R. v. Samaroo, 2026 ONSC 3874
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Robert I. Keenan, for the Crown
Respondent
- and -
RAMNATH SAMAROO
Elias Rabinovitch, for the Appellant
Appellant
HEARD: June 30, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On appeal from the sentence imposed on November 10, 2025 by Justice R. A. Cornelius of the Ontario Court of Justice.
STRIBOPOULOS J.
INTRODUCTION
1The appellant, Mr. Samaroo, pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a conveyance, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. He was sentenced to a $2,000 fine and a $100 victim surcharge and given six months to pay the fine and surcharge. Additionally, he was prohibited from driving for 18-months. The sentence imposed exceeded that sought by the Crown.
2Mr. Samaroo appeals his sentence pursuant to s. 813(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code. He submits that the sentencing judge committed two errors warranting appellate intervention. First, he claims that the sentencing judge failed to provide proper notice that he was considering imposing a sentence above the Crown’s position. Second, he claims that the sentencing judge erred by failing to receive evidence that Mr. Samaroo had completed counselling and volunteer work. As a result, Mr. Samaroo asks this court to allow his appeal and substitute a $1,000 fine and a one-year driving prohibition, the statutory minimum penalty that he had asked the sentencing judge to impose.
3For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the sentencing judge committed either of the errors alleged by Mr. Samaroo. Accordingly, there is no basis for intervention by this court, and his appeal is dismissed.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE
4Shortly after 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 22, 2024, Mr. Samaroo was driving a motor vehicle on Steeles Avenue East in the City of Brampton. He was speeding and failed to obey a traffic signal. As a result, he struck another vehicle that was turning onto Steeles Avenue East from the Highway 410 exit. A third vehicle was also impacted in the collision.
5When the police arrived at the scene of the collision, they found Mr. Samaroo standing on the road. He was not wearing shoes. He had difficulty standing, was swaying and stumbling, and had to use a guardrail for support. His face was flushed, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, and there was a strong odour of alcohol on his breath.
6When the police spoke to him, Mr. Samaroo’s speech was incoherent. He told an officer, “Take me to jail, I am fine”. Mr. Samaroo was not fine. He had a cut above his left eyebrow and later complained of chest pain. Thankfully, no one else was injured in the collision, which caused extensive damage to both Mr. Samaroo’s vehicle and the vehicle he struck.
7The police arrested Mr. Samaroo for impaired operation of a conveyance. He was transported to hospital and eventually released by police on an undertaking.
MR. SAMAROO’S CIRCUMSTANCES
8At the time of sentencing, Mr. Samaroo was 54 years old and had no criminal record.
9Before pleading guilty, Mr. Samaroo completed eight alcohol-addiction counselling sessions and 50 hours of community service. At his sentencing hearing, he advised the court through his counsel that he was continuing counselling, had stopped drinking, was remorseful, and wished to “turn over a new leaf”.
10With respect to his financial circumstances, Mr. Samaroo’s counsel advised the court that he came from an economically disadvantaged background and had only recently secured part-time employment at minimum wage.
SENTENCING HEARING
11On the day of his guilty plea and sentencing, Mr. Samaroo’s matter was initially before one court, but was then traversed to another, where the judge who ultimately took his plea was presiding.
12Before Mr. Samaroo pleaded guilty, counsel conducted a comprehensive plea inquiry with him on the record. Near the end of that inquiry, the following exchange occurred between Mr. Samaroo, his counsel, and the court:
DEFENCE: Do you understand that the judge can impose any sentence up to the maximum penalty?
MR. SAMAROO: Yes.
DEFENCE: That’s sufficient, Your Honour?
THE COURT: You also understand that regardless of what position has been agreed upon between the Crown and defence, that I have the ultimate say in what the appropriate sentence is?
MR. SAMAROO: Yes.
13After Mr. Samaroo was arraigned and pleaded guilty, the Crown read in the facts in support of his guilty plea, which Mr. Samaroo personally acknowledged. The court then found him guilty of impaired operation of a conveyance.
14The Crown then began making its submissions on sentence. At the outset of those submissions, the following exchange took place between Crown counsel, defence counsel, and the court:
CROWN: What’s being proposed is a joint position of a $1,500 fine.
DEFENCE: Sorry. I have an objection. It’s, it’s not a joint position, Your Honour. It was — your position was 1,500, and mine was a thousand on the fine aspect.
