CITATION: R v. Khogyani, 2026 ONSC 4178

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-120

DATE: 2026-07-17

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Applicant

g. Hendry, counsel for the Crown

• and -

HAMED KHOGYANI

C. Ward, counsel for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: July 17, 2026

SENTENCING

Derstine J.

Overview

1After a plea inquiry Hamed Khogyani pled guilty before me to counts 4 and 22 on the indictment which alleged that between April 2015 and March of 2018 he did procure K.C to offer sexual services, and that between April of 2015 and October of 2022 he obtained a material benefit knowing it was obtained from the commission of an offence under s.286.1(1).

2The Crown is seeking a sentence of 3-4 years less credit for time served, the defence asserts that given the time he has served and the mitigation from aspects of his time in custody and on bail, he has served sufficient time and ought to be released.

Circumstances of the Offence

3The following facts were read in and agreed to be correct:

1. In 2015, while K.C (18 years) was working under the direction of Francis Antoine, KHOGYANI (38 years old) convinced K.C to work for him in the sex-trade. At the time, a friend of K.C knew KHOGYANI and provided her KHOGYANI’s number so that she could purchase drugs from him. Following their initial conversation regarding drugs, KHOGYANI began constantly calling K.C telling her to work for him in the sex trade. The two engaged in a sexual activity and K.C eventually agreed to work for KHOGYANI. KHOGYANI and K.C began residing together. K.C eventually worked out of the Homewood Suites in Vaughan and other hotels in the area. KHOGYANI would drive to K.C to the hotels or pay for her transportation. KHOGYANI would provide drugs to K.C.

2. KHOGYANI and K.C commenced a relationship and eventually moved into a residence in Richmond Hill. K.C continued to work the sex trade in Burlington and Vaughan. K.C provided money earned through the sex trade to KHOGYANI. When K.C advised that she did not want to work, KHOGYANI would influence her to continue working in order to earn more money. K.C continued to use drugs and alcohol.

3. KHOGYANI took photos of K.C that were used in sex trade ads. K.C would set up dates with clients and KHOGYANI was aware of these dates and would drive and/or pay of an UBER to attend these dates.

4. K.C eventually became pregnant with KHOGYANI’s child. While pregnant, K.C moved into her KHOGYANI’s family residence. KHOGYANI influenced K.C to continue to work in the sex trade while she was pregnant and after giving birth to their child by convincing her that they needed the money for their family.

5. Arguments ensued between the parties and eventually K.C left the relationship in August 2017.

6. It is agreed that during the two year period she worked in the sex trade for the KHOGYANI, she earned at least $20,000 and turned over that money to him.

7. In June 2025 call J.H. (The mother of the victim) was speaking with the accused about arranging a visit with her granddaughter. During the conversation the accused asked her about K.C. and advised that he wanted to speak with her about the ongoing criminal case. The accused asked the mother if she could speak with K.C. about facilitating contact.

8. On October 22nd, 2025, at 6:57 PM, Peel Regional Police attended at the residence of the accused to conduct a bail compliance check. He was not home. He returned home at 7:11 PM. None of the exceptions to that house arrest applied.

9. On October the 28th 2025, members of the Ontario Provincial Police attended at the parking lot at 3085 Glen Erin Dr. The accused was located in his vehicle. He did not meet any of the exceptions to the house arrest condition and was therefore arrested.

The Circumstances of the Offender

4Hamed Khogyani was born on September the 9th 1978 in Saudi Arabia. He lived there with his parents and his two older brothers until he was approximately 17 years old when the family moved to Canada. He seems to have had a good childhood free of any abuse or significant trauma.

5His parents are both still alive and reside together in Mississauga. They are both retired and suffering from significant health issues. The father is 91 and suffering from dementia and heart disease and he requires around the clock supervision and care. His mother recently suffered 2 separate strokes has been diagnosed with Parkinson's disease and heart disease. Despite those issues his mother is currently acting as the primary caregiver for both her husband and the nine year old daughter of the relationship between he and the victim.

