ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Justin Travis Davy Brooke-Bisschop
Plaintiff
– and –
Kathryn Ann Carson
Defendant
Self-represented, Plaintiff
Nick Zapotochny, Counsel for the Defendant
HEARD: June 8, 2026 (Kingston)
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT
JENSEN J.
Introduction
1This case concerns a dispute between former partners over the ownership of a dog, Cooper, following the breakdown of their relationship. The plaintiff, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop, asserts that the parties jointly owned Cooper and seeks, among other relief, specific performance of an alleged agreement to share possession of the dog. In the alternative, he claims compensation for expenses he says he incurred in relation to Cooper’s care.
2The defendant, Ms. Carson, denies that the plaintiff has any ownership interest in Cooper. She maintains that she alone purchased the dog and intended to be its sole owner, and she seeks a declaration to that effect.
3The issues before the court are therefore whether Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop has established joint ownership of the dog, whether any enforceable agreement exists that would justify the remedy of specific performance, and whether Mr. Brooke-Bisschop is entitled to compensation, including on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Factual Background
4The parties, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop and Ms. Carson, were involved in a romantic relationship from approximately March 2016 until the fall of 2019. During that time, they lived together in a rented condominium in Toronto for a period beginning in August 2017.
5In May 2019, the dog at the centre of this dispute, Cooper, was purchased from a breeder. Following his purchase, Cooper resided with the parties while they were living together in Toronto. The evidence establishes that the parties lived together with Cooper for a relatively brief period of approximately three and a half months.
6In the summer of 2019, Ms. Carson made arrangements to relocate to Kingston in connection with her pharmacy residency. The parties ceased cohabitation at the end of July 2019 when that move occurred.
7The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate shortly thereafter and came to an initial end on September 29, 2019. Following that date, the parties attempted to reconcile for a limited period. During this interval, Cooper primarily resided with Ms. Carson, but Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop spent time with the dog on an informal basis.
8The evidence establishes that, following their initial separation, there was no formal or structured agreement governing the sharing of Cooper. Rather, any arrangement for Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop to spend time with the dog was informal, episodic, and dependent on the parties’ ongoing attempts to resolve their relationship.
9By January 2020, it became clear the parties would not reconcile, and their relationship came to a final end at that time. After that point, Cooper remained in the care of Ms. Carson on a continuous basis, subject only to occasional visits by Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop in the period immediately following the separation.
Issues
10The following issues must be determined:
Has the plaintiff established any ownership interest in Cooper?
Did the parties enter into a binding agreement respecting ownership or possession of the dog?
Is the plaintiff entitled to specific performance of any such agreement?
Has the plaintiff established a claim for compensation, including unjust enrichment?
What is the appropriate disposition of the action?
Analysis
Credibility and Reliability of the Evidence
11The resolution of this dispute turns significantly on credibility. The central issues—ownership of the dog, the existence of any agreement, and the extent of Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s financial contributions—depend on the reliability of the parties’ respective accounts.
12There are material inconsistencies between the affidavit and oral evidence of Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop, on core issues. His affidavit presents a structured narrative of joint ownership supported by an alleged financial arrangement, a “co‑ownership contract,” and a defined timesharing regime. However, his trial evidence departs materially from that narrative.
13At trial, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop acknowledged that Ms. Carson paid the full purchase price of the dog and he was unable to produce any documentary evidence supporting his assertion of a debt‑forgiveness arrangement said to constitute his contribution. This is a significant concession, as the alleged financial arrangement is central to his claim of joint ownership.
14Further, the document he characterized in his affidavit as a “co‑ownership contract” was described in his oral evidence as a light‑hearted, non‑binding document. This recharacterization materially undermines both the existence of any binding agreement and the assertion that the parties intended to create legal rights of shared ownership.
15The same pattern is evident in relation to the alleged timesharing arrangement. While the affidavit suggests a structured and equal sharing regime, the trial evidence establishes there was no fixed schedule, no agreement on contingencies, and no defined terms capable of enforcement.
16Taken together, these inconsistencies demonstrate a pattern of overstatement in the affidavit evidence which was significantly qualified under oath. I find that this materially diminishes the reliability of Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s evidence on the central issues of intention, agreement, and contribution. Where his evidence conflicts with that of Ms. Carson, I prefer her evidence.
