness centre. She was clearly loved by her family, and she shared many strong relationships with them. The impact of losing a young person whose adult life was just beginning cannot be overstated.
[9] Numerous victim impact statements (“VIS”) were filed by her family that described Ms. Marshall as a young woman who was moving forward, hoping to achieve all the normal hallmarks of a happy existence: a good job, a family, and fulfillment. She was described as being a true friend, feisty, and full of life. Like all people, she faced adversity in her life and she had the courage to overcome the issues she faced.
[10] In short, she appeared to be the kind of young woman any parent, family member, or friend would be proud of.
[11] Ms. Marshall’s loss has affected her family profoundly, as was evidenced by the VIS’s. Her family members all describe the expected emotions associated with such a tragic event: anger, fear, sadness, and even depression.
[12] The only way to describe the Marshalls’ loss is to say that it is tragic. Its impact is as awful as any pain I can imagine.
[13] For his part, Mr. Frenette filed a VIS. He described both the serious physical and psychological effects that the incident has had upon him. Because Mr. Frenette did not wish to have his VIS read into the record, I will not specify the issues he faces so as to respect his privacy. With that said, the impact of the offence has been significant upon him.
THE OFFENDER
[14] Mr. Jones is 27 years old. He is an Indigenous man. Both of his parents are/were Indigenous. His family has suffered from substance abuse, violence, and the like. Mr. Jones was taken into foster care when he was three or four. His ancestors attended residential school. Mr. Jones has been poor all his life.
[15] During his teenage years, Mr. Jones would get into fights. He became a father when he was 17-years old.
[16] Mr. Jones believes that he has ADHD as well as PTSD. He began to self-medicate in his teenage years. He used marijuana, crack cocaine, MDMA and other substances. He became an addict. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Jones would experience bouts of homelessness as he bounced from one domicile to another.
[17] Prior to September 7, 2023, Mr. Jones was using crystal methamphetamine and was drinking. On or about September 1, 2023, Mr. Jones travelled to Sault Ste. Marie to visit his father, who lives in the area. He was sleep deprived and was, to use his words, in a “bad way”. Mr. Jones believes that, when he was stopped at the border, he was suffering from sleep deprivation, psychosis, or schizophrenia. He was paranoid at the time he was arrested, and he cannot remember much of what happened.
[18] Mr. Jones has no criminal record.
[19] During his allocution, Mr. Jones apologized to the victims and their families. He accepted responsibility for his actions, stating that “prison is what I deserve, maybe worse”.
THE RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
Joint Positions
[20] A joint submission must be adhered to unless it brings the administration of justice into disrepute or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest. In R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, the Supreme Court of Canada stated at paras. 32 to 34:
Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal are helpful in this regard.
In Druken, at para. 29, the court held that a joint submission will bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest if, despite the public interest considerations that support imposing it, it is so "markedly out of line with the expectations of reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the case that they would view it as a break down in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system". And, as stated by the same court in R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19, at para. 56 (CanLII), when assessing a joint submission, trial judges should "avoid rendering a decision that causes an informed and reasonable public to lose confidence in the institution of the courts".
In my view, these powerful statements capture the essence of the public interest test developed by the Martin Committee. They emphasize that a joint submission should not be rejected lightly, a conclusion with which I agree. Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. This is an undeniably high threshold - and for good reason, as I shall explain.
Murder
[21] Murder imports a mandatory life sentence. Given that life sentence, I am required to impose a period of parole ineligibility. The Supreme Court of Canada outlined the analysis to undertaken when so doing in R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 227 where, at para. 27, it stated:
In my opinion, a more appropriate standard, which would better reflect the intentions of Parliament, can be stated in this manner: as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be "unusual", although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
[22] The Court of Appeal for Ontario described these factors in R. v. Boukhalfa, 2017 ONCA 660, Watt J.A. summarized these factors at para. 198 of his judgment when he stated:
In determining the period of parole ineligibility, the trial judge was required to take into account four factors:
i. the nature of the offence;
ii. the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence;
iii. the character of the accused; and
iv. the parole eligibility recommendations of the jury.
Prior paragraphs of these reasons have adequately described the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission. Nothing will be gained by their repetition. However, something should be recorded about the appellant's character and the jury's recommendations about parole eligibility.
[23] In R. v. Reid, (2003), 2003 CanLII 14779 (ON CA), 65 O.R. (3d) 723 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced a sentence of parole ineligibility from 15 years to 12 years in a situation where the offender struck another man in the head with a hammer 50 times. The Court of Appeal found that the sentence did not reflect the offender’s otherwise good character.
