Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FC-16-00000219-0000 Date: 2026-01-23 Ontario Superior Court of Justice Family Court
Between:
Lisa Ann Jeffrey, Applicant
-- and --
Casey Adam McNab, Respondent
Counsel: J. Singer, for the Applicant A. Turner, for the Respondent
Heard: September 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, October 1, 3, 6, 7, 16, 2025 at St. Catharines
The Honourable Justice K. Bingham
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Executive Summary
[1] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab were common-law partners who separated in June 2015. Also in June 2015, Mr. McNab sold the assets of his non-urgent patient transfer business for a significant sum. Ms. Jeffrey commenced an application seeking spousal support and a share of the sale proceeds. The proprietary issues were resolved in April 2025 on consent. With respect to the claim for spousal support, this decision sets out the reasons why Ms. Jeffrey has a continuing entitlement to support on a primarily non-compensatory basis, determines the income of each party for the relevant periods of time, sets the quantum of prospective and retrospective support since 2020, and fixes the duration of support.
Position of the Parties
[2] Ms. Jeffrey seeks an order for spousal support fixed for the years 2020 to 2024 based on the maximum possible income for Mr. McNab. Ms. Jeffrey also seeks a finding that Mr. McNab's conduct towards her was unconscionable such that it amounts to an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship and therefore he owes her ongoing support until April 1, 2027 in an amount of $15,034 per month (with credit for amounts paid) to compensate her for his actions. Alternatively, she seeks ongoing spousal support until June 1, 2029.
[3] Ms. Jeffrey requests that the existing non-dissipation order remain in effect until the final support payment is made and that Mr. McNab be obligated to maintain extended health coverage until such time as support is no longer payable.
[4] Mr. McNab seeks a finding that he has no ongoing support obligation to Ms. Jeffrey and that there is no retroactive support owed to her. In the alternative, he submits that support should be paid based on a lower income for him and a higher imputed income for Ms. Jeffrey, and that the duration of spousal support should be fixed at 11.5 years based on his dates for the period of cohabitation.
The Parties and Their Relationship
[5] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab met when Ms. Jeffrey applied for a job at the patient transfer business Mr. McNab's family owned and operated in Windsor, Ontario (Sports Medic Inc.).
[6] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab began dating shortly after she was hired and they worked together in Windsor. Ms. Jeffrey worked for Sports Medic Inc. until December 2003.
[7] In 2004, Mr. McNab and Ms. Jeffrey moved to Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario. Mr. McNab undertook a variety of entrepreneurial initiatives, which Ms. Jeffrey supported, and Ms. Jeffrey was operating a savannah cat breeding business ("cattery[^1]").
[8] Mr. McNab and Ms. Jeffrey supported one another personally and professionally and the network of businesses grew. Mr. McNab focused on the development of a patient transfer business which was operated by a constellation of corporations owned by Sports Medic Inc. At this time, Mr. McNab was the sole shareholder of Sports Medic Inc.
[9] Ms. Jeffrey worked on and developed businesses including a soap business, her cattery, a pet store, and a fashion retail store (the "retail store(s)"). The pet and fashion retail stores were owned by corporations owned by Mr. McNab. Ms. Jeffrey never received a salary for her work operating the retail stores.
[10] The retail businesses were not financially successful. The patient transfer business was financially successful, and over the years secured more lucrative financial contracts. The parties disagree on the extent of Ms. Jeffrey's involvement in the patient transfer business.
[11] In 2007, Mr. McNab and Ms. Jeffrey purchased their family home, a jointly owned property located at 1220 Line 3, Niagara-on-the-Lake. They also purchased a vacation property in Mount Dora, Florida.
[12] Mr. McNab and Ms. Jeffrey became well known business leaders in the community and enjoyed the success of the businesses.
[13] Leading up to their separation in 2015, Mr. McNab was negotiating the sale of the assets of the patient transfer business to Spectrum. The sale closed shortly after separation for over $5,000,000.
[14] After separation, Ms. Jeffrey continued to reside in the family home and operate her cattery. During the litigation, she purchased Mr. McNab's interest in this home and he retained the property in Mount Dora, Florida. When Ms. Jeffrey concluded that her cattery would not be a profitable business, she sought out other part-time employment. Ms. Jeffrey's employment was affected by two personal family events: her mother suffered a serious and life altering fall and her brother's death. Ms. Jeffrey's parents worked for the patient-transfer business prior to separation. As a result of her fall, Ms. Jeffrey's mother is disabled and her father is a full-time caregiver, with Ms. Jeffrey's support.
[15] Mr. McNab was initially bound by a non-compete agreement following the sale of the patient transfer business. After the expiration of the non-compete agreement, he incorporated CTG Medical Transportation Limited ("CTG Medical"), a non-urgent patient transportation business. Mr. McNab is the operator of CTG, and he and his brother are the shareholders. CTG is profitable and has made investments in other enterprises.
[16] This application was commenced April 15, 2016. The claims with respect to property were resolved in April 2025.
Issues for Determination at Trial
[17] The issues to be determined at trial included:
a. When did Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab begin to cohabitate?
b. Was Ms. Jeffrey a shareholder of Sports Medic Inc.?
c. Was there a payment of $250,000 paid to Spectrum?
d. Is Scott McNab a bona fide shareholder in CTG Medical or is Mr. McNab the sole beneficial owner?
e. Is Ms. Jeffrey entitled to spousal support?
i. If yes, is her entitlement compensatory or non-compensatory?
f. What is Mr. McNab's income for support purposes?
g. What is Ms. Jeffrey's income for support purposes?
h. Should the court exercise its discretion pursuant to subsection 33(10) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, to find that Mr. McNab's conduct constituted an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship?
i. What quantum of spousal support, if any, is payable by Mr. McNab to Ms. Jeffrey?
j. If spousal support is payable, for what duration?
Law and Analysis
When did Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab begin to cohabitate?
[18] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab do not agree on the date of cohabitation.
[19] Ms. Jeffrey's position is that she and Mr. McNab began to cohabit in January 2001 when she moved into his house at 13810 Tecumseh Road, Windsor, Ontario (the "Tecumseh property") after being hired for a job with Sports Medic Windsor in November 1999 and dating throughout 2000.
