CITATION: Aldridge v. Lehmann, 2026 ONSC 4247
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Kathryn Aldridge
Madhulika Dutt, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
Paul Lehmann
Respondent
Anteneh Kassa, for the Respondent
HEARD: July 3, 2026
SHORT MOTION ENDORSEMENT
Stewart J.
1Motion, by respondent father, to set aside the uncontested trial order made by the court dated October 1, 2025.
2For the reasons that follow, the motion is dismissed with costs to the applicant.
Court Materials
3Although both parties were represented counsel, none of the materials were hyperlinked, in breach of the Central West Practice Direction.
4The court may decline to hear future matters if the materials are not properly hyperlinked.
Background Facts
5The parties have two children, born 2015 and 2017. Following separation, the parties remained in the same home until that home was sold (the transaction closed in May 2026).
6The uncontested trial was considered in writing. The uncontested trial endorsement is dated October 1, 2025, and was sent to both parties by court administration on December 2, 2025.
Uncontested Trial Order
7The uncontested trial order included the following provisions:
a. Sole decision making to the applicant.
b. Parenting schedule as proposed by the applicant.
c. Table amount of child support of $828 per month based on the respondent’s annual income.
d. Support deduction order.
e. The respondent is to pay 25.5% of the children’s section 7 expenses.
f. No equalization payment to either party.
g. Severance of divorce and leave given to applicant to obtain a divorce on an uncontested basis.
h. Costs in the amount of $5000.
Test for Setting Aside Default Order
8A default order may be set aside (in whole or in part) pursuant to Family Law Rule 25(19)1. The test for setting aside a default order is the five-part test from the case of Mountain View Farms2:
a. Whether the motion to asset aside the default judgment was brought promptly following the moving party’s discovery of the default judgment.
b. Whether the moving party has established that there exists a plausible excuse or explanation for the default.
c. Whether the moving party has set forth sufficient evidence to establish that there is an arguable case to present on the merits.
d. The potential prejudice to the moving party should be motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the respondent should the motion be allowed.
e. The effect of any order the motion judge may make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.
9The test is not to be construed as a set of rigid rules; rather, the court must consider the particular circumstances of each case to decide whether it is just to relieve the defendant from the consequences of his default3.
10The onus is on the party seeking to set aside the order to satisfy the court that the test is met4.
11Ultimately, the decision to set aside (or not) is a matter of judicial discretion5.
12In assessing whether there is an arguable case on the merits, more is required than self serving statements devoid of detailed evidence supporting key assertions6.
The first factor of promptness is not met.
13The first factor in Mountain View requires the court to consider whether the motion to set aside the default judgment was brought promptly following the moving party’s discovery of the default judgment.
14Mr. Lehmann concedes that he became aware of the uncontested trial order on December 2, 2025, the date on which the uncontested trial endorsement was emailed to both parties.
15There is conflicting evidence what happened after the receipt of the endorsement:
a. The applicant says that, shortly after receiving the endorsement in December, she spoke to the respond and confirmed that he had received the order. The respondent told her that he would be speaking with a lawyer to have the order set aside.
b. The respondent says he did receive the order on December 2, but he did not understand that a final order had been made believing it to be part of ongoing settlement discussions. The respondent says he first became aware of the legal effect of the order when he received a letter from the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) on March 4, 2026.
c. The respondent’s lawyer says, without evidence, that the respondent contacted his office on December 18, 2025 (the respondent’s evidence is silent on this point). The respondent’s lawyer says, without evidence, that a filing error in his office classified this file as a non-urgent divorce matter as opposed to an urgent matter.
d. The applicant’s lawyer conceded in oral argument that there was an attempt to bring this motion in March 2026, although it was not clear to the court what the precise attempt was.
16The notice of motion is dated April 22, 2026.
17The respondent’s position that he thought the court endorsement was part of the settlement negotiations defies belief.
18The respondent learned of the default judgment on December 2, 2025. He apparently reached out to counsel in December 2025. Serving a notice of motion four months later, in April 2026, cannot be described as prompt.
Second factor: there is no plausible excuse or explanation.
19The second factor in the Mountain View test requires the court to consider if the moving party has established a plausible excuse or explanation for the default.
