CITATION: Mehta v. Mehta, 2026 ONSC 3794

COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-2012

DATE: 2026 06 29

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

SAMIR MEHTA

Plaintiff

Alexander Verrilli, for the Plaintiff

• and -

LALITA MEHTA

Defendant

Peter A. Mahoney, for the Defendant

HEARD: June 22, 2026

RULING ON MOTION

Wilkinson J.

1The Plaintiff, Samir Mehta, moves for production of a further and better affidavit of documents from the Defendant, Lalita Mehta, who is his mother. She is also the Estate Trustee for the estate of his father, Jagdishchandra Mehta.

2The parties have agreed that the requested documents can be divided into five different “buckets”:

1. Bank records for Jagdishchandra Mehta from 1997 to present;

2. Tax records for Jagdishchandra Mehta from 1997 to present;

3. The file of financial planners David Butler and Stuart Butler;

4. The file of estate planning lawyer Kevin Robbins; and

5. The file of lawyer Tyrone Crawford who handled the 2007 transaction that placed the Defendant on title to the Cooperage Street property.

3For the reasons that follow, the Defendant, Lalita Mehta, is required to produce the file of financial planners David Butler and Stuart Butler. The Plaintiff has not satisfied his onus to establish that the remaining documents requested ought to be included in the Defendant’s affidavit of documents.

Background

4This litigation involves a dispute over the legal and beneficial ownership of the property where the Plaintiff presently resides with his fiancée and child, located at 14 Cooperage Street in Brampton, Ontario.

5In 1994, the Plaintiff and his then-wife, Kristin Salisbury, purchased a condominium at 2 Valhalla Inn Road, in Etobicoke, Ontario. The purchase was made possible through a mortgage granted by CIBC.

6In 1997, the Plaintiff’s marriage to Ms. Salibury broke down, resulting in divorce. Jagdishchandra provided financial assistance to the Plaintiff at that time, and took over title to the property, although the Plaintiff continued to live at the property.

7The parties do not agree as to the sums paid by the Plaintiff towards the maintenance and expenses related to the property while he has been living there.

8In 2003 the Plaintiff moved out of the Valhalla Inn Road property when he purchased a property located at 14 Cooperage Street in Brampton, Ontario, with his second wife (now ex-wife), Mariam Kamal, and her mother, Nuzhat Kamal, who also moved into the Cooperage Street property. At the time of purchase, the title to the property was placed in the names of Jagdishchandra, who owned a 66.66 percent share of the property, and Nuzhat Kamal, who owed a 33.33 percent share of the property, as tenants in common.

9The Plaintiff claims that there was an agreement that Jagdishchandra was holding his portion of the ownership of the property in trust for the Plaintiff, and that Nuzhat Kamal was holding her portion of the ownership of the property in trust for her daughter Mariam. The Plaintiff therefore asserts that both he and Mariam had beneficial ownership of the Cooperage Street property at the time of its purchase.

10The Defendant denies that Jagdishchandra and Nuzhat held the Cooperage Street property in trust for the Plaintiff and his then-wife Mariam. She takes the position that the Plaintiff and Mariam were granted a license to live at the property provided they paid the maintenance and carrying costs for the property, which she claims they failed to do.

11Jagdishchandra sold the Valhalla Inn Road property in 2005, after the Cooperage Street property had already been purchased. According to the Statement of Claim, some of these funds were used to pay the down payment for the Cooperage Street property.

12In approximately 2007, Nuzhat moved out of the Cooperage Street property, at which time her interest in the property was transferred to Jagdishchandra. He then became the only party on title to the property. The Plaintiff submits that his beneficial ownership interest in the property did not change at that time, even though his father had sole title to the property.

13In June 2007 Jagdishchandra added his wife, the Defendant Lalita Mehta, on title to the Cooperage Street property as a joint tenant.

14Jagdishchandra paid out the remaining mortgage on the property in 2009.

15The Plaintiff and Mariam Kamal lived in the property together until 2017, when Mariam moved out after she and the Plaintiff divorced. The Plaintiff continued living at the property, and remains there today.

16Jagdishchandra died on June 3, 2019. After his death, his legal interest in the property passed to the Defendant through her right of survivorship as a joint tenant. The Defendant asserts that the property belonged to her exclusively at that time, and remains her property at the present time.