[20] To support her assertion as to the date of cohabitation, Ms. Jeffrey produced:
a. A contract dated October 26, 2001 to purchase a puppy that lists her address as the Tecumseh property;
b. A rent receipt from Mr. McNab for 12 months in 2002;
c. Her temporary driver's licence dated March 11, 2002 showing her address as the Tecumseh property;
d. An invoice for car repairs dated August 29, 2002 listing the Tecumseh property.
[21] Mr. McNab denies that Ms. Jeffrey resided in the Tecumseh property. It is his position that the parties began their relationship in 2001 after Ms. Jeffrey was hired with Sports Medic in late 2000. He testified that he did not move into the Tecumseh property in 2001. His evidence is that after he moved into the Tecumseh property, he and Ms. Jeffrey spent time together in the house, but during this period of the relationship Ms. Jeffrey was back and forth between Windsor and Niagara-on-the-Lake, such that they were not living together.
[22] Mr. McNab's position is that they began to cohabit in January 2004 when they relocated to Niagara-on-the-Lake. Mr. McNab had no recollection of the reason for the rent receipt in 2002.
[23] For the following reasons, I find that the date of cohabitation was March 1, 2002:
a. I accept Ms. Jeffrey's evidence with respect to the commencement of the relationship being 2000 and not 2001. Ms. Jeffrey wrote a Christmas card to Mr. McNab in 2001 noting it was their second Christmas together.
b. Ms. Jeffrey was uncertain as to the acquisition date of the Tecumseh property. Mr. McNab's evidence was that he moved into the property in August 2001. The abstract of the property was filed as an exhibit in this trial, in relation to Mr. McNab's sale of the property in 2020. The property was transferred to Mr. McNab March 1, 2002.
c. On March 11, 2002, Ms. Jeffrey obtained a temporary driver's licence showing her address as the Tecumseh property;
d. Mr. McNab issued a rent receipt to Ms. Jeffrey for rent payment to the Tecumseh property in 2002.
Was Ms. Jeffrey a shareholder of Sports Medic Inc.?
[24] Whether Ms. Jeffrey was a shareholder of Sports Medic Inc. was a central issue at trial.
[25] It is Ms. Jeffrey's position that she was a shareholder, and, through some fraudulent or nefarious act, Mr. McNab removed her as a shareholder of the corporation prior to its sale in June 2015.
[26] Mr. McNab denies that Ms. Jeffrey was ever a shareholder. She received dividends (reflected on her tax returns but not paid to her) from the corporation in 2012, 2013, and 2014 but is not registered as a shareholder in any of the corporate records, including corporate tax returns.
[27] Mr. Menzies, the corporate and personal accountant who prepared the parties' and corporation's tax returns in 2012, 2013, and 2014, testified that Ms. Jeffrey was paid a dividend as a form of income splitting as he understood that it was permissible for a non-owning spouse to receive dividends under the Income Tax Act.
[28] In his evidence at trial, he acknowledged that he was mistaken about this, a mistake he realized only after he was required to attend to give evidence. I accept Mr. Menzies' evidence as to the error he made and his realization of it.
[29] I do not accept Mr. McNab's explanation as to when he learned that it was improper for Ms. Jeffrey to have been paid dividends as she was not a shareholder of the corporation. His evidence was internally inconsistent and speculative. It did not align with Mr. Menzies' evidence.
[30] Ms. Jeffrey's position is that she was made a shareholder when the jointly owned property on Line 3 in Niagara-on-the-Lake was refinanced in December 31, 2012 and a shareholder loan was made to Sports Medic Inc. Because half of the money advanced to Sports Medic Inc. was "her money," she was made a shareholder in recognition of this financial contribution.
[31] However, Ms. Jeffrey did not give any evidence supporting her own theory as to the reason she was made a shareholder. She did not testify about the remortgaging of the property, what she knew, if anything, about the money loaned to the corporation, about any discussions for her to be made a shareholder, or any discussion of her signing documents to become a shareholder.
[32] In 2006, Ms. Jeffrey was running a soap business through a numbered corporation (1635446 Ontario Ltd). When she no longer required the corporate entity, the only share of the corporation was transferred to Mr. McNab and there was a signed resolution of directors and agreement signed by Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab. I infer from this that Ms. Jeffrey was aware that there are formalities associated with becoming a shareholder. The absence of evidence from her with respect to her becoming a shareholder underscores my conclusion that she was not a shareholder.
[33] Further, there was no evidence presented as to the actions allegedly taken by Mr. McNab to remove her as a shareholder prior to the sale of the corporation.
[34] The senior advisor of the asset purchaser filed an affidavit confirming that, while the purchaser was conducting its due diligence, it concluded that Ms. Jeffrey had little to no involvement with the business, which would include as a shareholder of the business.
[35] The receipt of dividends from the corporation is not determinative of ownership interest. The evidence supports that Mr. McNab often files erroneous income tax returns. Receipt of rental income would not create an ownership interest in a property. Similarly, improper receipt of dividends does not create a shareholder interest.
[36] I am not satisfied that Ms. Jeffrey was a shareholder of Sports Medic Inc. The theory presented by Ms. Jeffrey was denied by Mr. McNab in his evidence. While she has proven that a mortgage was registered against the jointly owned property and that a shareholder loan was advanced to the corporation, these events do not create an ownership interest to her.
[37] Whether Ms. Jeffrey had an ownership interest in the corporation is not determinative of the degree of her involvement in the corporation or whether her actions to the business unjustly enriched Mr. McNab. The parties resolved her equitable and proprietary claims prior to this trial with Mr. McNab paying Ms. Jeffrey $1,220,000. Her involvement in the corporations remains relevant to my determinations with respect to her claim for support.
Was there a payment of $250,000 paid to Spectrum?
[38] There is a disagreement between Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab as to the amount Mr. McNab received from Spectrum for the sale of the corporate assets.
