Home Trust Company v. Russell, 2026 ONSC 4105

CITATION.: Home Trust Company v. Russell, 2026 ONSC 4105 COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-00002039-0000

DATE.: 2026-07-14

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton ON L6W 4T6

RE:

HOME TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiff

AND:

RUSSELL, Beatrice Naomi, Defendant

BEFORE:

Justice Trimble

COUNSEL:

KOVASEVIC, Sonny, for the Plaintiff

Self-Represented, for the Defendant

HEARD:

July 7, 2026, In Person

ENDORSEMENT

The Motion

1The Plaintiff brings this motion for Summary Judgment against the Respondent, Ms. Russell, under its mortgage. The motion was returned on June 23, 2026 before Derstine, J., who adjourned it at Ms. Russell and her son’s request so that she could seek counsel. Derstine, J.’s endorsement was unclear whether he adjourned it to July 2 or July 7. The motion returned before me on July 2. I adjourned it to July 7 because it appeared to me that Derstine, J., in fact, adjourned the motion to July 7.

Position of the Mortgagee

2The Mortgagee submits that it has a fully enforceable mortgage, which is properly documented. Ms. Russell had counsel throughout. The Mortgagee advanced $450,000 to her, which she received. The whole of the transaction is documented, including the expenditures counsel made on her behalf. The defences Ms. Russell raises are specious.

3Ms. Russell, on November 24, 2021, gave a mortgage to Computershare Trust Company of Canada for a period of one year, to secure the loan of $450,000.00 at a rate of 10.490%, compounded half-yearly. The Charge was registered in the Land Registry Office for the Land Titles Division of Peel (No. 43) as Instrument No. is PR3949999.

4The Charge was transferred on March 20, 2025 from Computershare Trust Company of Canada to Home Trust Company and the transfer was registered as Instrument No. is PR4443210. The Charge was renewed from time to time in accordance with its terms.

5The Mortgage provides that on default in payment by Ms. Russell, the mortgage, at the mortgagee’s option, becomes payable and the mortgagee shall be entitled to possession of the Property.

6Ms. Russel defaulted in payment on February 1, 2025. The default continues. The mortgage matured on December 1, 2025, at which time the balance of the principal, outstanding interest, and expenses, became due. She did not pay out the balance, arrange for alternate financing, or extend the mortgage. As of 1 May 2026, the claimed balance is $508,397.23

7The mortgagee issued its Notice of sale on March 21, 2025, and served its demand for possession on 6 May 2026. Its Statement of Claim as issued on May 8, 2025.

Ms. Russell’s Position

8Ms. Russell says that there was no mortgage, but if there was, it is not enforceable. She makes the following arguments:

a. She thought that she was merely taking an unsecured loan to pay off assorted debts including the over $140,000 she owed to the CRA;

b. She never intended to give a mortgage. She already had a small mortgage;

c. She paid off the mortgage upon the closing of the mortgage when she gave the Mortgagee on closing “a promissory note that was accepted for value.” in the amount of $443,011.26;

d. The Mortgage was a collateral mortgage to secure a debt taken under a promissory note. Since the Mortgagee did not produce the “original promissory note”, the collateral mortgage is not enforceable;

e. Ms. Russell was never shown any documents that show that the loan was given by the Mortgagee or its predecessor;

f. The Mortgagee has never produced an original ledger indicating what payments, if any, were made;

g. In any event, she argues that there is no property to enforce against since she transferred the property to the Beatrice Naomi Russell Trust, in exchange for which she obtained a promissory note of payment which she registered under the Personal Property Security Act, which she says takes priority over the mortgage.

9On the above bases, Ms. Russell says that the Mortgagee’s motion should be dismissed.

10She goes further, arguing that the action should be dismissed under R. 2.1. Since there is no mortgage to enforce the action is vexatious. She seeks judgment against the Mortgagee for return of the $443,011.26 that she paid by the promissory note she gave on closing of the mortgage transaction.

11Many of these arguments were only advanced orally.

Ms. Russell’s Representation

12Two people appeared on Ms. Russel’s behalf: Richard Russell, Ms. Russell’s son, (as he had at the two earlier attendances) and a person who identified himself as “Cameron” who said that he was appearing for “the Trust”. Later in the Motion, Cameron identified himself as Cameron Richards.

