ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Amanda Christina Baker
Applicant
– and –
John Allan Baker
Respondent
Sarah Conlin, for the Applicant
Esther Lenkinski, for the Respondent
ENDORSEMENT
1On May 27, 2026, for reasons released that day, I ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant child support for their three children in the sum of $19,241 per month. In reaching that conclusion, I calculated the respondent’s income to be $1,218,831, being the three-year average of the respondent’s total income in his tax returns for 2022, 2023 and 2024.
2On June 12, 2026, I issued an endorsement allowing the parties to provide written submissions on a discreet issue, namely the impact of paragraph 12 of the Order made by Nicholson J. dated July 24, 2022.
The Nicholson Order
3The Nicholson Order was made on an “interim interim without prejudice” basis. It was made on consent. So far as I can tell, it was the first of many orders made in this case. The Order provided primarily for parenting arrangements for the parties’ three children. It also provided for Mr. Baker loaning money to Ms. Baker, namely the sum of $1,732,604.64, so that she could purchase a home for herself and the children. The loan was referred to as a “credit”. The order provided:
The Respondent, John Allan Baker's payment of $1,732,604.64 ($1,505,604.64 and $227,000.00) less the total sale proceeds of 206-35 St. David Street, Goderich, ON, N7A 1L4, shall be credited to G127 Court File Number G128 Form 25: Order (general) (page 3) FS-21-00000084-0000 the Respondent, John Allan Baker for any ongoing child support owed by the Respondent, John Allan Baker to the Applicant, Amanda Christina Baker for the benefit of the children, namely, Emmeline Baker, born May 28, 2016, Malia Baker, born October 20, 2017, and Camilla Baker, born August 22, 2019, which is over and above any monthly child support obligation of $6,890.00 owed by the Respondent, John Allan Baker, until the credit is paid in full.
Upon the sale and closing of the Applicant, Amanda Christina Baker's property located at 206-35 St. David Street, Goderich, ON, N7A 1L4, currently listed for sale at $469,900.00, the Applicant, Amanda Christina Baker shall provide the remaining sale proceeds after all closing fees inclusive of legal expenses and realtor commissions to the Respondent, John Allan Baker.
4The Nicholson Order was made before financial disclosure was exchanged. It was made at a time when Ms. Baker’s lawyer was in the hospital with COVID-19 and a junior in his office attended the hearing with Ms. Baker.
5Ms. Baker asserts that the Order was made in the face of Mr. Baker’s threats to resile his promises to make payments towards a house for Ms. Baker and the children to live in. She asserts that the funds were spent by Mr. Baker on upgrades to Ms. Baker’s home at his insistence. She asserts that she did not understand at the time that the funds were tied to ongoing child support in any way.
6Mr. Baker asserts that the consent order came ten days after mediation terminated by Ms. Baker and after voluminous correspondence between counsel. He points out that there was no request for an adjournment.
Related Orders
July 10, 2023
7On July 10, 2023, Leach J. made an order for temporary child and spousal support. The order was made on an “interim interim without prejudice basis” and provided that the respondent pay the applicant spousal support of $9,023 per month and child support of $7,207 per month. The support quantums were based on an annual income for the respondent of $458,825.
January 26, 2026
8The proceeds of sale of the St. David Street property were not paid to the respondent as required by the Nicholson Order. Instead, they remained in the trust account of the applicant’s lawyer.
9The Nicholson Order describes what amounts to a debt between the parties. This was not the only debt owing between them. In December of 2020, prior to the separation, the applicant loaned $1,000,000 to the respondent for the respondent to pay his tax debts to the Canada Revue Agency (CRA). The subject of that loan, and an agreement for partial repayment, came before me on October 1, 2025. The applicant sought the repayment of the loan in full pointing to correspondence between counsel. For reasons released on January 26, 2026, I ordered that the money in trust (the St. David Street proceeds) be paid to the applicant in partial satisfaction of the loan, with the amount thereafter outstanding being $591,042. That amount remains outstanding and is owing from Mr. Baker to Ms. Baker.
May 17, 2026
10The applicant brought a motion for an increase in the child and spousal support ordered by Leach J. because the respondent’s income had increased significantly. For reasons released, I made no change to the spousal support quantum and increased the child support to $19,241 per month commencing August 1, 2025, based on income of $1,218,831, being the average of the respondent’s income for 2022, 2023 and 2024.
Family Responsibility Office (FRO)
11The applicant filed an affidavit outlining events that occurred following the release of my May 17, 2026 Ruling.
12On May 29, 2026, counsel for the respondent wrote to the FRO to bring to their attention paragraph 12 of the Nicholson Order. Respondent’s counsel instructed FRO as follows:
In light of (the) amount that remains to be credited to Mr. Baker pursuant to the Nicholson Order, the amount to be withdrawn by FRO each month on a go forward basis ought to be no more than $6,890 until the credit owing to Mr. Baker has been fully satisfied.