[39] Ms. Jeffrey argues that Mr. McNab deliberately undervalued the amount that he received from Spectrum for the asset sale by $250,000. It is her position that there is no evidence of money being received into the business before it was paid to Spectrum and if the funds were an account receivable that was due to Spectrum, the payment would have been revenue neutral.
[40] I accept Ms. Jeffrey's position with respect to this $250,000 payment. There is no evidence of the funds being received by the corporation before the funds were forwarded to Spectrum. Other amounts forwarded under the asset purchase agreement are reflected as being received prior to payment.
[41] The absence of evidence from Mr. McNab also supports my conclusion that the amount was not paid. He knew that this was an issue for trial and could have asked Spectrum to provide confirmation of the amount paid. He did not.
Is Scott McNab a bona fide shareholder of CTG Medical or is Mr. McNab the sole beneficial owner?
[42] After Mr. McNab's non-compete agreement with Spectrum expired, he and his brother, Scott McNab ("Scott"), began to operate CTG Medical, which operates a business that is quite like Mr. McNab's previous patient transfer business.
[43] The records of the corporation show that Mr. McNab and Scott are equal shareholders of CTG Medical. Ms. Jeffrey disputes that Scott is a bona fide shareholder of CTG Medical.
[44] Scott initially loaned a small amount of money to the corporation. This loan was repaid. But for the production of hand sanitizer during the COVID-19 pandemic, Scott has not had significant hands-on involvement in the business. Mr. McNab is responsible for the running of the business; Scott is an advisor and silent partner. The business operates in and around Niagara-on-the-Lake. Scott lives in Thunder Bay, Ontario.
[45] Scott did not give evidence at trial.
[46] Ms. Jeffrey asks that an adverse inference be drawn against Mr. McNab because he did not call Scott as a witness. Mr. McNab disputes that an adverse inference should be drawn because there is no prima facie case to meet that Scott is not a shareholder.
[47] Drawing an adverse inference from failure to produce evidence, including a witness, is discretionary. An adverse inference can be drawn when, in the absence of an explanation, a party does not call a material witness over whom he or she has exclusive control. The criterion before an adverse inference is drawn includes:
a. That the witness must have key evidence to provide;
b. There must be no adequate explanation for the failure of the party to call the witness; and
c. The witness must be within the exclusive control of the party against whom the adverse inference is sought to be drawn. See: Bishop-Gittens v. Lim, 2015 ONSC 3971, at paras. 14-16.
[48] The records indicate that Scott is a shareholder of CTG Medical. Mr. McNab's explanation for his choice not to call Scott is adequate. Scott is not within Mr. McNab's exclusive control; there is no property in a witness and Scott was available as a witness to Ms. Jeffrey. Further, given the value that Mr. McNab obtained for his previous business, it is not unreasonable that Scott would be content to allow Mr. McNab to draw funds from the corporation for his work to profit at the time of sale.
[49] I decline to draw an adverse inference from Mr. McNab's choice not to call Scott as a witness. I am therefore satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that Scott is a bona fide shareholder in CTG Medical.
Is Ms. Jeffrey entitled to spousal support? If yes, what is the nature of her entitlement?
[50] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab had a medium-term relationship of 13 years and 4 months, from March 2002 until June 2015.
[51] Mr. McNab has paid spousal support since separation; first voluntarily, then pursuant to temporary court orders, which included payment of retroactive support amounts.
[52] Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab agree that there should be no change to spousal support prior to 2020. Mr. McNab is not seeking any adjustment for amounts paid. He seeks to terminate spousal support as of the date of this decision.
[53] In the alternative, Mr. McNab suggests that Ms. Jeffrey's entitlement terminates in December 2026, 11.5 years from the date of separation (which is in line with Mr. McNab's position with respect to the duration of the relationship).
[54] Ms. Jeffrey seeks to have spousal support calculated annually for 2020 to 2023, and then an ongoing amount payable as of January 1, 2024 which shall terminate June 1, 2029. It is her position that her entitlement continues until the termination date.
[55] Ms. Jeffrey claims that she is entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis given her contributions to the patient transfer business and the retail stores, for which she was not paid a salary.
[56] Mr. McNab argues that her entitlement to support has ended, she has not taken steps during the ten years since separation to become self-supporting, and he denies that she made significant contributions towards the patient transfer business or other businesses.
[57] During the relationship, Mr. McNab was the primary income earner or income generator. He developed a successful patient transfer business. I have concluded that Ms. Jeffrey was not a shareholder of the business.
[58] Notwithstanding my conclusion that Ms. Jeffrey was not a shareholder of the business, she worked for businesses that were owned, legally, by Mr. McNab and was not paid for her work. The retail stores, with the exception of the soap business and cattery, were operated by corporations owned by Mr. McNab. Mr. McNab's profitable corporations paid the expenses of the retail businesses when they were not generating sufficient income to cover their own expenses.
[59] While Mr. McNab characterized these endeavors as Ms. Jeffrey's, he regularly presented himself to the media and the public as an owner/operator of the businesses. These retail businesses increased Mr. McNab's profile in the community and provided other benefits to the patient transfer business, including accepting delivery of goods.
[60] Ms. Jeffrey provided specific evidence of ways that she supported the patient transfer business. This included working at public events (i.e., medical standby at Safari Niagara, schools), but it was also her evidence that, when the pet retail store opened, she was only assisting the patient transfer on an as-needed basis because her focus was on the retail store.
[61] I find that Ms. Jeffrey assisted Mr. McNab as a partner, organizing holiday events for the patient transfer business and attending at a trade show. The bulk of her efforts were to the retail stores which were her responsibility. It is acknowledged that she did not receive any income for her contributions.
[62] Mr. McNab testified that, during the relationship, he was content to pay for all of the expenses to allow Ms. Jeffrey to focus on her cattery and not pursue other employment. This overlooks the time and energy that Ms. Jeffrey was putting into the retail stores.
[63] If the retail businesses had been successful, they would have generated income for Mr. McNab's corporations.
