CITATION: Latino Wall Street, LLC v. Ontiveros, 2026 ONSC 3985

COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-0584 (Brampton)

DATE: 2026-07-08

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LATINO WALL STREET, LLC

Applicant

-and-

MARIA ALEXANDRA ONTIVEROS

Respondent

Matt Maurer, for the applicant

Maria Alexandra Ontiveros, self-represented

Heard: March 24, 2026, by video

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The applicant sued the respondent in Puerto Rico, alleging that the respondent copied its intellectual property, started a competing business, and poached the applicant’s clients. The applicant obtained judgment for $1,012,267.64 USD and seeks to enforce that judgment in Ontario. The respondent opposes enforcement on the basis that she did not receive notice of the Puerto Rican proceeding. Her position is that the judgment issued without her knowledge and without any opportunity to participate in or defend the proceeding. The applicant replies that the respondent likely did receive notice and, in any event, was afforded procedural fairness in accordance with the procedures of the Puerto Rican court.

1. The Test for Recognition of the Puerto Rican Judgment

[2] Canadian courts “have adopted a generous and liberal approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments”: Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, at para. 27. The threshold test for Canadian courts to recognize a foreign judgment requires that the plaintiff (or applicant) prove that the judgment: (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) is final; and (3) is for a definite sum of money. If the plaintiff establishes these three things, the defendant may still successfully resist enforcement of the foreign judgment if it establishes one of three defences: (1) fraud; (2) public policy; or (3) lack of natural justice.

2. The Sole Issue is the Defence of Lack of Natural Justice

[3] In this case, the underlying dispute arises from the respondent’s former employment (as an independent contractor) with the applicant. The applicant corporation is resident in Puerto Rico and the respondent lived in Stouffville, Ontario. Under the contract between the parties, the governing law is the law of Puerto Rico, and the parties agreed that they “consent to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction located in San Juan, Puerto Rico for all purposes in connection with any legal proceeding between them relating to or arising out of this Agreement.”

[4] It is clear from this undisputed evidence that the U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico had a real and substantial connection to the dispute and the parties, and therefore had “jurisdiction” (within the meaning of that term as described in Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, at para. 37) to make the order that it did against the respondent. The respondent did not argue otherwise. It is also clear that the judgment is final and is for a definite sum of money.

[5] The respondent does not advance the defences of fraud or public policy. However, the defence of lack of natural justice is in play because the respondent says she never received notice of the claim. I find that the respondent has established she did not receive actual notice of the proceeding; however, that finding does not dispose of the application because the respondent contractually attorned to Puerto Rico and had an available remedy there.

3. On a balance of probabilities, the respondent has established that she did not receive actual notice of the Puerto Rican claim

[6] The applicant started the Puerto Rican proceeding on December 30, 2021. The applicant then hired a process serving company to serve the respondent with the claim through the Central Authority in Ontario. After approximately one year without the Central Authority providing any update at all on service, the applicant brought a motion in the Puerto Rican court for substituted service. The court decided to permit service by the clerk of its court sending a copy of the complaint by registered mail.

[7] The respondent has the burden to show, on a balance of probabilities, that she did not receive notice of the Puerto Rican proceedings.

[8] As already noted, the Central Authority in Ontario provided the applicant with no update about service of the complaint for over a year. During this time, the applicant did not send the respondent the complaint by email, regular mail, or any other method. The applicant did not communicate with the respondent about the claim. The applicant did not ask the respondent to accept service by any method other than through the Central Authority.

[9] Although the allegations in the complaint relate to poaching customers, there is no evidence to indicate that customers were aware of the Puerto Rican proceedings, or that the respondent learned of the proceedings through second-hand information. There is some information in the record before me of a pre-litigation demand, in that the original complaint, which is Exhibit B to the affidavit of Anthony Delgado, states that on October 28, 2021, the applicant sent the respondent a communication apprising the respondent of its intention to institute legal action against her. Although this is only a pleading and there is no attestation that the demand was sent, I accept from all the circumstances that the respondent might have expected the claim. However, a long time had passed between the events in question and the date she is alleged to have received the complaint, so she may no longer have expected a claim would be made against her. There is no suggestion that she was attempting to avoid service.

