CITATION: Rea-Cina v. Cina, 2026 ONSC 4452
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Diana Rea-Cina, Applicant
-and-
Daniele Cina and 2647711 Ontario Inc, Respondents
BEFORE: Justice Audrey P. Ramsay
COUNSEL: Toni E. Wharton, for the Applicant
Respondents -Self-represented
HEARD: In-writing
Costs ENDORSEMENT
[1] Following a ten-day judge-alone trial and my decision dated September 12, 2025, I released my judgment reported at Rea-Cina v. Cina et al, 2025 ONSC 5130. The applicant was successful on most of the relief which she sought at the trial. I varied the provision related to parenting in a consent final order which had been breached by the respondent, and I awarded the applicant equalization and relief for oppressive conduct of the corporate respondent and the respondent.
[2] Since my judgment, the applicant has commenced proceedings on the Commercial List, to deal with the winding up of the corporate respondent as ordered by me.
[3] The parties could not resolve the costs, and I received submissions in writing from both sides.
[4] The applicant seeks her costs of the action on a full recovery basis in the amount of $304,489.57. The applicant contends that the respondent has acted in bad faith which warrants full recovery. Alternatively, she seeks her costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of her first offer to settle made in writing on July 20, 2023, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.
[5] The applicant asserts that the respondent’s conduct lengthened the proceedings, caused the applicant to incur unnecessary costs, and frustrated prospects for settlement. She submits he persistently failed to disclose information and disregarded court orders. Secondly, she argues that she recovered a judgment that was more favourable to her than her offers to settle.
[6] The respondent does not appear to dispute the applicant’s entitlement to her costs but seeks “recognition of the reasonable time and expenses” he incurred in representing himself. As for the quantum of costs sought by the applicant, the respondent submits that the amount is excessive, duplicative, and disproportionate to the issues. He asserts that the applicant has also sought double recovery of costs already paid.
I. Entitlement to costs
[7] Costs are in the discretion of the court under section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
[8] Family cost rules are designed for the fundamental purposes of: (1) partially indemnifying successful litigants, (2) encouraging settlement, (3) discouraging and sanctioning inappropriate behaviour by litigants, and (4) ensuring, in accordance with r. 2(2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, that cases are dealt with justly: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, at para. 10.
[9] As the primary objective of the Family Law Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly, it is incumbent on parties who, by choice or necessity, litigate to act reasonably and in a cost-effective manner. This means that family law litigants are responsible, and accountable, for the positions they take in their litigation: Heuss v. Surkos, 2004 ONCJ 141; Peers v. Poupore, 2008 ONCJ 615, 61 R.F.L. (6th) 453.
[10] This is not a case where the applicant had limited success. She had resounding success despite my denial of the claim for very modest damages for the lost opportunity in the sale of the matrimonial home and dismissal of the claim for aggravated and punitive damages. Costs of actions are to be determined by considering the overall success achieved by a party: Wesbell Networks Inc. v. Bell Canada, 2015 ONCA 33, at para. 21; Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc. v. Romandale Farms Limited, 2021 ONCA 381, at para. 10. Costs are not determined by considering success on an issue-by-issue basis: Fram Elgin, at para. 10.
[11] The respondent seeks his own costs and sets out the hours that he has expended. I would deny this relief. There is no basis for the unsuccessful respondent to be awarded costs. In the result, I need not consider whether he meets the test for recovery of his costs as a self-represented litigant as articulated in Fong v. Chan, (1999), 49 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.).
[12] A successful party has no right to costs, but only a reasonable expectation of costs. In the absence of misconduct, a successful litigant has a reasonable expectation of recovering costs from the unsuccessful party: B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 1995 CanLII 115 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at p. 404; Bell Canada v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1994), 1994 CanLII 239 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 135 (C.A.), at p. 142. The general rule is of long standing and should not be departed from except for very good reasons: Macfie v. Cater (1920), 1920 CanLII 401 (ON SCHCD), 57 D.L.R. 736 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 739, aff’d, 1921 CanLII 528 (ON SCAD), 64 D.L.R. 511 (App. Div.).