20To assess the respondent’s explanation for his default, it is necessary to consider the following chronology:
a. February 2025: the parties attend Peel Family Mediation for multiple sessions. The topic of the mediation was parenting issues (parenting time and decision making). The parties left the mediation with a draft agreement (which apparently did not have unanimous agreement) and the mediator’s direction to obtain independent legal advice. The respondent did not obtain legal counsel.
b. May 30, 2026: the respondent is served with the application. Specifically, he received a letter from the applicant’s lawyer, enclosing the following:
i. Application issued May 16, 2026;
ii. From 35.1 affidavit;
iii. Financial statement;
iv. Form 8.0.1, automatic order;
v. Respondent’s MIP notice;
vi. Tip sheet: automatic orders for financial disclosure in family cases;
vii. Case centre in the Superior Court of Justice;
viii. Blank Form 10 Answer; and
ix. Blank Form 13 financial statement.
The respondent’s evidence is that he thought this package was a follow up to the mediation process, rather than a commencement of a court proceeding. His affidavit is silent about what caused him to form this opinion.
c. June 30, 2026: deadline for respondent’s Answer to be served and filed.
d. August 15, 2025: the respondent is served with the applicant’s 14B motion (motion for uncontested trial) and supporting affidavit. The respondent says that he did not understand these materials as steps that would leave to a final order being made in his absence. His affidavit is silent about why he thought this.
e. December 2, 2025: the parties receive the uncontested trial endorsement. The respondent’s affidavit states he did not understand that a final order had been made, believing it to be part of ongoing settlement discussions. Again, the respondent does not support his statement with any reasons or additional information.
21The respondent received the message, on at least four occasions, that the applicant was separating from him:
a. At the mediation, parenting time was discussed – the only reason to arrange for parenting time is because the family unit is splitting up.
b. The applicant then served a formal application with supporting documents which clearly indicated a formal court proceeding had been started. To say that this package of documents pertained to the mediation is nothing more than wishful thinking. Further, even if the documents did pertain to the mediation, there is no explanation as to why the respondent did not act.
c. The respondent received the applicant’s motion in writing for an uncontested trial. The affidavit clearly sets out, on the first three pages, all of the orders sought by the applicant. To say that these documents pertained to the mediation is again wishful thinking. Again, even if the documents pertained to the mediation, there is no explanation for the respondent’s complete lack of action.
d. The final order arrived on December 2. The respondent offers no explanation about why he thought this was simply part of settlement discussions.
22The court finds that there is no plausible excuse or explanation for the respondent’s default.
Third factor: there is an arguable case on the merits on two issues.
23The third factor requires the court to consider whether there is sufficient evidence from the moving party to establish that there is an arguable case on the merits.
Spousal Support
24The respondent says that, due to the discrepancy in the incomes of the parties (the applicant earns roughly three times what the respondent earns), the respondent would have had a viable claim for spousal support.
25The respondent relies on salary differential but fails to demonstrate entitlement. He therefore does not raise an arguable case on the merits for spousal support
Equalization Payment
26The respondent also asserts that he would have been entitled to an equalization payment. During oral argument, the respondent’s legal counsel stated, without evidence, that the respondent would have been entitled to 50% of $191,000.
27The respondent produced no evidence about what his equalization would be, despite having the benefit of the applicant’s financial disclosure and access to his own financial information. In the absence of some evidence, there can be no arguable case on the merits on the issue of equalization.
28Further, the respondent alleged, without evidence, that there were misrepresentations and material omissions, in that the applicant failed to disclose that she had taken approximately $213,000 from the joint line of credit. This argument fails for the following reasons:
a. The respondent failed to support his allegation with any evidence, despite having access to those accounts, which were joint.
b. The respondent conceded, in oral argument, that this was not a material issue.
c. The applicant demonstrated, with documentary evidence, that the allegation was untrue and the $213,000 remained on the line of credit.
Parenting Time and Decision Making
29The respondent also argues that his role as a parent was minimized in the uncontested trial and he should be entitled to more parenting time as well as joint decision making.
30Parenting time: It is clear from the uncontested trial materials and the applicant’s affidavit that the applicant very much wants the respondent involved in the children’s lives.
31The uncontested trial order provides for a two-week schedule. In the first week, the respondent shall have two evenings (330pm to 8pm) at the discretion of the applicant. In the second week, the respondent shall have the children on the weekend (Friday after school to Sunday 8pm or Monday at 8pm if a statutory holiday). The schedule also addresses holiday time, including summer break then the respondent has two weeks (consecutive or non-consecutive).