THE COURT: Okay. You, you should know, I’ve received facts involving an accident and gross signs of impairment even without readings. You both appreciate that jail is something I can consider. Right?
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour.
[Emphasis added.]
15In its submissions, the Crown sought a $1,500 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition. In support of that position, the Crown noted that this was Mr. Samaroo’s first offence and that he had entered a relatively early guilty plea. At the same time, the Crown submitted that, given the nature of Mr. Samaroo’s driving and the collision, this was not a case in which the minimum sentence would be appropriate.
16Defence counsel submitted that the appropriate sentence was the mandatory minimum: a $1,000 fine and a one-year driving prohibition. In support of that position, defence counsel submitted that Mr. Samaroo had already taken significant steps to address the underlying causes of his offending behaviour: he had completed eight counselling sessions focused on alcohol addiction, had abstained from consuming alcohol, and had completed 50 hours of community service. Given those circumstances, together with Mr. Samaroo’s modest financial means, defence counsel urged the court to impose the minimum fine and driving prohibition.
17After defence counsel had completed his submissions, the following exchange took place between him and the court:
THE COURT: When did he do this community service work? Do you have any documentation of that?
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour. He did it with the Reach Out committee, with Angela Thorpe. Unfortunately, Ms. Thorpe wished to charge my client $150 for the letter for which he did not have funds to pay for the letter, so we provided an exhibit to the court of her providing text message evidence.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
DEFENCE: We provided an exhibit to the court prior to this date. I, I, I mean, the courtroom has changed, so it's possible it hasn't been provided to you. But we....
THE COURT: Why would it be? You're pleading in front of me? Shouldn't I have it?
DEFENCE: You, you — I believe you should. Yes, Your Honour. It was sent to MAG, and it was sent, and they confirmed that they received it and to be attached to the information.
THE COURT: It's, it's, it's your client?
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour.
THE COURT: And you're conducting this guilty plea?
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour.
THE COURT: It's your responsibility to make sure that anything you're going to rely on is in front of the court?
DEFENCE: Sorry. Sorry. Well, Your Honour, I, I did submit it for the court.
THE COURT: You're pleading in front of me. So I'm asking for the proof of this community service work.
DEFENCE: I....
THE COURT: You're telling me about giving things to MAG. It’s your plea.
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour. They said, they confirmed that it would be put before 103. My understanding was that it would be brought here as well, with the information, when it was traversed. But I undertake that those documents are accurate if that's acceptable to Your Honour.
THE COURT: And I take it the same applies to this counselling?
DEFENCE: Yes, Your Honour. I apologize that I didn't have paper copies to provide you with, but my understanding was that MAG confirmed it, so therefore, they should be before you.
COURT: Because the Crown has it, it should be before me. That's what you believe?
DEFENCE: Well, we were in 103, and then my understanding was it was going to be provided to the judge in that court. But if you don't have it, then we can provide it. I can go back there and we can get it, if that's acceptable. But again, I undertake that the documents are accurate. Perhaps the reporters can help me with that. The clerk.
THE COURT: At what?
DEFENCE: Well, it seems that they're searching for it.
THE COURT: I think they're doing their work.
DEFENCE: Okay.
THE COURT: It's — anyway, let's move on.
[Emphasis added.]
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
18In very brief oral reasons delivered immediately after the exchange with defence counsel quoted immediately above, the sentencing judge emphasized what he fairly characterized as the aggravating circumstances, including Mr. Samaroo’s gross impairment and the collision involving two other vehicles. He noted that it was “a matter of luck” that no one using the roadway was seriously injured or killed. He explained that “this is not the type of offence or outcome that results in a minimum sentence”. In imposing a $2,000 fine and an 18-month driving prohibition, the sentencing judge indicated that this sentence “properly addresses the aggravating features with respect to the driving and the need for denunciation that is so apparent in offences of this nature”. In his extemporaneous reasons, the sentencing judge did not refer to the mitigating factors that the parties had identified in their submissions.
ANALYSIS
19As noted, Mr. Samaroo advances two grounds of appeal. First, he submits that the sentencing judge failed to provide proper notice that he was considering exceeding the Crown’s position on sentence. Second, he submits that the sentencing judge erred by failing to receive evidence that Mr. Samaroo had completed counselling and volunteer work.