17By contrast, Ms. Carson’s evidence is consistent, both internally and when compared to the objective record. She maintained throughout that she intended to be the sole owner of the dog, that she paid the full purchase price, and that the inclusion of Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s name on the purchase agreement was not intended to confer ownership. Her explanation for the parties’ use of language such as “our dog” is also consistent and plausible in the context of a romantic relationship.
18Ms. Carson also made measured concessions, including acknowledging that both parties contributed to Cooper’s care during the relationship. Those concessions enhance the credibility of her evidence.
19The evidence of Ms. Charbonneau, the dog breeder who sold the dog to Ms. Carson, must be considered with some caution. While she expressed a firm view in her affidavit that Ms. Carson was the owner, she acknowledged at trial that her knowledge of the parties’ financial arrangements was limited to who paid her. She further testified that, as a breeder, she approved Ms. Carson as the caregiver and did not assess the plaintiff in that role.
20I accept that Ms. Charbonneau’s evidence is reliable insofar as it relates to the circumstances of the purchase and her dealings with Ms. Carson. However, her views on ownership reflect her own expectations and practices rather than a legal determination and therefore carry limited weight on that issue.
Findings of Fact – Financial Contributions
21On the totality of the evidence, I make the following findings with regard to the financial contributions made by Mr. Brooke-Bisschop.
22I find that Ms. Carson paid the full purchase price of Cooper in the amount of $1,100. This is supported by documentary evidence and by Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s admissions. I reject Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s assertion that he contributed indirectly through a debt‑forgiveness arrangement. That assertion is unsupported, uncorroborated, and inconsistent with the surrounding evidence. Notably, Ms. Carson testified that she knew nothing of such an arrangement until the litigation began. She testified that she had no idea that Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop was paying for things during their relationship with the understanding that this would be considered his contribution to paying for Cooper. I accept Ms. Carson’s testimony in that regard.
23I further find that, during the parties’ relationship, both contributed in various ways to Cooper’s care. However, those contributions were informal, voluntary, and typical of a shared domestic life. There was no agreement governing the allocation of expenses or providing for reimbursement.
24I find that the Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claim of substantial financial contribution is materially overstated. Many of the expenses he claims:
are unrelated to the dog;
were not actually incurred; or
reflect general relationship or household expenditures.
25I accept that Mr. Brooke Bisschop made some limited contributions. However, I find that those contributions were modest, sporadic, and largely voluntary. In particular, his trial evidence confirms that his direct financial contributions to veterinary care were minimal.
26I further find that expenses incurred by Mr. Brooke Bisschop after the parties’ separation were primarily the result of his own requests to spend time with the dog and were not incurred pursuant to any obligation on Ms. Carson’s part.
27Finally, I find that Ms. Carson bore the primary financial responsibility for Cooper, including both the acquisition and the ongoing costs of care.
Legal Framework
28The legal principles governing disputes over companion animals are now well settled. Notwithstanding their emotional significance to those who care for them, dogs are treated in law as personal property. Disputes concerning them are therefore resolved by applying ordinary principles of property, contract, and equity. Courts have consistently resisted efforts to import family law concepts such as custody or best interests into this area of the law.
(a) Pets as Personal Property
29The courts have repeatedly affirmed that disputes over pets must be approached as property disputes. In Warnica v. Gering, 2004 CanLII 50065 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d 2005 CanLII 30838 (Ont. C.A.), the Superior Court rejected a claim for joint custody of a dog and emphasized that courts ought not to engage in custody-type determinations for animals: at paras. 18-20The Court viewed such claims as fundamentally misconceived, noting that they misunderstand the legal status of animals. The Court of Appeal upheld that reasoning, confirming that the allocation of judicial resources to such claims is unwarranted: at paras. 5-6.
30The same principle is reflected in King v. Mann, 2020 ONSC 108, 53 E.T.R. (4th) 171 where the court emphasized that, although dogs may be deeply valued by their owners, they remain personal property in law: at para. 70. The inquiry is therefore one of ownership, not of caregiving, emotional attachment, or subjective importance. This approach is consistent with the decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in Baker v. Harmina, 2018 NLCA 15, where the court confirmed that the role of the court is to determine who owns the animal, not which party has formed the stronger bond or undertaken the greater share of care: at para. 12.
