G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 409

Citation: G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 409

COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-395-01

DATE: 2026-01-21

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

G.P.R. Applicant Mother

– and –

A.K. Respondent Father

Counsel:

Fadwa Yehia, for the Applicant Mother

Maninder (Monty) Sheena, for the Respondent Father

George van Hoogenhuize, counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, for the child, L.N.K.

HEARD: IN WRITING

SUPPLEMENTARY REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON COSTS, SECTION 7 EXPENSES AND THE FATHER’S 14B MOTION DATED JANUARY 5, 2026

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

PART I: OVERVIEW

1I heard a trial in this matter over the course of 16 days in May, June and July of 2025. The trial concerned parenting issues, the division of the parties’ jointly owned residence in Thornhill (the “Thornhill Property”), occupation rent, post-separation adjustments, child support, retroactivity, and special and extraordinary expenses pursuant to section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 as amended. The property issues involved arguments about the validity of a Cohabitation and Mortgage Agreement, and a Separation Agreement. The mother called expert evidence about the former.

2I released my Judgment on September 22, 2025 (the “Trial Judgment”). In it, I invited costs submissions in writing, the timelines for which were later extended as a result of a post-trial 14B Motion brought by the father. I also allowed the parties to file brief submissions in writing about the quantum and apportionment of section 7 expenses that had been incurred between February 2025 and the date of the Trial Judgment, but not yet properly shared.

3The mother seeks her full recovery costs of the trial in the sum of $342,216.40. She says she was successful, she achieved a result more favourable than an Offer to Settle she served on November 17, 2024, and the father did not achieve results more favourable than his three Offers to Settle. She also says that the father behaved in bad faith, whereas she behaved reasonably.

4The father does not seek costs. But he says that the mother’s costs of the trial should be fixed at $7,600.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable within 120 days. He says there was divided success, he did not act in bad faith, there was some unreasonable behaviour on the part of the mother, and the costs award should reflect his inability to pay.

5Neither party sought costs against the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, nor does the Office of the Children’s Lawyer seek costs.

6The mother asks the Court to order that the father owes her section 7 expenses in the amount of $5,256.33, for the period between February 2025 to September 22, 2025. The father did not file any further written submissions about the outstanding section 7 expenses issue.

7Finally, while this Supplementary Judgment has been under reserve, the father brought another 14B Motion dated January 5, 2026. In it he asks the Court to empower him to rent out a portion of the Thornhill Property on various terms. The mother opposes the request.

8For the reasons that follow, I find the father shall pay costs to the mother in the amount of $220,000.00 and section 7 expenses for the period of February 2025 to September 22, 2025 are fixed in the $5,256.33 amount claimed by the mother. The father’s latest post-trial motion, this time respecting the Thornhill Property, is dismissed.

PART II: COSTS

A. Offers to Settle

9In advance of the November 2024 trial sittings (when this case might have first gone to trial), the mother served a severable Offer to Settle dated November 18, 2024. It was open for acceptance without costs until November 20, 2024.

10The conditions in rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules are met because the trial didn’t start until May, 2025; the mother made this Offer more than seven days before. The Offer didn’t expire, and it wasn’t withdrawn prior to the trial either. The mother achieved results that were more favourable than the parenting and child support terms she proposed in her severable Offer to Settle.

11Regarding parenting, the mother proposed to settle for a form of joint decision-making, with parenting time for the father, including the division of holidays, and other ancillary terms. By contrast, the Court’s Order respecting the parenting issues was far more restrictive, based on the concerning evidence I heard at trial about the child’s best interests. The trial ended with the mother having decision-making responsibility and the father having very limited parenting time on strict conditions.

12Regarding child support, the mother also offered that the father’s income would be imputed at $100,000.00 per year. She did not seek child support for prior periods (prior to the Offer), even though she would go on to do so at trial. In other words, she proposed prospective child support only, starting in the first month that this case might have initially gone to trial (November 2024).

13While the Court didn’t order a commencement date for child support until February 1, 2025, it imputed an income of $200,000.00 to the father, i.e. double the amount the mother had proposed in her Offer to Settle. Any shortfall on account of the fact that the Court ordered a start date in February 2025 as opposed to in November of 2024, is more than made up for in the difference in the table amount of child support ordered consequent on the higher income imputation.

14Regarding section 7 expenses, the Court at trial essentially ordered the same section 7 expenses as those listed in the mother’s severable Offer. However unlike in the severable Offer, which proposed a 50-50 split between the parents, I ordered the father to pay 60%, proportionately based on his greater income that I imputed.