17The Plaintiff asserts that it was his father’s intention for him to have title to the Valhalla Inn Road property, and subsequently, the Cooperage Street property. The Plaintiff also asserts that his father intended for him to have access to his father’s investment funds, as a part of Jagdishchandra’s planning for the Plaintiff's future financial security.

18There is no written agreement between the Plaintiff and Jagdishchandra.

19The Defendant has filed a Counterclaim for $100,000 against the Plaintiff, seeking reimbursement for payment of loans advanced to the Plaintiff by Jagdishchandra, that she claims the Plaintiff has never repaid.

20The Plaintiff now seeks production of Jagdishchandra's bank records, tax records, and files maintained by Jagdischandra’s financial advisors, and estate and real estate lawyers, to confirm that it was Jagdishchandra’s intention that the Plaintiff was to be the owner of the Valhalla Inn Road property, and later, the Cooperage Street property.

21The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant, who is the Estate Trustee of his father’s estate, has power, possession and control of the documents being sought, because she can request production of the required documents from third parties, who currently have possession of the documents.

22This motion was originally heard on October 22, 2025. Some rulings were made, and the Plaintiff abandoned his request that certain documents be included in the Defendant’s affidavit of documents. However, argument could not be completed on that date because the parties had not directed their minds to whether documents in the possession of third parties can be considered to be in the power, possession and control of the Defendant, as Estate Trustee for the Estate of Jagdishchandra Mehta. The balance of the motion was therefore adjourned to permit the parties to prepare argument regarding this issue.

Position of the Plaintiff

23The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant has power, possession and control of the requested documents because she is able to request the documents in her capacity as Estate Trustee for the Estate of Jagdishchandra. He further submits that the Defendant can also obtain the records of the financial planners and the estate and real estate lawyers in her independent capacity as a client of these professionals.

24The Plaintiff further submits he has no right to request documents from these entities because he is not their client, which further supports his argument that the requested documents are in the power, possession and control of the Defendant.

25The Plaintiff submits that the requested documents are relevant, and that he has established that they exist.

26The Plaintiff also submits that it is proportional for the documents to be requested at this stage of the proceeding, as they would be requested as an undertaking in any event, and obtaining the documents in advance of the examination for discovery provides for a more stream-lined and cost-effective process.

Position of the Defendant

27The Defendant submits that she has produced all documents to the Plaintiff that relate to the issues raised in the pleadings. The Defendant takes the position that the documents being sought that are presently in the hands of third parties are not in her power, possession or control. She therefore argues that these documents should not be listed in her affidavit of documents, even if they are relevant, which she does not concede.

28She further argues that the Plaintiff has not established that the requested documents exist. She submits that requiring her to make further inquiries to attempt further production of documents causes undue hardship, unnecessarily delays the proceedings, and offends the proportionality principle at this stage of the proceedings.

29The Defendant submits that any further inquiries would be more appropriate in a discovery setting, particularly given the volume of disclosure already provided to the Plaintiff, and the fact that it is unknown if some of the requested documents exist.

30The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff's requests are based entirely on speculation, guesswork, and intuition, and are extremely broad. She states that it is therefore inappropriate for the Plaintiff to demand production of the requested documents prior to an examination for discovery.

The Law

31Rule 30.02 (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every document relevant to any matter in issue in an action that is or has been in the possession, control or power of a party to the action shall be disclosed as provided for in the rule, whether or not privilege is claimed in respect of the document.

32Rule 30.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the requirements for an affidavit of documents. The case of Sarta v. Mazo, 2021 ONSC 5660, at para. 5, sets out the four main questions that must be determined for the moving party to establish that the requested document should appropriately be listed in an affidavit of documents:

i) Has the moving party proven that the document exists?

ii) Is the requested document relevant to the issues in dispute?

iii) Is the requested document in the power, possession and control of the opposing party? and

iv) Is the production request proportional to the stage of the proceeding?

33Relevance is determined by reference to the pleadings. A document is relevant if it is logically connected to, and tends to prove or disprove a matter in issue: Sycor Technology Incorporated v. Kiaer, 2012 ONSC 5285, at para. 23.