31Taken together, these decisions make clear that the court’s task is not to resolve a relational dispute or to craft an arrangement that appears fair as between the parties. Rather, the court must determine legal ownership using established principles of property law.
(b) Determining Ownership: Traditional Approach
32Traditionally, ownership of a pet is determined by objective indicia of title. Courts have focused on who acquired the dog, who paid the purchase price, and whether there are documentary indications of ownership. These factors provide a straightforward and often decisive basis for resolving disputes.
33As reflected in Warnica (Ont. S.C), at paras. 26-28, King, at paras. 18, 70 and 71, and Baker, at paras. 49-53, particular weight is placed on the act of acquisition and the existence of a clear chain of title. Payment of the purchase price is generally strong evidence of ownership. By contrast, the fact that one party cared for the dog or incurred expenses in relation to it does not, without more, transfer ownership or create a proprietary interest.
34The authorities also recognize that the existence of a romantic or domestic relationship does not alter these principles. Property does not become jointly owned simply because it is used or enjoyed by both parties during the relationship. Absent a recognized legal mechanism—such as contract, gift, or trust—ownership remains with the party who acquired the property. As noted in King v. Mann, expenditures made in relation to a dog, even where significant, do not in themselves give rise to legal rights in that animal: at para. 71.
(c) Broader Contextual Approach
35In some cases, courts have taken a broader, contextual approach to determining ownership, particularly in the context of domestic relationships. In Coates v. Dickson, 2021 ONSC 992, the court considered the surrounding circumstances of the parties’ relationship, including their intentions, their conduct both during and after the relationship, and their respective roles in caring for the animal: at paras 7-9.
36This approach recognizes that strict reliance on formal indicia of title may not always reflect the realities of how property is treated within a relationship. It permits the court to examine whether the totality of the evidence supports a finding of shared ownership.
37However, the limits of this approach are clearly illustrated in Duboff v. Simpson, 2021 ONSC 4970. In that case, despite evidence that both parties cared for the dog, contributed to its expenses, and treated it as a family pet, the court concluded that ownership rested with the individual who had acquired it: at paras 22-23. The court emphasized that shared caregiving is a common feature of domestic relationships and does not, without more, create legal rights. Informal understandings or expectations are insufficient. Ownership will not be displaced absent clear and cogent evidence of an agreement or transfer giving rise to a proprietary interest: at para. 31.
38Accordingly, while contextual factors may assist the court in understanding the relationship between the parties, they will rarely outweigh clear evidence of acquisition and ownership.
(d) Post-Separation Sharing Arrangements
39The jurisprudence also establishes that courts will not impose or enforce post separation sharing arrangements for pets. In Warnica, the Ontario Superior Court declined to order a shared custody or access regime, emphasizing that courts lack the institutional competence and practical ability to supervise such arrangements: at para. 19. The Court of Appeal agreed.
40Similarly, in Duboff, the court held that arrangements allowing one party to spend time with a dog following separation are typically informal and dependent on the goodwill of the owner. Such arrangements do not create legal rights and are not suitable for judicial enforcement: at paras. 35-38.
41Courts have also recognized the broader policy concerns that arise in this context. Orders requiring shared possession of an animal are likely to generate ongoing conflict between the parties. They are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce effectively, and would require the court to take on an ongoing supervisory role. These considerations strongly militate against the imposition of such regimes.
(e) Specific Performance
42Mr. Brooke Bisschop seeks the equitable remedy of specific performance. That remedy is exceptional and is granted only in limited circumstances.
43In Lucas v. 1858793 Ontario Inc. (Howard Park), 2021 ONCA 52, at para. 69, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that specific performance will only be ordered where damages are inadequate and the subject matter of the contract is sufficiently unique. The Supreme Court of Canada in Asamera Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sea Oil & General Corporation et al., 1978 CanLII 16 (SCC), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, at p. 668 similarly emphasized that a plaintiff must demonstrate a fair, real, and substantial justification for the remedy.
