ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Harvey Albert Blair Packulak
Self-represented, for the Moving Party
Moving Party
- and -
Wanda Mobishwash and The Estate of Michelle Magiskan (Packulak)
Carly A. Deboni, for the Responding Parties
Responding Parties
HEARD: February 26, 2026, at Thunder Bay, ON
Madam Justice T.J. Nieckarz
Decision on Motion
Overview:
[1] Mr. Packulak (the “Applicant”) brings this motion for contempt against Wanda Mobishwash (the “Respondent”).
[2] Mr. Packulak is the estranged spouse of the deceased, Michelle Magiskan (Packulak). The Respondent is the deceased’s mother.
[3] The Applicant seeks to have the Respondent found in contempt of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Order of Newton RSJ, dated November 4, 2025, and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Order of Brochu J. dated November 13, 2025. The Applicant argues that contrary to the terms of the said orders, the Respondent failed to preserve the assets of the Estate of Michelle Magiskan (Packulak). Specifically, he argues that the Respondent wilfully and in contravention of said orders, depleted, purposely discarded, moved, and stole, the estate assets. He acknowledges that he will not likely see any further estate assets given the actions of the Respondent. He seeks payment of a fine by the Respondent, a restitution order in his favour, and costs of the proceedings equal to his accommodation costs and lost wages. In total, he seeks $7,135.38.
[4] The Respondent denies having committed contempt. She argues that she did not understand the contents of the orders and therefore cannot be said to have “wilfully” disobeyed them. She further argues that she acted in good faith during a particularly traumatizing situation. She urges me to dismiss the motion and order costs against the Applicant.
[5] For the reasons outlined below, while the Applicant has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent has committed civil contempt, in the circumstances of this case, I decline to make a contempt order. A contempt order would serve no purpose in this case. A costs order against the Respondent is appropriate.
Background:
[6] On October 4, 2025, Michelle Magiskan (the “Deceased”) died suddenly under tragic circumstances. She was survived by her mother, siblings, her two children (ages 13 and 7), and her estranged spouse, the Applicant.
[7] Ms. Magiskan died intestate. While she was legally married to Mr. Packulak, they had been living separate and apart at the time of her death. The Respondent was under the mistaken belief that the Applicant and the Deceased were legally divorced.
[8] Upon Ms. Magiskan’s death, the Respondent immediately attended at her apartment to care for the minor children, make funeral arrangements, and deal with the Deceased’s belongings. The apartment at 350 Bay Street, Thunder Bay, Ontario, was jointly leased by the Applicant and the Deceased.
[9] At the time of her death, the Deceased lived in the apartment with her children. The Respondent understood from the landlord that she was required to vacate the apartment by the end of November 2025. She began taking steps to sort and clear out the Deceased’s belongings and prepare her grandchildren to move.
[10] The Applicant commenced these proceedings on October 24, 2025, and subsequently brought an urgent, without notice motion on November 4, 2025. He sought, amongst other things, an order freezing the assets of the estate of the Deceased (the “Estate”). He takes the position that as the surviving spouse, he is the sole beneficiary of the Estate. He hired counsel to make an application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee Without a Will, but has been self-represented with respect to this proceeding.
[11] The Applicant further took the position that the Respondent had moved into the apartment that he is the rightful tenant of, had excluded him from funeral arrangements, had begun to pack belongings, and was giving belongings away.
The Order of Newton RSJ
[12] On November 4, 2025, Newton RSJ made the following Endorsement, containing the following orders (the “Newton RSJ Order”):
“This came before me as an urgent motion made without notice.
Given the circumstances as set out in the affidavit of Harvey Packulak, it appears that there is potential that assets either owned by him or owned jointly with the deceased (his spouse) may be taken by other parties or dissipated.
Accordingly, the proposed order will issue on a temporary basis and will continue until November 13, 2025, at 4:30 p.m. and will expire thereafter unless it is continued by further order of the court.