[13] Under r. 24(3) of the Family Law Rules, a successful party is presumptively entitled to costs. Although I dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for damages based on the doctrine of “loss of opportunity” in the sale of the matrimonial home and for punitive and aggravated damages, I agree with the applicant that she was the successful party and therefore presumptively entitled to her costs. She obtained most of the relief sought at the trial including: a variation of the provision of the consent order to award her sole decision-making responsibility and enforcement of the respondent’s obligations regarding special and extraordinary expenses; payment of equalization in her favour; and a winding up of 2647711 Ontario Inc., the last mentioned because the respondent had conducted the affairs of the company in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregarded the interests of the applicant.
[14] In the result, the applicant, who was the successful party, should be entitled to her costs. There is no suggestion of any misconduct. Therefore, I find no basis to depart from the presumption that she is entitled to her costs.
II. Scale of costs and factors to be considered by the court
[15] The court may increase or decrease costs depending on the conduct of the parties and the presence or absence of offers to settle: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, 143 O.R. (3d) 519, at paras. 9-10. Under r. 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, unless the court orders otherwise, a party whose offer satisfies the conditions enumerated in r. 18(12), is entitled to full recovery of costs from the date of the offer to the date of the conclusion of the step. While the applicant’s Bill of Costs includes the terms “partial indemnity” and “substantial indemnity”, the Family Law Rules do not contain any reference to scales of costs such as “substantial indemnity” and “partial indemnity”.
[16] The applicant delivered two severable offers to settle, dated July 20, 2023 and November 7, 2024. The applicant submits that her recovery at trial was more favourable to her than the terms of both offers to settle. Both offers remained open for acceptance until after the commencement of trial. The applicant says that the respondent accepted the parenting and support terms of the first offer to settle, which was incorporated in a consent order, which the respondent then breached.
[17] The respondent did make an offer to settle dated July 24, 2023. He accepted the applicant’s terms in her offer on parenting but later resiled from that agreement even after it was incorporated in a final consent order. The applicant submits that the respondent’s offer combined property and corporate issues in non-severable, vague terms that were incapable of acceptance. The offer also proposed that he purchase the applicant’s share at a value to be determined, to credit him with half the value of her pension, and to defer the calculation of the equalization calculation, among other things. The respondent has not suggested that he beat his offer to settle. I agree with the applicant that the offer to settle was not capable of being accepted. It is vague, includes conditions, and ushers in uncertainty.
[18] An offer to settle, once accepted, is a contract and may be enforced by the court: Olivieri v. Sherman, 2007 ONCA 491, 86 O.R. (3d) 778, at paras. 41, 51; Donaghy v. Scotia Capital Inc./Scotia Capitaux Inc., 2009 ONCA 40, 93 O.R. (3d) 776, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 92; and Haider v. Rizvi, 2023 ONCA 354, at para. 20. The law of contract construction applies to interpreting offers to settle under the rules: see Puri Consulting Limited v. Kim Orr Barristers PC, 2015 ONCA 727, para. 25. The case law establishes that offers to settle must be clear, definite, and unequivocal as to what is being offered so the other side is aware of what is being accepted: Bifolchi v. Sherar (Litigation Administrator of) (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 63 (Gen. Div.), at pp. 644-45, aff’d on other grounds, Bifolchi v. Sherar (1998), 1998 CanLII 7122 (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 772 (C.A.); Yepremian v. Weisz (1993), 1993 CanLII 5483 (ON CTGD), 16 O.R. (3d) 121 (Gen. Div.), at p. 123.