[64] I do not accept Mr. McNab's evidence that Ms. Jeffrey's cattery was making her significant income. I find that Ms. Jeffrey was spending more time on the cattery than she acknowledges, but that the expenses associated with the business were high and the income received, if any, was minimal. I do not find that the cattery was making significant income because:
a. Notwithstanding Mr. McNab's evidence that the cats destroyed the property they were living in, he purchased a new residence, as a jointly owned property, without a financial contribution from Ms. Jeffrey. If the cattery had been as lucrative as he alleges, he would have expected her to pay for the damage done to the property and/or contribute to the purchase price of the new home.
b. Mr. McNab paid for discretionary expenses for Ms. Jeffrey throughout the relationship. There is no evidence that she had any of her own funds to meet her own expenses.
c. Mr. McNab's own evidence is that he financially supported Ms. Jeffrey to expand the cattery. I infer that he would not have done so if the cattery were profitable.
[65] Mr. McNab acknowledged that, when the parties separated, he continued to pay for Ms. Jeffrey's expenses, classifying his actions as "being good to her." However, throughout the relationship, Ms. Jeffrey was financially dependent on Mr. McNab. He was aware of her financial dependence, and since she did not earn any income from the retail businesses or significant income from her cattery, he paid for her expenses.
[66] I am mindful that a spouse may have more than one ground of entitlement and the strength of the ground may shift. See: R.L. v. M.F., 2023 ONSC 2885, at para. 263.
[67] Had a property settlement not been achieved between the parties, Ms. Jeffrey's compensatory entitlement to support would have been much stronger, in order to recognize the economic consequences of the relationship and to account for her unpaid labour in support of the businesses. However, the parties did resolve her claim that Mr. McNab had been unjustly enriched as a result of her contributions during the relationship, and this lessens the degree of her compensatory entitlement. Therefore, for the period of 2020 to the termination date, Ms. Jeffrey's compensatory entitlement to support would be minimal.
[68] Ms. Jeffrey has not achieved financial self-sufficiency in the ten years since separation. Her efforts to obtain self-sufficiency have been minimal. However, I am also mindful of the unfortunate family events that occurred in her life that stalled her pursuit of employment. I find that Ms. Jeffrey also has a non-compensatory entitlement to spousal support because of the disparity in income and Ms. Jeffrey's financial dependence on Mr. McNab throughout the relationship.
What is Mr. McNab's income for support purposes?
Mr. McNab's Line 15000 income on his personal income tax return
[69] Mr. McNab is the owner of seven corporations. With the exception of CTG Medical, he is the sole owner of these corporations.
[70] It is Mr. McNab's obligation to show that his salary from the corporation(s) is a reliable indicator of his actual earnings. In this case, he acknowledges that it does not.
Imputation of corporate income
[71] The provisions for the determination of income for child support are applicable to income for spousal support purposes.
[72] Both parties submit that pre-tax corporate income should be attributed to Mr. McNab to determine his income for support purposes. See: Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 (the "Guidelines"), section 18.
[73] The onus is on Mr. McNab to show that retained earnings or pre-tax corporate income are not available for support purposes. See: Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 2001 MBCA 113, 19 R.F.L. (5th) 359, at paras. 19 and 21; Hausmann v. Klukas, 2009 BCCA 32, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 449 at paras. 51-61.
[74] Before determining what pre-tax corporate income should be attributed, section 18 requires that the court first determine what expenses, if any, should be added back to the corporation's pre-tax income. See: Ward v. Murphy, 2022 NSCA 20.
[75] Both Ms. Jeffrey and Mr. McNab retained experts to provide opinions with respect to Mr. McNab's income for support purposes. Ms. Jeffrey retained Scott Schnurr of AP Valuations Limited ("APVL") and Mr. McNab retained Michael Iantomasi of Pettinelli Mastroluisi Valuations Inc. ("PMVI").
[76] The experts were able to agree on many items, including most adjustments for personal expenses paid by the corporation, and the calculation of capital gains relating to the sale of a property in 2020. Sources of disagreement between the experts included:
(a) Life insurance premiums
[77] Whether life insurance premiums for a whole life policy paid by a solely owned corporation should be added as an adjustment of personal expenses paid by the corporation was in dispute. APVL opined that it should because there was no legitimate business reason provided. PMVI agreed that usually this type of policy would be a personal expense added back, but Mr. Iantomasi did not do so because the corporation was otherwise inactive, and the payments came from the capital of the corporation.
[78] The onus is on Mr. McNab to demonstrate why this expense was a necessary or legitimate business one. No evidence was provided. I find that these premiums should be added back as an adjustment to available pre-tax corporate income.
(b) Corporate losses
[79] PMVI opined that the pre-tax corporate income available from the group of corporations at large should be an amount that factors in corporate losses. Specifically, CTG Medical is the only profitable corporation. Given this, PMVI opined that the pre-tax corporate income of CTG Medical should be netted against the corporate losses of other corporations. PMVI agreed that corporate losses would not have been available to reduce Mr. McNab's Line 15000 income.
[80] In contrast, APVL opined that the losses of non-profitable corporations should not be used to reduce the pre-tax corporate income of CTG Medical. For the non-profitable corporations, no reduction was provided, and no pre-tax corporate income was attributed.
[81] Section 18 of the Guidelines refers specifically to pre-tax income of the corporation. However, this does not mean that corporate losses cannot be considered in calculating a corporation's income. If the corporation suffered a loss, then no amount of pre-tax corporate income may be attributed to the payor. See: Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 163.
[82] In Colivas v. Colivas, 2017 ONSC 4730, at paras. 229-33, Justice Douglas concluded, having considered the definition of income and the plain meaning of the words in the Guidelines, that pre-tax corporate losses cannot be considered in determining income under section 18(1)(a) of the Guidelines. The court did consider corporate losses each year in calculating the business income. However, where the corporate losses overwhelmed profits, the income of the corporation was nil. Then, the question becomes what part of that corporate income, if any, should be attributed to the payor.
[83] This interpretation is consistent with the court's reluctance to permit a corporate or business loss to be used to reduce a payor's income from other sources for support purposes. See: Nixon v. Lumsden, 2020 ONSC 147, at paras. 165-66.