13A caseworker from FRO contacted the applicant by telephone on June 22, 2026, advised that the Nicholson Order was sent to FRO and, as a result, FRO would hold all payments of both child and spousal support. On June 23, the caseworker told the applicant that, because of the Nicholson Order, FRO would not enforce child and spousal support and that, instead, they would apply a credit of $1,732,604.64 to the respondent such that no child or spousal support would be paid to the applicant. The FRO did not account for the proceeds of the St. David Street property that belonged to the respondent under the Nicholson Order and were paid to the applicant to be applied against the loan owing to her by the respondent.
14The caseworker was sympathetic to the plight of the applicant but said that the FRO system cannot acknowledge a credit for child support over $6,890 per month and could not differentiate between child support payments and spousal support payments. Any credit has to be a credit against all types of support. The result is that the applicant will receive nothing for child support and nothing for spousal support.
15The applicant, in her affidavit, expressed alarm and said that she relies on the support payments for living expenses.
16Mr. Baker filed an affidavit in response. He does not want FRO to enforce the support order. He claims to be willing to pay the applicant directly. He expressed some frustration with FRO and asserts that the applicant made a false claim to FRO in August of 2023, claiming that Mr. Baker owed to her two months of support under the Leach Order. He attached a statement of arrears signed by the applicant dated August 22, 2023, claiming support had not been paid on July 1 and August 1 of 2023 under that Order. He acknowledges that this was subsequently corrected with FRO but apparently took some time.
17The respondent claims in his affidavit that he relied on the credit and that it would be unfair for him “if there is no vehicle in place for me to receive credit for the large amount of money paid to Amanda pursuant to a consent order”.
Position of the Applicant
18The applicant requests that I vary the Nicholson Order to delete paragraph 12. She asserts that the respondent has waived enforcement of the Nicholson Order for the past three years by paying the full amount of child support in the Leach Order without demanding a deduction. She also asserts that public policy dictates against setting off child support against loans or credits owed between the parties.
Position of the Respondent
19The respondent objects to any variation of paragraph 12 of the Nicholson Order. The respondent points out that the motion before Nicholson J. was argued on July 6, 2022, and then resolved on consent on July 14. The Order based on the consent was not appealed, nor has either party sought to vary the credit provision in paragraph 12. The respondent asserts that the purpose of paragraph 12 was to ensure the applicant had a home that gave the applicant and the children an appropriate standard of living and to ensure the monies the respondent paid toward that home would be credited to him. The respondent asserts that he does not have any other form of security for his payment.
20The respondent embarked on an analysis of the children’s expenses, asserting that the appellant has sufficient monies to pay her expenses.
The Issue
21The issue is whether I ought to vary the Nicholson Order to delete paragraph 12, setting aside that part of the order that provides for the credit.
Analysis
22I start with a statement of the obvious: the entitlement to child support belongs to the child. It must be paid pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines.
23Can child support be offset against other payments that provide some benefit to the child? That is the crux of the question in this case.
Caselaw
24In Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, Brown J., speaking for the majority, said at para. 10:
In S. (D.B.), this Court endorsed certain important principles governing orders for child support (including retroactive child support) that merit restating here:
Child support is the right of the child, which right cannot be bargained away by the parents, and survives the breakdown of the relationship of the child's parents (para. 38);
Child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together (para. 38);
The child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent and is not confined to furnishing the "necessities of life" (paras. 38-45);
Retroactive awards are not truly "retroactive", since they merely hold payors to the legal obligation they always had to pay support commensurate with their income (para. 2);
Retroactive awards are not confined to "exceptional circumstances" or "rare cases" (para. 5); and
In determining whether to make a retroactive award, the payor parent's interest in certainty in his/her obligations must be balanced with the need for "fairness and ... flexibility". A court should consider whether the recipient parent's delay in seeking retroactive support was reasonable in the circumstances, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the child, and the hardship the retroactive award might entail (para. 133).
25I review the caselaw where the support payor seeks an offset or a credit against child support.
26In Lutz v. Lutz (1995), 1995 CanLII 473 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 293, the trial judge directed that Mr. Lutz was entitled to set off the support awards in favour of the children and Ms. Lutz against the judgment awarded in his favour against her. At paragraphs 7 and 8, the Court of Appeal said:
In our view, there was no justification for setting off a debt owed by Ms. Lutz to Mr. Lutz against his obligation to pay child support. The appeal on this issue must succeed. The provisions for set-off provided with respect to child support cannot stand.