[24] In Boukahlfa, the offender stabbed his mother to death. He suffered from mental health issues, as did his mother. He was 26 years old at the time of the offence and had a criminal record that included weapons offences. Mr. Boukahlfa spent considerable time in children’s services growing up, and he was trying to turn his life around by playing rugby and by engaging in otherwise pro-social activities. He stabbed his mother 25 times, and hit her with a baseball bat. A 15-year period of parole ineligibility was upheld on appeal.
[25] In R. v. Dahl, 2012 ONCA 433, the offender was a young man who suffered from mental health issues. His father travelled from Halifax to London to help Mr. Dahl’s sister with a painful cancer treatment. His father also wanted to check in on Mr. Dahl. Mr. Dahl stabbed his father to death during the visit, inflicting over 50 knife wounds to his father. A 15-year period of parole ineligibility was upheld on appeal.
[26] In R. v. Marshall, 2025 ONCA 638, the offender broke into an 82-year old’s apartment and murdered her in a violent and brutal fashion. The pathologist stated that the victim died as a result of multiple traumatic and violent blunt force injuries to the head and upper body. The trial judge held that an 18-year period of parole ineligibility was appropriate but reduced that period of parole ineligibility by 27 months to reflect pre-trial conditions. The judge considered the offender’s Gladue factors, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.
[27] In R. v. Laforme, 2022 ONCA 395, an Indigenous offender with an extensive criminal record received a 16-year period of parole ineligibility for stabbing an 82-year old woman to death.
[28] In R. v. Baig, 2019 ONSC 2713, the offender murdered his pregnant wife by stabbing her in the head and neck area 14 times, and in the arm 3 times. He pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Mr. Baig was 27 years old and had no criminal record. He received a 17-year period of parole ineligibility.
[29] In R. v. Daley, 2021 ONSC 7678, the offender was found guilty of murdering two friends who were also his drug dealers. He stabbed the men 73 times in various areas of their bodies. Mr. Daley suffered from numerous mental health conditions. The court sentenced the offender to 18 years of parole ineligibility on each count.
Attempted Murder
[30] Sentences for attempted murder reflect the seriousness of the offence and the resultant level of moral blameworthiness. In R. v. Forcillo, 2018 ONCA 402, the offender was found guilty of attempted murder in a shooting that occurred when he was a police officer and the victim was using public transit. After trial, in a notorious verdict, the offender was found guilty of attempted murder, even though the victim died as a result of the shooting. At para. 129 of the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision, the court stated:
The moral blameworthiness of attempted murder is always very high. To be convicted of this offence, an accused must have a specific intention to kill the victim: R. v. Ancio, 1984 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225, [1984] S.C.J. No. 12, at pp. 248-49 S.C.R. In R. v. Logan, 1990 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, the Supreme Court considered the fault requirement for attempted murder in the context of party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code. Chief Justice Lamer characterized attempted murder in the following way, at p. 743 S.C.R.:
Quite simply, an attempted murderer is, if caught and convicted, a "lucky murderer."
The stigma associated with a conviction for attempted murder is the same as it is for murder. Such a conviction reveals that although no death ensued from the actions of the accused, the intent to kill was still present in his or her mind. The attempted murderer is no less a killer than a murderer: he may be lucky -- the ambulance arrived early, or some other fortuitous circumstance -- but he still has the same killer instinct. Secondly, while a conviction for attempted murder does not automatically result in a life sentence, the offence is punishable by life and the usual penalty is very severe. [emphasis in original]
[31] In R. v. Jin, 2025 ONSC 2941, two women were going about their daily business on public transit in Toronto when the offender came up to them and stabbed them repeatedly. One woman died, and the other suffered serious injuries, some of them permanent. The offender had no criminal record but was “suffering from a major depressive disorder of moderate severity without psychosis … The symptoms associated with this disorder, including hopelessness and nihilistic ideations (often accompanied by suicidal thoughts) acted synergistically with Mr. Jin’s underlying characterological structure; an antisocial and paranoid personality. The symptoms may have been precipitated or intensified by substance use (specifically withdrawal), but the nature and extent of his substance use proximal to the incident remain unclear. Toxicology reports showed no alcohol or other psychoactive substances in Mr. Jin’s blood at time of his arrest.” The offender received a 20-year sentence for attempted murder. At para. 47 of her reasons, Barrett J. canvassed the sentencing range for attempted murder:
At para. 131 of R. v. Forcillo, 2018 ONCA 402, 141 O.R. (3d) 752, leave denied [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 258, the Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the sentencing range of six years to life imprisonment for the offence of attempt murder, as was previously set out in para. 35 of R. v. Tan, 2008 ONCA 574, 268 O.A.C. 385. The lower end of this range is reserved for rare cases such as Forcillo, in which a police officer attempted to kill an individual after a lawful use of force during an arrest. Sentences in the mid-range of 10 to 16 years' imprisonment are appropriate in cases involving the use of a firearm in a public place, planned executions, and cases involving intimate partner violence. Sentences at the higher end, including life imprisonment, are appropriate in cases of "stark horror", those involving serious and permanent injuries to the victim, or where the offender has a lengthy prior criminal record: See R. v. Small, 2023 ONSC 6841, 2023 W.C.B. 2002, at para. 40.
