Court File and Parties
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Aaron Tovye Copeland, Applicant -and- Brittany Lynn Copeland, Respondent
BEFORE: Robert Centa J.
COUNSEL: Kristen Normandin and Hannah Lank, for the applicant Nancy Deskin, for the respondent
HEARD: July 23, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1The applicant Aaron Copeland and the respondent Brittany Copeland lived together with their two children, aged 7 and 4, in the matrimonial home just northeast of the intersection of Eglinton Avenue West and Chaplin Crescent, in mid-town Toronto. The parties have continued to reside together since their separation in January 2025. As of the date of this motion, there have been no temporary orders addressing any parenting issues.
2On May 13, 2026, the parties sold the matrimonial home with a closing date of August 4, 2026. It is common ground that the parties will have to move out of the matrimonial home on or before closing.
3Brittany brings this interim motion seeking a temporary order to permit her to move with the children to Thornhill, Ontario, and to enroll them in schools in that area. The motion is dismissed.
4Although Brittany submits that her request is nothing more than a change of address resulting inevitably from the sale of the matrimonial home, I have no doubt that she is seeking permission to “relocate,” as that term is defined in the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). Moving the children to Thornhill is likely to have a significant impact on Aaron, who currently has shared parenting time, shared decision-making with Brittany, and sees the children on a daily basis.
5Brittany and Aaron have each brought motions to determine the parenting schedule on a go-forward basis. The parties argued those motions before Nishikawa J. on July 21, 2026. Justice Nishikawa concluded that it was difficult to determine the parenting schedule that would be in the children’s best interests without knowing the outcome of Brittany’s motion to move with the children to Thornhill. Justice Nishikawa has taken her decision under reserve pending the outcome of this motion and, if necessary, further submissions from the parties.
6I would be reluctant to allow a relocation on an interim basis in any case where the relocating parent has not obtained an order declaring that the children will have their primary residence with them. In this case, however, Brittany has not demonstrated any compelling circumstances that might persuade me to allow such a move.
7The only reason Brittany advances for wanting to move to Thornhill from Toronto is that rent will be more affordable on her $159,000 annual income. Brittany has not satisfied me that she would not be able to rent safe, secure, clean, and appropriate accommodations for her and the children in Toronto for $3200 to $3400 per month (which is the cost of her proposed rental units in Thornhill). The proposed move is likely to have a significant impact on the children’s relationship with Aaron. Brittany has no prior connection to Thornhill, has no family or supports in that area, and continues to work in downtown Toronto.
8Although I have considered all of the evidence and submissions, given the urgency of this motion, I will only address the most important points. Ultimately, I am not satisfied that the proposed relocation is in the best interests of the children and the motion is dismissed.
A. Brittany is not merely changing residence, she is seeking to relocate
9Brittany submits that she is merely asking to change her place of residence, within the meaning of s. 16.8(1) of the Divorce Act, and not to relocate, within the meaning of s. 16.9(1) of the Divorce Act. I disagree.
10Subsection 16.8(1) of the Divorce Act requires a parent to notify the other parent of their intention to change their address:
A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to change their place of residence or that of the child shall notify any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.
11Because of the sale of the matrimonial home, both parties and the children will necessarily be changing their home address on or before the date of closing. However, subsection 16.9(1) of the Divorce Act distinguishes a relocation from a mere change in residence and imposes heightened notification requirements to the other parent:
A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to undertake a relocation shall notify, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation and in the form prescribed by the regulations, any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.
12A change in address becomes a relocation when that change is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with the other parent.1
13I find that Brittany’s proposed move to Thornhill is likely to have a significant impact on a child’s relationship with Aaron. Currently, Aaron sees both children (aged 7 and 4) on a daily basis and has equal parenting time as they all live in the matrimonial home. Even recognizing that this situation is unlikely to continue in its current form after the matrimonial home is sold, it is the proposed move to Thornhill that is likely to alter his relationship with the children.
14Aaron is currently looking for an appropriate rental unit in mid-town Toronto in the Brown school district, which surrounds Avenue Road and St. Clair Avenue East, slightly to the south and east of the current matrimonial home.
15Brittany asks the court to permit her to move with the children to Thornhill where they will be enrolled in public school. She proposes that following the move, Aaron will see the children on the following schedule:
a. Week 1:
i. Tuesday and Thursday – Aaron to pick up the children from school and drop them off at Brittany’s residence at 7:45 p.m.
ii. Saturday – Aaron to pick up the children at 8:00 a.m. and drop them off at 7:45 p.m.
b. Week 2:
i. Monday, Thursday, and Friday – Aaron to pick up the children from school and drop them off at Brittany’s residence at 7:45 p.m
ii. Saturday – Aaron to pick up the children at 8:00 a.m. and drop them off at 7:45 p.m
16According to Google maps information appended to Brittany’s affidavit, it will take 30 minutes to drive the 27.2 km from the former matrimonial home to the elementary school in which she proposes to enroll the children. I confess that I cannot imagine anyone making that drive in 30 minutes except in the most ideal traffic conditions. Counsel for Aaron pointed out in submissions that when she entered those addresses into Google maps she was advised the trip could typically take up to one hour.