This endorsement and the notice of motion, affidavit, and order shall be personally served upon Wanda Mobishwash forthwith and this motion is adjourned to motions court November 13, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. to be heard by videoconference.”
The Zoom meeting coordinates for the next court appearance were provided in the Endorsement.
[13] On November 6, 2025, the Applicant caused J.R. Remus, an individual hired by him, to serve the Endorsement of Newton RSJ and the proposed order, on the Respondent. The order itself was not issued until November 30, 2025, through no fault of the Applicant. He did not receive it until December 1, 2025.
[14] The draft order that was served on the Respondent provided for the preservation of various assets and delivery of others to the Applicant. While the later issued order differed slightly from the proposed order with respect to matters such as the duration of the order, the Respondent’s obligations did not differ.
[15] The documents were accompanied by a letter dated November 5, 2025, from the Applicant to the Respondent. The letter did not alert the Respondent to the fact that the order was only a draft. The letter directed the Respondent to “immediately cease all actions dealing with the estate and assets.” The letter further stated that assets were to be made available for inspection, and “ownership and keys” were to be turned over. A response was demanded by 5:00 p.m. on November 6th, 2025, failing which the Applicant would be seeking remedies related to contempt.
[16] The Applicant states that on November 7th, he received a text message from the Respondent telling him he can “…take everything.” A copy of the undated message was attached to the Applicant’s affidavit as an exhibit. The Respondent does not deny having sent it, neither does she address it in her affidavit.
The Order of Brochu J.
[17] The matter returned to court on November 13, 2025, before Brochu J. The Respondent did not attend. Brochu J., endorsed the record that the Respondent was properly served with all materials. Brochu J., was not aware that only a draft order had been served on the Respondent. The Affidavit of Service of Mr. Remus referred only to service of an “order”. No order was uploaded to Case Center. In addition to continuing the terms of the Newton RSJ Order, Brochu J., added a term providing that the Applicant may attend at the Bay Street residence with the police to retrieve the assets listed in paragraph 5 of the Newton RSJ Order.
[18] Paragraph 5 of the Newton RSJ Order did not list the assets. As that order had not yet been issued, Brochu J., could have only had the draft November 4th order before her. The assets listed in paragraph 5 of the draft included the white Volkswagen Atlas vehicle (the “Atlas vehicle”), the Indian Sport Scout and the Honda Rebel motorcycle, along with keys and ownerships for the vehicles. Ultimately, this became paragraph 6 of the Newton RSJ Order.
[19] Instead of the Applicant going to the apartment to retrieve the items with the assistance of police, as ordered, the Applicant sent Mr. Remus on November 17th. Mr. Remus did not have the assistance of police. His affidavit says that he attended because the order had not been issued yet directing the police to attend with the Applicant. Mr. Remus also states that he had received a text message from the Respondent saying that if the Applicant showed up with police, she would make an allegation of a sexual nature against him. No copy of this email was attached to Mr. Remus’ affidavit, and it is curious as to why he would attend alone in the face of such threats.
[20] Mr. Remus attended the property prior to the time that was pre-arranged with the Respondent. This caused some issues and distress on the part of the Respondent.
[21] Mr. Remus attests that he attended the property to recover the keys, ownerships, financial paperwork, and to “inventory” Estate items. The exchange between him and the Respondent, who was grieving the loss of her daughter and not particularly cooperative, was troubling. When Mr. Remus declared that anything the Deceased owns belongs to the Estate, the Respondent replied “He’s not going to take it from me.” Mr. Remus made comments such as “Oh well, not my problem”, and made improper threats about having the court evict her the following day. He argued with the Respondent and threatened her with contempt for not providing him with access to the property. The Applicant attending with police, as required by the court endorsement, may have avoided this unfortunate situation and the additional distress caused to both parties.
[22] During the exchange with Mr. Remus, and in reference to the court documents she had received, the Respondent indicated that she cannot read. Having said this, it was clear that she was not going to willingly turn over the property. There was some discussion about items that the Respondent perceived as belonging solely to her daughter, and she clearly stated that Mr. Packulak was not going to get them.