32The original application sought joint decision making. The uncontested trial sought sole decision making. In oral argument (but not in an affidavit), the applicant said this change was because the respondent did not participate in the litigation, so she could not anticipate whether he would engage in joint decision making.
33It is open to the parties to agree to vary this schedule. The applicant says in her affidavit that the parties have collaborated well with respect to the parenting time arrangements.
34The court finds that the respondent has raised an arguable case on the merits with respect to parenting time and decision making.
Fourth factor: there is potential prejudice to both parties.
35The fourth factor requires the court to consider the potential prejudice to both parties: the moving party who seeks the default order to be set aside, and the responding party who obtained the default order in the first instance.
36The potential prejudice to the respondent/moving party is considerable in that he did not advance his claims for spousal support, equalization, parenting time and decision making. There is additional potential prejudice to him in that the applicant abandoned her request for equalization in the uncontested trial but would be able to assert that claim if the default order was set aside.
37The potential prejudice to the applicant is the cost (financial, time, emotional) of having to start this litigation from square one, putting her back in the place she occupied 14 months ago as well as the prejudice of dealing with the upheaval visited upon the children by this relitigation process.
Fifth factor: the integrity of the administration of justice.
38The fifth and final factor requires the court to consider the effect of any order it may make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.
39Public policy mandates the enforcement of support orders. At a minimum, the effective administration of justice requires the court to promote compliance with its own orders7.
40The fundamental foundation of the Family Law Rules is that matters are dealt with justly. This concept includes the need for parties to follow establishes processes and rules (in this case, respond to legal proceedings properly served) and the need for certainty and finality.
41The integrity of the administration of justice is also supported by having all the relevant parties to a dispute participate in the litigation of that dispute.
42On balance, this factor favours the applicant. While the respondent was absent from the proceeding, that was his choice, and not due to the fault of the applicant.
Balancing of Factors
43As noted above, the five factors are not rigid rules. The particular circumstances of each case must be considered. The ultimate question is whether it is just to uphold or set aside the order.
44On balance, the factors favour the applicant. The respondent chose not to participate in this litigation, although properly served. His reasons for not acting are nonsensical. He did not act promptly to set aside the order. He demonstrated an arguable case on only two issues: parenting time and decision making. Both parties will suffer prejudice if the order is set aside. On balance, the justice of the case requires that the uncontested trial remain in place.
45The court finds that the respondent has not met his onus to demonstrate that the uncontested trial order should be set aside.
Costs
46The parties did not reach an agreement on costs.
47There were no offers for the court to consider.
48Both parties uploaded costs outlines.
49If successful, the respondent seeks partial recovery of costs of $3627.30 (inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and HST).
50If successful, the applicant seeks substantial recovery costs of $4521.36 (inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and HST).
51As the successful party, the applicant is entitled to her costs of this motion. The applicant previously received a costs order arising from the uncontested trial.
52This matter was dealt with on a short motion. The materials were straightforward: each party filed one affidavit, each 24 pages in length (inclusive of exhibits). There were no cross examinations. There were no factums filed.
53Taking into account all the circumstances of this matter, the court finds that reasonable and proportional costs for responding to this motion are $4000, inclusive of all costs, disbursements and HST.
54The respondent shall pay costs of $4000 to the applicant within 30 days.
Conclusion
55The respondent’s motion is dismissed.
56The respondent shall pay $4000 in costs to the applicant by August 21, 2026
57Post judgment interest runs on this costs order from July 21, 2026, at the rate of 4%.
Stewart J.
Released: July 21, 2026
CITATION: Aldridge v. Lehmann, 2026 ONSC 4247
COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00112134-0000
DATE: 2026 07 21
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Kathryn Aldridge
Applicant
–and –
Paul Lehmann
Respondent
SHORT MOTION ENDORSEMENT
Stewart J.
Released: July 21, 2026
Footnotes
- Gray v. Gray, 2017 ONCA 100 at para 26 – 27.
- Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194.
- Mountain View Farms, at para 50.
- Irons v. Irons, 2020 ONSC 1471 at para 112.
- Mountain View Farms, at para 55.
- HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. v. Firestar Capital Management Corporation, 2008 ONCA 894 at para 28.
- FRO v. Berta, 2021 ONSC 2823 at para. 47.