His Majesty the King v. Khreis, 2026 ONSC 4051

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences.

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155,159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

CITATION : R. v. Khreis, 2026 ONSC 4051

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-11402970

DATE: 2026/07/14

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

His Majesty the King

Crown

– and –

Sami Khreis

Defendant

S. Lichti, for the Crown

R. Carew, Counsel for Sami Khreis

HEARD: May 19-22, 25, 27-28, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION

CORTHORN J.

1The court’s decision was delivered orally on July 3, 2026. These reasons were revised, from the oral version, to comply with the Court-ordered ban on identifying the complainants. In addition, these reasons include substantive content that was not delivered as part of the oral reasons.

Introduction

2Sami Khreis is charged with the following four offences:

1. One count of sexual assault on M.G., who now goes by A.A., contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code;

2. One count of stealing from and using violence to A.A., thereby committing robbery, contrary to s. 343 of the Code;

3. One count of stealing a cell phone of a value not exceeding $5,000, being the property of E.B., contrary to s. 334(b) of the Code; and

4. One count of stealing property of a value not exceeding $5,000, being the property of E.B., contrary to s. 334(b) of the Code.

3Counts 1 and 2 relate to events alleged to have occurred on or about January 28, 2024. Counts 3 and 4 relate to events alleged to have occurred on or about January 13, 2024. All events are alleged to have occurred in Ottawa, Ontario.

4The trial commenced on May 19, and continued on May 20, 21, and 22, 2026. On those dates, the Court heard the evidence of witnesses called by the Crown. On May 25, 2026, the Court heard submissions on a similar fact application; oral reasons were given on May 27, 2026. On that date, the Crown closed its case and Mr. Khreis chose not to call any evidence.

5Closing submissions were made on May 28, 2026.

6In broad terms, the Crown submits that it has met its burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for all four counts. Defence counsel asks the court to find Mr. Khreis not guilty on counts 1 and 2. In the alternative, defence counsel submits that the evidence related to the second count supports a finding of guilt on the lesser included offence of theft of property of a value not exceeding $5,000 contrary to s. 334(b) of the Code.

7Regarding counts 3 and 4, defence counsel asks the court to find Mr. Khreis not guilty because the Crown has not established beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Khreis’ identity as the individual who committed those offences.

Analytical Framework

8Mr. Khreis is presumed to be innocent of all the charges against him.

9It is not incumbent upon an individual charged with an offence to assert their innocence through either their own evidence or other evidence called on their behalf. Mr. Khreis had the right not to call any evidence. He chose not to testify. The defence evidence is restricted to three agreed statements of fact, referred to in this proceeding as “Admissions”. The three sets of admissions are Exhibits 1, 2, and 8 in this proceeding.

10For a finding of guilt to be made, the Crown must prove the specific charge beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a heavy burden to meet. It is intended as such to prevent the conviction of innocent persons.

11It is not sufficient for the Crown to establish possible, probable, or likely guilt. A reasonable doubt is neither far-fetched nor frivolous. Reasonable doubt does not involve proof to absolute certainty or proof beyond any reasonable doubt, which is often impossible: R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 231, citing R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 36. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, however, much closer to a certainty than it is to the civil balance of probabilities standard. For a finding of guilt to be made, the court must be sure that the defendant committed the offence.

12The court is entitled to believe all, none, or some of a witness’ testimony: R. v. Francois, 1994 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827, at pp. 836-37. The Court must carefully consider the credibility and reliability of witness testimony, in light of all of the evidence before it. Credibility relates to veracity and reliability to the accuracy of a witness’ testimony.

13I have considered the credibility and reliability of the testimony of each of the complainants and of the two lay witnesses. My assessment takes into account that many individuals called upon to give evidence at a criminal trial are not familiar with the process, may never have experienced a courtroom setting, and are required to rely upon their memory of events that occurred years earlier.

14I am mindful of inconsistencies and contradictions. Perfection in testimony is not expected and may be suspect.

15Consistency is an element of truthful testimony. Minor inconsistencies may also be an element of truthful testimony.

16Contradictions within a witness’ testimony and those demonstrated through consideration of the witness’ prior accounts of events are important. A meaningful tool in assessing the reliability of an individual’s testimony is to review the consistency of that person’s account, either over time or within the context of their evidence in chief and in cross-examination: R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, 123 O.R. (3d) 536, at para. 12, citing R. v. G.(M.) (1994), 1994 CanLII 8733 (ON CA), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 354, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 390.

17Significant inconsistencies or contradictions are treated much differently than are minor ones. In some circumstances, inconsistencies or contradictions can result in a witness’ testimony being rejected in whole or in part. For example, an inconsistency which involves “something material about which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, [ ] may demonstrate a carelessness with the truth about which the trier of fact should be concerned”: A.M., at para. 13, citing G.(M.), at p. 354.

18An inconsistency that relates to a peripheral issue may not have a significant impact on the witness’s credibility. If, however, the witness’ account contains many inconsistencies on a range of peripheral issues, such inconsistencies could fatally undermine the overall reliability of the witness’ evidence.

19If the witness’ testimony is internally contradictory, incoherent, or simply implausible it is open to the court to find that the witness is not worthy of belief on specific topics or more generally.

20I recognize that the potential exists for Mr. Khreis to be acquitted on some of the charges and found guilty on one or more of the charges.

