Ramnarine Persaud v. Lorena Persaud, 2026 ONSC 3796

CITATION: Persaud v. Persaud, 2026 ONSC 3796

COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-000208696-0000

DATE: 20260629

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

RAMNARINE PERSAUD

Applicant

– and –

LORENA PERSAUD

Respondent

Ruchelle Heckburn, for the Applicant

Glen Andrew Cook, for the Respondent

HEARD: April 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, 2026

K. SAH J.

reasons for decision

Overview

1This is a case wherein the parties’ dislike for one another comes very close to exceeding their love for their children. The parties’ positions as it relates to decision making responsibility and parenting time are polarized.

2In the case of the applicant, the conflict is so pronounced that it overshadows his ability to prioritize the children’s best interests.

3This case requires the court to consider what decision making and parenting time regimes are in the best interest of the children and what support obligations flow.

Brief Background and Litigation History

4When the parties met, the applicant was living in Canada, and the respondent was residing in Guyana.

5They married in Guyana in November 2009 following which the applicant returned to Canada where he was a resident. The applicant came to Canada in 2010.

6A year after her arrival, the parties had their first daughter. Two years after that, their second daughter was born, and seven years later, their third child was born.

7The eldest child, born in 2011, is currently 14 years old. The middle child, born in 2013, is currently 13 years old. The youngest child, born in 2019, is currently 6 years old.

8The parties separated in November 2020.

9At the time of separation, the respondent was charged with assault against the applicant, who remained in the family home with the children.

10The respondent was acquitted in 2021 following which she commenced an application for decision making and parenting time in the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ).

11At the first attendance of the OCJ proceeding, the applicant advised he wished to claim for a divorce. The OCJ proceeding was abandoned, and the applicant commenced this proceeding in March 2022.

12There was no formal agreed-upon parenting time between the parties from their separation in 2020 until July 2022, when the parties proceeded to a Case Conference.

13The case conference was held before Justice Boucher whose endorsement reflects that the parties agreed to a consent without prejudice order on parenting time. The court also requested the intervention of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

14By way of consent order dated July 29, 2022, respondent’s parenting time would commence in late August and would occur every alternate weekend on Saturday and Sunday from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., following the applicant’s trip with the kids to the United States. The applicant would not consent to overnight parenting time.

15The respondent alleges the applicant did not comply with the consent order made at the Case Conference.

16The OCL became involved, and a s. 112 report was prepared and authored by Karen Timmerman. This is the first OCL report dated March 25, 2023 (“the first OCL report”). The content and recommendation of the first OCL report are outlined below.

17The applicant disputed the first OCL report, and the court rejected this dispute.

18An addendum OCL report dated March 24, 2023, was prepared and circulated to provide context as to applicant’s behaviour and state of mind.

19The respondent brought a motion for expanded parenting time which was heard on January 4, 2024 by Justice Kristjanson (“the Kristjanson order”). This order provided the respondent with immediate overnight parenting time with the children on alternate weekends from pick up on Friday after school until drop off Monday evening, and every alternate weekend thereafter.

20The Kristjanson order also provided the respondent with parenting time on alternate weeks from Tuesday after school until drop off at school on Wednesday. In addition, the respondent was ordered to be listed as an emergency contact with the children's school and was to be given authorization to be provided with information about the children. The Kristjanson order was directed to be provided to the children's school and the applicant was ordered to provide the respondent with photocopies of the children's health cards. Lastly, this order provided for the release of the child protection records, and required the applicant pay the respondent her costs of the motion.

21The parties then proceeded to a Case Conference on May 27, 2024 at which time, on consent, the respondent was ordered to pay child support commencing June 1, 2024 on a temporary without prejudice basis in the amount of $845 based on her approximate 2023 income of $45,000. Additionally, the applicant was ordered to pay spousal support to the respondent at the low range of $334 per month on a temporary without prejudice basis, and subject to a readjustment of the applicant's true income for 2024.

22After the Case Conference and before the Settlement Conference, the OCL released an updated report dated January 7, 2025 authored by Danielle Ungara (“the second OCL report”). The content and recommendation of the second OCL report are outlined below.

23The parties then proceeded to a Settlement Conference on April 9, 2025, at which time they agreed to a temporary order that implemented many of the OCL's recommendations (“the Horkins order”). Justice Horkins ordered the eldest two children attend individual counselling and that after six months, they may begin to share their wishes to both parents about changes or preferences and parenting time. The youngest child was ordered to attend play therapy. The parties were ordered to follow the recommendations of the children's service providers. The OCL reports were ordered to be shared with the service providers working with the children.

24The Horkins order also provided that the parties were to provide medical reports to the court pertaining to themselves within three months, and the applicant was to provide confirmation of counselling initiated for the children, and both parties were required to provide confirmation of their own counselling records and completion of both parenting programs recommended by the second OCL report within six months. The Horkins order also required the parties to attend individual counselling and share a copy of the OCL reports with their counsellor/therapist. Finally, the parties were ordered to attend parenting programs to learn about building healthy attachment to children, and how to effectively develop coparenting strategies.

25The matter then proceeded to a Trial Management Conference on September 29, 2025 at which time, this matter was set for trial.

26On consent of the parties obtained at trial, an order shall issue severing the divorce from the corollary issues and permitting it to proceed on affidavit evidence.

27A final order for corollary relief cannot be granted under the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), unless a divorce has been granted under the Divorce Act: Rothgiesser v. Rothgiesser, 2000 CanLII 1153 (ON CA), [2000] 46 O.R. (3d) 577 (Ont. C.A.); Okmyansky v. Okmyansky 2007 ONCA 427, 86 O.R. (3d) 587.

28Accordingly, this court’s orders will be made pursuant to the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (“CLRA”) and the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”).

Issues to Be Determined

29This court is required to determine:

1. What parenting time regime is in the children’s best interest?

2. What ancillary parenting orders are in the children’s best interest?

3. What decision-making responsibility regime is in the children’s best interest?

4. What equalization payment does the applicant owe the respondent?

5. What are the incomes of the parties?

6. What retroactive and on-going child support obligations flow?

7. Is the respondent entitled to on-going spousal support?

8. If the answer to issue #7 is yes, what quantum and duration of spousal support should be ordered?

Credibility Assessment

30The court may accept some, none, or all of a witness’ evidence: R. v. R.(D.), 1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. (in dissent in the result), at p. 332; R. v. Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349, 277 C.C.C. (3d) 435, at para. 228.

31In the assessment of credibility, the court can consider the factors listed in McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 1, at para. 41.

32I find the applicant less credible than the respondent for the following reasons.

33While the applicant presented as civil and polite throughout the trial, his evidence presented as exaggerated, and it seemed that the driving motivation of the evidence was to present himself positively and the respondent negatively.

34For example, when testifying about the respondent’s criminal case, he claims to have told the Crown and police that he did not want to proceed to trial and because of these comments, he claimed the Crown “watered-down” their evidence and “let things slide”. This has no ring of truth.

35The transcript of the criminal judge’s reasons for judgement does not support the applicant’s assertions. The respondent’s acquittal rested mainly with the fact that the judge found the respondent to be believable.

36Much like the conclusion drawn by this court, the judge presiding over the criminal trial found that the applicant did not answer questions directly and was spinning responses to reflect what he wanted the court to understand about his situation.

37Further, this court is left with the impression that the applicant’s evidence was exaggerated, blown out of proportion, and ultimately, not supported by independent third-party review.