[19] I am not satisfied that either of the applicant’s offers to settle is clear, definite, and unequivocal. While I am mindful that the parties resolved a number of issues addressed by the first offer, the offer includes options with respect to the property claims, terms that are not part of the judgment at trial, and a severability provision. For example, the first offer contains the following severability provision:
The terms of this Offer to Settle are severable as follows:
i. The Respondent may accept all parts of the Offer to Settle;
ii. The Respondent may accept Parts B, C, D, E, F, G, H (part i or part ii in the alternative), or any combination thereof;
iii. The Respondent may only accept Part A of this Offer to Settle, in the event he is accepting Part C. To be clear, the Offer with respect to joint major decision making responsibility is only open for acceptance, in the event the Respondent accepts that the parties will retain an independent Parenting Co-Ordinator, on the terms set out in Part C;
iv. The terms within each individual Part are not severable, such that if the Applicant accepts a part, she must accept the entirety of the terms within that part. The exception is in Part H, for which the Respondent may accept all of the terms within option 1, or all of the terms within option 2.
[20] The burden of proving that the order is as favourable as or more favourable than the offer to settle is on the party who claims the benefit of the rule: r. 24(13). See Neilipovitz v. Neilipovitz, 2014 ONSC 4849, at para. 5. I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that she obtained a more generous outcome, as she argues, than her offer to settle. The second offer to settle also includes options, terms not included in the judgment (for example, that the respondent pay the applicant $550,000 for the transfer of shares in the respondent corporation), and a severability clause. The second offer contemplates a further proceeding to determine the issue of costs. Additionally, aside from the question of how the severability provision should be treated in determining whether the offer satisfies the technical requirements of the rules, in this case, I find the provision in the second offer to settle to be unclear. It also leaves open the possibility that further litigation will continue with respect to certain claims. It reads:
The terms of this Offer to Settle are severable as follows:
The Respondent may accept all parts of the Offer to Settle;
The Respondent may accept Part A, B, or C (option 1), or C (option 2) separately, or in any combination to resolve the issue addressed in that Part;
Part C options 1 and 2 are in the alternative. If the Respondent accepts Part C (Option 2), he need not accept Part C (Option 1) to settle that issue.
The terms within each individual Part are not severable, such that if the Applicant (sic) accepts a part, he must accept the entirety of the terms within that part.
[21] The applicant has not provided any authority to assist the court with the severability provisions in the offers. The inclusion of such a provision envisions that some claims advanced in the litigation may be resolved while still leaving other claims to be litigated. The purpose of an offer to settle under the rules is to encourage parties to make reasonable offers to settle and to facilitate the early settlement of litigation: Puri Consulting, at para. 28, citing Rooney (Litigation guardian of) v. Graham (2001), 2001 CanLII 24064 (ON CA), 53 O.R. (3d) 685, at para. 45. In my view, the comments of Carthy J.A., in Rooney, at para. 31, about the equivalent provision of the rule governing offers to settle under the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, apply equally to offers to settle under the Family Law Rules. Rule 18(12.1) of the Family Law Rules sets out the consequences of failure to accept an offer to settle under rule 24.
[22] In Puri Consulting, at para. 28, Justice van Rensburg made the following observation regarding the similar provision under the Rules of Civil Procedure:
When a party makes an offer to settle, the other party must give serious consideration to whether to settle by accepting the offer or to continue the litigation. Continuing litigation in the face of a reasonable offer can be risky. This is reflected in rule 49.10, which sets out the costs consequences of a failure to accept an offer that the offeror betters at trial. Rule 49 “is a simple recognition that if an offer is accepted it should carry with it party and party costs to that date”.
[23] While there are technical problems with the applicant’s offers to settle, the court may still consider them in determining costs. The offers to settle demonstrate that the applicant was willing to compromise to resolve the issues in dispute, short of a trial. The court may increase or decrease costs depending on the conduct of the parties and the presence or absence of offers to settle: Beaver, at paras. 9-10.
[24] The applicant argues that the respondent acted in bad faith, which warrants full recovery. In Beaver, at para. 13, the Court of Appeal indicated that the Family Law Rules “contemplate full recovery in specific circumstances, e.g., bad faith under rule 24(8), or besting an offer to settle under rule 18(14).” The respondent has not responded to the claim of bad faith.