6Both of his parents are supportive of him. They are aware of the charges before the court and are committed to assisting their son to getting back on his feet. Prior to his incarceration he was residing with his parents and was contributing significantly to their care. His departure has put the family under enormous strain as his mother has had to take up the reins even in the context of her poor health. The loss of income that he was earlier providing was also difficult for his parents.

7Mr. Khogyani has two older brothers. The first works as a pilot and currently lives in San Francisco he is aware of the charges before the court and is supportive of his brother. He is unable to assist his parents as he lives in another country. He does not have a close relationship with his other brother.

8Mr. Khogyani completed his high school education in Saudi Arabia and attended Humber college for a short period of time. He dropped out due to lack of interest. He later obtained degree in business administration from Humber College. It was during this period that the offences took place.

9The defence asserts that after the birth of his daughter in 2017 the accused committed to turning his life around and establishing himself as a stable and reliable father. To that end he obtained employment as a cleaning supervisor at a company and has worked there for approximately 2 years before finding a new job as an assistant operations manager at a housekeeping company. He worked there until his incarceration in October of 2025. Is uncertain whether this employment is available to him upon his release.

10The accused has had full custody of his daughter since 2020. Prior to that time he shared custody with the victim who resided in North Bay.

11There is affidavit evidence that the daughter that he and the victim share has not been doing well since the accused has been in custody. The principal at her public school swore an affidavit indicating among other things that her separation from her father appears to have exacerbated her pre-existing issues. She reports that the accused was present and actively engaged in the raising of his child and participated actively in her life at school.

12The accused was released on bail with respect to these charges on April 19th, 2024. The conditions required him to remain in his residence at all times except for employment purposes between 8:00 AM and 6:00 PM or while in the direct presence of one or more of the sureties. This condition was enforced by GPS monitoring. He was also restricted from possessing or using a cell phone or any device capable of accessing the Internet except while in the direct presence of a surety. He was bound by these conditions until October of 2025 when he was detained because of breaches of his bail. Those charges have been withdrawn but the fact of the breaches is before me as an aggravating feature on his sentence.

13Mr Khogyani submitted a written statement to the court by way of allocution and also made some additional statements in court.

14The effect of these statements was to express his sincere remorse and accept the full responsibility for the actions that led to his convictions. He asserted that he deeply regrets the decisions that he made and accepts responsibility for his participation and the consequences which have followed. He stated that he was pleading guilty because he wanted to avoid putting the victim through additional stress and trauma of testifying in court. He hoped that the victim could find closure and move forward. He spoke of raising their child and how this has been the most important responsibility of his life. He spoke of the fact that over the last 10 years he has worked to live a responsible and law-abiding life. I accept that he was being sincere and remorseful for his actions.

The Impact on the Victim

15The victim in this case read out a victim impact statement in court. I find it to be heartfelt and truly troubling. She recounted meeting Mr. Khogyani when she was 18 years old and was in a very vulnerable place in her life. She felt like she had few options and from the beginning she believed what he was telling her. With the benefit of hindsight, she can see how his manipulation started almost immediately. He would criticize her appearance sending her videos and the like for her to improve her appearance. He made her feel as if she was never good enough.

16She recounted how the impact of these comments stayed with her long after the relationship ended. It created years of insecurity and self-doubt. By the time she left him she could barely go grocery shopping without having an anxiety attack. She constantly heard his voice in her head criticizing her and making her doubt herself. He played a significant role in her addiction by providing substance and encouraging their use and normalizing that lifestyle throughout their relationship. She has a strained relationship with the daughter she bore to the accused and tragically her daughter reproaches her for having her father be in custody.

17I excerpt the following to give a flavour of her statement:

As I have grown older and become a parent myself, I have reflected on the age difference between us when he targeted me. Today, the age gap between us then is similar to the age gap between me and my own daughter. As a mother, I cannot imagine pursuing someone that young. It has made me realize even more clearly how predatory his behaviour was. I was young and vulnerable and this allowed me to be manipulated, isolated, and exploited for his own benefit.