38For example, for many years and even during the trial, the applicant has maintained that the respondent has a significant untreated mental health disorder. He claims that her mental health should act as a barrier to her parenting time as the children are at risk. However, the first OCL report found no evidence to support any of the applicant’s claims regarding any of the respondent’s alleged mental health conditions or alleged dangerous behaviour. The clinician of the first OCL report stated she could find no reason why the children were ever restricted from overnights with their mother or why the applicant continued to pursue supervised access.

39The first OCL clinician noted that the applicant presents a narrative of intense fear and threat of physical assault to the children and others, which appears to be exaggerated out of all proportion to reality. This exaggeration extends to the point where he instructs the children that their mother could physically harm them at any time.

40The second OCL report concluded that during their investigation, there was no evidence gathered to suggest the respondent has mental health issues and that there are barriers to her parenting.

41The second OCL clinician further concluded that there was no evidence to suggest the respondent is mentally unstable or unable to care for her children.

42Another example of inconsistencies between the applicant's testimony and the documentary evidence relates to his testimony about pursuing his Master’s in Business Administration (MBA).

43The applicant was working as a plant engineer for Halton Region prior to pursuing his MBA. He claims that the pursuit of his MBA was supported by his then employer, who he had hoped would fund his education. He testified that his employer signed off on his educational pursuit. After applying for his MBA, the applicant’s contract ended, and his former employer did not fund the MBA which resulted in him having to borrow money from family to fund the degree.

44The applicant tendered evidence of a document prepared by Halton Region entitled Performance Measurement Form, signed by both the applicant and his manager. This document does not support the applicant’s evidence that his employer supported his plan or offered to pay for it. The only reference to the MBA in the document is the applicant’s own words which suggest that he hopes that his plan to pursue an MBA will be supported by the Region. There is no mention of the Region approval.

45The respondent was straightforward and measured in her evidence. She gave less details in her evidence, but her explanations were reasonable.

46She presented as forthcoming and readily admitted facts that were not in her favour. For example, when questioned about reports of the children being abused, she did not deny that the parties had used corporal punishment, nor did she attempt to minimize the incidents. She explained that she did not dispute the allegations because, “back home,” it was common for adults to “belt” children. She acknowledged hitting them on the arm or knocking their head and stated that she now understands these forms of discipline are not appropriate.

47Further, when the respondent was questioned about her compliance with the Horkins order, she readily admitted that she tried to comply. She testified that she tried to pursue counselling as recommended by the OCL and as ordered on consent of the parties; however, she was told that she would be contacted once there was an opening. She admitted to calling another professional and was told that they had a waiting list. She readily admitted that she did not follow up.

48Even though the evidence was not favourable to her and she had motive to deceive, she chose sincerity instead.

49Where there is a conflict between the applicant’s evidence and the respondent’s evidence, I prefer the respondent’s evidence.

General Legal Principles

50The children’s best interests are the only requirement the court is to consider when considering the requested orders: CLRA, at s. 24(1).

51Section 24(2) of the CLRA provides that the courts must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security, and wellbeing when determining the best interests of a child.

52Section 24(3) of the CLRA sets out a list of factors for the court to consider relating to the child’s circumstances.

53The rights and responsibilities bestowed on a parent entitled to decision-making responsibility must be in the best interests of the child and must be exercised in those best interests: CLRA, at ss. 20(2) and 33.1(1).

54This includes the responsibility to protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding: CLRA s. 33.1(2).

55Section 28(c) of the CLRA lists additional orders the court may make as it considers necessary and proper in the circumstances.

56Section 5(1) of the FLA sets out the presumptive formula for the determination of equalization of net family property (NFP). It provides that “when the spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them.” The purpose of equalizing NFP is to equally divide the net wealth accumulated from the date of marriage to the date of separation/valuation date between the parties. The NFP equalization payment requires fairness to both spouses.

57The sections in Part III of the FLA relating to support obligations apply.

58The Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 sections relevant to this case include ss. 3(1)(a) and (b), 7, and 15-19.

59Section 19 of the Guidelines permits the court to impute income to a party as it considers appropriate.

60Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. To meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed: Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), 2002 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 28.

61The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 248 O.A.C. 168, at para. 28.

62Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719, at para. 66.

63Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them: Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 344, at para. 57; Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583, at para. 38.

64Section 30 of the FLA provides that “[e]very spouse has an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so.”

65Section 33(8) of the FLA sets out the purpose of a spousal support order, which should:

(a) recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;

(b) share the economic burden of child support equitably;

(c) make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and

(d) relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).

66Section 33(9) of the FLA states that in determining the amount and duration, if any, of support for a spouse or parent in relation to need, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the parties, including,

(a) the dependant’s and respondent’s current assets and means;

(b) the assets and means that the dependant and respondent are likely to have in the future;

(c) the dependant’s capacity to contribute to his or her own support;

(d) the respondent’s capacity to provide support;

(e) the dependant’s and respondent’s age and physical and mental health;

(f) the dependant’s needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together;

(g) the measures available for the dependant to become able to provide for his or her own support and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependant to take those measures;

(h) any legal obligation of the respondent or dependant to provide support for another person;

(i) the desirability of the dependant or respondent remaining at home to care for a child;

(j) a contribution by the dependant to the realization of the respondent’s career potential;

(k) Repealed: 1997, c. 20, s. 3 (3).

(l) if the dependant is a spouse,

(i) the length of time the dependant and respondent cohabited,

(ii) the effect on the spouse’s earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation,

(iii) whether the spouse has undertaken the care of a child who is of the age of eighteen years or over and unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,

(iv) whether the spouse has undertaken to assist in the continuation of a program of education for a child eighteen years of age or over who is unable for that reason to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,

(v) any housekeeping, child care or other domestic service performed by the spouse for the family, as if the spouse were devoting the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and were contributing the earnings to the family’s support,

(v.1) Repealed: 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (12).

(vi) the effect on the spouse’s earnings and career development of the responsibility of caring for a child; and

(m) any other legal right of the dependant to support, other than out of public money.

Analysis of Each Issue

Parenting Orders

67All parenting issues must be assessed through the lens of the children’s best interests. As per the CLRA, this requires a consideration of the following.

Children’s Views and Preferences

68The children's views and preferences have been determined twice throughout this proceeding, once in 2023, and once in 2025. While their views and preferences may be somewhat dated, this court subscribes considerable weight to certain views expressed for the reasons that follow.

69The children were eleven, nine, and four years old when first interviewed by the OCL. They were approximately thirteen, eleven and six years old the second time they were interviewed.

70The views and preferences of the youngest child are not ascribed significant weight given her age and corresponding level of maturity.

71There is no dispute that the older two children are intelligent, hard-working, and articulate.

72The clear message across both OCL reports is that the eldest child has struggled with the conflict between her parents.

73Her academic record is admirable; however, she talked about her fear that her father will be angry and her attempts to avoid his sadness and disappointment cause her considerable distress. She reported that if she or the middle child were to do something that upsets their father or makes him angry, he would ignore them and not speak to them the next day.

74The eldest daughter reported being very confused by her relationship with her mother, commenting that she used to miss her mother and wished to see her more often.

75The most distressing issue expressed through her views is a level of animosity that she continues to experience between her parents and the ongoing pressure she suffers as a result. She described that her parents hate each other, and made frequent references to how much her father dislikes her mother.

76In the first OCL report, the eldest daughter expressed that she resisted overnights at her mother’s home primarily out of fear of her father’s anger/disappointment, and not because of fear of her mother.

77The eldest child expressed fear of her father, and this was reiterated in the second OCL report when she stated that if she does something wrong, she is scared her father will hit her and that she feels anxious, has anger, and worries.