[25] For the reasons below, I am satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that the respondent acted in bad faith. An award of costs is subject to the factors enumerated in r. 24(14) of the Family Law Rules. Rules 24(7) and 24(8) pertain to unreasonable conduct of a successful party, and r. 24(10) pertains to bad faith by any party which permits the court to award costs on a full recovery basis.
[26] The applicant met the onus of identifying conduct by the respondent which meets the high threshold amounting to “bad faith”. In Scalia v. Scalia, 2015 ONCA 492, 126 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 68, the Court of Appeal observed that
[t]he legal test for bad faith in the family law context, as set out in S. (C.) v. S. (M.) (2007), 2007 CanLII 20279 (ON SC), 38 R.F.L. (6th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 17, affd 2010 ONCA 196, 262 O.A.C. 225, is that the impugned behaviour must be shown to be carried out with “intent to inflict financial or emotional harm on the other party or persons affected by the behaviour, to conceal information relevant to the issues or to deceive the other party or the court”. In short, the essential components are intention to inflict harm or deceive.
[27] The respondent willfully concealed information from the applicant throughout the proceeding. His failure to disclose corporate documents to the applicant resulted in the corporation, in which both parties were equal shareholders, being added as a party respondent. The respondent repeatedly breached court orders for disclosure. He refused to comply with a consent order with respect to parenting and refused to comply with the enforcement order of Justice Shin Doi. He involved the children in the litigation despite directions from Justice Brownstone, as she then was, to refrain from doing so.
[28] In his attempt to exclude assets from his net family property calculation, the respondent embroiled his minor children in the dispute between their parents. He did so in breach of a court order. He prepared statements on behalf of the children and had them sign, claiming that he held vehicles in trust for them to conceal assets.
[29] The respondent’s conduct during the litigation has attracted judicial criticism. His failure to disclose information was the subject of several orders for disclosure. His failure to provide financial information and valuations for his assets and the shares in the company has been described as “willful non-compliance ... egregious and exceptional”. His conduct has also been described as a pattern of “deliberate breach of court orders [that] strikes at the heart of the administration of justice” and “a long track record [proving] he puts his self-interest above that of his children and cannot be trusted to abide by agreements or court orders”, showing defiance, concealment, and obstruction that prolonged the litigation and increased costs. As the applicant observed, both the oppression claim and the corporation were added because of the respondent’s obstructive conduct related to the company. Ultimately, I found the respondent’s conduct as director and officer of the corporation to be oppressive.
[30] In my view, the respondent, despite repeated court orders for financial and corporate disclosure, knowingly and intentionally attempted to conceal assets, warranting a finding of bad faith and full recovery costs for the applicant.
III. Quantum
[31] A party’s entitlement to costs is subject to the factors set out in r. 24 of the Family Law Rules: Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, 128 O.R. (3d) 730, at para. 94. The applicant was successful and is therefore presumptively entitled to costs.
[32] In determining costs, the overarching considerations are whether the costs award is reasonable, fair, and proportionate in the circumstances of the case, and the reasonable expectations of the party: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 38.
[33] The issues were moderately complex in this case, especially because the respondent’s non-disclosure of corporate information, even though the applicant was an equal shareholder, resulted in the addition of the corporation, and expanded claims against the respondent as an officer and director and against the corporation. His breach of the settled portion of the claim lengthened the proceedings.
[34] The respondent submits that the applicant seeks double recovery for costs related to the motion/trial management, already awarded by Justice Nakonechny (June 18, 2024 – $6,000), and a motion for corporate disclosure in which Justice Hood awarded costs of $5,000 (December 20, 2024). I disagree that the applicant is seeking double recovery. Rather, she has sought the assessment of costs for steps in the proceedings where those costs were reserved to the trial judge.
[35] The respondent challenges the number of individuals who worked on the file and says that there is duplication. He argues that the applicant lawyer’s use of multiple lawyers and clerks increased costs and was not reasonable because of the issues.