17The move to Thornhill would prevent Aaron from having overnight visits with the children. This alone would be a significant impact on his relationship with the children. Moreover, the driving time would erode his time with the children. On a typical weekday, even assuming a 30 minute drive time, the following would take place:
a. 3:00 p.m. Aaron departs home to drive and pick up the children;
b. 3:30 p.m. Aaron arrives at the school, picks up the children and departs for home;
c. 4:00 p.m. Aaron arrives at home with the children;
d. 7:15 p.m. Aaron departs home with the children to drive to Thornhill;
e. 7:45 p.m. Aaron drops off the children at Brittany’s house and departs Thornhill to drive home;
f. 8:15 p.m. Aaron arrives at home.
18On this schedule, of the 5 hours and 15 minutes of time committed to parenting, Aaron will spend 4 hours and 15 minutes of time with the children. Of his 4 hours and 15 minutes of time with the children, one hour of that time will be spent in the car.
19I find that this change would have a significant impact on Aaron’s relationship with the children. The absence of overnight visits combined with the percentage of his parenting time spent in the car would be a significant change in his relationship with the children.
20I find that the move Brittan is proposing is a relocation, not an address change.
B. Factors to be considered on an interim mobility motion
21In Plumley, Marshman J. articulated the factors to be considered in deciding a mobility issue on an interim basis:
It appears to me that the following factors are or ought to be important in deciding the mobility issue on an interim basis:
A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim basis and permit the move when there is a genuine issue for trial.
There can be compelling circumstances which might dictate that a justice ought to allow the move. For example, the move may result in a financial benefit to the family unit, which will be lost if the matter awaits a trial or the best interests of the children might dictate that they commence school at a new location.
Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong probability that the custodial parent's position will prevail at a trial.2
22I accept Aaron’s submission that that where the parties currently have equal parenting time, relocation should be permitted by temporary order only in compelling circumstances. Justice Sherr, a learned and experienced family court judge, indicated that the court must conduct a “stringent analysis” before permitting a party to relocate a child on a temporary basis.3 Justice Sherr identified the following principles that the court is to apply:
The following are additional principles regarding temporary relocation cases:
a) The burden is on the parent seeking the change to prove compelling circumstances exist that are sufficient to justify the move. See: Mackenzie v. Newby, [2013] O.J. No. 4613 (OCJ).
b) Courts are generally reluctant to permit relocation on a temporary basis. The decision will often have a strong influence on the final outcome of the case, particularly if the order permits relocation. The reality is that courts do not like to create disruptions in the lives of children by making an order that may have to cause further disruption later if the order has to be reversed. See: Goodship v. McMaster 2003 CanLII 53670 (ON CJ), [2003] O.J. No. 4255 (OCJ).
c) Courts will be more cautious about permitting a temporary relocation where there are material facts in dispute that would likely impact on the final outcome. See: Fair v. Rutherford-Fair 2004 CarswellOnt 1705 (Ont. S.C.J.). In such cases, the court requires a full testing of the evidence. See: Kennedy v. Hull, [2005] ONCJ 275.
d) Courts will be even more cautious in permitting a temporary relocation when the proposed move involves a long distance. It is unlikely that the move will be permitted unless the court is certain that it will be the final result. See: Boudreault v. Charles, 2014 ONCJ 273.
e) Where one parent moves to another city or community with the child without notice to the other parent, the other parent may apply to have the child returned to the home community. See: Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 2012 ONSC 5069; Jennings v. Cormier, 2022 ONCJ 338, per Justice Melanie Sager.
f) There is a difference in a temporary relocation analysis between permitting a temporary move and sanctioning a move that has already happened, particularly when the move is contrary to a temporary non-removal order. A court cannot sanction the latter. See: Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 68. This is applicable by analogy when the move is in the face of a written objection to the move. See: Jennings v. Cormier, supra.
g) Courts will permit temporary relocation where there is no genuine issue for trial (see: Yousuf v. Shoaib, [2007] O.J. No. 747 (OCJ)), or where the result would be inevitable after a trial (see: Mackenzie v. Newby, supra, where the court observed that the importance of the father’s contact with the child could not override the benefits that the move would have on the child).
23In considering whether to permit a relocation, the court must consider the best interest of the child, informed both by the usual factors set out in s. 16 of the Divorce Act as well as the additional factors set out in s. 16.92(1) of the Divorce Act, but shall not consider whether the person intending to relocate would do so if the relocation is prohibited:
16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
(2) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider, if the child’s relocation was prohibited, whether the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.