78When the OCL interviewed the eldest child the second time, she said that she is aware her father does not agree with her view about the parenting arrangement, that he cannot see that she may have a different opinion from him, and that she does not like when her father questions her.

79Taken together with the OCL’s observations about the father influencing the child, these comments make it understandable why she would say she does not wish to change the parenting time arrangement. This court concludes that the eldest child’s views about the schedule are not independent.

80The middle child reported to the OCL that her mother used to be really mean to her father describing her mother's voice to be loud and her father's voice to be low and calm. She reported feeling angry toward her mother because of how scared she felt.

81This child expressed that she wished that her parents were able to talk to one another and be like a normal family again.

82The middle child admitted that she sometimes wanted to stay longer at her mother's house and told her mother that, but did not say anything to her father because he would be upset and she, in part, worried that her mother would not bring her home.

83The middle child's views and preferences were not consistent over the course of the second OCL clinician’s interview.

84Both the eldest and middle children interrupted the OCL to ask if they could share a long list of negative things about her mother, as if they had just remembered.

85From this evidence, the court concludes that the children were influenced by the applicant and were directed to make certain statements. This finding is consistent with my review of the CAS’s involvement with the family. The CAS notes, which were summarized within the OCL reports, reflect the workers’ concerns that the children appeared rehearsed at times during their interviews. For example, the notes document instances in which the children recounted allegations about how their mother had previously harmed their father.

86The OCL reports cite that both children wish their father would stop bringing up and urging them to remember the bad things their mother did. According to the OCL, he made them both keenly aware of his sadness, fear, and disapproval regarding them spending time with their mother because she is “dangerous”.

87The OCL found the applicant to present a narrative of intense fear and threat of physical assault which the OCL noted seemed to be exaggerated. The applicant also regularly informed the children that their mother could physically harm them at any time. He has cautioned the children that she may not return them and continues to remind them of his perception of her behaviours as of the date of separation.

88The OCL stated that it was very clear from the children’s comments that their father continues to actively present his distorted narrative that their mother is a dangerous person who does not really care for them and cannot be trusted.

89The OCL concluded that the children have been unable to move forward from the traumatic circumstances surrounding the separation or rebuild a secure and nurturing relationship with their mother. From the children’s perspective, their father is the only safe parent. They face a significant risk of losing his approval should he perceive that they are no longer aligned with his views, including his belief that he is the superior parent.

90The author of the first OCL report stated: “I believe all three children are at high risk of permanent estrangement from their mother, unless timely and decisive action is taken to alter the status quo and dynamics of the relationship relationships in this separated family.”

91The first OCL clinician concluded that the children are highly influenced by their father and are likely to be strongly resistant to any change in their parenting time arrangement that is not clearly and convincingly supported by him. The OCL further expressed concern that the father may escalate his efforts to obstruct the children’s relationship with their mother, and that the children may become increasingly and rapidly estranged from her.

92The OCL also stated that, unless the applicant is able to cease his manipulation and influencing of the children, and unless he is both willing and able to provide them with unequivocal reassurance that they are safe with their mother—and that the positive and caring behaviours they experience with her are genuine expressions of her love and can be trusted as such—the children’s relationship with their mother will remain at significant risk.

93The cross-examination of the OCLs did not diminish the weight or reliability of these opinions.

94From this evidence, the court concludes that the pattern identified by the first OCL report in 2023 persisted into 2025 when the OCL conducted its subsequent investigation.

95The record further indicates that, even prior to the parties’ separation in 2019, a CAS worker became increasingly concerned that the applicant appeared to be deliberately drawing the children into the parental conflict, including by reminding them to recount negative stories about the respondent’s alleged misconduct toward him and toward the children.

96This pattern continued immediately following the separation. CAS notes from November 2020 through May 2021 document a troubling series of decisions and behaviours by the applicant that appeared motivated to severely restrict the respondent’s contact with the children. These included the applicant falsely informing the children’s school that the respondent was subject to a restraining order, that he was concerned about her attending the school, and that she had supervised access—none of which was true.

97The evidence presented at trial, as further detailed below, suggests that this pattern has continued.

The Children’s Needs

98For the last 5 years, the children have experienced less than moderate stability. While they have resided primarily with the applicant, their time with the respondent went from non-existent, to alternate weekends in the daytime only, to alternate weekends overnight.

99The children have been interviewed by CAS, two OCLs, and each have participated in counselling. They require an end to this litigation. They deserved to focus on what is important to them free from conflict and free from fear of perceived disloyalty as they enter their formative years.

The Nature and Strength of The Children’s Relationship With Each Parent

100Both parties testified about the close and loving bond they share with the three children.

101The OCL’s evidence, as outlined above, reflects a pattern of fear-based loyalty in favour of the applicant. Notwithstanding, the evidence also establishes that, in many respects, the children have thrived while in his primary care. The one exception is their inability to develop and maintain a healthy attachment to their mother.

Willingness to Support the Development and Maintenance of the Children’s Relationship With the Other Parent

102The applicant, despite what he says are his good intentions, does not have the ability or willingness to support the development and maintenance of the children’s relationship with their mother.

103The OCL stated that it is necessary that the applicant ceases his pattern of constructing frivolous excuses to cancel or reduce the respondent’s time with the children. The first OCL report states that it is imperative that if such a pattern continues, that the matter be returned to court without delay and a reversal of primary residency be strongly considered.

104He must also view the children's relationship with their mother as equally as important as his relationship with the children.

105This recommendation was repeated in the second OCL report where it was outlined that if recommendations were not adhered to in the first six months, and if conflict continued to ensue, the respondent was encouraged to return to court for consideration of a reversal of decision-making to her in the future.

106The second OCL report noted that the applicant continues to believe that there are risks to the children if the respondent’s parenting time is expanded based on a written and undated self-assessment tool and a lack of updated medical evidence. The author of the second OCL report stated that during the investigation, there was no evidence gathered to suggest the respondent had mental health issues or barriers to her parenting. The clinician noted that the respondent maintained parenting time, housing, and employment, that there were no concerns in the observational visits, and that the children raised no concerns in their interviews.

107While it was clear that there was some missing medical information, the OCL clinician could not conclude that the information would change the recommendations she made or the OCL’s concerns.

108Little evidence was tendered regarding the respondent’s ability and willingness to support the children’s relationship with the applicant. Both the applicant and the OCL reports did address the respondent’s unfriendliness towards the applicant’s family members.

109The respondent testified that her relationship with the applicant was toxic and brought out the worst in her which was demonstrated through anger and poor behaviour, but now that they have separated, that she lives a more peaceful life.

110The children did not report that the respondent engages in the same degrading conduct toward the applicant that they describe the applicant engages in toward the respondent.

111In contrast, the applicant undertook the extensive effort of producing a graph intended to illustrate an alleged decline in the children’s academic performance following the commencement of the respondent’s overnight parenting time to undermine the respondent. The graph was likely shared with the children to influence them or align their views with the applicant’s views.

112Meanwhile, when speaking with the OCL, the principal at the children’s school told the clinician that the school has not seen any significant changes in the children’s academics, noting that all children experience “typical ups and downs” in their academics. The principal noted that the school is more focused on the overall mental health and well-being of the parties’ children. The principal recommended that the applicant redirect the energy he has been using to focus on the respondent, and instead use it to support the children emotionally, which is what they need most.

113The history of care has been outlined above.

Ability and Willingness to Care for and Meet the Needs of the Children

114Both parties have demonstrated they have the ability to meet the needs of the children.