27In Roach v. Lashley, 2018 ONSC 134, 2018 CarswellOnt 180, the support payor sought to credit the cost of clothing he purchased for the children against his child support obligation. The trial judge explained at paragraph 44(a) that the purchase of clothing could not be used in lieu of child support:
44(a) Mr. Lashley had claimed clothing expenses which he says were made in lieu of child support. These purchases were prior to Mr. Lashley making voluntary payments of child support in mid to late 2012 although some purchases of clothing overlapped. He submitted in evidence numerous receipts for clothing as well as other purchases. I disallow these expenses. I agree with Ms. Roach when she says that this was an attempt by the respondent to avoid his obligation to pay child support. It was not up to him to elect to pay child support by buying clothing for the children and there was little or no evidence other than that from Mr. Lashley that the children needed that clothing. If I allowed this expense, it would only serve to encourage other payor spouses to avoid paying base guideline child support by allowing them to pick and choose expenses of the children that they wish to pay without talking to the primary residence parent. I decline to give a credit to Mr. Lashley as against his child support for clothing bought for the children.
28In Woo v. Chin, 2007 CanLII 50880 (ON SC), [2007], O.J. No. 4590 (. S.C.J.), the mother owed child support and the father owed the mother property division income. The father’s debt was set off against the arrears of support. Justice Herman held:
55 A distinction is to be drawn between debts between the parties and child support, in that child support is the right of the child, not of the parent. The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the issue in Richardson v. Richardson, 1985 CanLII 5143 (ON CA), [1985] O.J. No. 243. In that case, there had been an overpayment by the husband for the wife's support and an underpayment for the child's support. Dubin J.A. stated that the husband could not set off any amount due from his wife for the overpayment against the obligation to support the child, since the money paid to the wife for child support was for the benefit of the child.
56 There have been several cases in which child support arrears have been set-off against a spouse's debt (see, for example, Benson v. Krein, [1996] O.J. No. 2490 (C.A.); McCallum v. McCallum, [1994] O.J. No. 2756 (Gen. Div.); Cowie v. Makin, [2004] O.J. No. 3136 (Sup. Ct.); Prince v. Prince, [2006] O.J. No. 3279 (Sup. Ct.). However, the cases do not generally provide a set-off against a prospective award for support. In Lutz v. Lutz, [1995] O.J. No. 963 (C.A.) at para 7, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that there was no justification for setting off a debt owed by the mother to the father against his obligation to pay child support. This case involved a prospective award for support. (emphasis mine)
57 The distinction between ordering a set-off of arrears but not of prospective support presumably derives from a consideration that, in the case of an award for arrears, the award may not directly benefit the child, but rather, may be compensation to the parent for expenses that have already been incurred. The same logic would apply to an order for retroactive support. In this case, there is the additional factor that Mr. Chin did not comply with his child support obligations when the children were with Ms. Woo.
58 For these reasons, the retroactive support obligation of Ms. Woo is set-off against Mr. Chin's debt to her. However, she does not receive a credit with respect to her obligation to provide ongoing child support.
29In Walsh v. Walsh, 2008 CanLII 586 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 98 (S.C.J.), the court accepted that set-off of an outstanding costs award against an award of increased child support would not “take bread out of the mouths of the children”: at para. 31. The court nevertheless rejected the argument for set-off, holding at para. 32:
[32] First, I have been unable to find a case that permits set-offs for costs against child support obligations. In Dickie v. Dickie, the court ordered costs set off against outstanding support, but in the context of a dispute over spousal support (among other things). Spousal support is an obligation between spouses, so there is no reason in principle not to set-off costs against such an obligation. In my view, it is desirable to maintain a “bright white line” around child support obligations: they should be paid annually, based on actual or imputed income, and it should only be truly exceptional circumstances that would lead the court to depart from this approach.
30The issue arose in Plimmer v. Burke, 2019 ONSC 1915, where Shaw J. said:
[21] Pursuant to s. 9 of the [Family Law Act] , I have authority to order that an equalization payment be paid in installments over time in circumstances of hardship. That section does not authorize the court to fund an equalization by a set-off against future child support. This issue was addressed in Lutz v. Lutz 1995 CanLII 473 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 293. In that case, the Court found that a trial judge does not have jurisdiction to set off a debt owed by a recipient parent to a payor parent against future child support owing by the payor parent.
31In Jamieson v. Loureiro, 2010 BCCA 52, 2010 Carswell BC 229, at para. 57 the court said:
I am unable to conceive of a case in which set-off would be allowed against future child support and consider that it would be a very rare case in which one would consider set-off against arrears of child support. The support is for the benefit of the child and should not be lost because the person to whom the support is paid may owe, in another capacity, amounts to the payor. There is simply an insufficient connection and an absence of manifest injustice in requiring the payor to pay the full amount of support.
