CITATION: J.C. v. J.C., 2026 ONSC 3884

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-130

DATE: 2026 07 06

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

J.C.

S. Arnold, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

J.C.

R. Shankar, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: June 26, 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEMAY J.

Overview

1The parties were married on October 14^th, 2010, and have separated as of December 4^th, 2025. There are two children of the marriage, D.C., who is 11 and K.C., who is going to be 9 later this month. This is a pair of motions that have been brought, one by each side, in respect of the children.

2On December 5^th, 2025, an ex parte order was made by McSweeney J. on the basis that the Applicant had significant fears for her own safety and wellbeing and for that of the two children. These Orders prevented the Respondent from knowing where the Applicant or the children were or from communicating with them. It also gave the Applicant sole decision-making authority.

3A further appearance took place before Juginovic J. on December 19^th, 2025. At that time, the orders were continued on consent, but a provision was added whereby the Respondent could bring the matter back to seek an order for virtual parenting time. Those consent orders included a prohibition on the Respondent attempting to contact the Applicant.

4At the time of separation, the Respondent was criminally charged with a number of offences that can be characterized as intimate partner violence related offences. He was released on bail, with one of the conditions of his bail being that he does not contact the Applicant or the children, except under the terms of a family law order made after the date of the bail conditions.

5The Respondent breached his release terms on two separate occasions and ended up being held without bail. He pled guilty to breaching the terms of his bail and contacting the Applicant in contravention of those terms. He was sentenced to 90 days for these offences, which amounted to time served, as he had 60 days of pre-custody jail time. I would note that these breaches are

6The Respondent’s motion is for immediate supervised parenting time, with the visits beginning with three hours every Saturday and expanding from there to overnights. The Respondent proposes his parents and/or a family friend as the supervisor.

7The Applicant opposes this motion and argues that there should be no parenting time at all until such time as a section 30 assessment is conducted by an independent psychologist. She also argues that the capital that the parties have built up should be realized upon to pay for the approximately $40,000.00 cost associated with this assessment, and that the Respondent should pay for eighty percent of it.

8The Respondent would prefer that the Court request that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) conduct a section 112 assessment. However, the Respondent is prepared to accept a section 30 assessment, as long as it is paid for equally by both parties.

9For the reasons that follow, I have determined that a section 30 assessment should take place before the Respondent has any parenting time, even supervised parenting time. I have also determined that the costs of this assessment are to be borne primarily by paid out of joint credit line in the first instance. If there is insufficient money in that credit line, then the Respondent shall be responsible, in the first instance, for paying for any shortfall. The question of who should ultimately pay for the section 30 assessment is left to trial.

Background

a) The Parties and the Marriage

10Based on the evidence that I have received, the marriage was a tumultuous one. At this point, I should note that I have only had the opportunity to review a paper record. As a result, my findings should not be taken as binding on any future judge, particularly a trial judge that hears viva voce evidence. With that caveat in mind, I now turn to the evidence that I have.

11The parties met sometime before 2010. The circumstances in which they met are not necessary for me to resolve to dispose of this motion. They got married in October of 2010 when the Applicant was eighteen and the respondent was twenty-five. There are a number of allegations that the Respondent has made about the conduct of the Applicant and of several of her friends around the time of the wedding. For the purposes of this motion, it is not necessary to resolve those issues either.

12The parties have two children, D.C. who is 11 and K.C. who is going to be 9 later this month. Both children are girls. D.C. currently toe-walks, and it was not clear to me on the materials why she does this. D.C. has, according to the Applicant’s Affiants, also become more withdrawn over the past year. In addition, K.C. has, on the evidence of the Applicant’s Affiants, become increasingly angry and dysregulated in the past couple of years. I note that the Respondent has not challenged this evidence in a meaningful way.

13During the marriage, the parties lived in the Walkerton area on a farm that is the matrimonial home. As this litigation progresses, there may be a dispute in respect of whether the Respondent’s parents made contributions to the parties’ finances and, if so, the nature of those contributions. Those issues are not before me, and nothing in these reasons should be taken as deciding those issues.

14The Applicant is qualified as a PSW and worked as a PSW before the parties had children. She has returned to work since the separation and is working on average approximately thirty-two hours a week. Prior to separation he was working as a contractor for Bruce Power. He alleges that he no longer has this job as a result of stress.