115This court is not persuaded by the applicant’s attempts to suggest that the respondent does not have the ability or willingness to meet the children’s needs. The applicant perceives himself to be a superior parent which suggests that he perceives the respondent as the inferior parent. However, the evidence presented in this case, specifically, the OCL reports and the reports from other collaterals and organizations involved with the family, suggests otherwise.

116The father's behaviour demonstrates an inability for him to recognize that the children's needs include having a stable and meaningful relationship with their mother.

The Parties’ Ability and Willingness to Communicate and Co-operate on Matters Affecting the Children

117The second OCL noted that the parties do not like each other and have little communication. She noted that the applicant appears to have a need to control the situation, and does not find it surprising that the respondent wants little to no contact with him. The respondent also informed the court that she wished to limit the personal information she shares with the applicant.

118These comments crystallized and became apparent in the ways the parties testified about the other.

119The disdain that each party has for the other will undoubtedly influence their ability to communicate and make decisions jointly.

120The history of this case suggests that the applicant has been making decisions for the children, and there is no evidence to suggest that he has not done so in their best interests.

121The respondent has not had the opportunity to participate in active decision-making since separation, and for this reason, there is no compelling evidence about her ability to make decisions in the children’s best interests.

122In the early stages of their separation, the applicant did not keep the respondent informed of all aspects of the children's lives. Whether deliberate or not, this left the respondent in the dark.

123This all changed following Kristjanson J.’s order. The respondent was listed as an emergency contact at the children's school, and she was authorized to be provided with information about the children directly from the school. She was also given the opportunity to attend parent-teacher interviews.

124The applicant submits that the respondent always had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making and she deliberately chose not to. He submits that she did not attend parent-teacher meetings or remain up to date on school activities. I find that the applicant created an environment where he was in control and therefore, made the respondent’s participation in the children's education and extracurricular activities difficult.

125The applicant took several steps to exclude the respondent from the children’s lives, first by unnecessarily restricting her parenting time after the separation, and then by refusing overnight parenting time until after a court order was made and the first OCL report was produced.

126All of this speaks to his view of the respondent and his perception about her ability to care for and meet the needs of the children.

127While this court recognizes that the applicant has established a daily and predictable routine for the children, and has been involved in their academics, school, and church activities, I cannot ignore the fact that he has actively prohibited the respondent’s participation in such activities.

128The court acknowledges, however, that in recent times, the parties have been able to schedule and reschedule parenting time with ease.

Any Family Violence

129An incident of violence occurred in front of the children at the time the parties separated.

130However, the fears the applicant has expressed he has of the respondent based on threats he claims she made are unsupported and exaggerated. The respondent was found not guilty of criminal charges of assault and there are no charges relating to the alleged threats.

131Since that one incident, there has been no significant incident of violence and changing childcare exchanges to occur at school rather than between parties has certainly assisted in reducing conflict.

132Family violence as alleged by each party is not corroborated by the evidentiary record. The OCL did not substantiate any allegations made by either party and there is no independent corroboration from CAS.

133I have considered the frequency and seriousness of the event that occurred when the parties separated. While it occurred in the presence of the children, their safety was not compromised. The incident did not result in the parties’ significant inability to meet the needs of the children. Viewed as a whole, this factor does not weigh in favour of either party.

Conclusion of Parenting Time and Decision-Making

134The applicant asks for sole decision-making and that the primary residence of the children remain with him. In terms of parenting time, the applicant suggests that the production of medical evidence from the respondent about her mental health should be a prerequisite to a slight expansion of her parenting time. In the interim, he proposes that the status quo remain.

135The applicant acknowledges the respondent should have parenting time with the children. His continued concerns about her undisclosed medical evidence are unwarranted. He may believe she has an undiagnosed mental health issue, but none of the evidence presented suggests that this is true.

136The respondent also asks for an order for sole decision-making and primary residence in her favour. She proposed that the applicant’s parenting occur on alternate weekends from Friday after school to Monday after school.

137Both parties agree to similar holiday parenting time schedules.

138I do not find that either party’s proposal in the best interests of the children. The respondent’s proposed order calls for a significant departure from the long-standing schedule which would create a substantial change for the children with no period of adjustment.

139The second OCL report stated that the children did not express any clear views requesting changes to the current parenting arrangement, and there is no evidence that this would be beneficial at this time. This recommendation must be balanced by both the OCL reports suggesting that if conflict ensues between the parties, the respondent should return to court for consideration of a reversal of decision-making and primary care to her in the future.

140Maintaining the status quo, or even clawing back from the status quo, as the applicant requests, disregards what this court finds to be the applicant’s established pattern of inflating issues to prevent the respondent from having a more meaningful role in the children’s lives.

141I find that the applicant is using a requirement to produce medical evidence about the respondent’s mental health as a means to further control her parenting time.

142The children have been denied the meaningful expansion of time with the respondent since separation. There is no compelling evidence that the children’s academic or educational pursuits will diminish with increased parenting time or that the respondent cannot support them in those realms.

143However, I do not find that it is in the children’s best interest to completely reverse the children’s primary care to the respondent. It is simply too much, too fast and will be a considerable disruption to their lives. I think it is important to note that the OCL recommended that the focus remain on promoting the children’s emotional security as the high conflict nature of this matter continues.

144Although the children did not explicitly state that they wanted a variation to the current status quo, their comments to the OCL suggest that they are reticence to freely speak their thoughts for fear of their father’s disapproval. The focus should be the OCL’s recommendation that focus remain on promoting the children’s emotional security as the high conflict nature of this matter continues.

145This court concludes that the respondent’s parenting time should increase by the addition of days to the existing schedule. This gradual increase offers them more time in a manner that is child focused and orderly.

146Effective immediately, the respondent’s parenting time shall be as follows:

Week 1 and 3: Monday evenings after school until the start of school in Wednesday morning; and

Week 2 and 4: Friday after school until the start of school Tuesday morning.

147At all other times, the children will reside with the applicant. This schedule results in the children being in the care of the respondent approximately 43 percent of the time which shifts the parties into a shared parenting arrangement.

148Various incidental orders will be made to facilitate the parties’ exchange of the children to assist them and to reduce conflict between them.

149The applicant did not raise any credible evidence to support an order requiring that the respondent not leave the children unattended or with a babysitter. Just as the applicant has at times relied on the assistance of others for the care of the children while he worked, the respondent should be afforded the same opportunity, and he should not have the right of first refusal.

150The court is satisfied that the respondent can and will adjust her work schedule to permit her to appropriately care for the children.

151A detailed holiday schedule, which is largely agreed upon between the parties, will also be ordered with the hope that it will offer predictability and stability for the children and will reduce conflict between the parties.

152However, the parties’ obvious and enduring disdain for one another makes it highly unlikely that they will be able to collaboratively and cooperatively make decisions for the children. Therefore, a joint decision-making regime is not in the children’s best interest.

153The parties agree that they will both be permitted to make day-to-day decisions about the children while they are in their care.

154To date, the applicant has been responsible for making decisions for the children. There is no evidence indicating that any major decision the applicant has made was contrary to the children’s best interests.

155No evidence was tendered to support a finding that altering the current decision-making arrangement in favour of the respondent would be in the children’s best interests.

156As such, decision-making will remain with the applicant with the strict condition that he shall advise the respondent of decisions that must be made, the basis for the final decision, and rationale for same. The respondent has the right to know and have details and be informed of all decisions to be made.

Equalization of NFP

157Based on the Form 13C: Comparison of Net Family Property Statements filed at trial and the parties’ submissions, this court is required to decide the appropriate value/inclusion of the following assets and/or debts.

2015 Toyota Corolla

158The applicant claims the value of this vehicle was $16,000 while the respondent asserts that it was worth $13,000 on valuation date. There is no dispute that the respondent claims this asset.