C. Brittany is not permitted to relocate the children
24It is not necessary to determine who bears the onus of proof in this case. Section 16.94 of the Divorce Act, states that I may decide not to apply the formal burden of proof allocations in ss. 16.93(1) and (2) of the Divorce Act and that I may focus on preserving stability for the child and protecting the relationship with both parents pending a full hearing.4
25I am satisfied that the relocation is not in the best interests of the children. I see no compelling circumstances to justify permitting this move on a temporary basis. Brittany may be able to demonstrate at trial that she should be permitted to relocate with the children, but, given the record before me, I am not prepared to permit such a move on a temporary basis.
26First, Brittany did not comply with the applicable notice requirements at least 60 days before the proposed relocation: Divorce Act, ss. 16.9(1) and 16.92(1)(d) of the. She did not provide notice to Aaron in the form prescribed by the regulations of her intention to relocate. She did not provide the address of the new place of residence until very shortly before the hearing. It is also common ground that Brittany has provided only her intended address as she has not yet submitted her offer to lease to the landlord.
27Second, as the children have spent equal time each day with their parents since birth, I think the impact on the children will be significant and harmful: Divorce Act, s. 16.92(1)(b) and (c). As I explained above, the move is likely to diminish the current relationship between the children and Aaron. Even recognizing that the children’s daily routine with their parents will change when the matrimonial home is sold, the elimination of overnight visits with Aaron is likely to harm their relationship with him. A significant amount of their time with Aaron would be spent in a car, shuttling back and forth between Thornhill and midtown Toronto. That is not conducive to a healthy, rewarding relationship between the children and Aaron.
28In addition, the children will also be removed from their friends and recreational activities in the neighbourhood in which they grew up. I do not place as much weight on this factor as the children are still young and it is not uncommon for children to switch recreational activities and friend groups. A certain amount of dislocation will inevitably follow the breakdown of the marriage and the sale of the matrimonial home. For example, last year, the children attended grade 1 and JK at Bialik Hebrew Day School. However, Brittany and Aaron agree that the children would not be returning to that school regardless of my decision regarding relocation. Similarly, given the sale of the matrimonial home, there will be some geographic change in the children’s residence. However, I am concerned that the children’s doctor and dentist are located in mid-town Toronto and Brittany did not offer a plan to either change their treating practitioners or otherwise ensure continuity of care.
29I do not accept Aaron’s submission that the move to Thornhill would significantly alter the children’s relationship with his parents. Even if the children are closely bonded with their paternal grandparents, the evidence before me is that the grandparents take the children once a week to the dollar store and to United Bakers for dinner, and that the family gathers together for the high holidays. I do not think either the relocation to Thornhill or the proposed parenting schedule would interfere unduly in the activities he described.
30Third, the reasons that Brittany has offered for the relocation do not justify it: Divorce Act, s. 16.92(1)(a).
31I think it is helpful to first identify the reasons Brittany does not advance in support of her motion to relocate with the children. Brittany is not relocating for work reasons. She works as an IT consultant at Accenture Inc. According to Aaron’s affidavit dated July 6, 2026, Brittany is required to attend in-person at her office in downtown Toronto approximately four days per week. Brittany did not respond to this evidence in her affidavit sworn July 22, 2026. Brittany is not relocating to be closer to a support network of friends and family. Her family lives in the United States and she did not identify any friends in Thornhill. Brittany is not relocating to Thornhill due to a historic tie to the area. Brittany is not relocating because the children have special needs that can only be met in Thornhill and can not be met in Toronto.
32Brittany says that she wishes to relocate so that she can find more affordable, safe and clean housing for her and the children. According to her 2025 notice of assessment, Brittany earned $159,449. According to her June 26, 2026, her current monthly housing expenses for the matrimonial home total $4,788.83. Her current annual expenses total $168,408.72.
33In her affidavit sworn June 26, 2026, Brittany says the following:
32 Comparable housing in the current Midtown area would likely require the children, who are 2 growing boys, to live in a much smaller residence, potentially a 1 bedroom apartment. Sydney Taylor, a real estate agent looking for homes for me, advised that she was struggling to find an appropriate rental in my budget. Attached as Exhibit "E" is said communication from Ms. Taylor and the list of rentals in mid-town near the public schools. She went on to confirm that if I wanted a home in the school districts mentioned, it would likely be closer to $4500.00 unless I was willing to live in a 1+1 unit, under 700 sq ft.
Conversely, I attach as Exhibit "F", a listing for a unit I hope to lease forthwith in Thornhill, together with the map showing the time it would take to get to the children's school for pick up. It is a 3-bedroom townhouse, 3 bathrooms, parking and in-suite laundry. It is a 30 to 45 minute drive from the Matrimonial Home.