[10] After over a year without information from the Central Authority, the applicant asked the Puerto Rican court to permit service on the respondent by an alternate means. The court’s order allowed service by the Clerk of Court in the following terms:

The Clerk of Court is to address and send to the defendant's last known address, that is, 44 Southeast Passage, Stouffville, Ontario, Canada L4AoY3, the complaint, its exhibits and the summons issued in the instant case. The documents shall be sent to the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4 (f)(2)(C)(ii), that is, via any form of mail used by the Clerk that requires a signed receipt. The Clerk of Court shall upload to the docket evidence of the documents sent and evidence of the signed receipt once returned. [Emphasis added.]

[11] Included in Exhibit C to Mr. Delgado’s affidavit, is a receipt indicating payment for the documents to be sent by registered mail and payment for a “return receipt,” as well as a tracking number. The court sent the documents on or about March 24, 2023. The clerk then received confirmation from the U.S. Postal Service that the “item was delivered in CANADA at 10:48 am on April 18, 2023.” However, there was no signed receipt.

[12] An affidavit from the applicant’s attorney in Puerto Rico says he spoke to a clerk in the District Court and was advised that the court staff “never expected to receive a signature confirmation receipt as they did not pay for this service.” The clerk further advised that this “is routine practice for the District Court, as this method already ensures that the District Court will either receive a confirmation if the letter is delivered, or a return notice, if it cannot be delivered.” The clerk further advised that the letter was not returned.

[13] The District Court’s records then show that default was entered by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on February 22, 2024.

[14] The respondent’s affidavit is loosely worded in places, but she makes it clear enough that she never received the complaint, and she did not have knowledge of the Puerto Rican proceeding until she received the judgment. She acknowledges that the documents appear to have been addressed correctly, but she states that she was “in the process of transitioning” her living arrangements “in anticipation of the closing of the property on May 30, 2023.” This is not further explained, but I infer she purchased a property and moved effective May 30, 2023. That is, she moved about six weeks after the letter is said to have been delivered. However, the respondent swears that:

• she “did not receive any delivery notice, pick-up slip, or other notification requiring [her] signature;”

• she “did not sign any return receipt or acknowledgment of service in relation to the alleged international registered mail referenced by the Applicant;” and

• she “did not have actual knowledge of the Puerto Rican proceeding at any time between 2021 and 2025.”

[15] It is right to be skeptical about the respondent’s evidence that she did not receive the registered letter. An error at any point in the delivery or notification process would be unexpected. With that said, errors in the delivery process are neither impossible nor implausible.

[16] Registered mail is notoriously inconvenient for the recipient because the recipient must generally attend the post office to pick it up. However, if the recipient does not pick up the item, the post office will return it to the sender. Here, the court in Puerto Rico received confirmation that the item was “delivered in Canada.” I do not have evidence about the circumstances in which the U.S. Postal Service would report that an item was “delivered in Canada.” For instance, it is not fully clear whether “delivered in Canada” means delivered to the applicable post office or delivered to the intended recipient. Because the court in Puerto Rico received the delivery notification and not the returned letter, I think it is likely that “delivered in Canada” means the letter was purportedly delivered to the recipient.

[17] After the Puerto Rican court accepted that service had been conducted in accordance with its processes, the applicant took no steps to confirm that the respondent was aware of the claim. For instance, the applicant did not call or email the respondent. Judge Aida M. Delgado‐Colón, U.S. District Judge in Puerto Rico, granted judgment without requiring that any effort be made to confirm that the respondent received the complaint and had chosen not to respond. This is so even though Judge Daniel R. Dominguez had ordered the letter be delivered via a form of mail that required a signed receipt and evidence of the signed receipt.

[18] The applicant did not cross-examine the respondent on her affidavit, as it was entitled to do. In addition, the applicant chose to proceed here by application, not by trial, and did so under subrule 14.05(h) on the basis that it was “unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute requiring a trial.”

[19] There is plausible sworn evidence from the respondent that she was completely unaware of the Puerto Rican proceedings, and that evidence has not been directly challenged. On the other side, I have evidence that the Puerto Rican court sent the complaint by registered mail and received confirmation of delivery. However, it remains possible that both sides’ information is correct, and for unknown reasons the respondent did not get the complaint, while the letter was recorded as delivered. Given the failure to cross-examine the respondent, her evidence is unchallenged and plausible, and I do not have a sufficient basis to reject it.