[84] Mr. McNab's corporations are non-arm's length, given that he is the sole owner of the majority and equal owner of the income earning corporation. As held by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Mais v. Shoman, 2024 SKCA 57, at paras. 31-33:
[31] ... The Guidelines make no mention of considering the net loss of a corporation in which a parent is a shareholder, officer or director. ... Moreover, deducting a corporation's net loss before taxes from a shareholder-parent's income is inconsistent with the principle of shareholder limited liability. ...
[32] As the judge understood, every corporation has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of an individual, separate and apart from every other person. Section 18 of the Guidelines does not pierce the corporate veil; it certainly does not render a shareholder-parent liable for corporate debt. The limited liability of shareholders for corporate losses means that no parent is obliged to cover the debts of a corporation in which they hold shares, absent something like a contractual requirement to do so, such as a guarantee, or an event that negates corporate personality, such as a fraud. That legal protection remains unaffected by the Guidelines.
[33] The intention behind s. 18 is simply to permit a judge to determine whether a shareholder-parent has left money in a closely held corporation that reasonably could have been made available to the shareholder-parent for child support purposes. Accordingly, where a corporation is affiliated with or controlled by another corporation of which a child's parent is a director, officer or shareholder, then the shareholder-parent may be deemed to control whether that affiliated or subsidiary corporation's pre-tax income is made available for support purposes under s. 18 of the Guidelines. Of course, it is always open to a shareholder-parent to establish that there were valid business reasons to leave income in a corporation or that the disbursement of that income was not subject to their control, and to thereby persuade the court that the corporation's pre-tax income was not reasonably available for support purposes. [Citations omitted.]
[85] Accordingly, I am persuaded that the scenario used by PMVI where corporate losses reduced the available pre-tax corporate income of CTG Medical is inconsistent with section 18 of the Guidelines.
(c) Working capital ratio
[86] In the attribution of pre-tax corporate income, PMVI used a working capital ratio of 1.5 compared to 1.3 used by APVL.
[87] APVL acknowledged in cross-examination that it did not provide the source for the ratio used.
[88] However, notwithstanding the application of a working capital ratio, APVL opined that the use of a ratio was hypothetical, because in this case there is evidence that there were monies that were available to the shareholders, as evidenced by the use of the funds by CTG Medical in third party investments.
[89] I have accepted the position of APVL that the use of funds represents actual income available to the corporation.
(d) Losses relating to 88 South and MCO Connext
[90] CTG Medical advanced loans to 88 South, a corporation operating a restaurant in Niagara Falls, Ontario. It is acknowledged that the restaurant business was a failure, and the funds invested were lost. The total loss amounted to approximately $830,000 in 2022 and 2023.
[91] CTG Medical also advanced loans to MCO Connext, a non-arm's length corporation in the United States that Mr. McNab testified would offer non-urgent patient transfers.
[92] APVL argues that the losses incurred by CTG Medical as a result of the loans should be attributed to the respondent as pre-tax corporate income because the funds were available to CTG Medical. Specifically, it is APVL's opinion that the advancement of the funds proves that the money was available to the corporation. In other words, the fact that Mr. McNab took the money to loan to the restaurant and MCO Connext is proof that the amounts were available to him.
[93] Conversely, PMVI argues that pre-tax corporate income of CTG Medical should not be adjusted for the restaurant losses and loans to MCO Connext.
[94] While the funds were advanced in 2021 to 2023, the significant difference in the income analysis between the experts relates to 2022.
[95] In 2021, APVL suggests that Mr. McNab's income for support purposes is $363,000 while PMVI suggests income of $307,000. In 2022, the difference is larger; Ms. Jeffrey argues Mr. McNab's income for support purposes is $427,000 compared to Mr. McNab's $266,000.
[96] CTG Medical's decision to invest in 88 South resulted in a significant loss of funds to the corporation. The evidence was that the investment was poorly considered and while the initial loan was only intended to be $100,000, the corporation kept pouring money into the business without proper security.
[97] The money invested in 88 South and MTO Connext was money that was available income to the corporation, and I am persuaded that his share was money available to Mr. McNab for support purposes.
Capital gains for sale of Tecumseh
[98] On December 20, 2019, a non-dissipation order was modified to permit Mr. McNab to sell the Tecumseh property in Windsor, subject to terms and conditions.
[99] Mr. McNab sold the property in 2020. He did not report the sale of the property to any professional, including PMVI, or to Ms. Jeffrey, notwithstanding his court-ordered obligation to do so.
[100] Notably, Mr. McNab did not report the sale of the property or the resulting capital gain (of $577,319) on his personal income tax return. In subsequent years, he reported rent received in relation to the Tecumseh property.
[101] A new property was purchased in the year of sale of the Tecumseh property for $310,478.
[102] Four alternatives were considered by the experts as to how the sale of the property and the capital gains have impacted Mr. McNab's income for 2020 through 2023. Each alternative includes nominal adjustments to previous rental income included in income:
a. That the capital gain of $577,319 and a gross-up of $627,185 be included in his income;
b. That the capital gain and the gross-up be excluded from his income;
c. That the capital gain be included but the gross-up be excluded;
d. That his 2020 income be increased by the differential between what Mr. McNab received from the sale and what he paid for the new property, plus notional interest.
[103] APVL opined that the court should accept scenario one or two, either the capital gain and gross-up is included or excluded. Mr. Schnurr described scenarios three and four as being unrealistic. In particular, with respect to scenario four, he suggested that it is fictitious because there is no permissible exception for income for tax purposes if a tax payor receives a capital gain but then re-invests some of the gain into a new property.
[104] PMVI acknowledged that the fourth alternative was based on the court order that provided for the adjustment to the non-dissipation order as long as the funds were preserved in either a replacement property or GIC.
[105] There is no authority to suggest that the capital gain be included income but the gross-up, which is significant because the gain was not reported, be excluded.
[106] Either the capital gain, with gross-up, should be included income, or both should be excluded. Mr. McNab argues that it should be excluded, because it is a non-recurring gain. Ms. Jeffrey argues that it should be included.