34Rule 30.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that a document is deemed to be in the possession of a party if the party is entitled to obtain the original document or a copy of it and the party seeking it is not so entitled.

35Certain aspects of a lawyer’s file such as internal office or firm memoranda are the property of the lawyer, not the client: Aggio v. Rosenberg, [1981] O.J. No. 2229.

36Rule 29.2.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides guidance when determining the proportionality of compelling production of requested documents, which is also confirmed in Oz Optics Ltd. v. Jing Ru Zhang, 2017 ONSC 4263, at para. 8:

i) Is the time required to produce the document reasonable?

ii) Is the expense associated with producing the document justified?

iii) Will production of the document cause undue prejudice?

iv) Will production of the document unduly interfere with the action’s orderly progress? and

v) Is the document readily available from another source?

37When considering motions for production of a further and better affidavit of documents, the court should be cautious about endorsing a process which results in successive rounds of discovery, productions, and motions: Oz Optics Ltd, at para. 7.

Analysis

Bank Records for Jagdishchandra Mehta from 1997 onwards: CIBC account ending in 5536, and accounts with Meridian Credit Union and Scotiabank

38The Plaintiff submits that the contents of the Statement of Claim and Counterclaim confirm that the bank records, including mortgage statements and payments made to the Plaintiff, are relevant to the litigation because they will reflect the collection and use of rental income from 14 Cooperage Street, and the advances of alleged loans made by Jagdishchandra to the Plaintiff totaling $100,000 as pleaded in the Defendant’s Counterclaim.

39The Plaintiff further submits that the bank records of Jagdishchandra are probative of the financial activities undertaken by Jagdishchandra, and can assist in identifying, locating, quantifying, and tracing funds related to the properties and alleged loans to the Plaintiff.

40The Plaintiff provided documentation that at various times Jagdishchandra had accounts with CIBC and Scotiabank. He also provided documentation suggesting that shortly after the death of Jagdischandra, the Defendant had bank accounts at CIBC, and Merdian Credit Union, and also a joint account that she held with the Plaintiff.

41The Defendant is entitled to obtain a copy of her bank records and the bank records of Jagdishchandra. The Plaintiff is not entitled to obtain bank records for accounts not in his name. The Plaintiff has therefore established that bank records belonging to Jagdishchandra who is now deceased, are deemed to be in the power, possession and control of the Defendant, who is his Estate Trustee. The Plaintiff has also established on a balance of probabilities that the requested bank records are likely relevant, particularly to the Counterclaim brought against him by the Defendant for loans allegedly advanced to him.

42However, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the requested bank records, which date back to 1997, currently exist. Further, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that it is proportional at the affidavit of documents stage to require the Defendant to request bank records from at least three different banks, for several accounts, spanning back almost thirty years.

43The Defendant is accordingly not required to include these documents in her affidavit of documents.

Tax records for Jagdishchandra Mehta

44The Plaintiff has established that the tax records for Jagdishchandra Mehta from 1997 to present are relevant to the issues in dispute between the parties as framed by the pleadings. I accept the Plaintiff’s submission that the tax treatment of the Valhalla Inn Road property and the Cooperage Street property, and any rental income generated from those properties and expenses associated with those properties, might provide probative information regarding the issues in dispute. I also accept that the tax records of Jagdishchandra Mehta are in the power, control and possession of the Defendant as his Estate Trustee.

45I further accept that writing a letter to the CRA to request production of tax records is proportional to the issues in dispute. There is no evidence that prejudice to the Defendant will be caused by producing these documents, nor is it anticipated that there would be a significant expense associated with producing these documents.

46However, as with the bank records, there is no evidence before me that Jagdishchandra’s tax records dating back to 1997 still exist. CRA typically only keeps records of tax returns and Notices of Assessments for a limited time. And while it is likely that tax returns were filed on behalf of Jagdishchandra’s Estate after his death in 2019, there is no evidence currently before me confirming that they were.

47The Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish that the Defendant is required to produce the tax records of Jagdishchandra dating back to 1997 at the affidavit of documents stage of the proceeding.