[20] In result, on the record before me, I find that the respondent has established she had no actual notice of the Puerto Rican proceedings.

4. Although there has been a lack of natural justice, the justice system in Puerto Rico, which the respondent agreed has jurisdiction, offers a means to address a lack of notice; The respondent must pursue her potential remedies in Puerto Rico

[21] Before describing the test that Canadian courts have applied regarding the requirements for natural justice in respect of notice of a claim, it is appropriate to acknowledge several general points from the jurisprudence.

[22] First, as noted by Vermette J. in Roger Vanden Berghe NV v. Merinos Carpet Inc., 2023 ONSC 6728, at para. 49:

The purpose of a proceeding to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment is to allow a pre-existing obligation to be fulfilled; that is, to ensure that a debt already owed by the defendant is paid. Such a proceeding is not based on the original claim the plaintiff pursued against the defendant, but, rather, on the obligation created by the foreign judgment. Barring exceptional concerns, a court’s focus when enforcing a foreign judgment is not on the substantive and procedural law on which the judgment is based, but instead on the obligation created by the judgment itself. Since the purpose of an action for recognition and enforcement is to assist in enforcing an already-adjudicated obligation and not to evaluate the underlying claim that gave rise to the original dispute, the enforcing court’s role is not one of substance, but one of facilitation. [Citations omitted.]

[23] On the other hand, as the Supreme Court in Beals also said, at para. 60:

A domestic court enforcing a judgment has a heightened duty to protect the interests of defendants when the judgment to be enforced is a foreign one. The domestic court must be satisfied that minimum standards of fairness have been applied to the Ontario defendants by the foreign court.

[24] Finally, the generalized approach to the recognition of foreign judgments applies equally to judgments obtained on a contested basis and judgments obtained by default. “In the absence of unfairness or other equally compelling reasons …, there is no logical reason to distinguish between a judgment after trial and a default judgment”: Beals, at para. 31.

a. The defence of lack of natural justice and lack of notice

[25] The application of the defence of lack of natural justice is nicely summarized in Vermette J.’s decision in Roger Vanden Berghe NV, at para. 54:

The defence of lack of natural justice will apply where it is proved, to the civil standard, that the foreign proceedings were contrary to Canadian notions of fundamental justice. The domestic court must be satisfied that minimum standards of fairness have been applied to the defendant by the foreign court. A fair process is one that, in the system from which the judgment originates, reasonably guarantees basic procedural safeguards such as judicial independence and fair ethical rules governing the participants in the judicial system. The defence of natural justice is restricted to the form of the foreign procedure, to due process, and does not relate to the merits of the case. Natural justice includes, but is not limited to, the necessity that a defendant be given adequate notice of the claim made against it and that it be granted an opportunity to defend.

[26] This last passage cites Beals, at para. 65, which states:

In Canada, natural justice has frequently been viewed to include, but is not limited to, the necessity that a defendant be given adequate notice of the claim made against him and that he be granted an opportunity to defend.

[27] The authors of Stephen G.A. Pitel, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2025), at page 222, say:

If a defendant is unaware of foreign litigation and only learns of the judgment in enforcement proceedings, he or she will be able to resist enforcement based on the lack of notice.

[28] Of course, Canadian courts do not always require personal service of an originating process. Plaintiffs in Canada can, and often do, obtain orders permitting substitutional service, or orders dispensing with service. Such orders are granted where the alternate level of service is likely to come to the attention of the defendant, or where service is “impractical.”