21The Crown relies on historical and cross-count similar fact evidence to support the credibility of both complainants and to support the identification of Mr. Khreis as the perpetrator of the offences charged in counts 3 and 4. In an oral decision given mid-trial, I allowed the Crown to rely on the majority, but not all, of the evidence that was the subject of the similar fact evidence application.

22The similar fact evidence, as admitted, is not now considered to suggest or to potentially support the existence of a propensity to commit the offences alleged. Rather, the Crown suggests that the facts associated with the prior convictions and those upon which the Crown relies in support of the current allegations are strikingly similar such that they (a) establish a modus operandi supporting the accounts of the complainants now before the court, and (b) render it improbable that Mr. Khreis’ implication in the alleged offences is the product of mere coincidence: R. v. Perrier, 2004 SCC 56, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 228, paras. 19-20; see also R. v. Arp, 1998 CanLII 769 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 45.

23I will address the offences based on the chronological order in which the events are alleged to have occurred. I start with counts 3 and 4 – both of which are colloquially known as “theft under”.

Counts 3 and 4

a) The Offence of Theft Under $5,000 (s. 334(b))

24There are four essential elements to this offence, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

25First, the Crown must prove that Mr. Khreis took property belonging to E.B.; second, that the taking was fraudulent and without colour of right; third, that when Mr. Khreis took or converted E.B.’s property for his own use, he intended to deprive E.B. of the property, at least temporarily; and fourth, that the value of the property did not exceed $5,000.

b) Overview

26The Crown alleges that Mr. Khreis took E.B.’s cell phone; used the cell phone to access E.B.’s online banking; and e-transferred approximately $2,900 from E.B.’s bank account to his bank account.

27The Crown relies on the testimony of E.B., C.C., and Det. Ronald McFarlane of the Ottawa Police Service (“OPS”). The two women testified about the events of January 12 and 13, 2024. Det. McFarlane testified about photographs he took on February 15, 2024, of a vehicle registered to Mr. Khreis.

28The Crown relies on the circumstantial evidence found in Admission No. 2 – Bank Records, and in Admission No. 3 – CCTV & Arrest of Accused. The former relates to CIBC records for accounts in E.B.’s name. The latter relates, in part, to Mr. Khreis’ registered ownership of, and possession of keys for, a Toyota RAV 4 bearing licence plate CCAT 834.

29Last, the Crown relies on the similar fact evidence admitted for the purpose of (a) identification of Mr. Khreis; and (b) E.B.’s credibility.

c) The Evidence of E.B. and C.C.

30E.B. is a 22-year-old member of the Canadian Armed Forces. On the date of the alleged events, she was days shy of her twentieth birthday. C.C. is of a similar age. In January 2024, the two women did not know one another well. On the night of January 12, 2024, they were part of a group of friends who went to the Heart and Crown Pub in the Byward Market area of Ottawa.

31The events giving rise to counts 3 and 4 begin with the two women leaving the Heart and Crown in the early morning hours of January 13, 2024, and seeking transportation home or to another destination.

32The evidence of the two women is consistent as to generally what transpired after they left the Heart and Crown to the point when they parted company. Based on that evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

• The two women left the Heart and Crown in the early morning hours on January 13, 2024;
• The women entered a vehicle driven by a male whom they did not know and who appeared to be in his late 30s or in his 40s;
• C.C. sat in the front passenger seat and E.B. sat in the rear seat of the vehicle, with both women believing that the driver was operating the vehicle for hire;
• At some point, the driver requested that he be given a cell phone to enter an address in the GPS on the phone;
• E.B. passed her cell phone to the front of the vehicle for that purpose;
• When the driver later stopped the vehicle to let the two women out, at a restaurant at which they intended to stop briefly, E.B. exited the vehicle before retrieving her cell phone from the front of the vehicle; and
• After E.B. searched for and made inquiries of the driver about her cell phone , he drove away before E.B. found or retrieved the cell phone.

33There are inconsistencies between E.B.’s and C.C.’s respective evidence. I am satisfied that the inconsistencies are minor and do not detract from the overall consistency of the women’s accounts as to how E.B. lost possession of her cell phone.

34The inconsistencies are, for example, as to how the driver of the vehicle identified himself (i.e., as an Uber driver or otherwise); and as to the location at which the women waited for transportation (near the Heart and Crown or a few blocks away on Rideau Street).

35Regarding the subject vehicle, E.B. described it as an SUV but could not recall its colour. E.B. testified that the vehicle might have been navy blue, dark gray, or burnt orange. C.C. described the vehicle as having four doors and was unable to recall the colour of the vehicle.

36As already noted, both women described the driver as a male in his late 30s or in his 40s. E.B.’s evidence is that the driver had dark hair and spoke with a middle eastern accent. C.C. described the driver as having “browner skin” and possibly being “Arabic of some sort”.

37I found both women to be credible witnesses. E.B. was matter-of-fact, even when describing the loss of both her cell phone and approximately $2,900. E.B. did not diminish the extent to which her personal decisions contributed to the loss of her cell phone. Under cross-examination, E.B. made concessions without resistance. For example, E.B. conceded that in her statement to the OPS she did not say, as she did when testifying at trial, that the passenger front door of the vehicle remained open as the vehicle was driven away.