13The Mortgagee did not raise any objection to his speaking on Ms. Russell’s behalf. She was present in the Court.

14I advised the gentlemen and Ms. Russell that under a) R. 15.01 a live person may act for him/herself. Anyone other than a lawyer may not a for a live person; and b) under anyone acting in a representative capacity (such as for a trust) must have a lawyer. I advised them that the Court has no jurisdiction to allow a non lawyer to represent a live person or someone acting in a representative capacity. For the purposes of the motion, however, I did not insist on the application of R. 15.

Result

15The Mortgagee’s summary judgment motion is allowed, with costs, as detailed below.

Analysis

16The Mortgagee’s motion for Summary Judgment is allowed for substantive and procedural reasons.

Substantive Reason

17The test for a summary judgment motion, set out in Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is the court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or a defence. This rule is to be broadly interpreted to ensure a timely, affordable, and proportionate procedure that will lead to a fair and just result (Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para. 5 and 66). All parties are expected to put their best case forward on summary judgment motions.

18I am satisfied that based on the record before me that I am able to find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles to resolve the issues raised in the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence. I need not resort to the enhanced fact-finding powers granted in Rule 20.04(2.1) to fairly and justly resolve the dispute.

19The plaintiff has established its claim. It took a mortgage from Ms. Russell and advanced $450,000 to her. The Lawyer’s trust ledger (which Ms. Russell signed to indicate she received a copy of the statement and understood it) indicates that $142,567.19 was used to pay off her CRA debt, various sums were paid to pay off other smaller debts, and that $22,283.67 was paid to Ms. Russell.

20Ms. Russell has not advanced any defence which would give rise to a genuine issue requiring the trial of this action or raised any factual allegation that I can accept.

21From her Statement of Defence, the material she filed on this motion, and Mr. Russell’s and Mr. Richards’ submissions, it appears that Ms. Russell ascribes to the complex and impenetrable “Organized, Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments” espoused by members of the “Freemen on the Land”, “Sovereign Citizens”, or similar groups. All of these arguments have been rejected by Courts all across Canada beginning with Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, and in particular paragraphs 544 to 547 and the cases that have followed it.

22Many of these Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial schemes or strategies are “money for nothing schemes” or “debt elimination schemes” that are well known, and uniformly rejected as debunked, specious theories (see for example: Community Trust Company v. Peart-Williams et al., 2025 ONSC 6753), at para. 2 and Bonville v. President’s Choice Financial, 2024 ABKB 483, at para. 6).

23Ms. Russell pleads or argues two of these “money for nothing” schemes before me. First, she argues that she paid off the mortgage at the time the mortgage deal closed, by delivering a promissory note, which the Mortgagee accepted as payment in full of the loan. Second, she argues that at some point after she gave the mortgage, she transferred the encumbered house into “the Beatrice Russell Trust” and then registered PPSA security against the property for the amount of the promissory note, which she argued has “1^st-in-time priority” over the mortgage.

24The foregoing is sufficient, alone, to allow the Mortgagee’s Summary Judgment motion.

Procedural Reasons

25I also find that Ms. Russell has not placed any proper evidence before the Court. This, alone, is sufficient to allow the Mortgagee’s Summary Judgment motion.

26The signature of the commissioner who administered the oath or affirmation to Ms. Russell which is contained in the jurat, is illegible. Further, there is nothing else to reveal the identity of the commissioner who purported to take administer the oath or affirmation to Ms. Russell. Currently, lawyers and paralegals registered with The Law Society are required to identify themselves by name and by LSO number. There is no such identifier here. Therefore, there is no evidence before the Court (see: Vinski et al. v. Lack et al., 1987 CanLII 4408 (ON HCJ); Reyes v. Esbin, 2016 ONSC 7755 at para. 27).

27A second procedural irregularity is the stamp affixed by whomever administered the oath or affirmation to Ms. Russell. If the only issue in this motion was the form of the stamp of the commissioner who administered the oath or affirmation to Ms. Russell, I would have adjourned the motion and demanded an affidavit from the alleged commissioner, requiring evidence of the commissioner’s status as a commissioner, including when s/he received his/her appointment as a commissioner for taking of affidavits and administering oaths and his/her registration number.