[29] Where foreign courts take a similar approach, shouldn’t Canadian courts also recognize an order for substituted service? There is a surprising paucity of jurisprudence on this question, and it is not fully consistent.

b. Oyj v. Reinikka – 1999

[30] In Oyj v. Reinikka, [1999] O.J. No. 2583 (S.C.J.), Pitt J. was asked to enforce a Finnish judgment for a debt. It was “not disputed that the respondent was aware of his indebtedness and his failure to comply with the terms of the loans, although he was not aware that a legal proceeding had been initiated against him.” The applicant had attempted service through the Central Authority in Ontario, but the authorities had not been able to serve the respondent. The Finnish court proceeded to judgment without any further effort at service. Pitt J. classified this as a mere irregularity in procedure: Oyj, at para. 12. He said, “The worst that can be said of the procedure followed by the Finnish Court is that it did not carefully scrutinize the material received from Ontario, or having examined it carefully, it concluded that the defects were not of such a nature as would require the taking of further steps before proceeding to judgment”: Oyj, at para. 11. The respondent became aware of the Finnish proceeding when he was served with a copy of the judgment. It was a feature of the law of Finland that the respondent had the right to have the issue retried “by lodging an action to that effect within 30 days from the receipt of service of the judgment”: Oyj, at para. 8. The judgment itself explained that the defendant had this right. Pitt J. found that “any suggestion of a denial of natural justice was effectively resolved when the Finnish Court served the respondent personally with the judgment and provided him with the opportunity to reopen the litigation”: Oyj, at para. 14. In a short endorsement, the Court of Appeal upheld Pitt J.’s decision: Oyj v. Reinikka, 2000 CanLII 26970 (ON CA).

c. Walters v. Tolman – 2005

[31] In Walters v. Tolman, 2005 BCSC 838, Melnick J. declined enforcement of a Washington State judgment against certain B.C. defendants who had not been served with the complaint. He found that the lack of personal service was contrary to natural justice. The husbands of these defendants had been personally served and had submitted to the jurisdiction of Washington State courts. Under the law of Washington State, “a debt incurred by either spouse during marriage, with a few exceptions, is presumed to be a community debt. When a community debt is being sued upon in Washington State, only one spouse needs to be served”: Walters, at para. 6. After reviewing Canadian and English case law, Melnick J. held that where judgment is obtained without personal service “it is a principle of the law in both England and Canada that a foreign judgment will not be enforced even though the procedure of the foreign court for substitutional service is acceptable in that foreign jurisdiction”: Walters, at para. 26, citing Wanderers Hockey Club v. Johnson (1913), 14 D.L.R. 42 (B.C.S.C.), 1913 CanLII 379 (BC SC) and Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 68 L.J. Ch. 281, at p. 796.

d. Cortés v. Yorkton Securities Inc. – 2007

[32] In, Cortés v. Yorkton Securities Inc., 2007 BCSC 282, Myers J. followed Walters and distinguished Oyj. He also questioned whether Oyj remained good law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Beals. He directly dealt with the question of the defendant’s failure to apply to the foreign court to have the judgment set aside.

[33] The judgment in question in Cortés was from Ecuador. Yorkton Securities had received no notice of the Ecuadorian proceedings. Myers J. found that “the failure to take effective steps to provide Yorkton with notice of the action was a breach of natural justice”: Cortés, at para. 82. He then dealt with the significance of Yorkton’s failure to apply in Ecuador to have the judgment set aside. An important question was whether Yorkton could bring a “nullification action” in Ecuador for a reasonable time after it was served with the judgment. Myers J. could not make a determination of this issue, other than to say that Ecuadorian law was uncertain on this issue. He went on to consider, regardless of whether Yorkton could have done so, “must a defendant avail itself of remedies in the foreign court?” He referred to the following passage from Adams v Cape Industries, [1991] 1 All E.R. 929 (C.A.), at p. 1051:

It is at least clear that our law does not oblige a defendant who can show that a foreign judgment has been obtained by fraud to have used any available remedy in the foreign court with reference to that fraud if he is successfully to impeach that judgment in our courts: see Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co. (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 295, [1881-5] All ER Rep. 307 and Jet Holdings Inc. v. Patel [1989] 2 All ER 648, [1990] 1 Q.B. 335. The position may well be the same where there has been a breach of natural justice of the two primary kinds considered by Atkin L.K. in Jacobson v. Frachon, [138 L.T. 386, 392] namely, absence of notice of the proceedings or failure to afford the defendant an opportunity of substantially presenting his case. [Emphasis added by Myers J.]