44In the context of disputes involving animals, courts have been reluctant to find that these requirements are satisfied. Although a party may place significant subjective value on a dog, granting specific performance would typically require the court to create and oversee an ongoing sharing arrangement. Such an order would necessitate continuing judicial involvement, the management of future disputes, and the enforcement of a fundamentally relational arrangement. These features render the remedy both impractical and inconsistent with the principles governing specific performance. As reflected in Warnica and Duboff, courts have consistently declined to grant such relief.
(f) Unjust Enrichment
45Claims for compensation arising from expenditures on a dog are typically analyzed under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The governing test, set out in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, requires proof of three elements: an enrichment of the defendant; a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment: at para. 32.
46The analysis must be undertaken with particular care in the context of domestic relationships. In Kerr, the Supreme Court recognized that parties in such relationships often share expenses, perform services, and make contributions for each other’s benefit without any expectation of compensation. As a result, the relationship itself may constitute a juristic reason that explains and justifies the transfer of value.
47This principle has been applied in the context of pet disputes. In Duboff, the court rejected a claim for reimbursement of expenses relating to the care of a dog, holding that such expenditures, when made in the course of a romantic relationship, are typically voluntary and motivated by affection. They do not give rise to a compensable loss in law. Absent a clear agreement to the contrary, such contributions will not support a claim in unjust enrichment.
(g) Synthesis of Principles
48The authorities establish a consistent framework. Pets are treated as personal property, and ownership—not caregiving—controls the analysis. While contextual factors may be relevant, they rarely displace clear evidence of acquisition and title. Courts will not impose or supervise shared possession regimes for animals and will approach claims for equitable relief with caution. Claims for compensation are governed by the doctrine of unjust enrichment and will generally fail where contributions were made voluntarily within a domestic relationship.
49These principles govern the analysis that follows.
Ownership of Cooper
50In determining the ownership of Cooper, I apply the broader contextual approach described in Coates, while bearing in mind that the ultimate question remains one of legal ownership. I consider the relevant factors in turn in light of the evidentiary record.
(a) Intention at the Time of Acquisition
51The parties’ intention at the time Cooper was acquired is a central factor.
52The evidence establishes that Ms. Carson was the driving force behind the decision to obtain a dog. She had long intended to acquire a golden retriever and took the steps necessary to do so, including contacting the breeder and selecting the puppy. Most significantly, she paid the full purchase price.
53Mr. Brooke Bisschop relies on the fact that he was named on the purchase agreement and on what he described as a “co ownership contract”. However, his own evidence undermines the weight of these factors. At trial, he acknowledged that Ms. Carson paid the purchase price and that the document he prepared was not intended to be legally binding. These concessions materially weaken any inference of a shared intention to create joint ownership.
54The surrounding circumstances also do not support a finding of shared intention. The inclusion of Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s name on documents is consistent with Ms. Carson’s evidence that she sought to include him in the process of acquiring the dog during the relationship, rather than to confer legal ownership. Mr. Brooke Bisschop was initially reluctant to have a dog, and Ms. Carson hoped that by including him in the process he would change his mind. These gestures were not intended to confer ownership of the dog on the plaintiff.
55As in Duboff, the use of inclusive language and the involvement of both parties at the time of acquisition reflect the nature of the parties’ relationship, not a legally operative intention to create shared ownership.
56On the totality of the evidence, I find the intention at the time of acquisition was that Cooper would be Ms. Carson’s dog.
(b) Financial Contributions
57The financial evidence strongly supports Ms. Carson’s sole ownership.
58I have found that Ms. Carson paid the full purchase price. Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s assertion that he contributed through a form of debt forgiveness is unsupported by any documentation and was not substantiated at trial.
59With respect to ongoing expenses, the evidence establishes that both parties incurred some costs during the relationship. However, these were informal, voluntary expenditures typical of a domestic relationship. Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s claim that he bore a significant share of the financial burden is not borne out by the evidence.
60His affidavit evidence substantially overstates his contributions. Many of the amounts claimed are unrelated to the dog, were not actually incurred, or reflect general household expenses. His trial evidence confirms that his direct contributions—particularly to veterinary care—were minimal.