Further Court Appearances
[23] The matter returned to court again on November 27, 2025, before Newton RSJ. The Respondent attended. The Endorsement reflects that she took no issue with Mr. Packulak’s ownership of the motorcycles, but the ownership of other property was disputed. The matter was adjourned to the next motions court.
[24] On December 4, 2025, the matter returned before Newton RSJ. The Respondent did not appear. The Endorsement provides for the issuance of an order declaring Mr. Packulak the owner of the undisputed motorcycles once the Certificate of Appointment issues. The Endorsement does not indicate the next appearance date.
[25] On December 11, 2025, the matter returned to motions court, and the Respondent appeared. Fitzpatrick J., adjourned the matter to permit the Respondent to file materials, and he also set out a timetable. That timetable was not complied with by the Respondent. The parties reappeared before Brochu J., on January 22nd, 2026, and a further timetable was set out.
[26] The Respondent says she vacated the Deceased’s apartment in late November, taking the children and their personal belongings with her to her own apartment, but nothing else. In preparation for the move, throughout the months of October and November, the Respondent moved the few items of furniture and personal items that belonged to the Deceased into the basement storage of the apartment building. The exception to this was her personal clothing, which was taken by a family member to be stored for a year in accordance with their Indigenous customs and traditions. She says that there were limited assets as the Deceased had been selling personal items prior to her death to deal with her mounting debt. She says that the Rebel motorcycle was sold prior to death. She says there were no financial records as her daughter had disposed of them all prior to her death. The Respondent says that it was her understanding that the Applicant could pick up the few personal property items from the apartment building storage if he wished. She moved the furniture and personal items of the Deceased to the storage unit. She also claims that the apartment was left open during the funeral and was “ransacked”. Mr. Remus witnessed and took images of an apartment that appears fully furnished and an unlocked, open, storage locker with a few items that did not include furniture. These images were captured in late November, after the funeral.
The Motion for Contempt
[27] On December 2, 2025, the Applicant brought this motion, seeking a finding that the Respondent is in contempt of the orders. The issued orders were served along with the motion materials on December 3, 2025.
[28] The Applicant says that the Respondent blatantly defied the court orders when she:
a. Refused to give his agent (J. Remus) Estate assets when he attended on November 17, 2025.
b. Made statements in the presence of Mr. Remus that she was not providing the Applicant with “the car..fish tank…kitchen table set”. She further denied there were keys or vehicle ownerships for any vehicle, or that there were “financial papers”. She alleged that some items had been stolen when she left the apartment/storage door open, and financial documents had been previously shredded by the deceased.
c. Removed the outdoor portable shed and 2025 Indian Sport Scout motorcycle contained inside and placed the motorcycle with a relative of hers.
d. Removed a 75-inch large screen wall-mounted television.
e. Removed a white, Volkswagen Atlas vehicle, contrary to the terms of the orders, and refused to return it to him, provide the keys, or ownership papers.
f. Refused to provide him with the contents of the apartment, including any financial documents.
g. Moved all estate assets from the Bay Street apartment despite the order requiring the preservation of estate assets. This is evidenced by Facebook posts made by her and the vacant apartment.
[29] The Applicant was able to track down the location of the motorcycle, without the assistance of the Respondent, and recover it. He does not have keys or ownership papers for this item.
[30] The Applicant has a photograph of the Atlas vehicle parked at the Deceased’s address on November 27, 2025. The vehicle is then seen at another location, where the motorcycle was recovered from, on December 1, 2025. The Respondent says this is her apartment. She says that her daughter’s landlord said the vehicle had to be moved from the parking space, so she did. She did not deliver it to the Applicant, as required.
[31] The Respondent advises that the Atlas vehicle has been repossessed by the finance company (or bank – it is unclear).