15The Applicant’s parents live in Bruce County while the Respondent’s parents live in the Niagara peninsula.

16During the course of the marriage, there have been some previous periods where the parties have separated. These have all ended with a reconciliation, although the Applicant now states that the reconciliations were as a result of pressure from the Respondent. The Applicant has also provided affidavit evidence from a longtime friend that describes years of abuse at the hands of the Respondent, including sexual abuse, that goes back to before the parties’ were married. The friend, A.J., has known the Applicant since before the parties met.

17I also understand that there have been some previous interactions with the police. In particular, in June of 2024, there was an incident with the family shotgun. On the Respondent’s evidence, the Applicant picked up the shotgun during the course of an argument, and he had to stop her. On the Applicant’s evidence, she was the one who attempted to prevent the Respondent from picking up the firearm during the argument.

18There was also an incident in March of 2011, where the Respondent pushed the Applicant. He was criminally charged as a result of this incident and acknowledges that it happened.

19Finally, both parties make allegations that the other party engaged in physical abuse during the marriage. Both parties deny the allegations that have been made by the other party.

20The parties were active in their church community, as were the Applicant’s parents. The children were also involved in the church community and attended school close to where the farm was. The children have been moved to a different school as a result of events that took place after separation. I now turn to those events.

b) The Separation and Related Events

21On December 4^th, 2025, the Applicant brought an ex parte motion on an urgent basis. She sought interim sole decision-making responsibility and primary residency of the children. She also sought an order that the Respondent was not to have any parenting time at all with the children.

22Based on her review of the materials filed by the Applicant, McSweeney J. found that there was a basis to be concerned for the safety of the children. Therefore, she granted a temporary order giving the Applicant sole decision-making responsibility, McSweeney J. also suspended any contact between the Respondent and the children until further Order of the Court. Finally, McSweeney J. made a restraining order protecting the Applicant and the children and preventing the Respondent from having any contact with them or attending at any place where they were known to be.

23On December 19^th, 2025, there was a further appearance before Juginovic J. where both the Applicant and the Respondent were present. The bulk of the orders made by McSweeney J. were continued on consent. The only variation was that the Respondent would be able to bring a motion for virtual parenting time.

24At around the time of the McSweeney J. order, the Respondent was also charged with several offences related to intimate partner violence. As a result of these charges, the Respondent was also subject to an order prohibiting him from contacting the Applicant or the children. These orders were breached, and I now turn to the facts in respect of those breaches.

c) The Respondent’s Post-Separation Conviction

25When the Respondent was released on December 9^th, 2025, his initial surety was P.B., a friend of his and a member of the same church community as the Applicant and the Respondent.

26Beginning in mid-December, the Respondent began messaging the Applicant directly, seeking reconciliation. In these messages, the Respondent stated that he is “narcissistic”. One of the other messages says:

Jail isn’t going to help me, itll just kill me and take your childrens father away, it will also probably take the most loving committed person to you that you will ever have away.

27This communication is followed up very shortly thereafter by another text message, which stated:

Theres two ways out of this, you can call me and I will agree to give u anything u want, the other way is I charge u for every single time you screwed up? I love u to death but u need to stop now! I am on my death bed and so are my parents so call me and work this out enough!!!

28These communications, and the numerous other communications that the Respondent sent to the Applicant were breaches of his bail conditions. The Applicant reported these breaches to the police. The Applicant was re-arrested, charged with further offences in respect of the breaches, and re-released on January 15^th, 2026, on a house arrest bail. On this occasion, his sureties were his parents, H.C. and R. C.

29Almost immediately after he was released, the Respondent began contacting the Applicant again. One of the messages in this second round of communications was a note to the Applicant advising that the Respondent had been diagnosed with a narcissistic personality disorder.

30As a result of these additional messages, the Applicant was charged again with breach of his release conditions. On this occasion, was not released from jail. He was in jail for a period of sixty days and then, on May 1^st, 2026, pled guilty to three counts of failing to comply with his release conditions.

31During the time period when the Respondent’s parents were his sureties, his mother, R.C., contacted the Applicant on numerous occasions. In R.C.’s Affidavit, she states that the reason she contacted the Applicant was to seek reconciliation. As a result, R.C. was charged with criminal harassment. Those charges were resolved in May of 2026 by way of a peace bond.