61In contrast, Ms. Carson bore the majority of the financial burden associated with Cooper, both at the outset and on an ongoing basis.
62As recognized in King, financial contributions to a dog’s care do not create ownership. Nevertheless, when considered as part of the overall context, the financial evidence here reinforces the conclusion that Cooper was acquired and maintained as Ms. Carson’s dog.
(c) Care, Custody and Control
63The evidence also establishes that Ms. Carson exercised primary care, custody, and control over Cooper.
64Although both parties were involved in Cooper’s care during the brief period of cohabitation, that period lasted only approximately three and a half months. During that time, the parties were in a romantic relationship and sharing a household, such that shared caregiving is unsurprising and does not carry significant weight.
65While Mr. Brooke Bisschop did have Cooper for approximately 45% of the time between September 29, 2019, and January 25, 2020, this arrangement arose from Ms. Carson’s voluntary choice. It was connected to her hope at the time that the relationship might be reconciled, rather than reflecting any established or independent entitlement on the plaintiff’s part to shared possession or control.
66Following the parties’ separation, Cooper resided primarily with Ms. Carson. She assumed responsibility for his day to day care, including feeding, training, and veterinary arrangements. Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s involvement after separation was limited and episodic.
67Mr. Brooke Bisschop did not establish that he exercised any sustained or independent control over the dog. His role is more accurately characterized as that of a participant in caregiving during the relationship, and thereafter as a visitor.
68As emphasized in Duboff, shared caregiving in the context of a relationship does not, without more, give rise to a proprietary interest. The evidence of care and control in this case supports ownership resting with Ms. Carson.
(d) Documentary Indicia of Ownership
69The primary document relied upon by Mr. Brooke Bisschop is the purchase agreement listing both parties as “buyers.”
70While documentary evidence is relevant, its weight depends on context. Here, the evidence surrounding the purchase agreement diminishes its significance. Mr. Brooke Bisschop did not contribute to the purchase price, and his own evidence does not support the existence of a binding co-ownership arrangement.
71Mr. Brooke Bisschop also relies on the fact that he arranged for Cooper to be registered with the Canadian Kennel Club (“CKC”) in both his name and Ms. Carson’s name. However, this registration reflects the names already set out in the purchase agreement and does not provide independent evidence of ownership. CKC registration is an administrative record and not a legal determination of title. It does not, without more, constitute indicia of a proprietary interest.
72Similarly, Mr. Brooke Bisschop points to the fact that he registered Cooper as his pet with his apartment building. This is, again, an administrative step taken for housing purposes and does not establish legal ownership. Such registrations are typically based on occupancy and convenience rather than a determination of proprietary rights, and they carry little weight in the present analysis.
73There is no other documentary evidence that supports Mr. Brooke Bisschop claim to ownership. There are no records of shared ownership, no formal agreement allocating rights, and no consistent documentary indicia suggesting joint title.
74In contrast, the evidence relating to the acquisition process, including payment and communications with the breeder, aligns with Ms. Carson as the purchaser and intended owner.
75Viewed in context, neither the purchase agreement, the CKC registration, nor the apartment registration displaces the otherwise clear indicia of sole ownership.
(e) Conduct During the Relationship
76The parties’ conduct during the relationship reflects a shared domestic life rather than a shared proprietary arrangement.
77The evidence shows the parties referred to Cooper in inclusive terms and both participated in his care. However, as the case law recognizes, such conduct is commonplace in a romantic relationship and does not establish ownership.
78There is no evidence of any structured agreement concerning ownership or allocation of responsibilities. The parties did not discuss ownership in legal terms, nor did they establish any framework suggesting that Cooper was jointly owned property.
79This factor does not support Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s claim.
(f) Post-Separation Conduct
80The parties’ post separation conduct further supports Ms. Carson’s ownership.
81Following separation, Cooper remained primarily in Ms. Carson’s care. Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s access to the dog was informal, intermittent, and dependent on the continuation of amicable relations between the parties.
82There was no formal agreement governing sharing or access. The arrangement described by Mr. Brooke Bisschop as a “parenting schedule” was not supported by consistent or credible evidence and lacks the indicia of any binding agreement.