[32] As indicated, video surveillance taken by Mr. Remus when he attended at the property shows an apartment that was fully furnished. The Applicant has received no furnishings. A Facebook post by the Respondent confirms that she ‘cleaned out’ the Deceased’s apartment. The post is not dated. The screenshot is dated November 27, 2025, with the post indicating it was made three days prior (on or about November 24, 2025).
The Legal Test for Contempt:
[33] Rule 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, provides that a contempt order may be obtained to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act.
[34] A contempt order is a declaration that a party has acted in defiance of a court order. The wilful defiance of a court order attracts consequences. Respect for the courts, and the Rule of Law, is directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, at para. 30.
[35] The test for civil contempt was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carey v. Laiken, at paras. 33-35, as having three components, which must be proved by the moving party beyond a reasonable doubt:
a. The order alleged to have been breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done;
b. The party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it; and
c. The party alleged to be in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do that which the order compels.
[36] Contempt can attract serious consequences. It is a discretionary power. It is seen as a remedy of “last resort”, and ought to be reserved for cases where the court wants to express its outrage: Ruffolo v. David, 2019 ONCA 385, at para. 18, citing Carey v. Laiken, at para. 36.
[37] A court may exercise its discretion to decline to make a contempt finding where it would be unjust to do so, such as where the alleged contemnor has acted in good faith to take reasonable steps to comply with the court order: Carey v. Laiken, at para. 37.
Analysis:
Test for Civil Contempt
(1) Whether the Orders are Clear and Unequivocal?
[38] The Respondent acknowledges that the Newton RSJ Order, dated November 4, 2025, as continued by the order of Brochu J., states clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done. I agree:
a. Paragraph 3 clearly states that the Respondent shall cease and refrain from depletion, selling, giving away, changing ownership, damaging, or moving any assets of the Estate of her daughter until further order of the court.
b. Paragraph 4 of the Order requires the Respondent to provide the Applicant with access to financial documents and records of any assets stored at 350 Bay Street.
c. Paragraph 5 requires the Respondent to allow the Applicant to inspect the estate assets personally, take images, and give him unrestricted access and knowledge of the whereabouts of those assets on request.
d. Paragraph 6 requires the keys, ownerships, and vehicles of the deceased to be held in the care of the Applicant until the appointment of an Estate Trustee.
[39] I also find that the Order of Brochu J., dated November 13, 2025, is clear and unequivocal, as follows:
a. Paragraph 1 of the Order continues the Newton RSJ Order pending the appointment of an Estate Trustee; and
b. Paragraph 2 provides for the attendance, by Mr. Packulak, at the Bay Street residence, along with the police, to retrieve the assets set out in paragraph 6 of the Newton RSJ Order.
(2) Whether there was Actual Knowledge of the Orders?
[40] As mentioned above, the issued orders were not served on Ms. Mobishwash until December 3, 2025, although she received copies of the Endorsements shortly after they were made, along with a draft order accompanying the Newton RSJ Endorsement.
[41] In Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation 145, 2014 ONCA 574, at para. 59, relying on Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. v. Cutter (Canada) Ltd., 1983 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 388, at p. 398, the Court of Appeal for Ontario made it clear that the lack of issuance of the order is not fatal to a finding of contempt. When no formal order has been issued, contempt may still be found if the reasons and/or endorsement, viewed as a whole, are clear as to the obligations of the alleged contemnor.
[42] I find that the Endorsement of Newton RSJ, when read in context with the proposed order referenced in the Endorsement, and served with the Endorsement, was clear as to the obligations of the Respondent. Similarly, the Endorsement of Brochu J., made it clear that the Newton RSJ Order was to be continued. I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had knowledge of the contents of the orders, despite having received only the Endorsements and draft order, and not having received the issued orders.
(3) Whether there was Intentional Non-Compliance of the Orders?
[43] The Respondent does not take issue with the lack of timely service of the issued orders. Rather, her actions in not complying with those orders occurred prior to service of the issued orders.