32The Respondent was released by the Courts on May 1^st, 2026. Following his release, the Respondent did not message the Applicant directly. However, he did instruct his counsel to send an email to the Applicant’s counsel. It reads, in part:

My client has instructed me to talk to you with the hope and expectation that you will raise the following points with your client and with the social worker identified in the criminal matter called [redacted].

My understanding is that the following terms are likely to trigger a recollection on the part of your client. Mu understanding is that your client was quite abusive towards mine, and in fact wom3 of the incidents or phrases given below highlight those instances where those interactions occurred between your client and mine.

[list redacted]

My client specifically wanted me to raise these issues or bring these above instances to your attention, with a hope that your client might consider resolving the issues in the family matter. Rather than continue to let the matter gather steam and get out of control.

33This communication is very similar to the communications set out at paragraphs 26 and 27, above. That was not the end of the Respondent’s efforts to indirectly communicate with the Applicant.

34On May 15^th, 2026, the Respondent sent an e-mail directly to the Applicant’s counsel. It read as follows:

I am emailing you directly inform [sic] you and I would ask that you pass this along to [redacted- social worker]

A client of yours, that has provided statement that you and [redacted- same name] have “helped her to see things differently” I am afraid has not been honest with you.

Your client has a very explosive unstoppable temper that leads to physical violence.

I have been subject to her physical and verbal violence. I think you will find it true also that she is very dishonest and manipulative.

My top priority has always been for there to be a healthy relationship in our family, I do not wish for a mother to be without her children. I plead that through resources available there is help and the family can be a health [sic] complete unit. Although if this is not going to be the case, your client will need to be charged and the children will need protection from CAS immediately.

It is very clear in your clients statement to police that she is guilty and does not wish for this outcome but rather stated she has been shown what to do.

Save a family and advise your client based off of all of the facts.

35The Respondent has described these communications as an attempt “to seek a less damaging route of reconciliation and indicated the downfalls of continuing this adversarial path.” In other words, these communications were designed to show the Applicant the advantages of reconciling with the Respondent and the drawbacks of not doing so.

36The Respondent has also put up some Facebook postings setting out what he describes as his side of the story. This posting includes allegations that the Applicant engaged in violent behaviour and the observation that “Jail does not profit anyone, counseling can. I am praying for reconciliation for all involved and honesty.” In other words, while the Respondent is not communicating directly with the Applicant, he continues to attempt to deliver the same messages to the Applicant.

37Since these emails were sent and these postings put up, the parties have had a case conference before Sproat J. At the conclusion of that case conference, Sproat J. directed that the matter be placed on the short motions list for June 26^th, 2026, and heard for up to ninety minutes. It then came before me.

Issues

38Based on the foregoing evidence, and having heard the submissions of counsel, the issues that I am required to decide are:

a) Should a section 30 assessment be ordered and, if so, how should it be funded and who should conduct it?

b) Should the Respondent be entitled to parenting time?

39I will deal with each issue in turn.

Issue #1- A Section 30 Assessment?

40Section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”) gives the Court jurisdiction to appoint an individual who has technical or professional skill to assess and report on the child’s needs, and the ability and willingness of the parties to meet those needs. The Court also has the jurisdiction to determine who should be responsible for the payment of the costs associated with the assessment.

41To address this issue, I need to answer three questions:

a) Should there be an assessment?

b) Who should conduct the assessment?

c) Who should pay for the assessment?

42I start with the question of whether there should be an assessment. The decision in Glick v. Cale, 2013 ONSC 893 sets out a detailed analysis of the circumstances in which a section 30 assessment should be ordered.

43The Respondent does not really take issue with whether an assessment should be ordered. However, he has suggested that there should be a section 112 assessment in this case instead of a section 30 assessment. I pointed out to counsel for the Respondent that it would take time for the OCL to determine whether they would accept the referral. Given that one of the possibilities in this case is that I would not permit the Respondent to have even supervised parenting time until the assessment was completed, counsel acknowledged that a section 30 assessment might be necessary.

44When I consider the factors in Glick, (at para. 48), I am of the view that an assessment in this case is clearly necessary. I do not intend to review every one of the factors set out in Glick. However, I will comment on some of the more important ones. I am not persuaded that the family was viably functioning prior to separation. The parents blame each other for the dysfunction in the relationship, and they are unable to communicate constructively. I would observe that the impediments to communication between the parties go beyond merely the bail-related impediments to communications. As will be discussed more fully below, I have grave concerns with the Respondent’s approach to communications generally. The Respondent has also shared a diagnosis of a narcissistic personality disorder.