83As recognized in Duboff, such informal access arrangements do not create ownership rights. They are properly understood as acts of accommodation rather than recognition of a legal interest.
(g) Overall Assessment
84Considering all these factors together, the evidence does not support a finding of joint ownership.
85This case bears a strong resemblance to Duboff, where shared caregiving, financial contributions, and emotional attachment did not displace ownership in the party who acquired the dog. By contrast, this case lacks the kind of structured agreement or mutual understanding present in cases such as Coates that might support a different conclusion.
86The most salient factors—intention at acquisition, payment of the purchase price, and primary control—point consistently in one direction. They establish that Cooper was acquired by Ms. Carson and remained her dog throughout.
87I therefore find that Cooper is the sole property of Ms. Carson.
Specific Performance
88Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop has not established the existence of a binding agreement. The alleged arrangement lacks certainty of terms and was not intended to be legally binding.
89Even if such an agreement existed, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop seeks to enforce what is effectively an ongoing shared possession regime.
90In Warnica, the court rejected such arrangements. In Duboff, the court confirmed that such arrangements depend on goodwill and are not suitable for enforcement.
91Further, the requirements for specific performance are not met. In accordance with the decisions in Lucas and Asamera, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop must establish that damages are inadequate and that the subject matter is sufficiently unique. Even assuming the dog is subjectively important, the remedy would require ongoing supervision and continuous interaction between former partners, which weighs strongly against granting relief.
92I conclude that specific performance is neither available nor appropriate.
Unjust Enrichment/Damages
93Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop advances a claim for compensation arising from expenses he says he incurred in relation to Cooper’s care. That claim is framed in unjust enrichment and must be assessed in accordance with the principles set out in Kerr.
94To succeed, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop must establish that Ms. Carson was enriched, that he suffered a corresponding deprivation, and that there is no juristic reason for the enrichment. Each element must be proven on a balance of probabilities.
95There is some basis in the evidence to conclude that, at least in a broad sense, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop conferred a benefit on Ms. Carson by incurring certain expenditures during the relationship. However, the scope of that benefit must be assessed in light of the factual findings already made.
96I have found Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claimed contributions are significantly overstated. His affidavit evidence alleges substantial expenditures exceeding $9,000. However, the evidence establishes that many of these claimed expenses were either unrelated to Cooper, were not actually incurred, or were attributable to general household or relationship costs. The spreadsheet he relies upon includes items such as rent differentials, groceries, and travel, which bear no clear connection to the care of the dog. To the extent that expenses can properly be attributed to Cooper, they are modest in scale.
97Further, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s own admissions at trial significantly narrow the scope of any cognizable claim. He acknowledged, for example, that his direct contributions to veterinary care were minimal, amounting to approximately $30. The evidence also establishes that he did not assume responsibility for major expenses such as the dog’s neutering, routine veterinary care, or other substantial costs associated with ownership. These findings undermine any suggestion of a meaningful financial deprivation.
98Even assuming that some enrichment and corresponding deprivation could be established, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claim fails at the third stage of the analysis: juristic reason.
99The jurisprudence is clear that many of the contributions made in the context of a romantic or domestic relationship are ordinarily explained by that relationship itself. In Kerr, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that parties to such relationships frequently share expenses, provide services, and make contributions for each other’s benefit without any expectation of reimbursement. These contributions are often motivated by mutual support, affection, or the ordinary incidents of shared life.
100The evidence in this case strongly supports the conclusion Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s expenditures fall squarely within that category. I have found that the parties were in a romantic relationship at the time the expenses were incurred, that they cohabited and shared aspects of their domestic life, and that there was no agreement governing financial contributions to the dog’s care. Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s own evidence does not establish that he incurred these expenses with any expectation of repayment. To the contrary, his position appears to be that such expenditures only became compensable after the breakdown of the relationship.
101This retrospective characterization is not supported by the law. As the court held in Duboff, expenditures relating to the care of a dog during a relationship are typically voluntary and motivated by affection. They do not, without more, give rise to a compensable deprivation. The same reasoning applies here. Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s contributions, such as they were, are properly understood as part of the ordinary give‑and‑take of a domestic relationship.