Files of Financial Planners David Butler and Stuart Butler

48The Plaintiff has already obtained production of an email summary prepared by Stuart Butler of his meetings with Jagdishchandra regarding his financial planning. The email was sent by Stuart Butler to Sangeeta Hollo, who is the daughter of the Defendant, and the sister of the Plaintiff, on March 12, 2021. At the beginning of the email, Stuart Butler stated: “Your Mother asked me to summarize notes from our past meetings, financial plan and estate plan meetings as they pertain to Samir”.

49The email then referenced discussions regarding the Plaintiff’s financial situation which dated back to July 14, 2009. The summary identified several meetings during which the Plaintiff was discussed, including several notations which mention setting up a trust for the Plaintiff, and a discussion regarding plans for the Cooperage Street house in Brampton.

50The content of the summary document establishes that the issue of Jagdishchandra’s financial plans and intentions involving the Plaintiff were discussed during Jagdishchandra’s meetings with his financial planners. The documents therefore contain information that is relevant to the issues in dispute between the parties as framed by the pleadings.

51Since the email was written relatively recently (just over five years ago), I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the requested documents still exist.

52The Defendant did not provide any evidence or direct me to any case law to suggest that the file of the financial planners was not in the power, possession and control of the Defendant. Indeed, the Defendant’s factum includes the case of MediPharm et al. v. Hexo and Hwang et al., 2021 ONSC 4823, in which Justice Garson drew a distinction between records in hands of third parties which can be ordered to be produced under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and documents in the hands of advisors for which the client has possession, power and control, at paras. 90-91:

90This is not a situation where Hexo can make a simple request to its advisors to produce the entirety of the due diligence files sought. This is not a patient seeking his own medical records.

91Therefore, these third-party documents are not in Hexo’s possession, power, and control.

53The Defendant is able to request a copy of her file which is maintained by her financial planners, but the Plaintiff cannot request a copy of the file. I therefore find that this document is in the power, possession and control of the Defendant.

54I reject the Defendant’s argument that the file of the financial planner is irrelevant to the issues in dispute between the parties regarding the Cooperage Street property because the financial planning summary email did not specifically mention the Plaintiff having a beneficial interest in the property. The pleadings, including the Statement of Claim, the Counterclaim and the Plaintiff’s reply to the Counterclaim, were worded sufficiently broadly to establish that the content of the financial planning file for Jagdishchandra and the Defendant is relevant to the issues in dispute in the litigation.

55I also reject the Defendant’s submission that she is unduly prejudiced by the delay caused in requiring these additional productions because she is eighty years old, and is experiencing stress from the litigation. There is no evidence in the Defendant’s affidavit that speaks to her distress, nor is there evidence before me to suggest that obtaining this file will be unduly burdensome or expensive for the Defendant, or that the financial planning file is overly voluminous. I also note that these documents are not available from another source, and that the financial plans of Jagdishchandra concerning the Plaintiff are central to the issues in dispute between the parties as framed by the pleadings.

56The Plaintiff has therefore established that production of the file of Jagdishchandra’s financial planners is proportional at the affidavit of documents stage.

57Having considered all the factors, the Plaintiff has established that it is appropriate that the Defendant obtain the complete files of financial planners David Butler and Stuart Butler, and include those documents in her affidavit of documents.

File of Estate Planning Lawyer Kevin Robbins

58The Plaintiff submits that the file of Kevin Robbins ought to be produced as part of the Defendant’s affidavit of documents because it pertains to the acquisition of the Cooperage Street property, and will reveal relevant information about Jagdishchandra's estate planning intentions, and any provisions made for the Plaintiff. In particular, he submits that the file will include documents and notes which will help determine if the purchase of the property was intended to be a gift to the Plaintiff, or if it was purchased as a rental property. The file may also include information regarding loans owed by the Plaintiff to Jagdishchandra.

59The estate planning intentions of Jagdishchandra with respect to the Plaintiff are relevant to the issues in dispute between the parties as pleaded. As Jagdishchandra only died seven years ago, it is reasonable to expect that his lawyer’s file still exists, and is available to be produced. In addition, there is no evidence before me that production of this file is prejudicial to the Defendant; that production of this file is an unduly burdensome or expensive task; or that the file from this lawyer can be obtained through another source.

60There still remains, however, the issue as to whether a client generally has power, possession and control over the documents contained in their lawyer’s file.