15As indicated, the father served three Offers to Settle. I agree with ¶ 4 of the mother’s written submissions, that neither could not be accepted because the parenting provisions were problematic, as were the child support terms.

16I find that the mother is entitled to costs from the date her severable Offer was served, and full recovery costs thereafter, but only in relation to its parenting and child support terms. She did not achieve a result more favourable than her offer regarding the Thornhill property.

B. Success

17Even if she had not served that Offer, the mother would have been entitled to costs based on her success. The presumption of success set out in rule 24(3) of the Family Law Rules applies in the mother’s favour, although I agree with the father that there was some divided success.

18When I compare her trial position to what the Court ultimately ordered, the mother was completely successful regarding the parenting issues. The father lacked success.

19The mother lacked some success regarding child support, in that her trial position about the incomes she asked the Court to impute to the father exceeded the $200,000.00 amount that I imputed, and in that she sought child support for prior periods of time that I did not order. However the mother protected her exposure here, with her Offer, as indicated.

20The father lacked success regarding his position about child support, both about his income, and who owed who child support. At one point he argued that the mother owed him money for an overpayment, which he then didn’t pursue at the end of the trial.

21Neither side enjoyed success regarding their various positions about enforcing or setting aside one or both domestic contracts. As indicated in the Trial Judgment, both sides took different positions and brought mid-trial motions about the pleadings, with the ultimate goal of departing from titled ownership and the buyout to which they agreed in the Separation Agreement, but in different ways that benefitted each of them. I found that they were each disingenuous and maneuvered.

22The Court held the parties to their property bargain in the Separation Agreement. While I agree with ¶ 5 of the mother’s costs submissions, that the Court recognized she had an ownership interest in the Thornhill Property, this is not tantamount to great success, when compared with the position she took at trial, and in light of the Court’s finding about her (and for that matter, the father’s) trial conduct in relation to this issue.

23The mother will not be given costs in connection with the property issues. She should have just conceded that the property terms of the Separation Agreement were perfectly fine and valid, and should be enforced.

24As such, my assessment of success overall, is this is a case of divided success under rule 24(4) of the Family Law Rules, but not evenly divided success. Or if I am mistaken and she was the more successful party regarding the Thornhill Property, then I would still reduce her costs anyway under rule 24(7) respecting this issue. The reduction in time will include that the mother does not get her experts’ fees, for the expert whose testimony she called, but I found I did not need, and I did not rely upon.

25The mother otherwise enjoyed success regarding her requests for security for costs and prejudgment interest. She lacked success regarding her claims for other adjustments, occupation rent, and for life insurance and health benefits. She asked for orders for the latter at the end of trial, without the necessary evidentiary basis before the Court. But these were minor issues in comparison to the others dealt with above, which consumed far more trial time.

C. Bad Faith

26Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules says that if a party has acted in bad faith, the Court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.

27At ¶ 17 of S.(C.) v. S.(M.), Perkins J. defined bad faith as behaviour that is:

…carried out with intent to inflict financial or emotional harm on the other party or other persons affected by the behaviour, to conceal information relevant to the issues or to deceive the other party or the court. A misguided but genuine intent to achieve the ostensible goal of the activity, without proof of intent to inflict harm, to conceal relevant information or to deceive, saves the activity from being found to be in bad faith. The requisite intent to harm, conceal or deceive does not have to be the person’s sole or primary intent, but rather only a significant part of the person’s intent. At some point, a party could be found to be acting in bad faith when their litigation conduct has run the costs up so high that they must be taken to know their behaviour is causing the other party major financial harm without justification.

28At ¶ 58-61 of Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556, Pazaratz J. wrote that bad faith implies “the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity”; it involves “duplicity, obstruction or obfuscation”. Bad faith is different from unreasonable behaviour. Its essence is when “a person suggests their actions are aimed for one purpose when they are aimed for another purpose” and it is done “knowingly and intentionally”. The Court must find “malice” or “intent to harm”. Bad faith can be established by “the intentional failure to fulfil an agreement in order to achieve an ulterior motive”, or “the intentional breach of an order with a view to achieving another purpose”.