[34] Myers J., at para. 104 of Cortés, observed that the English Court of Appeal in Adams:

drew a distinction between primary breaches of natural justice, which included failure to give notice, and other breaches of natural justice. In the Court of Appeal’s view, where there is a primary breach of natural justice “it may very well” be the case that the issue of resort to the remedies available in the foreign jurisdiction are completely irrelevant.

[35] Regarding the Oyj decision, Myers J. noted that it pre-dated Beals, and said, “I doubt that the conclusion that lack of personal service is a mere irregularity can still be sustained”: Cortés, at para. 108. He observed that the minority in Beals addressed the failure of the defendant to avail itself of remedies in the foreign court. While the majority did not do so, the minority had to because it had found a breach of natural justice. Binnie J. and LeBel J. both referred favourably to the English Court of Appeal in Adams: Beals, at paras. 128 and 262.

[36] Myers J. found “good reasons why failure to give notice should be treated differently from other breaches of natural justice insofar as the obligation to make use of remedies available in the foreign court is concerned”: Cortés, at para. 119. He gave three reasons:

a. The enforcement proceeding is the “natural place” to raise the objection because the defendant will, by definition, already be participating in the procedure: Cortés, at para. 120.

b. The defendant should not be deprived of the ability “to mount a jurisdictional application [in the foreign jurisdiction], or to defend the action, or to ignore it. … The plaintiff should not be able to force a defendant to make whatever is left of those decisions after a judgment is obtained”: Cortés, at para. 121.

c. The defendant should not be forced to attorn to the foreign jurisdiction: Cortés, at para. 122.

[37] These three reasons are not persuasive in the case before me, because the respondent contractually agreed to Puerto Rico as the appropriate forum.

[38] Myers J. was persuaded that the plaintiffs had the responsibility of avoiding procedural errors in the foreign jurisdiction that would prevent enforcement in the local jurisdiction: Cortés, at para. 135. That is a strong point. In this case, it would have been a simple thing, and would have avoided difficulty for all parties and for the courts in both jurisdictions, for the applicant to have simply sent an appropriate email to the respondent at any point in the process. Procedural motions, rather than a contested determination of the merits, were readily foreseeable with the approach the applicant chose in this case.

[39] In the next paragraph of his decision in Cortés, Myers J. returned to consider Oyj, saying:

136If Oyj is still good law after Beals (which I doubt: see above), there are two factors which existed in Oyj that are not present in the case at bar. In that case:

(a) the defendant had contractually attorned to the jurisdiction of the Finnish Court; and

(b) there was the absolute right given the defendant to re-open the litigation.

137Under those circumstances – putting Beals to one side - it might be reasonable to force the defendant to avail itself of the right it had to have the case re-heard on its merits. However, in the case at bar there was no attornment, the right to bring the nullification action in Ecuador is in doubt, and the result of such an action is not automatic. [Italics in original, underlining added.]

[40] Ultimately, Myers J. declined to enforce the Ecuadoran judgment. This presumably left the plaintiff with no remedy short of bringing an action in British Columbia.

e. Marx v. Balak – 2008

[41] About a year after deciding Cortés, some similar issues arose for Myers J. in Marx v. Balak, 2008 BCSC 195. The judgment in question there was a judgment from Utah. The defendant retained a Utah attorney and attorned to Utah, but that attorney later got off the record. The defendant said he did not receive a notice requiring him to appoint new counsel or appear in person. That notice had been sent to him by mail in accordance with the procedures in Utah. Not surprisingly, Myers J. did not accept that there had been a denial of natural justice. I refer to the case because of the discussion about the availability of potential remedies that the defendant had in Utah. The defendant had not availed himself of a potential remedy in Utah, that would have allowed him to bring a motion (within three months) to set aside the judgment. Myers J. had not been provided with opinion evidence on the interpretation of the rule in Utah, so interpreted the rule as he would a domestic law: Balak, at para. 38. He held as follows (Marx, at paras. 39 to 43):

I therefore conclude that the defendant had a remedy in Utah of which he did not avail himself.

40Taking the circumstances of this case into account, should the defendant be disentitled from challenging the enforcement of judgment here because he did not avail himself of the Utah procedure?

41I have held that there is nothing unreasonable with the Utah rules of service, or the manner in which service was effected in this case. The judgment was not obtained using a procedure that was in breach of natural justice. The only issue with respect to natural justice is the defendants’ claim that he did not receive the document mailed to him.