61Recognizing the finding in Aggio v. Rosenberg that certain aspects of a lawyer’s file are the property of the lawyer, I am not satisfied by the evidence before me that the complete file of Kevin Robbins is in the power, possession and control of the Defendant. Even if the Defendant had written to Kevin Robbins to request a copy of his file, the Plaintiff has not established that Mr. Robbins would be obliged to provide his entire file to the Defendant, absent a court order requiring him to do so under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

62Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not established that the file kept by Kevin Robbins is within the Defendant’s power, possession and control as a client of Kevin Robbins, or in her capacity as Estate Trustee. I find that the Defendant is not required to produce a copy of the file from Kevin Robbins in an affidavit of documents.

File of Real Estate Lawyer Tyrone Crawford

63Another important issue in this litigation, as identified in the pleadings, involves Jagdishchandra’s decision to place the Defendant on title to the Cooperage Street property in 2007. The Defendant has already produced several documents that establish the title transfer that took place. The file of Jagdishchandra’s real estate lawyer is clearly relevant to the issues in dispute between the parties.

64However, the Plaintiff has not established that the complete contents of the file of Tyrone Crawford are documents that are within the power, possession and control of the Defendant. As was the case with the file of Kevin Robbins, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that Mr. Crawford is under an obligation to provide the entire contents of his file to the Defendant, without a court order requiring him to do so. It therefore cannot be concluded that the file of Tyrone Crawford is within the power, possession and control of the Defendant.

65In addition, I note that this file is nineteen years old. Many lawyers do not retain their files for that length of time. The Plaintiff has therefore also not established that this file currently exists. Even though the Plaintiff has established on a balance of probabilities that this file existed at one time, for the reasons outlined above, the Defendant is not required to list documents that were never in her power, possession or control in Schedule C of her affidavit of documents.

66I accordingly find that the Defendant is not required to produce a copy of the file from Tyrone Crawford in an affidavit of documents.

Conclusion

67The Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining an order for production of bank records retroactive to 1997 as he did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the records in question still exist. He also failed to establish that requiring production of bank records from at least three different banks retroactive for almost thirty years is proportional at the affidavit of documents stage of the proceeding.

68The Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining an order for the production of the tax records for Jagdishchandra dating back to 1997 as he did not provide evidence that the records still exist.

69The Plaintiff was successful in obtaining an order that the entire financial planning file of David Butler and Stuart Butler be produced in the Defendant’s affidavit of documents.

70The Plaintiff was not successful in obtaining an order for the production of the estate planning file of lawyer Kevin Robbins at the affidavit of documents stage of the proceeding because he was not able to establish that the Defendant has power, possession and control of that entire document.

71Similarly, the Plaintiff was not successful in obtaining an order for the production of the real estate file of lawyer Tyrone Crawford at the affidavit of documents stage of the proceeding, because he was not able to establish that the Defendant has power, possession and control of that entire document.

Costs

72On the first day that the motion was argued, many of the Plaintiff’s production requests were either withdrawn, or denied. I also note that the Plaintiff was only successful in obtaining one of the five production orders that he sought at the return of the motion on June 22, 2026. I further note that the Plaintiff’s insistence on having this motion argued in advance of an examination for discovery has significantly delayed the action from moving forward.

73I am not, however, prepared to grant either side costs for this motion.

74In the Defendant’s Affidavit of Documents sworn July 6, 2022, she stated:

“I have conducted a diligent search of my records and have made appropriate enquiries of others to inform myself in order to make this affidavit. This affidavit discloses, to the full extent of my knowledge, information and belief, all documents relevant to any matter in issue in this action that are or have been in my possession, control or power.”

75I am not satisfied that the Defendant has indeed made all the necessary inquiries of others to discover the existence of documents. Much of the time spent at the motion addressing whether certain documents exist could have been avoided if the Defendant had simply made inquiries to determine which of the requested bank and tax records are currently available.

76If all relevant documents are produced prior to a party’s discovery, there will be far fewer undertakings given, and both sides will enjoy costs savings if a re-attendance at a continued examination for discovery can be avoided.

77The parties may send a draft order in Word format for a timetable for the remaining steps in the action, along with a signed consent, to my attention at scj.csj.general.brampton@ontario.ca

Wilkinson J.

Released: June 29, 2026

CITATION: Mehta v. Mehta, 2026 ONSC 3794