45In addition to these factors, the children are starting to show some signs of difficulties in the way that they interact with others. That is suggestive of an ongoing issue that should be considered by a professional. Finally, it is worth noting that there are allegations back and forth in this case. For reasons I will come to, I am of the view that the Respondent has made the situation in this case substantially worse through his ongoing misconduct. However, I cannot conclude that the Respondent is solely responsible for the issues in this case either as it is possible that the Applicant also engaged in physical violence during the course of the marriage. As a result, it is appropriate to have an assessor involved in this case.

46For reasons that I will come to, I have also concluded that the Respondent should not have any parenting time until a section 30 assessment is completed. In my view, this finding also disposes of the question of whether the Court should ask for a section 112 assessment. The question of whether the Respondent should have parenting time, and what boundaries should be put around that parenting time is something that a trained professional should address quickly, particularly given the ages of the children and the fact that seven months have already passed since separation. As a result, I am ordering a section 30 assessment.

47This brings me to the question of which professional should be appointed to conduct the assessment. The Applicant has suggested a psychologist that she has found who lives in the area, a Dr. Ashley Bildfell. Dr. Bildfell’s resume is attached to the materials that I was provided. She is a psychologist with a specialty in applied child psychology. She has trained under a number of well-known and well-respected psychologists who work in the family law area.

48The Respondent has suggested that, somehow, Dr. Bildsell knows the Respondent because they resided in the same town at one point. He states that there is “a high chance that they may have had a prior relationship.” He also suggests that they may have had prior communications and that this is a reason for rejecting Dr. Bildsell.

49I reject both arguments. On the prior communications, I am of the view that it is entirely appropriate for a party to contact the proposed assessor and find out what their availability to conduct the assessment is before proposing them as an assessor. Indeed, one of my concerns with the Respondent’s proposed assessors is that it is not clear when they would be available to start work.

50I also reject the Respondent’s concern that, since Dr. Bildsell is from the same small town as the Applicant, it is highly likely that they know each other. The Respondent and the Applicant have been married for more than a decade and a half, and they started a relationship when the Applicant was eighteen. The Respondent would have to have better evidence than “they must have known each other” to establish the risk of a conflict given the length of time he has known the Applicant and her friends.

51This brings me to the Respondent’s selections. None of them appear to be psychologists. The Respondent has self-identified as having a narcissistic personality disorder. As a result, it is necessary to have an assessor who has expertise with psychological issues conduct this assessment. The assessors proposed by the Respondent do not have this expertise. As a result, Dr. Bildfell is appointed the assessor in this case, presuming she is still prepared to accept the appointment.

52Finally, there is the issue of the payment for the section 30 assessment. This issue requires me to briefly touch on the parties’ relative incomes. In doing so, this decision should not be taken as even addressing imputed income on a preliminary basis. It is just a preliminary analysis of where the economic burden for the costs of this assessment should be.

53I should note at the outset that there is no real dispute that the parties have significant assets. They own a number of properties, and the financial statements filed by both of them show that there is significant net equity in these properties. As a result, if it is necessary, monies can be obtained for the assessment from either selling or further encumbering these properties. The ability to afford an assessment is another one of the factors set out in Glick.

54The question then becomes who should bear the bulk of the responsibility for the payment of the assessment. I start with the Respondent’s income. Prior to the divorce, he was employed in the power sector and earned an income of approximately $100,000 to $125,000. He currently argues that he is off on medical leave as a result of “stress”. The medical documentation that was provided to support this assertion is quite limited. Based on what I have, I am not prepared to accept that the Respondent is unable to work.

55The Applicant acknowledges that she is working approximately 32 hours bi-weekly and earning an hourly rate of $26.35. This is a salary of approximately $2,000.00 per month. The Respondent’s counsel argued that the Applicant had not included a pay stub in her materials. Applicant’s counsel pointed out that a pay stub would contain additional information for the Respondent to potentially determine where the Applicant worked. As a result, I agree with the Applicant’s counsel that it is sufficient for the Applicant to have set out her income in her Affidavit.