159This vehicle was purchased in September 2020 for $14,000 before tax. The applicant estimated the total purchase price at between $16,000 to $17,000.

160The parties separated in November 2020. The respondent estimated a $2,000 to $3,000 reduction in the value of vehicle from the time it was purchased to the valuation date two months later.

161I accept that the vehicle depreciated after purchase. Neither party tendered any documentary evidence in support of their position. I find that this vehicle was, on balance, worth $14,000 on valuation date and this amount shall be inserted on the respondent’s side of the ledger.

2003 RSX Acura

162This court is required to determine the value of this asset as of the date of marriage and valuation date. The applicant claims this vehicle was valued at $2,000 on valuation date. It was the applicant's evidence that the vehicle was rusted and sold a year after the parties’ separation for $2,000. The respondent alleges that the vehicle was valued at $5,000 at that time.

163It was the applicant’s evidence that this vehicle was purchased prior to the marriage in 2007 for $16,000. It was used and repossessed. The applicant produced the permit and used vehicle information with respect to this vehicle. He claims two years later, when the parties married, the vehicle experienced a $4,000 depreciation and was worth $12,000. He claims the respondent did not include this asset in her calculation as of date of marriage.

164The respondent did not tender any documentary evidence to support why this asset should not be included on date of marriage. She did not dispute the applicant’s evidence nor did she provide evidence in support of her valuation date estimation.

165I accept the limited documentary evidence and the applicant’s undisputed evidence. This asset is valued at $2,000 as of valuation date and $12,000 as of date of marriage.

Jewellery

166In the applicant’s NFP statement, he estimates that, on valuation date, each party had $2,500 worth of jewelry, claiming the total value was $5,000.

167The respondent does not claim any jewelry on her NFP statement. She alleges that when she was arrested, the jewellery was left in the family home and she does not have any jewellery owned during the marriage and therefore, is not claiming this as an asset on her side of the Ledger. She also does not ask that any amount be attributed to the applicant.

168Neither party tendered documentary evidence or proof of ownership regarding jewellery.

169The applicant testified that he gave the respondent two rings—a diamond ring and a gold ring. He also claims that when the respondent returned to the family home after separation, she took seven bags of items including the applicant’s gold ring.

170The court is not in the position to apply the best evidence approach as there was no evidence tendered on the values proposed by the parties or the appropriate division of the property.

171As a result, no value will be inserted in the NFP relating to the jewellery.

USD Chequing Account

172The applicant claims that he held a US chequing account with TD Canada Trust on valuation date with an account balance of $1,509. The respondent submits no valuation day proof was provided in support of this amount and therefore, it should be omitted from the calculation.

173The applicant did not tender any evidence at trial in support of the figure he sought to include in the NFP. As a result, no value will be inserted in relation to this alleged asset.

Disposition on RRSPs

174The applicant is claiming a valuation debt of $5,636 on account of 15 percent disposition costs on RRSPs. There is no dispute that on valuation date, the applicant held $42,628 in RRSPs.

175The respondent asks that no value be inserted in the NFP statement for the disposition of the RRSPs as the applicant did not tender expert evidence in support of the liability. Further, the respondent asserts that the RRSPs could be rolled over and that a rollover would eliminate any disposition costs. This argument is moot because she did not request that the equalization payment be made by way of a rollover.

176There is no dispute that notional tax liabilities are routinely deducted from the value of RRSPs. While the amount sought to be deducted is typically the equivalent of 13.2 percent of the value of the RRSP’s on valuation date and not 15 percent, this court will not interfere with the amount claimed despite this discrepancy as the respondent did not provide any compelling evidence to reject the figure.

DOM RRSP and the Applicant’s Bank Balances

177The applicant’s evidence about the existence of the date of marriage RRSPs in the amount of $15,000 is as follows. He testified that when he returned to Guyana to marry the respondent, he had the option to cash out the RRSPs or to borrow money to fund the trip and/or wedding. He decided to borrow money from the bank, presumably to not incur the tax liability.

178The applicant testified that when his brother-in-law discovered the applicant borrowed money, he lent the applicant the same sum to allow him to repay the debt. The applicant testified that he proceeded to repay this loan to his brother-in-law.

179In Lyttleton v. Lyttleton, 2022 ONSC 5120, Justice Nakonechny, at para. 63, summarized the “best evidence” approach as follows,

The court has a broad discretion to find value, even in the absence of solid valuation evidence. In Felte v. Felte, the Court of Appeal stated that where the evidence is unsatisfactory and incomplete, a trial judge must use the evidence he or she does have, in attempting to come to a reasonable and fair result. [Footnotes omitted.]

180Here, the court is left with no option but to rely on the limited available evidence to achieve a just and fair result.

181The respondent did not tender any evidence to dispute the amount sought to be inserted. I accept that records dating back 2009 no longer exist. I accept the applicant’s evidence regarding the RRSPs owned on date of marriage. There is no dispute that by the time the parties married, the applicant had been working in Canada for eight years. I accept that this resulted in the accumulation of some assets.

182However, neither party tendered evidence with respect to the applicant’s claim that he had $750 in his bank account on date of marriage. As such, that amount will not be included in the calculation.

183Having consideration for all the above and the value of assets and debts agreed to by the parties, the applicant owes the respondent an equalization payment of $4,688.29.

184If there are any errors identified with my arithmetic, the parties may schedule a time to attend before me within seven days.

Income of the Parties

185Both parties seek to impute income to the other.

186In her draft order, the respondent asks that the applicant’s income be imputed to $85,000 for the purpose of child support and $134,000 for the purpose of spousal support. In closing submissions, the respondent agreed that income for child and spousal support should be the same. The respondent seeks payment of child and spousal support based on the children residing primarily with her.

187The applicant seeks to impute the respondent’s income to $55,860 to reflect the income of a full-time personal support worker. He bases his draft order on the pretense that the children are in his care that there is no off-setting of support.

188Given the parenting order made and because spousal support is at issue, this court is required to determine the income of both parties.

Applicant’s Income

189Academic success, pursuing educational goals, and vocational achievements are clearly important to the applicant.

190Prior to separation, the applicant worked at several companies, including Magma and Siemen Money to pay for tuition for his MBA. The evidence suggests that his desire to pursue this further education was his decision.

191The applicant prided himself on achieving vocational success working as a plant maintenance engineer with Halton Region. The respondent began working for Halton Region following the parties’ separation for what was to be a 20 month contract position. The contract was extended for an additional 18 months. The applicant believed that he was going to be hired by the company full-time. He was not, and no explanation was provided for same.

192While working as an engineer with the Region, the applicant applied for his MBA program. While he tried to suggest that his employer wanted him to pursue further education and supported the plan, there is no documentary evidence to support this.

193The applicant decided to pursue the degree even though his employer did not pay for the tuition and his employment came it an end. The applicant could not fund his education by himself and proceeded to borrowed money from his sister to pay for his MBA. He suggests this sum has since been repaid.

194The applicant’s income decreased significantly while he was a full-time student. After graduating from the MBA program in June 2025, the applicant has not been gainfully employed. He tendered evidence of varying positions he applied to, but maintains he has not received any offer of employment.

195As was the case when he pursued his degree, the applicant’s sole source of income is currently Ontario Works.

196This court finds that the applicant’s desire to pursue additional education was voluntary. The applicant was already highly educated and qualified. He has obtained several certifications through the University of Toronto, Humber College, after receiving his Bachelor of Engineering from the University of Guyana.