42In my view, the defendant should be required to bring that matter before the Utah court. To not require him to do this would allow him to ignore the Utah action – to which he attorned – with impunity, since a new action could not be started there or here due to the passage of the limitation period, issue estoppel or both.

43I also think that not requiring the defendant to apply to the Utah court for relief would, in the circumstances of this case, demonstrate a lack of comity by this court to that court. [Footnote omitted.]

[42] Myers J. then received submissions on “whether the defendant should be given an opportunity to make the necessary application to the Utah court, in which case final judgment should be stayed, or possibly deferred, pending the Utah court’s ruling, or whether judgment should simply be given against the defendant.” Ultimately, he decided not to grant a temporary stay: Marx v. Balak, 2008 BCSC 222.

f. Conclusion on this issue

[43] Despite Myers J.’s reservations about the decision in Oyj, I find that it applies here. The essential facts of Oyj (and this case) are different from Beals, Adams, and Cortés because in those cases the parties had not agreed to the foreign jurisdiction as the appropriate forum.

[44] In this case, the respondent contractually agreed that the courts in Puerto Rico would have jurisdiction “for all purposes in connection with any legal proceeding between them relating to or arising out of this Agreement,” and that the governing law would be the law of Puerto Rico “without regard to conflict of law principles.”

[45] The circumstance in this case is closely akin to that in Oyj and Marx. The text of the rule in Utah that applied regarding “relief from a judgment or order,” being rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appears to be nearly identical to rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that appears to apply to the Puerto Rico proceeding in this case, with perhaps the most significant difference being that the time limit to set aside a judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” is one year under the federal rules rather than three months under the Utah rules. As in Marx, it appears that if the respondent brings a motion in Puerto Rico, she could raise the lack of notice under rule 60(b)(6): “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment … for … any other reason that justifies relief.” Other than a requirement that the motion be made “within a reasonable time,” there does not appear to be a time limit to pursue a remedy in Puerto Rico. In any event, she had a remedy available to her that she could have pursued (and it appears, still can pursue).

[46] To be sure, there are some differences between Marx and this case. The defendant in Marx had not only contractually attorned but had also defended the proceeding. He went into default after not responding to documents that had been mailed to him, but that he said he did not receive. There was nothing unreasonable about the manner of service of those documents, whereas here we would not consider the manner of service to be reasonable for an originating process – after all, the applicant knew the address of the respondent and personal service could have been easily arranged, or receipt confirmed through a signature or by email. If the situation were reversed, and although the matter would be discretionary, few Ontario judges would likely grant judgment in comparable circumstances without some follow up effort to see if the defendant had in fact been notified of the claim. However, as in Marx and Oyj, the respondent agreed to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the foreign court is not only an appropriate jurisdiction but also the natural choice given the nature of the relationship between the parties, and there is or was a remedy available to the respondent in the foreign jurisdiction.

[47] The legal system in Puerto Rico is similar, although not identical to our own. Having agreed to the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican courts, the respondent should not be permitted to ignore the action there. She should be required to seek a remedy in the courts there.

[48] It must also be remembered that the applicant attempted to respect the Hague Convention on service. The Central Authority in Ontario had provided no certificate of any kind.

[49] Comity requires due respect for the Puerto Rican court for the actions it has legitimately taken within its territory.

[50] In result, the Puerto Rican judgment should be recognized in Ontario.

5. Judgment should issue, but submissions are required on whether and for how long the judgment should be stayed

[51] As in Marx, a point that was not argued is whether the defendant should be given an opportunity to make the necessary motion to the court in Puerto Rico, in which case judgment here should be stayed, or possibly deferred, pending the Puerto Rican court’s ruling, or whether judgment should simply be given against the respondent. The parties are to submit written argument on that point. These same submissions are to also address costs. The applicant's written submissions shall be delivered by July 17, 2026. The respondent's written submissions shall be served and filed by July 28, 2026. To reduce the risk of a communication error, in addition to filing the argument with the court and uploading it to Case Center, the parties are to email a copy of their written submissions (cc to each other) to my attention through my judicial assistant (from whom you will have received a copy of these reasons).

____________________

Chown J.