[36] I do agree with the respondent that having so many individuals working on the case, four lawyers and three clerks, would have led to some duplication. I would be inclined to reduce the amount claimed for costs because of time billed for interoffice communications. However, it is evident from the materials filed that a significant amount of time has already been deducted from the time billed to the case by various timekeepers. That is because the applicant’s Bill of Costs calculates the actual costs in the amount of $36,429 on a partial indemnity basis, in the amount of $484,572 on a substantial indemnity basis, and in the amount of $605,715 on a full recovery basis.
[37] I would have reduced the quantum sought by the applicant for her full recovery costs by 25 percent to take into account any duplication; however, the amount sought by the applicant is less than I would have been inclined to award her for her full recovery costs. In his own submissions, the respondent asserts that it was the applicant’s choice “to retain several lawyers”. There is nothing in the record before me to indicate that the applicant is seeking amounts billed by her former lawyers. The respondent has not challenged the applicant’s position that she is seeking recovery limited to her current, and not her former lawyer’s legal fees.
[38] The respondent’s own conduct in failing to disclose personal and corporate records and breaching the court orders complicated the litigation, resulting in amended pleadings and expanding the relief sought by the applicant. His breach of his agreement and repeated refusal to abide by the consent order of Justice Sharma resulted in re-opening matters that were subject to that order, and again expanding, as opposed to narrowing the issues in dispute. His refusal to provide valuations of his assets and the shares of the family company led to protracted proceedings and adverse inferences ultimately being drawn against him at trial. I agree with the applicant that his conduct made settlement impossible, which undermines the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to enable the court to deal with cases justly by ensuring, among other things, that the procedure is fair to all parties, saving expenses and time.
[39] On the other hand, the respondent has not suggested that the applicant acted unreasonably, or took any steps or failed to take any steps that lengthened the proceedings. His own conduct, which included his repeated breach of disclosure orders and failure to provide a valuation of the shares of the respondent company, not only lengthened the family law proceeding, but also has resulted in further litigation for the applicant as a result of my appointment of a liquidator and the winding up of the respondent company.
[40] As the record before me indicates that there has already been a significant reduction made by the applicant to her costs being claimed, I make no further reductions.
[41] The respondent also challenges the hourly rates of the timekeepers on the file but does not identify why. I find the hourly rate is fair and reasonable and appropriate for the level of experience of each of the timekeepers.
[42] The Court of Appeal has long indicated that costs are not simply a mathematical calculation. The amount of costs should reflect what is fair and reasonable and be in accordance with what the losing party would reasonably expect to pay: Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier, 2002 CanLII 25577 (ON CA), 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4; Boucher, paras. 26, 38. Based on the respondent’s own submissions, a significant amount of time has been spent on this litigation. He had a former lawyer, but he had not indicated how much he was billed by his former counsel, only what he paid the lawyer. He asserts that he personally devoted 630 hours of his own time and is seeking $62,500 at an hourly rate of $125.00, which does not include the amount paid to his former lawyer ($13,000).
[43] In determining the quantum of costs, I have considered the factors set out in r. 24(14), including the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs claimed, as they relate to the complexity of the issues, each party’s behaviour, time spent, offers to settle, the legal fees including the number of lawyers and their rates, and any other relevant matter. After reviewing the Bill of Costs and the supporting time dockets for steps in the litigation and considering that the overall objectives in fixing costs are proportionality and fixing costs in an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party, I fix the applicant’s costs on a full recovery basis in the amount of $268,015.75, plus HST of $34,842.05.
IV. Disbursements
[44] I am allowing disbursements of $1,631.77, all-inclusive, which were unchallenged by the respondent, and which I find are otherwise assessable, fair and reasonable, considering the same factors above.
V. Disposition
[45] For the reasons above, I therefore award costs to the applicant on a full recovery basis fixed in the amount of $304,000.00, inclusive of HST, as requested, plus disbursements of $1,631.77, for a total amount of $305,631.
Justice Audrey P. Ramsay
Date Released: July 31, 2026