[44] The Respondent denies contempt on the basis that she did not wilfully or intentionally commit acts that constitute breaches of the orders. She says that any breach that may have occurred was unintentional.
[45] The Applicant must establish beyond a reasonable doubt an intentional act or omission that is a breach of an order – he need not establish that the Respondent intentionally disobeyed the orders: Carey v. Laiken, at para. 38. A contumacious intent (deliberate desire to flout the authority of the court) is not an element of civil contempt.
[46] The Respondent argues that she did not understand what she was required to do. She argues that she is a day school survivor with a Grade 8 education and did not understand what the served Endorsement was. She argues that her lack of understanding is demonstrated by her failure to appear in court until November 27th. Her alleged inability to understand a clear order may be characterized as a problem of knowledge more so than intent, although I acknowledge that conceptually, it could affect both. Regardless of where this analysis is conducted, I find that the Applicant has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had knowledge of the requirements of clear orders, and that she intentionally committed acts that breached the Newton RSJ Order.
[47] The Respondent also defends her actions on the basis that the sudden and tragic loss of her daughter had left her in a state of significant distress, with her focus being protecting her grandchildren and providing a proper funeral for her daughter consistent with her First Nations’ traditions. She says that she could not afford to pay her daughter’s landlord rent to remain, or have the belongings remain in the apartment beyond November 30th and did what she needed to do. She was under the impression that the Applicant had taken what he wanted (even though there is no evidence of him taking anything). There was no wilful or intentional act that was contrary to a court order. She says she acted reasonably given her grief, the interests of her grandchildren, and her knowledge at the time. By the time she retained counsel to explain her obligations to her, the acts complained of had already been committed.
[48] I note that the Respondent’s affidavit attributes her lack of understanding of the impact of the Endorsements to her Grade 8 education. Furthermore, in her interactions with Mr. Remus, she indicated she could not read. This claim was not made in her affidavit. I am left to doubt the veracity of each of those statements (i.e. lack of understanding and inability to read) for the following reasons:
a. While I accept that the effect of an Endorsement may not always be clear to a lay person, both Endorsements (Newton RSJ and Brochu J.) made it clear that orders were being made. Brochu J.’s Endorsement specifically stated, “I make an order that the Order of Newton RSJ dated November 4, 2025 shall continue until the appointment of the estate trustee”. There was no doubt that orders had been made and what those terms required with respect to the assets of the deceased.
b. I have concerns with respect to Ms. Mobishwash’s credibility. Her statement to Mr. Remus that she cannot read seems to be contradicted by her Facebook account and the regular posts she makes. While it is possible that others may regularly assist her with these posts, I have no evidence to that effect.
c. I also note the text message sent by Ms. Mobishwash to Mr. Packulak in early November telling him he can “take everything” but “not the kids”. She specifically noted that “I don’t care about the vehicle or motorcycle I just want her kids with me so back off about the kids they aren’t yours”. There was nothing in her affidavit denying that either the Facebook posts or this message was authored by her.
d. Even if I give Ms. Mobishwash the benefit of the doubt with respect to her ability to read or cognition given her level of education, this text suggests to me that Ms. Mobishwash had an understanding of what the issues were that were raised by the Endorsements, and her obligations. She made a clear statement that suggests she was aware of Mr. Packulak’s claims to the personal property of the Deceased and specifically references the vehicle and motorcycle that were referred to in the Endorsement/Proposed Order. Despite knowing that the vehicle and motorcycles were an issue in early November, and despite a court appearance acknowledging that the remaining motorcycle was the property of Mr. Packulak, Ms. Mobishwash still moved both items to her apartment address. She did not deliver them to Mr. Packulak as she was required to do by paragraph 6 of the Newton RSJ Order. She did this after having been served with the Endorsements and proposed order.
e. Despite knowing that there was a court proceeding commenced over her daughter’s belongings, and that orders had been made, and despite her interactions with Mr. Remus, the Respondent continued to clean out the apartment, posting on social media about doing so. If she was concerned about the expiry of the tenancy, she should have contacted the Applicant to discuss storage of the Deceased’s items pending a determination of the issues in this proceeding.