28A commissioner, who is not a lawyer, is required by s. 4(5) of the Commissioners for Taking Affidavits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.17 to use a pre-approved stamp to be affixed to the jurat. In this case, the commissioner’s stamp reads:

MOOR HOUSE LAW OFFICE

4 Silver Maple Crt Brampton, ON L6T 4R2

cameron bey; June [‘June’ is handwritten] commission 2028 [the ’28’ is handwritten]

I.N.A.R. Consulate Public Minister

29This is not a standard, approved commissioner’s stamp. It does not a) identify cameron bey as a commissioner, b) give the date on which the commissioner gave the oath or affirmation, and c) does not give the day, month, and year of the expiry of the commissioner’s office. It refers to him as “I.N.A.R. Consulate Public Minister”. This is not an office which is not one under which persons become commissioners by dint of office per s. 1 of the Commissioners for Taking Affidavits Act, or regulations thereunder.

30Finally, there is the problem of ‘cameron bey’ who appears to be the alleged commissioner.

31The Mortgagee suggested that the person before the Court who identified himself as “Cameron” and spoke on behalf of “the Trust” had been disciplined by the Law Society of Ontario, referring to the 8 July 2022 order of Pollack, J., in LSO v Cam Ra El Bey et al, Court File No: CV-22-679086. I asked Mr. Cameron if he was the Cameron Bey referred to in that order. He said no. I asked him for his full name, which he said was Cameron Richards.

32In her Order, Pollak, J. held that “Cam Ra El Bey, aka, Cameron Bey, cameron bey, Cam Raael Bey, carrying on business as Moor House Law Firm, aka Moorish Law Firm,” were all permanently enjoined from practicing law or providing legal services or holding themselves out as able to practice law or provide legal services. On July 25, 2023, Merritt, J., in a judgment in the same court file, held Mr. Bey, cob as Moor House Law, in contempt of court for breach of Pollack J.’s order and ordered Mr. Bey incarcerated for 12 days.

33The stamp that the commissioner applied in this case says it is on behalf of Moor House Law Firm, which is subject to Pollack, J.’s prohibition.

34I make no finding that Cameron Richards and Cameron Bey (or his aliases) are the same.

Damages

35In addition to principal and interest, the Mortgagee claimed the following fees, without evidence supporting them as reasonable estimates of actual fees incurred:

Return payment fees: $ 1,000.00

Maintenance fees: $ 576.30

Tax administration fees: $ 480.25

Renewal fee: $ 950.00

Property inspection fees: $ 600.00

Property inspection invoice: $ 186.45

Legal administration fee: $ 1,295.00

Discharge administration fee: $ 395.00

Out of pocket/E-registration fee: $ 85.00

Total: $ 4,481.55.

36I assume that the claims for legal fees paid and taxes paid were paid by the Mortgagee, even though no invoices or other proof of payment was provided.

37In the absence of evidence that the charges in question reflect real costs legitimately incurred by the respondents for the recovery of the debt, in the form of actual administrative costs or otherwise, or reasonable pre-estimates of such costs, I conclude that the only reason for the charges was to impose an additional penalty or fine on the debtors, apart from the interest otherwise payable under the Mortgage, thereby increasing the burden on the Defendant beyond the rate of interest agreed upon in the Mortgage. The courts have not hesitated to disallow similar charges on the basis that they offend s. 8 of the Interest Act (see: P.A.R.C.E.L. Inc. v. Acquaviva, 2015 ONCA 331 at para. 96).

38Since the Mortgagee did not provide evidence to support the above fees, I disallow them.

39Accordingly, Judgment is granted for $503,915.68.

40Pre-Judgment interest is at 10.49% per annum, compounded half-yearly, for the period of 4 May to 13 July 2026 inclusive.

41Post-Judgment interest is at 10.49% per annum, compounded half-yearly beginning 14 July 2026.

Costs

42The plaintiff mortgage successful on this motion and, therefore, presumed entitled to its costs.

43I will decide who pays whom costs, and in what amount, based solely on written submissions, not to exceed four double spaced, typewritten pages, excluding bills of costs or offers to settle. The plaintiffs submissions shall be served and filed by 4:00 p.m. 31 July 2026, and the respondents shall be served and filed by 4:00 p.m., 21 August 2026. There will be no right of reply.

44Finally, since the Defendants are self represented, their approval as to any judgment arising from these Reasons is dispensed with.

Trimble, J.