38C.C. acknowledged that she had, before leaving the Heart and Crown, consumed alcohol to the point that she would not have driven a vehicle. C.C. did not minimize the amount of alcohol she consumed – describing it as “a decent amount” and acknowledging that she had a “buzz”. In both examination-in-chief and on cross-examination, C.C. acknowledged matters about which she was uncertain. For example, C.C. was unable to remember whether she had placed an order for an Uber before the subject vehicle arrived.

39Neither E.B. nor C.C. was asked to identify Mr. Khreis in court. There is no evidence of either E.B. or C.C. identifying Mr. Khreis from a photographic lineup.

40In the absence of identification of Mr. Khreis by one or both of E.B. and C.C., the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence and on the similar fact evidence admitted for the purpose of counts 3 and 4.

d) The Circumstantial Evidence

41Where the Crown relies exclusively or largely on circumstantial evidence to establish one or more elements of an offence, they must demonstrate that an inference of guilt flowing from this evidence is the only reasonable inference: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 30.

42I start with the CIBC records for E.B.’s chequing account with Simplii Financial.

43On the morning of January 13, 2024, E.B. used her laptop computer to access her bank accounts online. E.B.’s evidence, which I accept as an accurate description of the relevant events, is that she discovered that, without her authorization and knowledge (a) all the money in her savings account - $2,875 – had been transferred to her chequing account; and (b) the $2,875 had been e-transferred from her chequing account to an email address she did not recognize.

44Based on Admission No. 2 – Bank Records, Mr. Khreis admits that the CIBC records for E.B.’s account show the following e-transfer was made on January 13, 2024:

• At 6:52 a.m., an e-transfer in the amount of $2,875 was sent from E.B.’s chequing account. E.B.’s email address was used to send the transfer. The recipient’s email address is [redacted]; and
• At 7:23 a.m., $2,875 was deposited into a BMO Bank of Montreal account registered to “Sami Khreis”.

45In closing, defence counsel highlighted that when the Information in this matter was laid, the defendant’s name was “Sami Hassan Khreis”. In the Indictment now before the court, the defendant’s name is “Sami Khreis”. Defence counsel asks the court to conclude that the change to the defendant’s name reduces the uniqueness of his name.

46I agree with that submission. That reduction in the uniqueness of the defendant’s name does not, however, eliminate the possibility that evidence involving the name “Sami Khreis”, with or without the middle name “Hassan”, affords some evidence of the identity of the individual who committed the offences alleged in counts 3 and 4.

47The photographs admitted into evidence include a photograph of a provincial Health Card with the name “Sami Hassan Khreis”. That Health Card was found in the defendant’s vehicle when it was searched on the date of the defendant’s arrest.

48I am satisfied that there is relative distinctness in the name “Sami Khreis”.

49I also take into consideration the evidence, from Admission No. 3, regarding Mr. Khreis’ registered ownership of an SUV – the type of vehicle E.B. described getting into in the early morning hours of January 13, 2024. In that regard, I consider the following passage from Regina v. Chandra (1975), 1975 CanLII 1294 (BC CA), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 570 (B.C. C.A), at para. 6:

[Mere] identity of name affords some evidence of identity of a person. When accompanied by other factors such as the relative distinctiveness of the name, or the fact that it is coupled with an address, or appears upon a licence or other document of significance, its weight is strengthened […] When such evidence is adduced to the trier of fact it cannot be said there is no evidence.

50The decision in Chandra was cited favourably in Regina v. Nicholson (1984), 1984 ABCA 88, 12 C.C.C. (3d) 228 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1984] S.C.C.A. No. 176. At p. 236 of Nicholson, Kerans J.A. explains that “[s]imilarity of name […] is an item of proof of identity to be weighed together with the failure of the accused to testify.” I rely on the fact that the defendant answered the charges and chose not to testify.

51Chandra and Nicholson are, in turn, cited favourably in R. v. Blandizi (2 November, 1998), Toronto, 294/96 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). In the concluding paragraph of his decision on a summary conviction appeal, Then J. (as he was then) found that the evidence before the trial judge, when viewed cumulatively, was “adequate to prove the identity of the appellant as the perpetrator of the offence charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”

52The circumstances before the trial judge in Blandizi are much like the circumstances regarding the identification of Mr. Khreis as the perpetrator of the offences charged in counts 3 and 4. In both matters, the circumstances include the following:

• The defendant has a sufficiently distinctive name;
• The existence of photo identification in the defendant’s name; and
• The defendant was served with a court document, has the same name as the individual named in the court document, answered to the charge(s), and appeared in court.

53Mr. Khreis did not put forward any other plausible theories or any theories inconsistent with guilt, that are, at the same time grounded in logic and common sense (and not in mere speculation or conjecture), to explain the similarity between his name and the name on the account to which the funds were transferred. Applying the principles from Villaroman, I am satisfied that no other theories are available.

e) Similar Fact Evidence

54Added to the circumstantial evidence of identification is the historical and cross-count similar fact evidence admitted for counts 3 and 4. I will not repeat that evidence here. Instead, I highlight that, in the oral reasons on the similar fact evidence application, I found there exist five elements of “an observed propensity” in “a closely defined and circumscribed context” that apply to the four historical complainants.

55In summary, the five elements are as follows:

1. The geographic location of the Byward Market area or the streets proximate to that area;
2. The late night or early morning hours during which the events occurred;
3. Reliance on a ruse, beginning with an offer to assist the woman to make their way home;
4. Continuation of the ruse through fabrication of a reason to require access to the woman’s bank card or cell phone; and
5. Ultimately accessing the woman’s bank account through the use of an ATM or electronic banking function.