f. Ms. Mobishwash knew that there was a court proceeding. She had family help with her attendance at court and while at the apartment with Mr. Remus. She knew what the issues were and what the Applicant’s claims were. I find her excuse for non-compliance with the orders based on a lack of understanding disingenuous for the reasons set out in this decision.
g. The video taken by Mr. Remus also confirms that the Respondent was aware of Mr. Packulak’s claims with respect to the possessions in the Deceased’s apartment. She even argued that he could not have certain items because they were not acquired during the marriage period. It is clear to me that the Respondent did not feel that the Applicant was entitled to anything given that he was estranged from the Deceased and given the Respondent’s perception of his treatment of her daughter. I find that she was fully aware of his claims, that court orders had been made, and what those orders required. She disagreed with those claims and proceeded to clear out her daughter’s apartment despite the clear terms of those orders. She also did as she wished with the contents, regardless of the orders. Her actions demonstrate intentionality.
h. I also do not accept the Respondent’s evidence that there was little remaining furniture, or that what was there had been ransacked when the door to the apartment was not locked during the funeral. While I cannot say that all the items claimed by the Applicant were still in the apartment at the time of the Deceased’s death, Mr. Remus’ video still shows an apartment that was appropriately furnished. I also do not accept that the Respondent placed the furniture in the storage locker and left it unlocked, believing that the Applicant would come to retrieve the items from the locker. At no point in her communications with the Applicant did she indicate she was doing this. In any event, moving the belongings to the storage locker in and of itself is an intentional act that was committed in breach of paragraph 3 of the Newton RSJ Order. Even if it were not, moving the car to her apartment on December 1st instead of delivering the keys and vehicle to Mr. Packulak was an intentional act that resulted in a breach of the order. I find that the evidence is consistent with a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Mobishwash did in fact commit intentional acts that were contrary to the Newton RSJ Order, as continued by Brochu J.
[49] Based on my credibility findings with respect to the Respondent, I also find it difficult to believe that there was not a single record in the Deceased’s apartment to be provided to the Applicant in compliance with the terms of the order; not a single bill, bank statement, or credit card statement. I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to provide such documents, however limited they may or may not have been, was intentionally done with knowledge of the obligations imposed by the court orders.
[50] I do not find the Respondent’s example of not attending court until November 27th compelling evidence of her lack of understanding of her obligations. In other words, it does not create reasonable doubt as to her ability to understand her obligations under the orders, particularly given my other findings. The Endorsement of Newton RSJ provides for a return date for the motion (but does not state she is required to attend), while the Endorsement of Brochu J., does not provide a return date. The lack of understanding of a need to attend court is understandable in these circumstances, whereas the Respondent’s obligations with respect to the assets and records of her daughter were very clearly set out.
[51] I find that the Respondent’s actions with respect to the records and personal property of her daughter were intentional. The Facebook posts she made indicate that she felt it was her responsibility to her daughter and grandchildren to attend to the clearing out of her daughter’s apartment. By continuing to do so after the Endorsements came to her attention, Ms. Mobishwash committed intentional acts that constituted breaches of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 (in part) and 6 of the Newton RSJ Order.
Discretion to Decline Making a Finding of Contempt
Whether Civil Contempt should be Found in this Case?
[52] At para. 37 of Carey v. Laiken, Cromwell J., noted that a judge may properly exercise his or her discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case. Those circumstances were not delineated.
[53] I find that this case is one in which a finding of contempt should not be made.
[54] I acknowledge the tragic circumstances facing Ms. Mobishwash at the time she was served with the Endorsements and the unimaginable grief she must have been experiencing. I also acknowledge that the claims of her daughter’s estranged spouse must have been extremely frustrating for her to manage in the circumstances. While I have considered these factors, they alone do not cause me to decline to exercise my discretion in favour of a finding of contempt.