Mr. Jones’ Indigeneity
[32] In R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated principles regarding the sentencing of Indigenous offenders. These principles were revisited in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433. At para. 59 of Ipeelee, the majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles initially described in Gladue:
The Court held, therefore, that s. 718.2(e) of the Code is a remedial provision designed to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing (Gladue, at para. 93). It does more than affirm existing principles of sentencing; it calls upon judges to use a different method of analysis in determining a fit sentence for Aboriginal offenders. Section 718.2(e) directs sentencing judges to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique and different from those of non-Aboriginal offenders (Gladue, at para. 37). When sentencing an Aboriginal offender, a judge must consider: (a) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular Aboriginal offender before the courts; and (b) the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage or connection (Gladue, at para. 66). Judges may take judicial notice of the broad systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people generally, but additional case-specific information will have to come from counsel and from the pre-sentence report (Gladue, at paras. 83-84).
[33] At para. 60 of Ipeelee, the majority also described those matters about which the court must take judicial notice:
Courts have, at times, been hesitant to take judicial notice of the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society (see, e.g., R. v. Laliberte, 2000 SKCA 27, 189 Sask. R. 190). To be clear, courts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders. Rather, they provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel. Counsel have a duty to bring that individualized information before the court in every case, unless the offender expressly waives his right to have it considered. In current practice, it appears that case-specific information is often brought before the court by way of a Gladue report, which is a form of pre-sentence report tailored to the specific circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. Bringing such information to the attention of the judge in a comprehensive and timely manner is helpful to all parties at a sentencing hearing for an Aboriginal offender, as it is indispensable to a judge in fulfilling his duties under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.
[34] It is also clear that the offender need not show any causal links as between his or her background as an Indigenous individual and the commission of criminal offences (Ipeelee at para. 82).
[35] Equally, I must be cognizant of the fact that, per para. 79 of Gladue,
[g]enerally, the more violent and serious the offence the more likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be close to each other or the same, event taking into accounts their different concepts of sentencing.
[36] However, the majority of the Supreme Court cautioned against placing an overemphasis on this passage. In particular, the majority stated at para. 85 of Ipeelee:
Whatever criticisms may be directed at the decision of this Court for any ambiguity in this respect, the judgment ultimately makes it clear that sentencing judges have a duty to apply s. 718.2(e): “There is no discretion as to whether to consider the unique situation of the aboriginal offender; the only discretion concerns the determination of a just and appropriate sentence" (Gladue, at para. 82). Similarly, in Wells, Iacobucci J. reiterated, at para. 50, that
[t]he generalization drawn in Gladue to the effect that the more violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter for similar terms of imprisonment to be imposed on aboriginal and non-aboriginal offenders, was not meant to be a principle of universal application. In each case, the sentencing judge must look to the circumstances of the aboriginal offender.
This element of duty has not completely escaped the attention of Canadian appellate courts (see, e.g., R. v. Kakekagamick (2006), 2006 CanLII 28549 (ON CA), 214 O.A.C. 127; R. v. Jensen (2005), 2005 CanLII 7649 (ON CA), 196 O.A.C. 119; R. v. Abraham, 2000 ABCA 159, 261 A.R. 192).
THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[37] The Crown and the defence join in their submission that a life sentence with no chance of parole for 15 years is the correct sentence for the murder of Ms. Marshall, and that a 14-year sentence minus time served (concurrent to the life sentence) is appropriate for the attempted murder of Mr. Frenette.
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
[38] The parties agree that the aggravating features of the case are:
a. The extreme violence used by Mr. Jones in both incidents;
b. The vulnerability of both victims, especially Ms. Marshall;
c. The fact that Ms. Marshall was killed in a home invasion murder;
d. The randomness of the attacks; and
e. The devastating effects of the crime.
[39] The mitigating features of the case include:
a. The guilty plea entered, although the value of the plea is attenuated by both the timing thereof (after the start of trial), and by the strength of the Crown’s case (which would appear to be fairly strong). The plea represents a show of remorse which appears to be sincere given Mr. Jones’ statements to the victims, the families of the victims and the court;
b. The lack of a criminal record which would otherwise indicate that Mr. Jones is not of bad character; and
c. The relative youthfulness of the offender.