29I agree with the mother that the father engaged in bad faith behaviour in certain ways. A number of findings in the Trial Judgment support a finding of bad faith. Specifically, the Court found:

(a) Against the backdrop of the Court’s findings that the father committed several acts of family violence, the father denigrated the mother during the trial itself. There are several examples at ¶ 497 of the Trial Judgment;

(b) The father interfered inappropriately with the work that counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, and his clinician, were trying to do: see ¶ 153-158 of the Trial Judgment;

(c) The father attacked Lourdes Geraldo’s (the reunification therapist) competency, impartiality and integrity: see ¶ 258-263 of the Trial Judgment;

(d) The father engaged in a lengthy list of other inappropriate conduct during the trial itself: see ¶ 319 of the Trial Judgment. This behaviour included threatening and insulting counsel, accusing two other social workers of bias (in addition to his treatment of Ms. Geraldo) (none of which I found), and attacks on the Court, including even that Himel J. accepted “kick backs”;

(e) The father attempted to deceive the Court with the Cohabitation and Mortgage Agreement, and the evidence he called about it: see ¶ 376(g) of the Trial Judgment and the several paragraphs of reasons that follow it;

(f) The father failed to discharge his onus to prove his income, and to meet his disclosure obligations respecting the determination of his income: see ¶ 608-630 of the Trial Judgment; and

(g) The father brought numerous mid-trial motions, the majority of which were without merit. These were a distraction during the trial, such as seeking adjournments, and then asking for parenting time mid-trial, before the Court heard all the evidence. These mid-trial motions cost time, and probably money, for the mother to respond with her counsel, while they were trying to focus on completing the trial: see ¶ 330 of the Trial Judgment.

30Incidentally, this pattern of bringing multiple motions has continued after the trial ended. While not each of the additional motions he brought after the trial were necessarily done in bad faith, I still note they have continued, they are a nuisance, and the father has continued to put the mother to the expense of responding, particularly respecting the most recent one.

31In particular, while the Trial Judgment was under reserve, the father brought another 14B Motion for parenting time, or alternatively to compel me to release the Trial Judgment “without further delay”.¹ I dealt with that motion on September 23, 2022. The Trial Judgment had been sent for release the day before. The request for parenting time was dealt with in the Judgment and the complaint about “delay” was without merit and ultimately now moot.

32The father then brought a second 14B Motion, this time post-Trial Judgment, to seek an extension of time to file costs submissions. I dealt with that one on November 26, 2025 and granted the extension, even though I found the request to be without merit. I now see that it has some relevance to the third 14B Motion.

33All of costs submissions were originally due by the beginning of December (December 8) on the schedule originally ordered in the Trial Judgment. The father’s motion for an extension pushed out the timeline to just before the holiday. This Supplementary Judgment is just getting released now, albeit still only about a month after the last filing came in. It might have been released before the holiday, but for the extension.

34While this costs decision was under reserve over the course of the last month or so, the father brought a third 14B Motion asking for permission to rent the Thornhill Property. That request too, is without merit. I dispose of it below.

35In any event, in his responding costs submissions, the father says that he did not behave in bad faith. At ¶ 13 of those submissions, he says he was under “extreme emotional stress during and leading up to the trial” and is being treated for “his bi-polar”. Yet the father called limited evidence about his mental health during the trial, and no evidence that he suffers from bi-polar disorder. The absence of better evidence about the father’s mental health proved to be one of the challenges at the end of this trial, when it came to crafting a remedy: see ¶ 512-520 of the Trial Judgment.

36I find the father engaged in bad faith behaviour for the reasons summarized in the list of lettered subparagraphs, above. The summary above are findings that have been extracted from the Trial Judgment.

37Alternatively, I would have found the father engaged in unreasonable behaviour.

D. Whether the Mother Engaged in Unreasonable Behaviour

38At ¶ 16 of the father’s written submissions, the father argues that the mother behaved unreasonably. Some of the arguments are based on her lack of success about certain issues. Not achieving success is not the same as behaving unreasonably: see Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554 ¶ 88-97.

39The father complains that the mother took up trial time (more than was allocated). She did; I addressed this in the Trial Judgment. So did the father. Both sides did this.

40The father complains that the mother didn’t cooperate about reunification therapy. I addressed this argument in the Trial Judgment in full too, at ¶ 256-257. The context of what happened, is there.

41Now I did find that both sides, (and also the father’s sister and the mother’s adult daughter) behaved inappropriately, regarding the Christmas incident and its aftermath: see ¶ 248-251. And I do agree that the mother’s approach to the issue of setting aside the Separation Agreement was unreasonable, as was her ultimate decision to call expert evidence once clarity about what the father was doing, emerged.