56Despite the passage of time since the events giving rise to the 2018 convictions, I am satisfied that it is well beyond coincidence that Mr. Khreis is the individual who committed the historical acts and the acts upon which counts 3 and 4 are based. The defendant has not put forward, for the court’s consideration, any other reasonable theory regarding the historical similar fact evidence.

57The same five elements apply to the cross-count similar fact evidence – as will be seen from the reasons to follow with respect to count 2. I note that for the cross-count similar fact evidence, the events occurred two weeks apart.

58I rely on the analysis below, regarding count 2, in determining that there is a similarity between the incident involving A.A. and that involving E.B., which is beyond mere coincidence and which helps identify Mr. Khreis as the perpetrator on counts 3 and 4.

59I recognize the high standard for relying on similar fact evidence to establish identity, and I am satisfied that this standard is met.

60I rely on the oral reasons given for the similar fact evidence application regarding there being no possibility of either of the current complainants’ evidence being tainted.

f) Disposition

61Considering the evidence cumulatively, including the circumstantial and similar fact evidence, I find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements required to support a conviction on the two counts of theft under $5,000.

62I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Khreis,

• took E.B.’s cell phone, valued at less than $5,000, and $2,875 from E.B.’s chequing account;
• took both the cell phone and the money fraudulently and without colour of right; and
• took that property intending to deprive E.B. of it at least temporarily.

63I find Mr. Khreis guilty on counts 3 and 4. I turn next to count 1 and conclude thereafter with count 2.

Count 1

a) The Offence of Sexual Assault (s. 271)

64Section 271 of the Code does not define sexual assault. In R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 131, at para. 51, the Supreme Court of Canada states that a person commits sexual assault “by applying force intentionally to another person, directly or indirectly, in circumstances of a sexual nature”. The application of force can mean any form of touching: R.V., at para. 52.

65Sexual assault is a physical assault of a sexual nature. Whether the assault is sexual in nature is determined based on an objective standard – not on the subjective perspective of the defendant. The nature and quality of the act is to be examined objectively: R. v. Marshall, 2017 ONCA 801, at para. 52.

66The question of whether the touching was of a sexual nature and violated the complainant’s sexual integrity is answered by looking at all of the circumstances surrounding the alleged assault: R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, at p. 345. At p. 302 of the decision in R. v. Chase, 1987 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293, McIntyre J. held that the factors to be considered in answering that question include,

• the part of the body that was touched;
• the nature of the contact;
• the situation in which it occurred;
• the words and gestures accompanying the act; and
• all other circumstances surrounding the conduct, including threats that may or may not be accompanied by force.

67The Crown is not required to prove that the defendant had any sexual purpose in touching the complainant or obtained any sexual gratification in doing so: R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, at para. 25 (citations omitted). The test is whether, when viewed in the light of all of the circumstances, the sexual or carnal nature of an assault is visible to a reasonable observer.

68In addition to establishing that the defendant committed the act of sexual assault, the Crown must show that the defendant intended to touch the complainant (the mens rea component of the offence): Ewanchuk, at para. 41; R. v. Trachy, 2019 ONCA 622, 147 O.R. (3d) 250, at para. 74.

b) Overview

69The Crown alleges that in the early morning hours on January 28, 2024, Mr. Khreis posed as the operator of a vehicle for hire and, once alone in the vehicle with A.A., drove to an isolated location and sexually assaulted her.

70The Crown relies on the evidence of A.A.; A.A.’s sibling, C.G.; and OPS members Cst. Mautbur, Cst. Danis, and Acting Sgt. Deschamps. A.A. and her sibling testified about their night out on January 27 and into the morning hours of January 28, 2024.

71Cst. Mautbur testified about his attendance at the women’s home in response to a 9-1-1 call made by A.A. Cst. Danis testified about photographs taken on the morning of January 28, 2024, of the physical location at which the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Acting Sgt. Deschamps testified about a single photograph of a red SUV parked in front of Mr. Khreis’ residence on February 10, 2024, when a search warrant was executed.

72The Crown relies on the circumstantial evidence found in each of the three agreed statements of fact:

• Admission No. 1 - Seizure of Exhibits & DNA Analysis;
• Admission No. 2 - Bank Records; and
• Admission No. 3 - CCTV & Arrest of the Accused.

73The CCTV evidence is from cameras at two TD Bank ATMs located in Ottawa.

74Last, the Crown relies on the similar fact evidence regarding the events upon which Mr. Khreis was convicted in 2018 for the sexual assault of Ms. P.

c) The Evidence of A.A. and C.G.

75In January 2024, A.A. and C.G. lived in a home, with their brother, in the Hunt Club area of Ottawa. On the evening of January 27, 2024, A.A. and C.G. went to a bar or nightclub in the Byward Market area of Ottawa. For the purpose of these reasons, I refer to the venue as “the bar”. The siblings travelled downtown by public transportation.

76The events giving rise to count 1 begin with the siblings leaving the bar and planning to take a bus home. The siblings abandoned that plan; they travelled home in what they believed was a vehicle for hire.

77The siblings’ respective evidence is consistent as to generally what happened while they were at the bar and to the point when C.G. was dropped off in the Hunt Club area. From that point, A.A. continued on her own, in the vehicle for hire, with the driver.