197While this court cannot conclude the pursuit of an MBA was not necessary for his career development, it concludes that the applicant’s obligations to financially support his children cannot be avoided by a self-induced reduction of income: Thompson v. Gilchrist, 2012 ONSC 4137, 27 R.F.L. (7th) 83, at para. 33; DePace v. Michienzi, 2000 CanLII 22560 (ON SC), [2000] 5 R.F.L. (5th) 40, at para. 31.

198Applying the law set out above, this court finds that the applicant is intentionally underemployed or unemployed. This court does not have to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations before imputing income. The applicant’s act of voluntarily becoming a full-time student was not a requirement to or prerequisite of his continued employment with the Region.

199The applicant’s attempts to secure employment post-graduation are noted. It was the applicant’s evidence that he has been actively applying for jobs. He has been tracking his jobs and produced a document listing that he applied for 67 jobs from February 3, 2025 to April 7, 2025. He claims that he did not receive any callbacks, but his resumes have been retained by the companies.

200He submits that he should not pay spousal support given that he has no income. This court disagrees and exercises its discretion to impute income to him in the circumstances. This position is one of the court’s methods by which it gives effect to parents’ joint and ongoing obligation to support their children and to meet their legal obligation to earn what they are capable of earning.

201The applicant’s history of reported income is as follows:

2020 – $69,371;

2021 – $106,307;

2022 – $134,449 (which includes employment income of $109,449 + RRSP withdrawal of $25,000. The RRSP withdrawal amount was not included in the consideration of the applicant’s income for 2022); and

2023 – $86,599.

202The respondent seeks to impute the applicant’s income to $85,000 for 2024 to 2026. This amount is reasonable given that it is approximately the same amount that he earned just prior to pursuing further education when he was employed on a full-time basis. This amount is also lower than the income he earned in 2021, 2022, and 2023 which adds to its reasonableness.

203Common sense would dictate that the applicant’s new degree would add to his earning potential; however, no evidence was led with respect to the potential of earning for an engineer who also holds an MBA. Accordingly, this court exercises its discretion to impute income to the applicant and the total amount of $85,000 per annum.

204This imputed income will be applied on a retroactive basis as outlined below.

Respondent’s Income

205During the parties’ marriage, the respondent enrolled in the PSW program at Humber College. After graduating, she worked on a part-time basis. She is now employed at a long-term care residence.

206The applicant claims the applicant can and should work full-time as a personal support worker as the children are not in her care full-time. He believes that her decision to work part-time is connected to her desire to continue receiving subsidized housing.

207This court does not accept that the respondent’s motives to work part-time are driven by her desire to maintain subsidized housing. However, this court still concludes that she may be slightly underemployed.

208The respondent did not provide the court with a reasonable explanation for why she continues to work part-time. She has a significant amount of experience, and gave evidence that when she is able to work additional hours, she does so.

209Like the applicant, the respondent’s obligation to financially support her children cannot be avoided by a self-induced reduction of income.

210The respondent’s history of earnings are as follows:

2021 – $41,632;

2022 – $43,127; and

2023 – $45,477.

211The applicant calculated the respondent’s potential full-time employment income by multiplying her rate of $25 per hour by 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year. This amounts to approximately $52,000 per annum.

212The court finds that it is reasonable and appropriate to impute income to the respondent in the amount of $52,000 per annum. This income will be imputed to the respondent on a prospective basis as further outlined below.

Child Support

213This court is required to determine retroactive and prospective child support obligations.

214Child support is the right of the child: D.B.S. v. S.R.G. 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, at para. 38.

215The purpose and promise of child support is to protect the financial entitlements parents owe their children: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763, at para. 38. These entitlements survive the breakdown of their parents’ marriage: D.B.S., at para. 38.

216Given the parenting time orders made in this case, s. 9 of the Guidelines applies.

217The parties did not make submissions on the three-part s. 9 analysis.

218Neither party tendered evidence about the increased cost of parenting time or the conditions, means, needs, and other circumstances of each of them and the children. Accordingly, a straight set-off will apply.

219Based on an income of $85,000, table support for three children amounts to $1,700 per month. On an income of $52,000, monthly support amounts to $1,035. Therefore, the applicant has an obligation to pay the respondent prospective child support in the monthly amount of $665.

220Turning now to retroactive support, the Supreme Court of Canada in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 114, set out the framework to be used for applications to retroactively increase support:

a) The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

221Courts have held this framework is also to be applied in situations for an original request for retroactive support, with necessary modifications: M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555, at para. 80; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189, at para. 198.

222First, the court must determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci.

223Second, the court must determine if it should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair.

224Third, the court must quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

225The applicant seeks retroactive child support effective November 2020 up to and including the date that prospective support is ordered. He requests the respondent pay a lump sum towards the retroactive child support with periodic monthly payments until they are paid in full. According to his calculation, the respondent owes him retroactive child support of over $35,000.

226This application was commenced in 2022. Presumably, the applicant can seek retroactive support to a maximum of three years prior to the commencement of this application which places the date around the time of the parties’ separation in November 2020 (as requested in his draft order) or January 2021 (as requested in the calculations submitted with his closing submissions).

227The applicant testified he asked the respondent to pay $100 per month per child, but the respondent refused to do so. There was no evidence of this conversation, and the applicant’s credibility is questioned. The applicant did not testify as to when or how this request was made. No documentary evidence was led by either party about requests made in writing for contribution to child support following separation.

228The applicant argues that the respondent is in good health, receives subsidized housing, has no significant childcare expenses, and she is intentionally underemployed. He claims she knew she had an obligation to pay support.

229This court retains the discretion to depart from the presumptive retroactivity where the results would be unfair.

230In exercising my discretion not to order retroactive support to November 2020, I make the following findings.

231The respondent initially commenced proceedings in the OCJ. The applicant delayed in responding to that application until the first attendance, and only then indicated that he wished to pursue a divorce, thereby necessitating that the matter proceed in the SCJ. The applicant then further delayed in bringing the SCJ action forward.

232Considering his conduct as a whole following separation and up to the commencement of his court application, the applicant’s behaviour reflects a pattern of delay and slow engagement with the process. While this might have suited his position on parenting time, he cannot benefit from these delays to now secure retroactive child support.

233There is no basis to conclude that the respondent attempted to avoid her support obligations. To the contrary, she initiated proceedings and sought to advance all issues. The progression of the litigation was impeded by the applicant’s actions.

234Having considered the circumstances of the children, I cannot conclude that they experienced financial hardship or went without necessities. In fact, there was no point in which the applicant tendered evidence about the children experiencing financial hardship. Following the parties’ separation the applicant continued to be gainfully employed, earning significantly more than the respondent.

235The applicant’s financial statement does not demonstrate any significant increased debt associated with childcare. His credit card debt has reduced. He purchased and financed a new car post separation, and the only significant increase in debt disclosed was his loan to complete his MBA which was voluntary. He testified about trips he took with the children and how he likes to spend time with them going to Tim Hortons.

236Finally, I find that ordering the payment of retroactive child support to 2020 would cause significant financial strain on the respondent.

237The respondent’s financial statement reveals that she has no significant assets. She currently receives assistance through subsidized housing. Additionally, given that the children will be in her care for more than 40% of the time, such an order cannot be said to be in their best interests.

238A temporary order for child support was made in May 2024, requiring the respondent to pay child support in the amount of $845 per month. This order was without prejudice and subject to reassessment based on actual or imputed income.

239After weighing the D.B.S. factors and considering the parties’ conduct, the children’s needs, and the financial circumstances of the parties, the retroactive start date for child support should be April 2022—the month after this application was commenced. This date is guided by fairness and the best interests of the children.