20An appellate court owes significant deference to a sentencing judge’s decision. Sentencing is a highly individualized exercise, and appellate intervention is justified only where the sentence is demonstrably unfit or where the sentencing judge committed an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence. Such errors include an error of law, a failure to consider a relevant factor, the erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor, or the unreasonable weighing of relevant factors: see R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46; R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras. 90-91; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 46; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 11, 39, 43-44, 49, and 51; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 25-28; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at paras. 29-30.
21It follows that an appellate court is not entitled to intervene simply because it would have imposed a different sentence or weighed the relevant factors differently: see Lacasse, at paras. 11, 49; Friesen, at para. 25; Parranto, at paras. 29-30; R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655, 169 O.R. (3d) 68, at para. 26.
22In determining whether a sentence is demonstrably unfit, the relevant standard is supplied by the principle of proportionality, which is codified in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. As stated in Lacasse, at para. 53:
This inquiry must be focused on the fundamental principle of proportionality stated in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that a sentence must be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. A sentence will therefore be demonstrably unfit if it constitutes an unreasonable departure from this principle. Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and to the offence committed by the accused, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Individualization and parity of sentences must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate: s. 718.2(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.
23Mindful of the deferential standard of review that governs sentence appeals, I turn to the two grounds of appeal advanced by Mr. Samaroo.
1. The sentencing judge provided adequate notice that he was considering exceeding the Crown’s position
24In a contested sentencing hearing, a sentencing judge is not bound by the Crown’s position and may impose a harsher sentence than that sought by the Crown. However, if the sentencing judge is considering doing so, the judge must notify the parties of that possibility and afford them an opportunity to make further submissions: see R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 43-46. This enables the parties to address any concerns raised by the sentencing judge, “including matters that the parties considered irrelevant or simply overlooked in their initial submissions”: Nahanee, at para. 48.
25The notice requirement is not onerous. A sentencing judge is not required “to set out in detail, or with exactitude, what it is that they find troublesome with the Crown’s proposed sentence”: Nahanee, at para. 45. It is sufficient for the judge to communicate that, in their view, the sentence proposed by the Crown appears too lenient: see Nahanee, at para. 45. As the Supreme Court explained, notice “can be as simple as saying: I am considering imposing a higher sentence than the Crown is seeking due to the seriousness of this offence”: Nahanee, at para. 45.
26Finally, although a sentencing judge’s failure to provide notice and an opportunity for further submissions constitutes an error in principle, it does not automatically justify appellate intervention. Intervention is warranted only where at least one of the following is also established: (1) the failure had an impact on the sentence because the sentencing judge was deprived of important information that could have affected the sentence, such as a pertinent authority or an important mitigating fact; (2) the sentencing judge failed to provide reasons, or provided unclear or insufficient reasons, for imposing the harsher sentence, thereby foreclosing meaningful appellate review; or (3) the sentencing judge relied on flawed or unsupportable reasoning for imposing the harsher sentence, such as by erroneously considering an aggravating factor or misapprehending the relevant authorities: see Nahanee, at paras. 52, 56-57, and 59-61.
27The appellant submits that the sentencing judge provided inadequate notice that he was contemplating exceeding the Crown’s position on sentence. I do not agree.
28At the outset of the Crown’s submissions, after being advised of the parties’ competing positions, the sentencing judge made clear that a jail sentence was available given the combination of Mr. Samaroo’s gross impairment and the motor vehicle collision. Defence counsel confirmed that he understood. In light of that exchange, defence counsel was effectively on notice from the outset of the sentencing hearing that the sentencing judge was considering a sentence more severe than the one proposed by the Crown. Because the judge’s remarks came at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, defence counsel had a full opportunity to make submissions with the benefit of that knowledge. In the circumstances, the notice and opportunity requirements recognized in Nahanee were satisfied.
29In any event, even if the notice was inadequate, the circumstances would not justify appellate intervention. The appellant cannot persuasively point to any information that was not before the sentencing judge and that might have affected his decision regarding the appropriate sentence. That issue overlaps with the second ground of appeal, to which I now turn.
2. The sentencing judge had all the information he required
30It is apparent from the record that the sentencing judge was frustrated that defence counsel did not have physical copies of the documents relating to the appellant’s counselling and community service available to provide to the court during the sentencing hearing. There also appears to have been some miscommunication between the court and defence counsel regarding how those materials were filed.