[40] I agree with the parties’ characterization of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
ANALYSIS
[41] With crimes of violence of this magnitude, it is clear that the primary sentencing principles must be denunciation and deterrence. With that in mind, I leave for another day the amount of weight to be apportioned to the Gladue factors. Nonetheless, Mr. Jones’ conduct needs to be met with a stiff sanction in order to demonstrate society’s opprobrium. It is an open question as to whether this case is one of those where “the more violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter for similar terms of imprisonment to be imposed on aboriginal and non-aboriginal offenders”.
[42] With that said, similar second-degree murder convictions have attracted between 12 and 17 years of parole ineligibility. The cases described in these reasons involve situations where people murder their victims in brutal, even savage attacks, and where mitigating factors are at play including a lack of a criminal record, mental health issues, shows of remorse as exemplified by a guilty pleas, etc. Some offenders were Indigenous. Therefore, the recommended sentence of 15 years of parole ineligibility is in the middle of this range. The joint position is thus reasonable.
[43] As for the sentence to be imposed on the attempted murder count, a 14-year sentence is within the sentencing range for these cases as was described in Jin. As such, the joint position is reasonable.
[44] Given the impact that this case has had upon the community, however, I feel compelled to make a comment prior to imposing sentence.
[45] This is a difficult case because there appears to be no logic to it, no reason for the crime. The randomness of the attack appears to have no explanation, although one can surmise that drugs and mental illness may have played a role.[1] The randomness of these offences makes sentencing especially difficult.
[46] What is clear, however, is that the offence has had devastating effects upon the victims and their families. I hope that Mr. Frenette is able to move forward with his life and that he can get to a point where he is once again a productive member of society. I hope that he is not forced to manage the ongoing trauma visited upon him by a complete stranger. The sentence imposed for attempted murder reflects the profound difficulty that Mr. Frenette will undoubtedly have in getting his life back together.
[47] As for Ms. Marshall and her family, there is no sentence that can undo that which has been done, or that can properly address the pain and suffering caused by Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones’ life sentence reflects the most severe sanction that Canadian law can impose but it cannot restore Ms. Marshall’s life nor can it take away the pain and suffering felt by her family and friends. Nonetheless, a life sentence tells Mr. Jones (and other members of society who may feel that they can take the life of another person) that murderous actions will not be countenanced, and that society will punish those who commit murder with the heaviest punishment known to our courts. While the fifteen years of parole ineligibility adequately reflects the balance of the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors of this case as defined by the sentencing range, I am sure that no amount of jail time for Mr. Jones can assuage Ms. Marshall’s family’s pain.
[48] They have my deepest condolences.
CONCLUSION
[49] Mr. Jones is hereby sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for a period of 15 years for the offence of second-degree murder. Mr. Jones has served 1,083 days as of today’s date and his parole ineligibility as of today is for a period of 12 years, 11 days (or a possible release date of September 7, 2038).
[50] Mr. Jones is hereby sentenced to 14-years in prison (minus time served) for the attempted murder of Mr. Liam Frenette, concurrent to the life sentence imposed today. Mr. Jones will be credited for 1,625 days time served. His sentence for attempted murder will be 3,485 days (plus 1,625 days time served).
[51] Mr. Jones will be subject to the following ancillary orders:
A lifetime order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code of Canada prohibiting him from possessing firearms;
An order that Mr. Jones shall provide a sample of his DNA pursuant to s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code of Canada;
An order under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code of Canada whereby Mr. Jones is prohibited from having contact with;
a. Liam Fernette;
b. Ronald Marshall;
c. Shirley Marshall;
d. Dawson Mattila;
e. Abby Delavalle;
f. Don Ibbitson;
g. Kristy Marshall;
h. Lori Marshall;
i. Maureen Marshall;
j. Nicole Mattila;
k. Patti Delavalle;
l. Susie Burns;
m. Patricia Currie;
n. Spencer Marshall;
o. Cody Marshall;
p. Norman Marshall;
q. Emily Burns; and
r. Alex McEachern.
- Forfeiture of all seized items as per s. 490 of the Criminal Code.
Varpio J.
Released: August 25, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Jones, 2026 ONSC 4513
COURT FILE NO.: 9055/24
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
STEVEN JONES
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Varpio J.
Released: August 25, 2026
1Mr. Furgiele rightfully conceded in his submissions that I have no evidence that this case fits the legal tests for either a finding of “not criminally responsible” or for a finding that Mr. Jones’ moral blameworthiness was diminished as a result of mental illness.