Application of Legal Principles to This Case
32I am not sitting in appeal of the Nicholson Order. Rather, the question is whether it should be varied to delete paragraph 12. The Order was made on consent and without argument on the issue of the off set. The Order was made on an interim interim without prejudice basis; This wording invites the court to reconsider the order on better evidence as the litigation unfolds.
33Paragraph 12 of the Nicholson Order deals with a debt owing from the applicant to the respondent, albeit one that resulted in the applicant’s purchase of a home that benefits the children. Then there is the debt owing from the respondent to the applicant outlined above.
34There are other financial issues between the parties. The applicant has claimed an equalization of net family property that may depend on her claim to set aside the marriage contract. The applicant also has a claim for retroactive support that may or may not be successful.
35I take into account the parties’ respective financial positions. The Leach Order for spousal and child support was based on an average income of the respondent for the previous three years, namely $458,825. In 2021, the respondent’s gross income was $20,923,798, which was found to be an anomaly, and the 2021 income was adjusted to $519,285 for the purpose of support calculations. This adjustment was of substantial benefit to the respondent.
36Following the Leach Order, the respondent’s income increased significantly: in 2022 it was $806,267; in 2023 it was $1,019,623; and in 2024 it was $1,830,602. My use of the average of these three incomes, as opposed to using the respondent’s 2024 income alone, was of substantial benefit to the respondent.
37The applicant is unemployed. She has been unemployed since 2016 when she became a stay-at-home mother to care for the parties’ three children. The applicant’s most recent financial statement dated November 28, 2025 discloses a 2024 income of $3,195.79 for teaching Pilates part-time.
38The applicant discloses expenses of $47,518.40 per month. This amount appears extremely high but includes legal expenses of $24,500 per month. The respondent’s most recent financial statement dated July 14, 2025, discloses expenses of $90,358.15 per month including interest payments to CRA and the Bank of Nova Scotia.
39The applicant discloses financial assets of $205,589. The respondent discloses financial assets of $622,643.
40The applicant discloses total assets of $3,304,589 and debts of $15,617, for a total current net worth of $3,288,972. The respondent discloses total assets of $345,073,123 and debts of $9,387,887, for a total net worth of $335,685,236. The respondent’s stated net worth is more than 100 times that of the applicant.
41The equalization claim, the retroactive support claim and the adjustment of the interim support orders are all issues that the trial judge will have to wrestle with.
42In my view, the parties’ relative financial positions must be taken into account when considering whether paragraph 12 of the Nicholson Order ought to be deleted.
43I also consider the impact that paragraph 12 now has on the applicant. FRO has refused to enforce both the spousal support and the child support orders, explaining that it does not have the capacity to integrate offsets against support orders into its system. The applicant relies on the support to cover her expenses and now those support payments are in jeopardy. The respondent asserts that he will pay the applicant directly, but the applicant is entitled to have FRO enforce the order and she should not be forced to trust the respondent to comply.
44I return to the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Michel v. Graydon and the other authorities cited above. Child support is the right of the children and cannot be bargained away by the parents. Children should, to the extent possible, have the same standard of living after their parents separate as before. There should be a “bright white line” around child support and child support should only be adjusted for debts or credits as between the parties in exceptional circumstances: Walsh v. Walsh, at para. 31. Where there are such circumstances, the adjustment should be made to retroactive support or arrears of support as opposed to ongoing support.
45All of these principles dictate that the amounts owing for debts as between the parties cannot impact ongoing child support. The refusal of FRO to enforce support orders that are subject to an offset clause is, in itself, a reason why offsets against ongoing child support should not be ordered.
46The offset set out in paragraph 12 of the Nicholson Order cannot stand. An accounting of the debts between the parties must be left to the trial judge after a determination of the other financial claims between the parties. I, once again, encourage the parties to move forward to a trial as quickly as possible.
Disposition
47I make the following orders:
The Order of Justice Nicholson dated July 14, 2022, shall be varied to delete paragraph 12.
The applicant shall pay interim child support in the amount of $19,241 per month commencing August 1, 2025, pursuant to my Order dated May 27, 2026, and interim spousal support of $9,023 per month pursuant to the order of Justice Leach dated July 10, 2023, both to be enforced by FRO.
The determination of loans and credits between the parties shall be left to the trial judge and shall not have any effect on the ongoing interim child and spousal support.
Further to my endorsement of June 12, 2026, the timetable for the parties’ submissions on costs for my Ruling on Motion released May 27, 2026, shall be extended to start today, with the applicant to have the opportunity to file supplementary costs submissions.
Pamela L. Hebner
Justice
Released: July 28, 2026
CITATION: Baker v. Baker, 2026 ONSC 4373
COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-84 (Goderich)
DATE: 20260728
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Amanda Christina Baker
and
John Allan Baker
ENDORSEMENT
Hebner J.
Released: July 28, 2026