56Respondent’s counsel then points to the fact that the Applicant took approximately $30,000 from the parties’ line of credit when she left the relationship in December of 2025. The Applicant responds by observing that she needed the money (and has spent most of it) for living expenses. The Applicant does not have access to any of the parties’ properties and would understandably feel that it was unsafe for her to use any of those properties to live in, given the restraining orders against the Respondent. As a result, I also accept the Applicant’s evidence that she will have spent most of the money that came from the credit line on day-to-day expenses. I also have no indication that the Respondent is paying child support.

57In the Applicant’s Affidavit, she sets out the fact that the parties own a number of rental properties, and that they have access to a line of credit that has significant borrowing room on them. The money for the assessment is to come from the line of credit, as it is money that will be available quickly. To the extent that there is insufficient money on this credit line, the Respondent is responsible for paying the remainder of the costs of the assessment. The costs of the assessment are to be paid within twenty-one (21) days of the release of these reasons.

Issue #2- Parenting Time

58Parenting time is a parenting order within the meaning of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp). Section 16.1 of the Divorce Act gives the Court the authority to make an order in respect of parenting time or decision-making responsibility (“parenting orders”).

59Section 16 of the Divorce Act sets out the factors that the Court must take into consideration when making a parenting order, as follows:

16 (1) The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.

(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.

(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

(7) In this section, a parenting order includes an interim parenting order and a variation order in respect of a parenting order, and a contact order includes an interim contact order and a variation order in respect of a contact order.

60This section requires the Court to focus only on the best interests of the child in making a parenting order. There are a number of factors that a Court should take into consideration in determining the best interests of the children, and a detailed discussion of these factors is set out in S.V.G. v. V.G, 2023 ONSC 3206 at paras. 90 to 92

61In addition to the factors set out in section 16 and the discussion in S.V.G., there are three important points for me to keep in mind:

a) The analysis of what is in a child’s best interests must be undertaken from the lens of the child rather than the parents: Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3.

b) The considerations that the Court should focus on and the weight to be given to each one will vary depending on the unique factors of each child and each case: Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at para. 13.

c) In conducting the best interests analysis, the Court should not apply a standard of perfection to parents: S.V.G. at para. 93.

62In this particular case, the question I have to determine is whether the Respondent should have supervised access to the children, pending the completion of the section 30 assessment.

63Counsel for the Respondent observes that, on motions such as this, Counsel for the Respondent observes that there is a considerable amount of untested hearsay in the Affidavits that the Applicant has tendered. That may be the case. However, in this case, I have some evidence that simply cannot be challenged, as follows:

a) The Respondent was aware of the fact that the Courts had ordered him not to contact the Applicant or the children and repeatedly breached these Orders.

b) The Respondent was convicted of the breaches of the Court orders and cannot now challenge those convictions.

c) Even after he was convicted of breaching Court orders not to try and contact the Applicant, the Respondent continued to attempt to contact the Applicant indirectly.

64Further, I find the communications set out at paragraphs 32 and 34 quite concerning. They demonstrate that the Respondent was not only attempting to contact the Applicant indirectly after he had been convicted of contacting her directly, but that he was also attempting to intimidate her into reconciling with him. There is really no other way to read these communications, especially when the sworn statement reproduced at paragraph 35 is considered. The Respondent is, in essence, saying to the Applicant, either we reconcile, or I will report you to the police for domestic violence, you will go to jail and the children will be taken by the CAS.

65The Respondent has had six months in which to stop this inappropriate behaviour, but it continues. It also continues in the face of a Court convicting him and telling him that the behaviour has to stop. I am gravely concerned that permitting the Respondent even supervised access time with the children would be an invitation to the Respondent to attempt to influence the children and involve them in the adult conflict. Given the issue that have already been identified with the children (see paragraph 12), it would be contrary to the best interests of the children to run the risk of this type of influence on them without a full understanding of the family dynamics that can only be obtained from

66The Respondent argues that his access will be supervised, and that the supervisors can be people of integrity and can properly supervise the Respondent’s parenting time. I am not convinced of that fact. The first proposed supervisors are the Respondent’s parents. The problem with them as supervisors is that they supervised the Respondent when he was released from jail in January, and they were unable to prevent him from contacting the Applicant. Indeed, the Respondent’s mother assisted the Respondent in his efforts to attempt to get the Applicant to agree to get back together. Given that history, I simply cannot accept that the Respondent’s parents will ensure that the necessary supervision is imposed.