78Based on the siblings’ evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

• The siblings were at the bar for approximately 2.5 hours. The siblings left the bar around 2:00 a.m.; travelled on foot to Rideau Street; and planned to take a bus home;
• While the siblings were at a bus stop on Rideau Street, the driver of a vehicle parked nearby asked the siblings if they were waiting for an Uber;
• After initially responding “no”, and one or two additional interactions with the same driver, the siblings agreed to accept a ride with the driver for an agreed-upon price of $30;
• The communication with the driver about the price of the ride was handled exclusively by A.A. C.G. does not speak English. A.A. translated from English to Spanish when relaying the conversation with the driver. I pause here to note that C.G. testified at trial with the aid of an interpreter;
• C.G. was intermittently asleep during the ride to the Hunt Club area;
• By the time the vehicle arrived in that area, the driver had increased the price of the ride from $30 to $40. The siblings had a total of $30 in cash on them;
• C.G. exited the vehicle and went home. A.A. returned to the vehicle, sitting in the front passenger seat, with the intention of travelling with the driver, to a nearby ATM, to obtain the additional $10 required to pay for the ride.

79The siblings’ choices regarding their modes of transportation and the amount of cash they were carrying on January 28, 2024, have a ring of truth to them. For example, the siblings did not drive to the Byward Market area that night, despite the fact that A.A. had a car. A.A. testified that, at least at the time, her understanding was that the law allows for zero alcohol tolerance for vehicle operators. A.A. explained that she knew she would be consuming alcohol as part of her night out with her sibling.

80The siblings took public transportation to the Byward Market and intended to return home by bus. It makes sense that they would have limited cash with them. They did not plan to pay for a vehicle for hire – whether a taxi or an Uber. It is not surprising that, in 2024 – the post-Covid era – two individuals in their twenties headed out for the night without a lot of cash on them.

81The siblings describe leaving the bar at approximately 2:00 a.m.; finding themselves waiting in the cold for what they knew would be the last bus at that hour; and faced with a walk of some distance from their end-point bus stop to their home. It rings true that they would make the collective decision to pool their money and pay for a vehicle for hire to take them close to their home.

82There are inconsistencies between A.A.’s evidence and C.G.’s evidence. The inconsistencies include, for example, as to the amount and type of alcohol each sibling consumed while at the bar; as to the logistics for ordering drinks at the bar; and as to the number of times A.A. interacted with the driver before the siblings accepted a ride with him. I am satisfied that those inconsistencies are about peripheral matters, are minor, and do not detract from the overall consistency of the siblings’ evidence about their collective interaction with the driver.

83Before moving on to the balance of the evidence in support of the allegations of sexual assault, I will address the credibility and reliability of the siblings as witnesses.

84I found A.A. to be a credible witness. She was detailed, forthright, and direct in her testimony. Her account accords with the other evidence before the court. A.A. was firm on certain elements of her testimony, but otherwise made reasonable concessions when they were presented to her.

85I was struck by A.A.’s answer to a question posed in cross-examination regarding the counselling sessions she attended after the alleged sexual assault. A.A. testified that she stopped attending the sessions for multiple reasons. As an example of those reasons, A.A. explained that she did not develop a connection with the counsellor, otherwise a stranger to A.A., to the point of being able to open up about the events that had transpired.

86Consistent with the reason given for stopping the counselling sessions is A.A.’s evidence that, in the immediate aftermath of the alleged sexual assault, she did not disclose that event to (a) the taxi driver she approached for a ride home; (b) her sibling, on arriving home; (c) the 9-1-1 operator; or (d) the officers, none of whom she had previously met, who attended her home in answer to the 9-1-1 call. I do not intend that observation in any way as commentary on the timing of disclosure of an alleged sexual assault by A.A. or anyone else. I observe only that A.A.’s choices in that regard are consistent with her approach several weeks or months later in deciding to end the counselling sessions.

87Turning to C.G., I found her to also be a credible witness. They readily acknowledged their lack of fluency in the English language and resulting reliance on their sibling to communicate with others – both at the bar and with the driver of the vehicle for hire. In light of that acknowledgement, it was interesting to observe the certainty with which C.G. expressed that, as the regular bus rider, she was the more familiar of the two siblings with bus schedules and fares. C.G.’s certainty in that regard rings true with the siblings’ respective life circumstances.

88As to the reliability of both A.A. and C.G., I accept their respective evidence that they did not feel intoxicated when they were dealing with the driver. C.G.’s evidence is, and I find that, both siblings were sober when they arrived at the bus stop. There is nothing about the evidence of either A.A. or C.G. that causes me to doubt the reliability of their respective evidence on matters that are central to the outcome of the charges against Mr. Khreis.

89I pause to note that, in cross-examination, A.A. acknowledged that there are frailties in her memory of some of the details of events recounted. She was open, for example, at times to suggestions about other possibilities as to how events transpired. That acknowledgement and that openness do not, however, detract from the reliability of A.A.’s evidence relevant to the elements of the offence of sexual assault.