102The absence of any contractual foundation further reinforces this conclusion. There is no evidence of a written agreement requiring Ms. Carson to reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred in relation to Cooper. Nor is there sufficient evidence of a clear and enforceable oral agreement to that effect. The alleged “co‑ownership contract” does not address reimbursement and, in any event, was not intended to be legally binding. In the absence of a contractual framework, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claim cannot succeed on a restitutionary basis where a juristic reason exists.
103Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop also relies, in part, on expenses incurred after the parties’ separation. However, I have found that these expenditures were incurred voluntarily, largely in connection with his desire to continue spending time with Cooper. They were not incurred at Ms. Carson’s request, nor pursuant to any agreement between the parties. Such expenditures cannot ground a claim in unjust enrichment.
104Even if the elements of unjust enrichment were arguable, I would decline to grant a remedy in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The doctrine is not intended to facilitate the retrospective accounting of contributions made within a personal relationship. As the Supreme Court noted in Kerr, courts must exercise caution before imposing financial consequences on the everyday exchanges that occur within domestic life. To do otherwise would risk transforming personal relationships into commercial partnerships subject to after‑the‑fact accounting.
105In my view, this case illustrates precisely that concern. Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop seeks to convert a series of informal, voluntary expenditures made during and shortly after a romantic relationship into a legally enforceable debt. The law does not support such a transformation.
106For these reasons, Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop has failed to establish the absence of a juristic reason and, consequently, has not made out a claim in unjust enrichment. His claim for damages must therefore be dismissed.
Final Conclusions
i. Ownership
107Having considered the totality of the evidence and the applicable legal principles, I reach the following conclusions.
108First, with respect to ownership, I find that Ms. Carson is the sole legal owner of Cooper. The evidence establishes that she alone acquired the dog, paid the purchase price, and assumed primary responsibility for his care. The contextual factors relied upon by Mr. Brooke Bisschop do not displace these core indicia of ownership. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr. Brooke Bisschop has not established any proprietary interest in the dog.
ii. Agreement
109Second, I find that no binding agreement was made between the parties concerning either shared ownership or shared possession of Cooper. While the parties clearly interacted with the dog in a shared and informal manner during their relationship, the evidence does not support the existence of any agreement possessing the certainty, intention, or essential terms required for enforceability. Any arrangements that did exist were informal, contingent on the continuation of the relationship, and not intended to give rise to legal rights.
iii. Specific Performance
110Third, Mr. Brooke Bisschop’s claim for specific performance must fail. It fails, in the first instance, because there is no enforceable agreement capable of being performed. It also fails in principle, as the remedy sought would require the court to impose and supervise an ongoing sharing arrangement for the dog. As the jurisprudence makes clear, such relief is not available in law and is not appropriate in the context of a property dispute of this nature.
iv. Unjust Enrichment/ Damages
111Fourth, Mr. Brooke Bisschop has not established any entitlement to compensation, whether framed in unjust enrichment or otherwise. The evidence demonstrates that any expenditures he made in relation to Cooper were modest, voluntary, and incurred in the context of a romantic relationship. There was no expectation of reimbursement at the time the expenditures were made, and no agreement providing for it. In these circumstances, the law does not recognize a compensable deprivation, and the claim must fail.
Disposition and Order
112Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s action is dismissed.
113The court declares that Cooper is the sole property of the defendant, Ms. Carson. Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop has no ownership interest and no entitlement to possession or access.
114Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claim for specific performance is dismissed.
115Mr. Brooke‑Bisschop’s claim for damages, including unjust enrichment, is dismissed.
Costs
116Ms. Carson was entirely successful at trial. She is therefore presumptively entitled to her cost. I encourage the parties to come to an agreement regarding costs. If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may arrange for a half hour appearance before me to speak to this issue. Three days in advance of this appearance they must upload written submissions not exceeding three pages, including a Bill of Costs to Case Center.
Date: July 6, 2026
Justice K.A. Jensen
CITATION: Brooke-Bisschop v. Carson, 2026 ONSC 3945
COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-74
DATE: 2026/07/06
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
Justin Travis Davy Brooke-Bisschop
Plaintiff
– and –
Kathryn Ann Carson
Defendant
REASONS FOR Judgement
Justice K.A. Jensen
Released: July 6, 2026