42But there is much more to this story about the Separation Agreement and the expert evidence. Both sides were involved in the confusion and unreasonable trial behaviour in different and competing ways. The Court found that both sides were disingenuous and maneuvered: see ¶ 340 of the Trial Judgment and the paragraphs that follow it. What transpired with the expert evidence very much involved not just the mother’s unreasonable trial strategy, but the father’s shifting positions over the course of the trial too, all of which is explained at ¶ 385-392.

43Regardless, the mother is not getting costs in relation to the Thornhill Property and its associated issues, or recovery of her disbursement for her expert. This accounts for any discount based on her unreasonable behaviour, within the meaning of rule 24(7) and (8) of the Family Law Rules (recognizing still, that the father was behaving inappropriately, right along side her in relation to some of these issues during the trial).

E. Quantum

44Even though the mother has satisfied me that she is entitled to full recovery regarding some of the issues based on her Offer to Settle, and based on the father’s bad faith behaviour, proportionality and reasonableness “are the touchstone considerations to be applied when fixing the amount of costs”: see Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840 ¶ 12.

45In regard to the factors in rule 24(14) of the Family Law Rules, to the extent that I have not already addressed them, Ms. Yehia is a 21 year lawyer. Her hourly rate of $550.00 per hour is reasonable. Ms. Yehia delegated work to others in her office at lower hourly rates. That too is reasonable.

46There is no principled reason why the mother should be restricted to recovering costs of $7,600.00 as the father argued. I am not surprised that the mother’s lawyer’s full Bill of Costs totals $342,216.40 inclusive of HST and disbursements. As I noted beginning at ¶ 302 of the Trial Judgment, there were numerous issues and witnesses, and this case was very document intensive. As Ms. Yehia said on the first day of the trial, all issues in this proceeding, including even basic facts, were in dispute.

47The mother’s fees, exclusive of HST, are $292,398.50. As I indicated at ¶ 4 of the Trial Judgment, “clearly the most significant issue for this trial was what parenting arrangements should be put in place for L.” The Court is not required to parse through this Bill. Without some actual submissions on this point, I am not able to say precisely how much of this trial, and therefore these costs, pertained to parenting and child support, versus the Thornhill Property issues for which I would not award the mother her costs. A rough approximation is probably that 1/3 of the trial concerned the Thornhill Property issues, in my view.

48Therefore, I would order costs rounded at $220,000.00.² I order full recovery of this amount, again based on her Offer to Settle and the father’s bad faith, but not full recovery of the total Bill.

F. The Father’s Ability to Pay

49The father argues inability to pay, based on having paid $86,000.00 in legal fees already, and the fact that he says he will likely need to sell his home to continue to pay child support.

50I disagree with both of these arguments. The Court’s child support Order was premised on an income determination of $200,000.00 for the father. I found the father was the real owner of his marijuana business, not his sister: see ¶ 608-611 of the Trial Judgment. The Court did not make a significant retroactive Order. The father can pay prospective child support as of February 1, 2025 out of his income that I found he earns. The father has equity in the Thornhill Property to pay costs, in addition to the property award.

51Even if the father truly lacks the ability to pay costs (which I do not find), I adopt what McGee J. has written in several costs decisions. “Those who can least afford to litigate should be most motivated to seriously pursue settlement, and avoid unnecessary proceedings”: see for example Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238 ¶ 17: see also Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29 ¶ 38, 79, 80, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal has adopted McGee J.’s statement.

PART III: SECTION 7 EXPENSES BETWEEN FEBRUARY 2025 AND SEPTEMBER 22, 2025

52At ¶ 680(y) of the Trial Judgment, I ordered that certain section 7 expenses would be shared 60% father, and 40% mother. At ¶ 680(z), I allowed the parties to file brief additional written submissions when they filed costs submissions, if they wanted to ask the Court to fix the amount of section 7 expenses owing for the period February 2025 to the date of the Trial Judgment (September 22, 2025). I ordered that for the reasons set out at ¶ 672 and 673 of the Trial Judgment, specifically because I had heard some evidence at the trial about what the mother had already paid for in the first part of 2025, to which the father did not contribute his fair share.

53At Tab A to the mother’s supplementary written submissions, she attaches a chart. The items claimed on the chart fall within the categories of section 7 expenses that I ordered to be shared. There are also receipts. The father’s 60% share of amounts to which he has not contributed yet, is $5,256.33.

54Further to this Court’s Trial Judgment and in the absence of any response from the father, the Court’s Order shall fix and require the father to pay this sum to the mother for the period February 2025 to September 22, 2025.