The damage caused by his actions cannot be measured only by the years I spent with him. It includes the years of treatment, the loss of confidence, the trauma, the anxiety, the impact on my parenting, the damage to my relationship with my daughter, and the lasting effects on my daughter and family. While I am proud of how far I have come, I should never have had to fight so hard to recover from the harm he caused.

While I cannot change what happened to me, I have worked hard to rebuild my life. I have fought for my recovery, my children, and my future. Today, I am no longer the vulnerable young woman he met years ago. I stand before the Court stronger than I was then, but the impact of his actions will remain with me for years to come.

I ask the Court to consider not only what he did, but the long-lasting impact it has had on every part of my life. I ask that the sentence imposed reflect the seriousness of the harm caused and the lifelong consequences that continue to affect me and my family.

The Principles of Sentencing

18Under s. 718 of the Criminal Code the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives listed in s. 718. These objectives include:

• denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

• deterrence of the offender and other persons from committing offences;

• separation of offenders from society, where necessary;

• assisting in rehabilitating offenders; and

• promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

19A “just sanction” is a proportionate sanction. Punishment must be neither excessive nor inadequate. Under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, a sentence must be proportionate both to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

20Under s. 718.2, additional principles, must be taken into consideration in sentencing, including the following:

• assessment of the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender must be informed by “any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances in relation to the offence or the offender [See: s. 718.2(a)];

• parity in sentencing must be respected: “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances” [See: s. 718.2(b)]; and

• the principle of restraint must be respected – under s. 718.2(d), “an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances” and under s. 718.2(e), “all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders…”

21I also recognize that the principle of restraint does not concern only the decision to imprison or not to imprison but entails that the duration of imprisonment should be the shortest period consistent with the proportionality of sentence and the achievement of the objectives of the sentence.

22I take into account the fact that Parliament through the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act has indicated in its preamble that the sex trade is inherently exploitative. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 it would have been open to Parliament to decriminalize and regulate the sex trade. Instead, Parliament adopted a variant of the so-called “Nordic Model” which has been adopted in several other countries. This model views the sex trade as a form of sexual exploitation. It targets those who created the demand for prostitution and those who capitalize on it. (See R. v. N.S., 2022 ONCA 160 at para 19-21)

Range of Sentence for Offences of this Nature

23Sentencing judges frequently begin their assessment of a fit, just and proportionate sentence with the search for an established range of sentences applicable to the offence or offences in question. Ranges are helpful guidelines. They assist courts in adhering to the parity principle – ensuring that like cases are treated alike. Ranges are not, however, meant to be fixed or inflexible: see R. v. D.D., , [2002] O.J. No. 1061 (C.A.). They must play a servient role in the individualized sentencing process: see R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at para. 43.

24Both Crown and defence counsel provided the court with a number of cases in an attempt to assist the court in determining the appropriate range of sentence applicable to the circumstances of this case. I have reviewed their cases and will comment on them briefly.

25Crown counsel provided several cases focused on the appropriate range in similar cases, including R. v. Ramocan, 2024 ONSC 6247, R. v. Elansooriyanathan, 2025 ONSC 5823, and R. v. Nicholson, 2026 ONSC 503.

26In Ramocan, Carnegie J. conducted a thorough review of the applicable caselaw and concluded that the range of sentence for offences under s. 286.3(1) is one to five years imprisonment. For first time offenders, he found the range to be one to three years.

27Carnegie J. was particularly influenced by the decision of Trimble J. in R. v. Williams 2023 ONSC 4648. Trimble J. determined that the appropriate range of sentence for s. 286.3(1) offences is one to five years, with the subrange of one to three years for first offenders who offer a guilty plea.

28I have also considered the dicta from Campbell J.’s decision in R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749, where he suggested that sentencing judges consider a number of factors when assessing the gravity of the offence and moral blameworthiness of the offender in pimping-related offences. These factors include: the degree of coercion/control, the money received, the age and number of complainants involved, the vulnerability of the complainant, the working conditions, and the level of planning and sophistication involved.