90I summarize, as follows, A.A.’s evidence as to what transpired from the point in time at which C.G. was dropped off in the Hunt Club area to the later morning hours on January 28, 2024:

• After C.G. exited the vehicle, the driver suggested to A.A. that she sit in the front of the vehicle. A.A. did so. The doors of the vehicle locked automatically when the vehicle started up again;
• Shortly after resuming driving, the driver’s demeanour changed from pleasant, as it was when both siblings were in the vehicle, to aggressive. The driver used his right hand to grab A.A. “very tight” on the right side of her neck and her right shoulder. The driver attempted to pull A.A. closer to him. The driver also touched A.A.’s legs. The driver used his left hand to continue driving;
• A.A. responded to this physical touching and aggression by saying “no”; “stop”; and “I don’t like it”. A.A. also attempted, while the vehicle was moving, to open the front passenger door of the vehicle. She was unable to do so because the door was locked;
• The driver did not drive to and stop at a nearby ATM, as A.A. expected he would. The driver continued on to a business/industrial area near the intersection of Hunt Club and Riverside Drives and near the Ottawa Airport;
• The driver parked in an area that was unfamiliar to A.A. She recalled there being a car mechanic business, trees, metal storage-type containers, and snow on the ground;
• After parking the vehicle, the driver smoked all or part of a cigarette. The driver moved quickly from his seat, across the console, landing on top of and facing A.A. She felt her seat recline, but not to a flat position;
• The following series of events happened very quickly:
  • At times, the driver had one hand on A.A.’s neck as he slapped her face with the other hand;
  • Without entirely removing his pants, the driver placed his penis in front of A.A.’s face;
  • The driver uttered several phrases of degrading language;
  • The driver forced his penis into A.A.’s mouth;
  • The driver ejaculated onto the left side of A.A.’s face; and
  • The driver returned to his seat.

91A.A.’s evidence is that she did not want to participate in any of the events she described. A.A. testified that while these events were transpiring she said, “I do not want to do this” and repeatedly said “no”. In addition, on at least one occasion A.A. said “she likes it”, solely in response to a demand from the driver that she do so and out of fear that if she did not do so the situation would worsen for her.

92Also, A.A. testified that she tried to push the driver away, but was unsuccessful in doing so because of their difference in physical size; their difference in physical strength; and the driver’s dominant position on top of her.

93A.A.’s evidence is that, after the driver returned to his seat, he handed A.A. two napkins. A.A. used the napkins to wipe herself off. A.A. did not recall whether she gave the napkins back to the driver and he threw them out or she threw the napkins out.

94I agree with the Crown’s description, in closing submissions, of A.A.’s evidence regarding the sexual assault allegations as “clear, detailed, and compelling”. For example, A.A. recalled details about the pants the driver was wearing. Those details include that the pants were grey, were made of soft material, and did not have a zipper – details that are consistent with the physical maneuvers A.A. described the driver making.

95A.A. did not embellish her evidence during either examination-in-chief or in cross-examination. She acknowledged details about which she was uncertain or which she could not remember. For example, A.A. twice acknowledged that she was uncertain who threw out the napkins.

96I accept, as true, A.A.’s description of the events that transpired when she was alone in the vehicle with the driver – to the point where the napkins were thrown out.

97Based on A.A.’s evidence, I find that the driver of the vehicle applied force intentionally to A.A., directly, in circumstances of a sexual nature. In making that finding, I have considered the factors listed at p. 302 of the decision in Chase, and referred to in an earlier section of these reasons.

98I also find that A.A. did not consent to any of the touching that was sexual in nature. That touching includes grabbing A.A. by the neck and shoulder and attempting to pull her closer; and the driver’s placement of his penis on A.A.’s face and in her mouth.

99Neither A.A. nor C.G. was asked to identify Mr. Khreis in court. There is no evidence of either A.A. or C.G. identifying Mr. Khreis from a photographic lineup.

100In the absence of identification of Mr. Khreis by one or both of A.A. and C.G., the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence in support of the allegation that Mr. Khreis committed the sexual assault. The Crown also relies on the similar fact evidence admitted regarding A.A.’s credibility for the purpose of count 1.

d) The Circumstantial Evidence

101The Crown relies on the evidence of Cst. Mautbur (attended at A.A.’s home in response to the 9-1-1 call); Cst. Danis (took photographs of what is alleged to be the location at which A.A. was sexually assaulted); and evidence regarding a red SUV registered in the name of Mr. Khreis. The latter evidence includes as to the SUV found at his home when a search warrant was executed in February 2024. In addition, the Crown relies on Admission Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

102Cst. Mautbur’s evidence is that, when A.A. described to him the location of the sexual assault, he recognized the business/industrial building she had described. At the end of his meeting with A.A., Cst. Mautbur drove to the subject location, and observed what he believed to be fresh tire tracks in the snow. The tracks were in keeping with A.A.’s description of where the driver parked the SUV. Cst. Mautbur observed a brown napkin and a white napkin on the ground on either side of the tire tracks he believed to be those of the vehicle in which the sexual assault occurred.

103Cst. Mautbur held the scene and arranged for Cst. Danis of the Forensic Identification Team to attend the scene. Cst. Danis took photographs of the parking lot behind the business/industrial building located at 3326 Limebank Road.

104Despite the fact that many tire tracks can be seen in the photographs taken of the parking lot, Cst. Mautbur was certain of his ability to identify the tracks made by the subject vehicle. Added to Cst. Mautbur’s evidence is the CCTV footage (Admission No. 3) from a security camera located on the building. In that footage, from the early morning hours of January 28, 2024, an SUV is shown entering the lot, pulling up, front-facing, towards a snow bank, parking for approximately 14 minutes, and leaving.