PART IV: THE FATHER’S 14B MOTION DATED JANUARY 5, 2026

55The father’s latest 14B Motion dated January 5, 2026 asks for permission to rent out part of the Thornhill Property. He is asking for this relief on an “interim, and without prejudice” basis, and not to “determine or alter any substantive property rights that remain under appeal”.

56The father’s affidavit sworn January 6, 2026 suggests that this can be ordered in part because he wasn’t ordered to pay any property related amounts in the Trial Judgment immediately. He argues that costs haven’t been finalized, so his payment obligation of the property amounts has not been crystalized.

57Some background is required here to dispose of this argument. At the end of the trial, the mother asked me to order some security out of the Thornhill Property to protect her costs claim. Contrary to what he has said, the father’s payment obligations for items like child support, the Thornhill Property, prejudgment interest and so on, have been crystalized in the Trial Judgment, in that they have been quantified.

58I delayed the timing of the property payment until costs were dealt with, so that the mother wouldn’t be giving up her interest in the Thornhill Property (until she was fully paid). What she is to be fully paid now includes costs: see ¶ 680 (jj) to (pp) of the Trial Judgment.

59Interestingly, I now see from the father’s affidavit sworn January 6, 2026 that accompanies the 14B Motion, that when he filed his penultimate 14B Motion seeking an extension of time to deliver his costs submissions, he also wrote to opposing counsel around the same time, and started to raise the rent issue. That request was not brought to my attention at the time.

60By asking for the extension, the father’s side was the one who caused the delay in the delivery of his own costs submissions, even though they were not due for a whole two months after the release of the Judgment. That in turn led to this Supplementary Judgment being released now, rather than potentially before the holiday in December. The father can hardly complain that there has been a delay in the adjudication of costs, a consequential delay in the implementation of the property terms, and therefore a delay on his ability to separate the mother from the Thornhill Property and rent it out if he wishes.

61Most importantly, it was well known to both sides that the Thornhill Property was rented out in the past. I heard evidence about that at the trial, including who handled the rentals and what was done with the rent proceeds. The Thornhill Property was not rented at the time of trial. Both sides knew this too; the father then acknowledged this again, in his January 5, 2026 affidavit.

62No one asked me at trial, to make orders about further rentals. To the contrary, in closing submissions, I was asked by the father to determine that the mother had no interest in the property at all, and by the mother to order security for costs among other things. What I ordered, was for the father to pay the mother her property entitlements 30 days after costs are adjudicated (so that she would continue to have security in the property). If the father doesn’t pay within 30 days, the property will be sold.

63The father is raising this rental issue months after the trial has ended, and after the release of the Trial Judgment. It is too late to be seeking a new remedy now, that might disrupt the mechanism to finalize the property issues as set out in the Trial Judgment.

64Now that costs are concluded, and except for overseeing the completion of the property transaction, this case, in this Court, is over. The Trial Judgment specifies clearly what is to happen. Once the father pays the amounts owing to the mother under the Trial Judgment, and now this Supplementary Judgment, the mother ill come off title, and the father can do with the Thornhill Property what he sees fit, including renting it out. He won’t need a court order for that. Or if he doesn’t pay, the property will be sold. I do not intend to add any new term that will hinder the sale option, should it become necessary.

65Finally, the mother’s responding affidavit to the 14B Motion says that the father is appealing the property provisions of the Judgment apparently. Clearly that too will delay the resolution of the property issues. He is free to exercise his rights of appeal if he wishes.

66In this context, the mother argues that the father should raise the rent issue with the appellate court. I’m not ruling on the merits of that argument. Whether an appellate court can or will deal with an interim issue like that is an issue for it to decide, if the issue is placed before it properly.

PART V: ORDER

67I make the following Orders:

(a) The father shall pay section 7 expenses to the mother, fixed in the amount of $5,256.33, for the period February 2025 to September 22, 2025;

(b) The father shall pay costs to the mother in the amount of $220,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements; and

(c) The father’s 14B Motion dated January 5, 2026 is dismissed.

Footnotes

1. 1The 157 page Trial Judgment was released a mere 2 months and 4 days after this trial, which again, I heard over the course 16 days, during three different months earlier in the spring and summer.
2. 2I.E.: 2/3 of the wife’s fees amounts to $194,932.33 + HST of $25,341.20 + disbursements of $2,059.84 (after backing out the disbursements associated with the wife’s expert) amounts to $222,332.37.