67The other proposed supervisor is S. B., a neighbour and a fellow member of the church community that the Applicant and the Respondent belonged to. While she is an Early Childhood Educator, she is also the wife of the first surety who was supposed to supervise the Respondent when he was released after the charges were laid in December of 2025. Again, I have concerns about the fact that the Respondent has not followed the Cort orders, and even now continues to try to influence the Applicant indirectly. Again, I am not persuaded that she is an appropriate supervisor.

68In any event, however, the real underlying problem in this case is that the Respondent continues to pursue his agenda of contacting the Applicant, only now indirectly, and pressuring her to return to a relationship by threatening to report her to the police. I am quite concerned that the Respondent will attempt to enlist the children in his efforts to have the Applicant return to the marriage, which would be clearly contrary to their best interests as they should not be involved in the adult conflict as it would be bad for their mental health. I am also not at all sure that the children would be entirely physically safe in the Respondent’s presence either at this point.

69This brings me to the Respondent’s counsel’s observation that the termination of parenting time is a remedy of last resort. In support of this observation, he referred me to J.S. v. Y.S., 2024 ONSC 1028, a case where there were serious criminal allegations, including assault, sexual assault and breaches of Court orders. In that case, the Court noted that supervised parenting time is a significant restriction on the parent-child relationship, and that supervised parenting time should be temporary.

70I accept that supervised access should be temporary. However, it is also a step that needs to be taken in conjunction with a more coordinated plan and in the best interests of the children. At this point, even supervised access comes with risks for these children.

71The Respondent also points out that it is often in the children’s best interests to encourage a loving relationship with both parents, even in the face of domestic violence allegations: Rezwan v. Rezwan, 2022 ONSC 7289 at para. 25. I accept this as a general observation. However, in this case, there are three reasons why I am not prepared, at this point, to award even supervised access:

a) The Respondent has repeatedly attempted to force the Applicant to reconcile and has threatened her with criminal charges if she does not do so. This conduct has continued, indirectly, even after the Court had sentenced the Respondent for his direct contact with the Applicant.

b) The children are, on the evidence I have, experiencing challenges and demonstrating negative changes in behaviour. They cannot be exposed to the adult conflict in this case.

c) The Respondent has provided no convincing plan for supervised access, given the concerns with his supervisors and his previous conduct as detailed above.

72For these reasons, the Respondent’s motion for supervised access is dismissed as it is not in the best interests of the children. He may renew that motion once the section 30 assessment is completed, and the Court has the benefit of that assessment.

Conclusion and Costs

73For the foregoing reasons, I am ordering as follows:

a) Dr. Aubrey Bildfell is appointed to conduct a section 30 assessment.

b) The section 30 assessment is, if possible, to be completed by the end of September.

c) The section 30 assessment is to be funded, in the first instance, from the parties’ joint line of credit. Any shortfall is to be made up by the Respondent in the first instance.

d) The question of who should ultimately pay for the section 30 assessment is a matter that is left to the trial judge to determine.

e) The Respondent shall not have parenting time until further order of the Court or agreement of the parties.

f) The Respondent may return this matter to Court for a motion to seek parenting time at any point after the completion of the section 30 assessment.

74This brings me to the costs for this motion. The parties are encouraged to agree on the costs of this motion. Failing agreement, each party may serve, file and upload submissions of no more than three (3) single-spaced pages, exclusive of offers to settle, bills of costs and case-law within fourteen (14) calendar days of the release of these reasons.

75Each party may then serve, file and upload reply costs submissions of no more than one (1) single spaced page, exclusive of case-law within seven (7) calendar days thereafter.

76There are to be no extensions on costs submissions, even on consent, without my leave. If costs submissions are not provided in accordance with this timetable, then there will be no order as to costs. Finally, in addition to serving, filing and uploading their costs submissions, counsel are required to provide an electronic copy of their submissions to me at the email address: scj.judicialassistant.brampton@ontario.ca . The e-mail re line should include the file name and the fact that the submissions are for my attention.

77I am not seized of this matter.

LEMAY J.

Released: July 6, 2026

CITATION: J.C. v. J.C., 2026 ONSC 3884