[107] Determination of whether to include some or all of the gain in a spouse's income is discretionary and fact specific. The onus is on Mr. McNab as the payor seeking to exclude the amount from the presumptive inclusion under section 16 of the Guidelines. See: Mosher v. Bossence, 2024 ONSC 878, at paras. 268-269.
[108] Capital receipts will rarely be considered income for support purposes in circumstances where the sale of a one-off. See: Saroli v. Saroli, 2021 ONSC 4450, at para. 216.
[109] The Alberta Court of Appeal, in Ewing v. Ewing, 2009 ABCA 227, set out a list of factors the court might consider in determining whether the section 16 income calculation is fair, having regard to non-recurring gains. The factors relevant to my determination of this issue in relation to the Tecumseh property capital gain include:
a. The non-recurring gain is not a bonus or incentive payment relating to income. It is gains from the sale of a property.
b. The portion of rental income realized by Mr. McNab from the asset is very small in proportion to his other sources of income.
c. The capital does not provide Mr. McNab a significant source of income for the future.
d. Mr. McNab is not at retirement age; the sale of the Tecumseh property does not constitute his retirement fund.
e. Mr. McNab testified that he approaches all business ventures with a view to readying them for sale. Notwithstanding this approach to business, there is no evidence that the sale of real property is a source of income for him.
f. The capital gain from the sale of the Tecumseh property has not otherwise been shared with Ms. Jeffrey. The parties were not married and there is no legal entitlement to an equalization of Mr. McNab's personal assets.
g. The capital gain did generate cash for Mr. McNab, however, because he purchased a new property, the cash received is less than the capital gain realized.
h. Mr. McNab was under a court ordered obligation to preserve the asset and provide details to Ms. Jeffrey. He did not do so.
i. The funds relate to a property purchased solely by Mr. McNab early in the parties' relationship and sold several years after separation.
[110] In these circumstances, I find that Mr. McNab has rebutted the presumption that the capital gain should be included in his income because the gain is non-recurring and I find that it is fair that it be excluded.
Mr. McNab's income 2020-2023
[111] In commenting on the scenarios considered by the experts, PMVI testified that between two income calculations, the differences relate to:
a. The inclusion of life insurance premiums (about $15,000 per year);
b. The amount of pre-tax corporate income available to CTG medical (mainly because of the working capital ratio used); and
c. For 2022, his assumption that the loan to 88 South would be excluded from income available to CTG Medical.
[112] I have determined that the life insurance adjustment should be made and that the loan to 88 South should be included in the monies available for attribution to Mr. McNab.
[113] In terms of the working capital, I am satisfied that the monies of the corporation were actually used and for this reason the approach taken by APVL is a fairer determination of Mr. McNab's income for support purposes.
[114] Accordingly, I find Mr. McNab's income for spousal support purposes to be:
a. $517,000 in 2020;
b. $367,000 in 2021;
c. $427,000 in 2022; and
d. $257,000 in 2023.
Income over $350,000 ceiling
[115] Mr. McNab's income in each year besides 2023 is over $350,000 -- more significantly so in 2020 and 2022.
[116] Neither party made submissions with respect to the spousal support ceiling and what, if any, consideration should be given in determining his income for support purposes.
[117] I find that no adjustment should be made and that Mr. McNab's support obligation should be based on his actual income. In particular for 2020, because I have already excluded non-recurring capital gains, an award of support based on his remaining income fairly balances Ms. Jeffrey's compensatory entitlement and non-compensatory entitlement to support.
Post-separation increase
[118] The parties agreed that the issue for trial was support beginning in 2020, five years after separation.
[119] I do not have evidence as to Mr. McNab's income immediately prior to separation. There is no basis to determine whether or not there is a post-separation increase and, if so, if it should be shared.
Mr. McNab's income for support purposes in 2024
[120] Mr. McNab did not provide financial disclosure or income information for 2024. Both parties submit that his income for 2024 should be determined using the average of his prior three years' income. I agree.
[121] Using the incomes determined for the prior three years, Mr. McNab's income for 2024 is $350,333 or $350,000.
What is Ms. Jeffrey's income for support purposes?
[122] Ms. Jeffrey argues that income should be imputed to her in the amount of $35,000.
[123] Mr. McNab argues that income should be imputed to Ms. Jeffrey in the amount of $68,000, comprised of full-time employment at an hourly rate of $25 per hour and investment income based on a four percent return on $500,000. Five hundred thousand dollars is approximately the amount remaining of the property settlement received by Ms. Jeffrey from Mr. McNab.
[124] The rate of return on investment income of four percent (based on the post-judgment interest rate) is not contested by Ms. Jeffrey.
[125] Ms. Jeffrey is currently working a series of odd jobs. These jobs include seasonal cleaning at a bed and breakfast, commission-based sales for the local newspaper, and some limited work for a winery as an independent contractor.
[126] Ms. Jeffrey's evidence is that she has always been an entrepreneur and, without the property funds she received from Mr. McNab earlier this year, she was hamstrung in earning an income. However, the evidence at trial confirms that none of Ms. Jeffrey's entrepreneurial ventures have been financially successful.
[127] Ms. Jeffrey has not made serious efforts since separation to become self-supporting. Her job search efforts have been minimal, and she has not applied for any consistent employment. Ms. Jeffrey has taken some further training but has either not completed the program or not completed the steps required to obtain the designation.
[128] Ms. Jeffrey's plan is to accept work year-round at the winery. She hopes to work four days a week, six hours per day. As an independent contractor, she earns $25 per hour. She does not know what rate of pay she would be offered as an employee but hopes it would be the same. She wants to have three days a week to provide support to her mother and to her father.
[129] I am not satisfied that Ms. Jeffrey has made reasonable efforts post-separation to achieve self-sufficiency. I find that it is appropriate to impute to Ms. Jeffrey full-time minimum wage employment income of $35,000. At the winery, Ms. Jeffrey is earning more than minimum wage. A minimum wage income balances Ms. Jeffrey's experience, current hourly rate at the winery, training, and caregiver responsibilities for her mother.