105Based on the oral evidence of the officers, the photographs of the parking lot, and the CCTV footage, I find that (a) the CCTV footage is of the vehicle in which the sexual assault occurred; and (b) the napkins found on the ground in the parking lot are the two napkins thrown from the subject vehicle in the moments after the sexual assault occurred.

106A DNA analysis was carried out on both napkins and on an oral swab taken from A.A. on the morning of January 28, 2024 (i.e., as part of a sexual assault kit completed at the Ottawa Hospital – Civic Campus). The results of the DNA analysis are summarized at item 6 of Admission No. 1. Based on that analysis, I find that (a) the napkins thrown from the subject vehicle had on them one or more of Mr. Khreis’ semen, Mr. Khreis’ DNA, and A.A.’s DNA; and (b) Mr. Khreis’ DNA was present on the oral swab taken from A.A.’s mouth.

107Based on A.A.’s evidence and the circumstantial evidence, I find that the Crown has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Khreis committed the sexual assault described by A.A.

e) The Similar Fact Evidence

108The historical similar fact evidence includes that related to the sexual assault of Ms. P., for which Mr. Khreis was convicted in 2018. That evidence is admitted for its relevance to and probative value regarding A.A.’s credibility with respect to the actus reus for count 1.

109The similarity found between that historical evidence and A.A.’s evidence is as to the modus operendi employed by Mr. Khreis to create a sexual opportunity – namely a ruse related to the victim’s bank card.

110I have already made findings related to A.A.’s credibility. I place little weight on the similar fact evidence in terms of enhancing those findings. I would make the same findings about A.A.’s credibility with respect to the actus reus for count 1 without the benefit of the similar fact evidence.

f) Disposition

111Considering the evidence cumulatively, including the circumstantial and similar fact evidence, I am satisfied that the Crown has met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Khreis sexually assaulted A.A. in the early morning hours on January 28, 2024. I find Mr. Khreis guilty on count 1.

112I conclude these reasons with my determination on count 2.

Count 2

a) The Offence of Robbery (s. 343)

113For the purpose of this trial, the Crown relies on the following definitions of “robbery” found in ss. 343(a), (b), and (c) of the Code:

Every one commits robbery who:

(a) steals and, for the purpose of preventing or overcoming resistance, uses violence or threats of violence;

(b) steals and at the time uses violence against a person;

(c) assaults a person with intent to steal.

114I discuss these three subsections in greater detail in a later section of these reasons.

b) Overview

115The Crown alleges that, after committing the sexual assault, Mr. Khreis drove with A.A., from the isolated parking lot to a shopping plaza at the intersections of Hunt Club and Riverside Drives. The Crown alleges that Mr. Khreis continued the ruse about an additional $10 to pay for the ride and stole A.A.’s bank card and phone for the purpose of gaining access to A.A.’s bank account.

116The Crown relies on A.A.’s evidence and the evidence of Det. MacFarlane. The latter’s evidence, reviewed under count 1, relates to photographs, taken in February 2024, of a vehicle registered to Mr. Khreis.

117The Crown relies on circumstantial evidence found in Admission No. 2 – Bank Records. The Crown points to the ATM transactions for A.A.’s bank account on the morning of January 28, 2024. In addition, the Crown relies on Admission No. 3 – CCTV & Arrest of the Accused. The admissions include CCTV video footage from a TD Bank ATM at the shopping plaza and two stills captured on a camera at a TD Bank ATM on Merivale Road in Ottawa.

118Last the Crown relies on the historical and cross-count similar fact evidence admitted as relevant to the assessment of A.A.’s credibility on the actus reus of count 2. As set out in the oral reasons on the similar fact application, that evidence is as to “an observed pattern of behaviour operating in a closely defined and circumscribed context”.

c) The Evidence of A.A.

119For the reasons given regarding count 1, I find A.A. to be a credible witness and her evidence to be reliable – including as to the events that transpired after the sexual assault. The narrative that follows constitutes both a summary of A.A.’s evidence and my findings of fact based on that evidence.

120The drive from the isolated parking lot to the shopping plaza took five to eight minutes. Mr. Khreis drove to and stopped at a TD Bank Drive-Thru ATM located in the plaza. Mr. Khreis asked A.A. to give him her bank card. She did not want to do so. A.A. gave her bank card – a debit card – to Mr. Khreis.

121Mr. Khreis inserted the bank card in the ATM. He asked A.A. for the security number (“PIN”) for the card. A.A. did not want to provide the PIN but did so out of concern that, if she did not provide the PIN, her situation would worsen. Mr. Khreis removed the card quickly from the ATM and said, “never mind”.

122Mr. Khreis then drove to the area of the plaza in which a gym is located. Mr. Khreis asked for A.A.’s phone, and the password for it. Reluctant once again, and out of fear, A.A. gave her cell phone and provided the password to Mr. Khreis.

123Mr. Khreis effectively, although not physically, kicked A.A. out of the vehicle. He kept A.A.’s bank card, cell phone, and purse. Shortly after starting up again, Mr. Khreis threw the purse out of the vehicle. He drove away with possession of A.A.’s bank card and cell phone.

124A.A. spotted a taxi parked in the plaza and secured a ride home.