240For 2022, based on the respondent's actual income of $43,127, child support amounts to $858 per month. When this figure is multiplied by nine months (April to December), the respondent owes retroactive support of $7,722. The respondent did not pay any child support in 2022 and therefore, the full amount is owing.

241For 2023, based on the respondent's actual income of $45,477, child support amounts to $895 per month. When this figure is multiplied by 12 months, the respondent owes retroactive child support of $10,740. The respondent did not pay any child support in 2023 and therefore, the full amount is owing.

242The temporary order for support provided for support payable effective June 1, 2024. The only evidence before the court regarding the respondent’s 2024, 2025, and current income is her evidence that she made roughly the same amount over that period. She testified that she earns between $40,000 and $45,000 per annum. Through his closing submissions and the calculations he submitted with his closing submissions, the applicant does not seem to dispute the respondent’s income for 2024, 2025, and 2026 as $41,862. As such, her income will be set at $41,862 for those years.

243For 2024, based on the respondent’s accepted income of $41,862, the respondent ought to have paid monthly support in the amount of $838. When this figure is multiplied by 12 months, the respondent’s 2024 support obligations amount to $10,056. According to the applicant’s undisputed position, in 2024, the respondent paid a total of $5,866 in support, leaving an outstanding balance of $4,190.

244For 2025, based on the accepted income of the respondent to $41,862 and the 2025 tables, the respondent ought to have paid monthly child support in the amount of $838. For the year, this amounts to a total of $10,056. Based on the applicant’s undisputed position, in 2025, the respondent paid a total of $10,056 and support. As a result, the respondent does not owe any retroactive child support for 2025.

245As set out further below, the prospective child support order will be effective July 1, 2026.

246For January to June 2026, based on the applicant’s undisputed evidence, there are likely no support payments owing if child support was paid. For clarity, the respondent’s child support obligation for the first six months of 2026 would have totalled $5,028. Presumably, she has been paying child support in the amount of $838 per month for six months which results in total payments of $5,028. Accordingly, no support is owing for the first six months of 2026.

247At the request of the applicant, and based on the evidence tendered, this court has imputed income to the respondent in the amount of $52,000. Imputed income becomes effective at the point where the respondent’s conduct justifies such imputation. On the evidence before me, the respondent should reasonably be paying support based on the imputed income prospectively. Neither party made submissions regarding the precise commencement date or the applicable payment amounts arising from the imputed income.

248As it relates to the respondent, I am satisfied that it is fair and appropriate for the imputed income to take effect prospectively. No evidence was tendered to support an earlier effective date of the imputed income. Further, given my findings above regarding retroactive support, including the potential financial hardship to the respondent, setting a prospective commencement date best reflects overall fairness in the circumstances.

249On a prospective basis, given the imputation of income to each party, the applicant owes child support to the respondent in the monthly amount of $665. This amount will be payable effective July 1, 2026 and payable on the first day of each month thereafter.

250The respondent’s retroactive child support owing for the period of April 2022 up and including June 30, 2026 is $28,518.

251A request was made that any equalization payment the applicant owed to the respondent would be offset against any retroactive support. There was no dispute to this request.

252The applicant owes the respondent an equalization payment of $4,688.29. This amount will be deducted from the $23,829.71 that she owes him, resulting in the respondent owing $23,829.71 in retroactive child support.

253Given the respondent’s financial position as set out in her financial statement, she will be given time to pay the retroactive support. She will pay the amount of $300 per month for approximately 79 months, until the amount is paid in full.

254Commencing July 1, 2026, and payable in the first day of each month thereafter, the applicant shall the respondent child support in the amount of $665.

255The parties did not focus evidence or submissions on the issue of section 7 expenses. The respondent’s draft order does not contain an order for special and extraordinary expenses. The applicant’s draft order requests an order that the parties share section 7 expenses in proportion to their respective income such that the applicant pays 30% of the expense based on his income of $20,254 and the respondent pay 70%.

256The court did not receive any evidence of past, current or future special and extraordinary expenses. The applicant generally testified about one of the children wanting to play volleyball and badminton and wanting braces. There was not evidence tendered about the cost of the desired expenses.

257As a result, this court cannot make orders specific to an actual expense but can order the proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses in general based on the income of the parties as determined above. Given the conflict between the parties, this court will order that any expense a party seeks to recover ought to be agreed upon in writing.

Spousal Support

258The temporary support order made on consent in May 2024, provides that the applicant shall pay spousal support to the respondent at the low-end range of $334 per month. This order was made on a without prejudice basis to the respondent’s claim for retroactive and prospective spousal support and subject to re-adjustment based on the applicant’s true income for 2024.

259The applicant asks that his spousal support obligations terminate effective May 2026. He does not dispute the respondent’s retroactive entitlement to spousal support, but he disputes ongoing entitlement.

260The respondent asks for monthly support retroactive from the date of separation until 2031 upon which it may be reviewed.

261No submissions were made as to why spousal support should be reviewed in 2031. I observed that 2031 is 11 years post date of separation.

262Spousal support is governed by the factors set out in the FLA, and the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines which highlight the basis for compensatory and non-compensatory support: Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016).

263I find that the respondent continues to be entitled to on-going spousal support on compensatory and non-compensatory basis.

264On a compensatory basis, it is significant that parties cohabited for 11 years after the respondent came to this country where the applicant had previously established himself. There was always a disparity in their respective incomes.

265The respondent subsequently obtained further education which allowed her to obtain employment, but she also had three children which affected the progression of her career. Meanwhile, the applicant continued to pursue his career, education, and training.

266At all times during the parties’ relationship, the respondent was a secondary earner, and although she was not the primary caregiver for the children after separation, she played an integral role in their upbringing prior to the parties’ separation.

267The respondent is also entitled to non-compensatory support. Because of her lack of education and no job prospects when she arrived in Canada, she was reliant on the applicant, and they had economic interdependency which developed because of their shared life.

268This is a case where the respondent’s compensatory entitlement is very clear in the early years of separation, but a non-compensatory claim may continue.

269The applicant did not request a retroactive variation of spousal support and therefore one will not be ordered.

270The respondent request for a retroactive variation of spousal support to the date of separation results in no spousal support payable when the parties’ incomes as determined above are inputted into the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines using the “custodial payor” formula which accurate reflects the parenting arrangement since separation to present.

271On a prospective basis, despite a finding on continued entitlement to spousal support, using the “with child support” formula, there is no amount payable considering the imputation of the parties’ income and the child support obligations that flow.

272The “with child support” formula is applied as the applicant is no longer the custodial payor and while funds are not flowing to the applicant, the calculation contemplates the respondent’s payment of child support.

273The formula results in a range of zero dollars per month, for an indefinite, unspecified, duration, subject to variation and review with a minimum duration of five and a half years and a maximum duration of 17 years from the date of separation.

274There shall be no payment of spousal support at this time given the foregoing.

Conclusion and Orders

275For the reasons set out above, this court orders:

1. The divorce shall be severed from the corollary issues and may proceed based on affidavit evidence on an uncontested basis.

Pursuant to the Children’s Law Reform Act,

2. The applicant shall consult with the respondent about any important decision that is required to be made for the children. The applicant shall immediately advise the respondent of decisions that need to be made as they arise. The applicant shall advise of the respondent of the basis for the final decision and rationale for same.

3. The applicant shall have final decision-making responsibility about the welfare of the children, Selina Persaud, born October 16, 2011, Anna Persaud, born September 20, 2013, and Elizabeth Persaud, born January 2, 2019, including decisions about their:

i) Health;

ii) Education;

iii) Extra-curricular activities; and

iv) Religion.