[130] In addition to Ms. Jeffrey's employment income, as of 2025, she is earning investment income. Ms. Jeffrey's financial statement of August 27, 2025 includes investments of $530,173.41. Assuming that Ms. Jeffrey has $500,000 in capital and a four percent rate of return, this is additional income of $20,000 per year.
[131] When the settlement was paid, Ms. Jeffrey was also paid pre-judgment interest on the sum. This was intended to compensate her for interest lost between the date of separation and payment. I have not divided this interest up and included it in her income because she did not have the benefit of this sum in prior years.
[132] Accordingly, I find that Ms. Jeffrey's income for the years 2021-2024 should be imputed at $35,000 and that her income in 2025 and ongoing should be imputed at $55,000.
Should the court exercise its discretion pursuant to subsection 33(10) of the *Family Law Act* to find that Mr. McNab's conduct constituted an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship?
[133] Ms. Jeffrey argues that the quantum of spousal support should be outside of the ranges provided by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ("SSAGs") because Mr. McNab's conduct constituted an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship. The quantum she seeks is the difference between half of the amount that Mr. McNab received from the asset sale to Spectrum and the amount that she received in the settlement between the parties.
[134] Ms. Jeffrey submits that she is entitled to relief under section 33(10) because:
a. Mr. McNab removed her as a shareholder of Sports Medic Inc. through fraud;
b. Mr. McNab committed fraud by falsifying records that he received $250,000 net less on the sale of the assets; and
c. Mr. McNab breached a non-dissipation order.
[135] Section 33(10) has a very high threshold. The course of conduct must be exceptional, and it will be rare that circumstances pass the threshold. See: Bruni v. Bruni, 2010 ONSC 6568, 104 O.R. (3d) 254, at paras. 204-208; Smith v. Smith, 2013 ONSC 6261, at para. 91; Menegaldo v. Menegaldo, 2012 ONSC 2915, at para. 63.
[136] I do not find that Mr. McNab's conduct constituted a gross repudiation of the relationship:
a. I did not accept Ms. Jeffrey's position that she was a shareholder and removed fraudulently by Mr. McNab;
b. I am not satisfied that Mr. McNab committed fraud in relation to the records regarding $250,000.
c. I am satisfied that Mr. McNab breached the non-dissipation order by not providing Ms. Jeffrey with the information she was entitled to with respect to the sale of the Tecumseh property, but this would not constitute a course of conduct, nor is it exceptional. Ms. Jeffrey has not sustained any damages as a result of the breach.
d. Mr. McNab, unlike many spouses, supported Ms. Jeffrey immediately upon separation, transferring her money and paying expenses on credit cards to which she had access. Often, a party is required to bring a motion to secure payment of spousal support, and while Ms. Jeffrey did eventually need to bring a motion, Mr. McNab appropriately paid support at the time of separation.
What quantum of spousal support, if any, is payable by Mr. McNab to Ms. Jeffrey?
[137] Based on my findings with respect to income for Mr. McNab and for Ms. Jeffrey, the Guidelines suggest the following ranges of support:
| Year | Incomes | Low | Mid | High |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $517,000 | $8,134 | $9,489 | $10,845 |
| 2021 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $367,000 | $5,602 | $6,536 | $7,470 |
| 2022 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $427,000 | $6,615 | $7,718 | $8,820 |
| 2023 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $257,000 | $3,746 | $4,371 | $4,995 |
| 2024 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $350,000 | $5,316 | $6,202 | $7,088 |
| 2025 | Ms. Jeffrey - $55,000 / Mr. McNab - $350,000 | $4,978 | $5,808 | $6,638 |
[138] The "without child" support formula calculates an amount between one-and-a-half and two percent of the income difference per year of the relationship.
Ongoing spousal support
[139] For future support, beginning January 1, 2025 until the termination date, I find that an amount slightly above the low end of the range is appropriate. Specifically, support calculated at 1.55 percent of the income difference over the 13 year and 4 month relationship (13.33 years). I reach this conclusion because Ms. Jeffrey's compensatory claim is not strong. I have also considered Ms. Jeffrey's needs, as expressed in her financial statement, given that her entitlement is also non-compensatory.
[140] Ms. Jeffrey's August 27, 2025 financial statement confirms that she is not currently meeting her expenses, even when subtracting the debt to CRA that has been repaid. Ms. Jeffrey also testified that, based on her current financial resources, her current lifestyle is inconsistent with the one she enjoyed during the relationship.
[141] Mr. McNab is currently paying a monthly amount to maintain an extended health benefit plan for Ms. Jeffrey. The current cost is $242.32 per month.
[142] Ms. Jeffrey has asked that this obligation continue for as long as support is payable. I have, therefore, considered this additional cost to Mr. McNab and benefit to Ms. Jeffrey when considering the appropriate quantum of support.
[143] I find that on an ongoing basis, commencing January 1, 2025 until termination, ongoing spousal support of $5,079 per month fairly compensates Ms. Jeffrey for her contributions to the relationship and is more than sufficient to cover her needs. Mr. McNab shall receive credit for the interim support paid in 2025.
Retroactive spousal support
[144] Ms. Jeffrey argues that she is entitled to retroactive spousal support for the years 2020 to 2024. It is her position that because Mr. McNab's income is known for this period of time and has fluctuated, the quantum should be assessed on an annual basis.
[145] Mr. McNab argues that there should be no retroactive adjustment for spousal support.
[146] Since March 2020, Mr. McNab has been paying interim spousal support to Ms. Jeffrey in the amount of $3,675 per month (he paid $2,000 in January 2020 and nothing in February 2020). In addition, until the jointly owned home was transferred to Ms. Jeffrey, he was paying other expenses for her benefit. After the home was transferred, he also paid monthly premiums for Ms. Jeffrey's health benefits.