125A.A. did not give anyone permission to make the multiple (approximately ten) ATM transactions listed in a chart that forms part of Admission No. 2. Those transactions were made between 3:26 a.m. on January 28, 2024, and 5:20 p.m. on January 29, 2024.

d) The Circumstantial Evidence

126The circumstantial evidence includes CCTV video of a vehicle pulling up to the TD Bank Drive-Thru ATM at the plaza. The video depicts a male who inserts a bank card into and retrieves the card from the ATM. He does not receive any cash or a transaction record. In the video, an individual is sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle.

127The circumstantial evidence includes the multiple ATM transactions. Two of those transactions were made twelve seconds apart (9:30:35 a.m. and 9:30:47 a.m.) at the TD Bank ATM located at 1585 Merivale Road in Ottawa. The transactions were for withdrawals of $80 and $10, respectively.

128Admission No. 3 – CCTV & Arrest of Accused includes two still images from the CCTV for the Merivale Road ATM at the two times of day mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The images are of man in a dark puffy jacket standing at the ATM. The man’s face is observable from the eyes down. It is daylight; the man appears to have at least a slightly dark complexion. In both images, a red SUV can be seen in the parking lot approximately five parking spots away from the ATM.

129Mr. Khreis did not put forward any other plausible theories or any theories inconsistent with guilt, that are, at the same time grounded in logic and common sense (and not in mere speculation or conjecture), to explain the bank transactions listed in Admission No. 2 and the video or photograph evidence which forms part of Admission No. 3. Applying the principles from Villaroman I am satisfied that no other theories are available.

130I am satisfied that an inference of Mr. Khreis’ guilt is the only reasonable inference flowing from the circumstantial evidence.

e) The Similar Fact Evidence

131Added to the circumstantial evidence is the historical and cross-count similar fact evidence admitted for the issue of A.A.’s credibility as it relates to the actus reus for count 2. It is the same historical similar fact evidence that was admitted, for a different purpose, for counts 3 and 4. I will not repeat my review of the historical similar fact evidence. The cross-count similar fact evidence relates to the theft of E.B.’s phone and of money from her bank account.

132I am satisfied that it is beyond mere coincidence that Mr. Khreis was the perpetrator of the four historical events, counts 3 and 4, and the events which support count 2.

f) Disposition

133Considering the evidence cumulatively, I find that the Crown has met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Khreis stole A.A.’s bank card and cell phone and at least $90 from A.A.’s chequing account. What remains to be determined is whether there is a path to conviction on the count of robbery pursuant to one of ss. 343(a), (b), and (c) or Mr. Khreis is found guilty of the lesser included offence of “theft under”.

134For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Crown has met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Khreis committed robbery as defined in s. 343(b). Relying on the language of that subsection, I am satisfied that Mr. Khreis stole from A.A. and immediately before he stole from her, he used personal violence (i.e., the sexual assault) to A.A.

135In convicting Mr. Khreis of robbery, I rely on the following passage from p. 416 of the majority decision of Jessup J.A. in R. v. Lieberman, 1970 CanLII 393 (ON CA), [1970] 3 O.R. 407 (C.A.): “In my view it is not necessary under s. 343 that the intent to steal accompany the interdicted violence, and it is sufficient if there is a theft in fact with the infliction of violence on a person from whom anything is stolen at a time immediately proximate to the time of the theft.”

136I find that A.A.’s time alone with Mr. Khreis in his vehicle is part of a single, continuous event during which Mr. Khreis sexually assaulted A.A. a matter of minutes before he (a) demanded her bank card, PIN, cell phone, and password, and (b) drove away from A.A., leaving her without her bank card and cell phone.

137The Code does not include a definition of “immediately before” or “immediately thereafter”. It would strain credulity to conclude that, with Mr. Khreis and A.A. remaining in the same confined physical space throughout (i.e., Mr. Khreis’ vehicle), and with Mr. Khreis entirely in control of the vehicle, including the locking mechanisms, the number of minutes that passed between the violence of the sexual assault and the acts of stealing exceeds what is intended by “immediately before” in s. 343(b) of the Code.

138I am satisfied that, through the unlawful violence of the sexual assault, Mr. Khreis created a situation in which, within a matter of minutes of that violence occurring, he took advantage of A.A. by stealing her bank card and phone. I refer to the decision in Regina v. Downer (1978), 1978 CanLII 2340 (ON CA), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 532 (Ont. C.A.). At p. 536, Martin J.A. highlights that where, “unlawful violence or threats of violence preceded the theft, creating a situation of which the offender took advantage by stealing from the victim, the offence, it would seem, was robbery, notwithstanding that the violence or threat thereof was not used for the purpose of furthering the theft.”

139I am not satisfied that the Crown has met its burden to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Khreis had the intention required for the purpose of a conviction of robbery pursuant to either s. 343(a) or (c). The similar fact evidence supports the existence of a ruse – including the request for an additional $10. The similar fact evidence does, not, however, support a finding that, from the outset, the ruse included an intention to sexually assault A.A. immediately before acts of stealing. The evidence does not support drawing the inference required to support a conclusion that the Crown has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the intent required for a conviction under either s. 343(a) or (c).

140I find Mr. Khreis guilty on count 2.

Summary

141There will be a finding of guilt on counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Date: July 14, 2026

Justice Sylvia Corthorn

CITATION : R. v. Khreis, 2026 ONSC 4051

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-11402970

DATE: 2026/07/14

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

His Majesty the King

Crown

– and –

Sami Khreis

Defendant

reasons for DECISION