31Under the Ontario Court of Justice’s Practice Direction for Serving and Filing Criminal Court Documents, effective June 2, 2025, documents in criminal proceedings are generally required to be filed electronically by email, subject to certain exceptions.1 For matters in the Ontario Court of Justice in Brampton, that is done by sending them to the prescribed filing email address.2 The Crown concedes that defence counsel did exactly that in this case, as the Practice Direction required.
32Unfortunately, defence counsel’s reference to “MAG” during his exchange with the sentencing judge appears to have contributed to the confusion. The Ministry of the Attorney General is responsible for court administration in Ontario. In the context of defence counsel’s explanation, however, the sentencing judge understandably appears to have understood “MAG” as referring to the Crown, and therefore questioned why defence counsel would think that providing materials to the Crown would result in their being placed before the court.
33The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred by proceeding to sentence him without admitting into evidence the documents concerning the counselling and community service that had been properly filed with the court. He submits that this had a meaningful impact on the sentence imposed. In that regard, he notes that, in his reasons, the sentencing judge made no reference to any of the mitigating factors in this case, including the counselling the appellant had completed and the community service hours he had performed.
34To be sure, it is unfortunate that the issue concerning the supporting documentation was not clarified during the sentencing hearing. However, I am not satisfied that it had any impact on the sentence imposed. Importantly, when the confusion arose, defence counsel, as an officer of the court, represented that the documents existed and substantiated his submissions regarding the counselling sessions and community service hours. Nothing the sentencing judge said suggests that he rejected those representations.
35Nor am I satisfied that the sentencing judge’s failure to refer to the counselling or community service in his very brief oral reasons demonstrates that he failed to consider those mitigating efforts.
36In reaching that conclusion, I am mindful that appellate courts must review trial reasons functionally and in context, not with an eye to finely parsing them for error. This is especially true where reasons are delivered orally and extemporaneously in busy criminal courts, such as the Ontario Court of Justice in Brampton. Trial judges are not required to address every argument, every item of evidence, or every collateral point. The question is whether the reasons, read as a whole and in the context of the record, the live issues, and the submissions, disclose the basis for the result and permit meaningful appellate review. As the Supreme Court explained in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, requiring trial judges with heavy criminal caseloads “to deal in their reasons with every aspect of every case would slow the system of justice immeasurably”: at para. 32, citing R. v. Burns, 1994 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656, at p. 664; see also R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 15-17, 35, and 37; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 68-82; R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at pp. 525-26; and R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA), 218 O.A.C. 37, at paras. 31, 33, 53 and 57.
37Here, the sentencing judge began the sentencing hearing by expressing the view that a jail sentence might be appropriate given the combination of gross impairment and a multi-vehicle collision. The fact that he ultimately imposed a non-custodial sentence satisfies me that he considered the mitigating factors in Mr. Samaroo’s case, despite not mentioning them in his very brief oral reasons.
38Notwithstanding the mitigating factors, of which the sentencing judge was well aware having just heard the submissions of counsel, his reasons reveal that he concluded the minimum sentence would be inappropriate because of the significant aggravating factors. He further concluded that a sentence exceeding the Crown’s position was necessary to reflect the need for denunciation, having regard to the gravity of the offence. Although the sentencing judge’s reasons were concise, his conclusions are apparent from both the record and the reasons he gave, and are entitled to deference on appeal.
CONCLUSION
39For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Samaroo’s sentence appeal is dismissed, and the orders previously issued by this court staying the fine portion of his sentence are vacated.
40During the hearing, counsel for Mr. Samaroo advised that Mr. Samaroo is now unemployed and supported by the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP). Counsel submitted that, had the appeal been allowed, this court should give Mr. Samaroo as much time as possible to pay any fine imposed.
41Given that the appeal has been dismissed, this court cannot grant Mr. Samaroo an extension of time to pay the fine. However, counsel is reminded that he may apply to the sentencing judge for such an extension under s. 734.3 of the Criminal Code.
Signed: “Justice J. Stribopoulos”
Released: July 3, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Samaroo, 2026 ONSC 3874
COURT FILE NO.: SCA(P) 1010/25
DATE: 20260703
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and –
RAMNATH SAMAROO
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice J. Stribopoulos
Released: July 3, 2026
Footnotes
- See online: Ontario Court of Justice <www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/notices/serving-and-filing/>.
- See Courthouse Email Addresses, online: Ontario Court of Justice <www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/courthouse-email-addresses/>.