[147] I find that support should be paid for Ms. Jeffrey's benefit for the period of 2020 to 2024 and specifically, Mr. McNab ought to have paid Ms. Jeffrey 20.66 percent[^2] of the difference in their incomes as I have determined the incomes to be.
| Year | Incomes | Income Difference | Monthly Amount that was payable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $517,000 | $482,000 | $99,581/12 = $8,298 |
| 2021 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $367,000 | $332,000 | $68,591/12 = $5,716 |
| 2022 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $427,000 | $392,000 | $80,987/12 = $6,749 |
| 2023 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $257,000 | $222,000 | $45,865/12 = $3,822 |
| 2024 | Ms. Jeffrey - $35,000 / Mr. McNab - $350,000 | $315,000 | $65,079/12 = $5,423 |
[148] Mr. McNab has paid support throughout this period of time for which he shall receive credit. There are also tax implications given that this amount shall be paid as a lump sum and the parties have already filed tax returns for this period. If the parties are unable to agree on the quantum of retroactive spousal support from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2024, they may bring a motion to my attention for determination.
If spousal support is payable, for what duration?
[149] The duration of support is the duration of entitlement.
[150] I have found that the parties had a relationship of 13 years and 4 months. They have been separated for ten years, throughout which time Ms. Jeffrey has received spousal support. She has also made insufficient efforts to contribute to her own support.
[151] Ms. Jeffrey has now received compensation for her equitable claim in relation to the unpaid work done for Mr. McNab's businesses.
[152] I find that Ms. Jeffrey's entitlement to support ends June 30, 2027, 12 years from the date of separation, for the following reasons:
a. I am not satisfied that Ms. Jeffrey is unable to pursue full-time employment.
b. Ms. Jeffrey's evidence is that she was hamstrung because she did not have any access to capital following the relationship. However, none of Ms. Jeffrey's entrepreneurial endeavors during the relationship were profitable. Her new plan is to work, albeit on a very limited basis.
c. Ms. Jeffrey is capable of contributing to her own support.
d. Ms. Jeffrey was financially dependent on Mr. McNab throughout the relationship. A sufficient period of time is required to allow her to become self-supporting.
Should Mr. McNab be responsible to maintain Ms. Jeffrey on a health benefit plan?
[153] Mr. McNab has been required to maintain a health benefit plan for Ms. Jeffrey. The current monthly amount is $242.32.
[154] Ms. Jeffrey did not call any evidence as to whether she would be able to obtain her own coverage or take over the existing plan.
[155] In determining the quantum of ongoing spousal support and selecting a monthly amount at the low end of the range, I have considered this ongoing benefit to Ms. Jeffrey. Accordingly, Mr. McNab will be required to maintain the health plan until June 1, 2027, terminating effective June 30, 2027.
Should the non-dissipation order continue?
[156] Mr. McNab and many of his corporations are currently subject to a non-dissipation order originally made by Justice Henderson on April 26, 2018 and varied by Justice Edwards December 20, 2019.
[157] Ms. Jeffrey seeks an order that the non-dissipation order continue until spousal support terminates.
[158] Mr. McNab asks that all remaining claims by Ms. Jeffrey be dismissed.
[159] The evidence supports Ms. Jeffrey's assertions that Mr. McNab did not comply with the non-dissipation order, most notably in relation to the sale of the Tecumseh property. However, the non-dissipation order was put in place to protect the funds received from the asset sale to Spectrum at a time when Ms. Jeffrey had an equitable claim to them and to preserve Ms. Jeffrey's claim for lump-sum spousal support.
[160] The non-dissipation order was necessary at the interim stage, particularly because it was possible that at trial Ms. Jeffrey would be awarded an interest in Mr. McNab's assets. However, the trial has concluded and Ms. Jeffrey's equitable claim resolved on consent.
[161] There is a lump sum component for retroactive support owed to her, but on an ongoing basis, support is payable monthly.
[162] While Mr. McNab has a poor track record of following the terms of the non-dissipation order, he has a strong track record of making his interim spousal support payments. I am not satisfied that there is an ongoing need to restrain Mr. McNab or the corporations.
Final Order
[163] For these reasons, on a final basis:
a. Within 60 days, the respondent, Casey McNab, shall pay to the applicant, Lisa Jeffrey, retroactive spousal support for the period of January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2024. If the parties are unable to agree on the net amount that Casey McNab owes to Lisa Jeffrey, either party may bring a motion to my attention.
b. Commencing January 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the respondent, Casey McNab, shall pay to the applicant, Lisa Jeffrey, spousal support in the amount of $5,079 per month. Casey McNab shall receive credit for all payments he has made pursuant to the order of Justice Edwards dated December 20, 2019. If the parties are unable to agree on the credit to which Casey McNab is entitled, either party may bring a motion to my attention.
c. Provided that Casey McNab is not in default of his support payments, spousal support shall forever terminate June 30, 2027 with the last payment made June 1, 2027. At that time, Lisa Jeffrey shall have no further claims to spousal support.
d. Casey McNab shall maintain extended health benefits for Lisa Jeffrey until June 30, 2027.
e. The non-dissipation order of Justice Henderson dated April 26, 2018 and varied by Justice Edwards December 20, 2019 shall terminate.
f. SDO to issue.
Costs
a. The parties shall engage in meaningful discussions respecting the issue of costs.
b. In the event they are unable to resolve the issue of costs, the applicant shall serve and file written submissions of no more than three pages, double spaced (with case law hyperlinked), plus a detailed bill of costs and copies of any offers to settle by February 6, 2026. Responding submissions of no more than four pages, double spaced (with case law hyperlinked), plus a detailed bill of costs and copies of any offers to settle, shall be served and filed by the respondent by February 20, 2026. Reply submissions of the applicant, if any, of no more than two pages, double spaced, shall be served and filed by February 27, 2026.
c. No party shall include information with respect to the discussion to try to resolve the issue of costs.
d. If a party does not meet these deadlines, there shall be no costs payable to that party.
e. If no submissions are received, the parties will have been deemed to have settled the issue of costs as between themselves.
f. Once filed with the court, a copy of the submissions shall also be directed to my attention by email to St.Catharines.SCJJA@ontario.ca.
K. Bingham, J.
Date Released: January 23, 2026
[^1]: Ms. Jeffrey operates a savannah cat breeding business ("cattery") as a sole proprietor. A savannah cat is a cross between a domestic cat and a serval.
[^2]: 1.55 percent x 13.33 year cohabitation = 20.66 percent