29Both counsel accepted based on the above authorities that the appropriate range for crimes of this sort where there has been a guilty plea is 1-3 years. The Crown submits that this case exceeds these parameters, I will address those submissions later in these reasons.

30The defence points to cases such as R. v. Lucas-Johnson, 2018 ONSC 4325, R v. Garcia, 2020 ONCJ 31 and R. v. D.A.L, 2025 ONSC 134 to show cases at the lower end of the established range. I accept that there is support in those cases for sentences at the lower end of the range for offences bearing significant similarities to the case at bar. There are of course differences in the precise factual matrix but so there are in most authorities cited.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

31The age of the victim is aggravating in the circumstance. She was between 18 and 20 years old when she was the victim of the conduct Mr. Khogyani. He was also much older than she was, he was 38 when she was 18.

32The victim had previously worked in the sex trade but I do not see this as a mitigating or aggravating factor. The defence would have me put this in the mitigating category because she was not recruited into the sex business but rather continued it. The other side to this is that she was already vulnerable for being in that industry and he took advantage of her youth and drug addiction to perpetrate the crimes for which he has pled guilty.

33Her earnings were considerable, at least $20,000, though the number of years that she was working cause this figure to be less significant on a day-to-day or month to month basis.

34Fundamentally this is an unusual case in that the offender and the victim lived together and had a child together and were in many respects in a committed relationship during the currency of most of the crimes to which he has pled guilty. The defence asserts that this places him on the lower end of the continuum of severity because their relationship was not purely commercial and not purely exploitive. The difficulty I have with this submission is that encouraging someone with whom you are an intimate partner relationship to continue to sell sexual services for money has elements of a breach of trust which sit uncomfortably with a mitigating aspect for sentencing.

35On the other hand, it is true on the facts before me that they were in a committed relationship and it appears that a substantial amount of the money that was earned went into paying common expenses in that relationship. This was not a situation where the perpetrator was buying luxury goods while his victim worked in squalor and hotel rooms. The victim in this case did perform work in hotel rooms but for much of her time stayed in a house with the offender.

36On margin I am inclined to treat this situation as being a neutral factor. It has features which are aggravating and features which are mitigating but when taken together do not pull my analysis as to the severity of the offence in one direction or another.

37There is no indication that he used violence against the victim and no indication that he confined her. He did persuade her to work when she did not want to but persuasion, even if morally odious, is not the same as confinement. He persuaded her to work while she was pregnant, and I take this as an aggravating feature.

38The crown asserts that the two-year span of the crimes before the court are a significant aggravating feature. I do not dispute that a longer period of criminality is more aggravating than a shorter period and I take that into account.

39A significant mitigating feature of this case is that there was a guilty plea, acknowledgment of responsibility and the sparing of the victim the need to testify. As to the timing of the plea a little bit more background needs to be mentioned. This matter came before me for trial but after several false starts it appeared that the two main accused in the indictment before me wished to plead guilty to some of the offences on the indictment. Once that occurred there was discussion about continuing with this accused on several remaining charges, but this resolution was placed before me for a plea to only two offences.

40The defence asserts that there would have been a plea at a very early stage of these proceedings had this resolution been suggested by the crown. They assert that the crown was always seeking a lengthy period of custody on a number of charges, and it was only at the last moment that they changed their position no doubt in response to the rest of their case proceeding to plea. The crown does not contest that the resolution to only two charges was not one which was available before, and it does agree did there may well have been a resolution had this offer been made at an earlier occasion. I do not fault the crown on this record for having taken a different position very close to the trial time. Their case had substantially changed given that the main two accused I decided to plead guilty.

41For these reasons I give substantial mitigation to the accused for his plea and acknowledgment of responsibility, and I do not discount this mitigation by the fact that it was made close in time to his trial. This would seem to put him squarely in the range of one to three years mentioned in the case law above subject to the position of the crown that it is worth more time in custody.