[55] In my view, very little purpose will be served by a contempt finding in this case. Contempt is a power that the court should exercise sparingly. While the power of contempt may be required to preserve the dignity of the court and respect for its process, the goal of contempt is primarily compliance with court orders. Punishment for defiance of those orders is a secondary purpose. Rule 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates a contempt order being made to require a person to do an act, or refrain from committing an act that is required by an order.
[56] Mr. Packulak has acknowledged (reasonably so) that the personal property items are gone and likely cannot be recovered. If Ms. Mobishwash still has some of them, she is not acknowledging that fact and is denying it. While Mr. Packulak claims restitution in his notice of motion, there is no evidence as to what that amount is. Beyond the limited video evidence of Mr. Remus, it will be difficult to ascertain with any certainty what assets remained in the possession of the Deceased at the time of her death. I do not know what may have belonged to the landlord or the Deceased (i.e. appliances). The Respondent’s actions have caused the Applicant some costs, which can be compensated for without a finding of contempt. The Applicant now primarily seeks to recover those costs. A contempt order is not required to compensate him for his costs.
Whether an Alternate Order is Just?
[57] Rule 60.11(5) provides that in disposing of a contempt motion, the judge may make such order as is just. I find that the Respondent’s actions in refusing to cooperate with the Applicant have frustrated the intent of the orders made and have unnecessarily increased the costs of this proceeding. Therefore, despite a lack of finding of contempt, costs payable by her are appropriate.
[58] Neither party made submissions as to costs at the hearing. This is not unusual, as generally the first stage of a contempt proceeding focuses on the finding of contempt and not the penalty or remedy. Mr. Packulak has provided a chart of the costs he claims, but it is problematic and requires further evidence. Ms. Mobishwash’s counsel has provided a Bill of Costs, but has not commented on the specific costs claimed by Mr. Packulak, who is self-represented.
[59] Further evidence will be required from Mr. Packulak as follows:
a. Verification of the process service fees incurred (invoices) and payment;
b. Verification of the Service Ontario fees paid and reason for them;
c. An explanation as to why the “Larson Legal Fee deposit” of $1,000 is applicable to this matter in which Mr. Packulak was self-represented;
d. A detailed explanation of how 30 hours claimed at $75 per hour was arrived at for preparation of “self-representation forms”;
e. Verification of the $482.38 claimed for “Hotel accommodations in Thunder Bay”, and an explanation as to how that charge relates to this proceeding. All appearances in court were virtual;
f. Verification of the $2,220 claimed for “lost wages/travel expenses from Dryden 12 hr day shift x 5 days”, including a detailed listing of dates and why that time was missed; and
g. Verification of “Court Costs x 2 appearances $400”. The court does not charge such fees. Is this a lost wages claim?
Order:
[60] The Applicant’s motion for a finding of contempt is dismissed, with costs payable by Ms. Mobishwash to Mr. Packulak.
[61] The parties shall schedule a one-half hour hearing to deal with costs.
[62] Mr. Packulak shall serve on Ms. Mobishwash (through her counsel), and file with the court, his supplementary affidavit and bill of costs no later than 30 days prior to the hearing date, limited to five pages (not including attachments), double spaced.
[63] Ms. Mobishwash shall serve and file her responding materials no later than 7 days prior to the hearing date, limited to five pages (not including attachments), double spaced.
[64] Any Reply shall be served and filed by Mr. Packulak no later than 3 days prior to the hearing date, limited to two pages, double spaced.
___________________________________
The Hon. Madam Justice T.J. Nieckarz
Released: July 16, 2026
CITATION: Packulak v. Mobishwash et al., 2026 ONSC 4149
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-0485-ES
DATE: 2026-07-16
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Harvey Albert Blair Packulak
Moving Party
- and –
Wanda Mobishwash and The Estate of Michelle Selena Magiskan (Packulak)
Responding Parties
DECISION ON MOTION
Nieckarz J.
Released: July 16, 2026