Our children's stability is my highest priority. Changing my residence allows me, within my budget, to provide them with consistency rather than relying on temporary housing. It creates a realistic path towards long-term financial stability for me and eventually home ownership, allowing me to provide the children with greater security as they grow. Remaining in midtown would leave little to no opportunity to improve our housing situation or build equity, as comparable housing is beyond my financial means. I do not see my salary increasing by any significant stretch in the future….
34The only evidence to corroborate Brittany’s evidence is Exhibit E to her affidavit, the April 12, 2026, email from a sales representative at a realty group that reads as follows:
Hi Brittany,
I did some homework on the rentals and have attached some MLS below. I am struggling to find what you are looking for within your budget. A lot of 1+1s are going close to 2800 with parking. I attached a ton of rentals for you to see what market prices are. If you want a house in the school districts mentioned it will likely be closer to $4500. I attached some houses for rent in that range as well. One unit was under 700 square feet and is going for $2808 + 200 for parking and that is a 1+1 bedroom. The unit on Rosewell is is also a 1+1 bedroom and is 2800.
35There are a number of weaknesses with this evidence. First, Brittany did not include any prior emails with the sales representative or explain what she told the sales representative about her budget or the type of accommodation she sought. Second, Brittany did not include the attachment that she received from the sales representative, which contained a “ton of rentals” so that Aaron and the court could see the sales representative’s sense of “market prices.”
36Brittany affirmed that she hoped to rent the unit described in Exhibit F to her June 26, 2026, affidavit. This unit had a posted monthly rent of $3,400 per month. If Brittany hoped to lease this unit, it would be helpful to know if she told the sales representative looking for midtown properties that she would happily pay $3,400 per month for an appropriate unit. There is no independent, objective, third party evidence to support Brittany’s submission that there are no suitable rental units available for $3,400 a month that would not involve a relocation to Thornhill.
37In an affidavit sworn July 22, 2026, Brittany indicated that she now intends to secure a 2 + 1 bedroom unit with two bathrooms for $3,200 per month. She states that she has signed an offer to lease dated July 22, 2026, but has not yet delivered it to the landlord.
38On the other hand, Aaron has provided evidence from his real estate agent that there are units available in mid-town Toronto that are comparable to the Thornhill units described in Brittany’s two affidavits:
- Upon receipt of Brittany's Affidavit, I asked my real estate agent, Lynne Elkind, to see if she could find comparable rentals to the unit that Brittany has identified she would like to lease in Thornhill that are in midtown Toronto. Within minutes, my real estate agent sent me an email with the following units:
a. 701-103 Avenue Road, an 1,150 square foot, 2-bed, 2-bath condominium located at the intersection of Avenue Road and Davenport for $3,300 per month;
b. 101 Burnside Drive Main, a 1,000 square foot, 2-bed, 1-bath unit that is the main floor of a house, for $3,250 per month (including parking);
c. 909-1603 Eglinton Avenue West, a 963 square foot, 2+1 bed, 2-bath condominium for $3,300 per month (with a 300 square foot balcony and underground parking);
d. 303-185 Alberta Avenue, a 917 square foot, 2+1 bed, 2-bath condominium for $3,330 per month (with underground parking); and
e. 403-159 Russell Hill Road, an 800-899 square foot, 2-bed, 2-bath condominium for $3,200 per month (this unit even offers one month of free rent on a 2-year lease).
39Based on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied either that Thornhill provides a significantly less expensive housing market for Brittany or that she could not find accommodation in mid-town Toronto that is comparable to the properties she was prepared to lease in Thornhill. I am also not satisfied that Brittany would not be able to afford safe, adequate, and clean accommodation in Toronto while still significantly reducing her current monthly housing costs.
40Even assuming that Brittany will be able to find acceptable public school and before and after school care options for the children in Thornhill, I find that the reason advanced for the relocation is not sufficiently strong as to outweigh the harm the relocation would likely do to the relationship between Aaron and the children. I find that the relocation of the children would not be in their best interests and I dismiss Brittany’s motion.
41If the parties are not able to resolve costs of this motion, Aaron may email his costs submission of no more than three double-spaced pages to Theresa.finelli@ontario.ca on or before August 4, 2026. Brittany may deliver her responding submission of no more than three double-spaced pages on or before August 11. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.
Robert Centa J.
Date: July 27, 2026
Footnotes
- Jacques v. Leblanc, 2023 ONSC 1689, at para. 96; S.C. v. J.C., 2022 ONSC 4146, at paras. 8, 21 to 26.
- Plumley v. Plumley, 1999 CanLII 13990 (ON SC), 1999 CarswellOnt 3503, at para. 7.
- N.P. v. D.H., 2022 ONCJ 535, at para. 55.
- A.J. v. M.N., 2024 ONSC 4687, at para. 44; Kanavor v. Kanavor, 2023 ONSC 6397, at para. 36.