4. Each party shall be permitted to make day-to-day decisions about the children (for example, homework, meals, visiting with their friends, use of the computer, etc.).

5. Both parties may make inquiries and receive information from the children's teachers, school officials, doctors, dentists, health care providers, summer camp counsellors, or others involved with the children. This paragraph is intended to provide each party with access to any information or documentation to which a parent of a child would otherwise have a right of access.

6. The parties shall be jointly responsible to apply for or renew all important documentation/forms/passport for the children. The applicant shall hold all the children’s important documents, including but not limited to their passport, birth certificate, social insurance number card, vaccination record, and shall provide the respondent with a notary copy of the children's important documents.

7. Neither party shall speak negatively to the children about the other parent.

8. The parties shall continue to communicate on WhatsApp or email regarding the children.

9. The respondent’s parenting time shall be as follows:

Week 1 and 3: Monday evenings from after school until the start of school on Wednesday morning;

Week 2 and 4: Friday afterschool until the start of school on Tuesday morning.

10. At all other times, the children will reside with the applicant.

11. The respondent shall be responsible for picking up and dropping off the children to/from school and their extracurricular activities during her parenting time. If the respondent is unable to pick up the children from school, the respondent shall pick the children up from the applicant’s home.

12. The holiday schedule below, is in addition to the regular parenting time above and overrides the regular parenting time in the event of conflict.

Family Day Weekend

13. The children shall stay with the applicant on Family Day Weekend in odd-numbered years and with respondent in even-numbered years, from after school on Friday until the start of school on Tuesday morning.

March Break

14. The children shall stay with the applicant during March Break during odd-numbered years and with the respondent in even-numbered years, from after school as the break starts until the start of school following the break.

Easter Weekend

15. The children shall stay with the applicant on Easter Weekend in even-numbered years and with respondent in odd-numbered years, from after school on the Thursday before the Easter weekend until the start of school on Tuesday.

Mother's Day

16. If the children are not otherwise with the respondent on this weekend, the children shall stay with the respondent on Mother’s Day Weekend, from Saturday at 7:00 p.m. until the start of school on Monday.

Victoria Day Weekend

17. The children shall stay with the applicant on Victoria Day Weekend in odd-numbered years and with the respondent in even-numbered years, from after school on Friday until the start of school on Tuesday.

Father's Day

18. If the children are not otherwise with the applicant on this weekend, the children shall stay with the applicant on Father's Day Weekend, from Saturday at 7:00 p.m. until the start of school on Monday.

Summer Vacation

19. With respect to the children's Summer Break, each party shall spend uninterrupted Summer Vacation time with the children as follows:

i) The children shall stay with the applicant for two consecutive or non-consecutive weeks, during which time the respondent's regular parenting time will be suspended.

ii) The children shall stay with the respondent for two consecutive or non-consecutive weeks, during which time the applicant's regular parenting time will be suspended.

iii) The applicant shall have first choice of Summer Vacation time in odd-numbered years and the respondent shall have first choice of Summer Vacation time in even-numbered years. The party with first choice will advise the other, in writing, by April 1 of each year of their chosen weeks, and the party with second choice will advise the other, in writing, by May 1 of each year of their chosen weeks. In making plans, each party will take into account the children's views and preferences, camp, and other scheduled activities.

Canada Day Weekend and August Civic Holiday

20. Subject to the Summer Vacation, which will take precedence:

i) The children shall stay with the applicant on the Canada Day Weekend in odd-numbered years and the respondent in even-numbered years from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until 9:00 p.m. on Monday.

ii) The children shall stay with the applicant on the August Civic Holiday Weekend in odd-numbered years and the respondent in even-numbered years, from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until 9:00 p.m. on Monday.

Labour Day Weekend

21. The children shall stay with the applicant on Labour Day Weekend in odd-numbered years and with the respondent in even-numbered years, from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until the start of school on Tuesday.

Thanksgiving Weekend

22. The children shall stay with the applicant on Thanksgiving Weekend in odd-numbered years and with the respondent in even-numbered years, from after school on the Friday before Thanksgiving until the start of school on Tuesday.

Christmas Break

23. The parties shall equally share the children's Christmas Break as follows:

i) The children shall stay with the applicant for the first half of the Christmas Break in odd-numbered years and the last half of the Christmas Break in even-numbered years.

ii) The children shall stay with the respondent for the first half of the Christmas Break in even-numbered years and the last half of the Christmas Break in odd-numbered years.

iii) The first half of the break will start after school on the last day of school in December and end on December 25 at 12:00 p.m. The second half of the break will start on December 25 at 12:01 p.m. and end at the start of school in January on the Friday before school commences.

Travel

24. For travel that is outside of the Province of Ontario with children, the parties shall require the consent of the other. Consent will not be unreasonably withheld.

25. The travelling parent shall provide the other with at least 21 days’ notice of their intention to travel. Such notice shall include the following, if applicable:

i) A flight itinerary;

ii) The airline carrier and flight times;

iii) Accommodation details;

iv) The address the children will be staying at during the trip, telephone numbers, and details about how to contact the child(ren) during the trip; and

v) Irrespective of the number of days for travelling, the travelling parent shall arrange telephone/virtual contact with the non-travelling parent. Times and dates shall be mutually agreed upon.

Pursuant to the Family Law Act,

26. The applicant owes the respondent an equalization payment of $4,688.29, which amount shall be offset by the retroactive child support award the respondent owes the applicant.

27. After offsetting the amount owing for equalization, the respondent shall pay the applicant retroactive child support for the period of April 1, 2022 to June 30, 2026 in the amount of $28,518payable at a rate of $300 per month until paid in full.

28. Commencing July 1, 2026 and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, the applicant shall pay child support for the benefit of Selina Persaud, born October 16, 2011, Anna Persaud, born September 20, 2013, and Elizabeth Persaud, born January 2, 2019 to the respondent. The amount payable shall be based on an imputed income of $85,000 in the amount of $1,700 per month.

29. The respondent and shall pay child support for the benefit of Selina Persaud, born October 16, 2011, Anna Persaud, born September 20, 2013, and Elizabeth Persaud, born January 2, 2019 to the applicant. The amount payable shall be based on an imputed income of $52,000 in the amount of $1,035 per month.

30. The applicant shall pay the respondent the set off amount of child support of $665 per month.

31. The parties shall share future section 7 expenses, special and expenses, in proportion to their respective incomes, with the applicant paying 67% and the respondent paying 33% of any expense agreed upon in writing, prior to it being incurred.

32. For as long as child support is paid, the parties must provide updated income disclosure to each other in each year, within 30 days of the anniversary of this Order, in accordance with section 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines.

33. There shall be no spousal support payable at this time.

34. A Support Deduction Order and Support Deduction Order Information shall so issue.

Costs

276The parties shall engage in meaningful discussions on the issue of costs of this proceeding.

277If they are unable to resolve costs, on or before July 17, 2026, any party seeking costs shall submit written submissions no longer than five pages, not including the documentation required by subrules 24(15) and (16).

278On or before July 31, 2026, a party may serve and file a responding written submission on costs, no longer than five pages, not including the documentation required by subrules 24(15) and (16).

279Costs shall be deemed settled if written submissions are not received in accordance with the timeline above.

K. SAH J.

Released: June 29, 2026

CITATION: Persaud v. Persaud, 2026 ONSC 3796

COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-000208696-0000

DATE: 20260629

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

RAMNARINE PERSAUD

Applicant

-and-

LORENA PERSAUD

Respondent

REASONS FOR decision