42The defence submits that there has been a very substantial passage of time, around nine years, since these offences. They say that the accused has led a pro social life since then, has supported his parents and taken care of his daughter as her primary caregiver. He has obtained and kept gainful and responsible employment and does not appear to be in need of specific deterrence by way of further incarceration.

43I accept that the passage of time diminishes substantially the need for specific deterrence in the case of the accused. To that extent it is clearly a mitigating factor. It appears that he has lived pro socially and usefully, he has raised his child apparently carefully and has not participated in any further criminal activity. I do note however that he breached his bail several times which undercuts somewhat his assertion that he has lived an entirely pro social life since the victim moved out of the home almost a decade ago.

44I do still take note however that undetected crimes are still crimes and the need for denunciation and general deterrence are not lessened by the passage of time. While this is not a sexual assault case, the lessons of historical sexual assault sentencing include the notion that the passage of time cannot overwhelm a fit and appropriate sentence for the nature of the crimes that have been found or admitted to.

45That said it is also well to recall the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at paras 113-114 that “doubts as to the effectiveness of incarceration as a deterrent have been longstanding”.

46In this case and on these facts, I find that the passage of time since the criminal activity to which the offender has pled guilty is a factor which diminishes the need for further incarceration beyond that which has been served. I also accept that nine years of pro social behavior and having turned his life around in the absence of legal sanction speak well to his prospects for the future.

47The defence submits and the crown does not contest that the ongoing incarceration of the offender would have significant effects on two parties who are utterly innocent of these crimes.

48The first are the parents of the accused who are elderly and in poor health and who rely significantly on the offender to assist them in this time of their greatest need.

49The second is the child over the relationship between the offender and the victim who is currently living full time with the offender’s mother. There is evidence before me in the form of the affidavit from the school principal asserting that she is doing less well since her father's incarceration.

50While these circumstances do nothing to mitigate the crime, they do provide a reason to consider a lesser period of incarceration. Both parties on the evidence before me will be substantially disadvantaged if the accused remains in custody and I certainly take that into account in forming my judgment as to a fit and proper sentence in this case.

51Mr. Khogyani has no criminal record, and this is a significant mitigating factor.

52The defence filed many testimonials as to his good character and to his change in life since the birth of his child. These letters are detailed and heartfelt, and I accept that they are truthful and reflect his real changes since the time when he was involved in the criminal offences for which I am to sentence him today.

Pre-trial Custody and Related Mitigation

53The parties agree that as at the date of the sentencing submissions Mr. Khogyani had served 252 days in pre-trial detention. This means that as at today’s date he has served 271 days. The Summers credit for this is 407 days.

54He served 44 days of his sentence in lockdown at the Maplehurst Detention Centre. He was also triple bunked for 49 days. He is entitled to mitigation of his sentence for that fact. The terrible conditions of incarceration which persist at that Institution are all too well known in this jurisdiction.

55He was also on a house arrest bail for 596 days until he breached that bail. This would generally call for a Downes credit which is commonly given in the 1/3 to 1/5 ratio on the caselaw. It is also in my discretion not to give such credit for good cause.

56The crown asserts that I should not give such credit because the accused breached the terms of his bail and was incarcerated as a result. I am not prepared to find that this is a proportionate response to his actions. As a first offender even if he was convicted of one or two breeches, they would not likely have resulted in a very significant custodial sentence. The most serious of them is the attempt to communicate with the victim but it was an attempt only and never resulted in any contact. The offences of being at large outside of your curfew time but not committing any secondary criminal offences may or may not have attracted a custodial sentence. If I am to take an ordinary Downes credit ratio of 4 to one, It would result in a credit of approximately 150 days. This is significantly in excess of the sentence which he would have likely received had he pled guilty to a couple of breaches of his bail.

57In this case I prefer to give the Downes credit and consider his breaching his bail as part of the general circumstances of aggravation in the charge in general. This elevates the credit for his pretrial incarceration and bail to 557 days. I also must consider the overall mitigation of his sentence for having been subject to lockdown.

58It is in this context that the defence says that the offender has served a sufficient amount of time to meet the goals of sentencing.

59The Crown asserts that this case ought to depart from the 1–3-year range for three reasons. They cite the two-year duration of the offences, the age disparity and the fact that she was persuaded to work while pregnant as being factors of especial aggravation which warrant such a departure.

60I am not persuaded that these factors mandate a departure from the one to three-year range in the case law. All offences of this nature are morally odious and deserving of significant sanction. All of them underlie exploitation and wrongful acts toward a vulnerable party.

61On the evidence before me although the criminal behavior was ongoing for two years the amount of money earned indicates that this was hardly a daily occurrence. Some unfortunate victims are forced to perform a very large number of acts over a short period of time. Others are alleged to have been persuaded to perform a number of acts over a much longer period. It is not clear to me that the second paradigm is aggravating compared to the first.

62The age disparity is certainly worthy of comment. More youthful people can benefit from the court's recognition that youth and inexperience often make for bad choices which may not be reflected for the rest of a person's life. People who are relatively older cannot benefit from such a presumption and should generally be held to the idea that they should know better than to be engaging in such acts. It is easier for an older person to exert influence over a younger person although these courts are full of cases where younger people exert significant influence over people their own age. While I am prepared to find that this is a modestly aggravating circumstance, it is not the kind of circumstance that would take the case outside of the range set out in the case law.

63Finally, the fact that she was urged to work during the currency of her pregnancy is morally odious but so is the fact that she was urged to perform sexual services while in a relationship with the accused. The expressed reason for having her work during this was because the money was needed for common expenses. In those circumstances while this is an aggravating feature it again is not the kind of aggravating feature to move the matter outside of the established range.

64I hasten to add that while I have considered these three matters individually, I have also considered them very much as a whole. It would be wrong of me to only consider them individually and while I have addressed them in that manner, I have also considered the aggravating features together and considered whether together they would cause me to exceed the range which the crown and the defence have conceded is the ordinary one for offences of this nature.

Conclusion

65For these reasons I find that the range of one to three years is an appropriate range in which to sentence Mr. Khogyani. I will not repeat all the mitigating and aggravating circumstances which I have discussed already in these reasons.

66Fundamentally, given the passage of time of some nine years since the date of the offence and his pro social life since then, combined with the very real need of his parents and child to see him no longer in custody, considering his guilty plea, his remorse, his lack of criminal record, and his support in the community, I find that it not necessary for him to serve further time in custody to fulfil the goals of sentencing. Given his credits for time that he has served in custody and on bail and the mitigation for his treatment in custody, his time already served is somewhat less that the midway point in the range. In these circumstances and paying particular attention to the needs of his child and parents, it is not necessary to incarcerate him further. I consider the principle of restraint in sentencing as playing a real role in my decision.

67I therefore sentence him to one day in custody after giving him credit for 557 days of pre-trial credit. I am not including his credit for his treatment in custody because of the direction from the Court of Appeal that such factors go to mitigation of the sentence and ought not to be deducted from an otherwise appropriate sentence. I did assess his treatment in custody as mitigation, and it is another reason why it was not necessary to incarcerate him further.

68Probation as a condition was not requested by the Crown and was not addressed by the defence. In those circumstances I will not impose it of my own motion. I considered a non-communication order, but the parties share a child and may well wish to have communication for that purpose. They do not live in the same city, and the victim has moved on with her life. If Mr. Khogyani communicates inappropriately with the victim, I would expect that to be the subject of charges which would be dealt with through that mechanism. He would be wise to be very careful in his communications with her.

Ancillary Orders

69Pursuant to s. 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada I order that Mr. Khogyani provide his bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis and inclusion in the National DNA Data Bank.

Released: July 17, 2026

CITATION: R v. Khogyani, 2026 ONSC 4178