R. v. O.C., 2026 ONSC 3785

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-40000094-0000

DATE: 20260629

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

O.C.

E. Moore and T. Yin, for the Crown

G. Logan, for the Accused

HEARD: May 6, 2026

This decision is subject to a publication ban under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

WASSENAAR J:

Background

1On December 17, 2025, a jury found Mr. C. guilty of four counts:

• Count 1: Sexual Interference (s. 151)

• Count 2: Incest (s. 155(1))

• Count 3: Invitation to Sexual Touching (s. 152)

• Count 4: Exposure to a Person under 16 (s. 173(2)).

2At the sentencing hearing, the following exhibits were filed:

• Exhibit 1 – Pre-sentence Report

• Exhibit 2 – Letter from Mr. C.’s church

• Exhibit 3 – Victim Impact Statement

Facts

3The complainant, C., was Mr. C.’s biological daughter. C. was born in 2007. She was 18 when she testified at trial and 15 when she gave her video statement to police. Her parents separated in 2011 and divorced in 2012. C. and the other children lived with their mother. However, Mr. C. maintained contact, and at one point he and C.’s mother resumed their relationship. During that period, there were times that Mr. C. would stay overnight. Around 2018 the relationship ended. Mr. C. was still in the children’s lives between 2018 and 2021, but after 2018 he would see them outside of C.’s home.

4Mr. C. sexually abused C. from 2014 to 2020, when she was between the ages of six or seven and 12. C. disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2022 and her mother confronted Mr. C. After that, Mr. C. was no longer in their lives. In 2023, C. reported the abuse to police.

5C. recounted many incidents over a period of years. The abuse did not happen every day, but it happened frequently. After the first incident, Mr. C. told C. that she should not tell her mother because then C’s mother would hate them both. C. said her father did not force or grab her; he coerced and manipulated her. He made it seem like they were doing something that she had agreed to. He was always “nice”. By age eight the abuse was “something that just was”. At age nine, the nature of the abuse changed, first to digital penetration and then penetration with his penis. The penile penetration started with the tip and gradually increased. There was one incident of anal penetration when she was 10 or 11. At age 11, C. started trying to stop the abuse from happening. Her father often told her they should stop because it was a sin against God. Sometimes he commented on her body. He also made her watch pornography. C. knew that there was a period of time when she was being abused that her parents has resumed sexual relations. Her younger sister was born in 2017. Initially, C. felt like she had betrayed her father when she disclosed the abuse to her mother. After her mother confronted him, Mr. C. texted C. that only God knows the truth. After that, C. no longer felt like she had betrayed her father.

6The incidents relevant to the four counts are set out below. These summaries reflect how the jury was charged in relation to each count.

Count 1: Sexual Interference (s. 151)

7C. testified that her father touched her on a number of occasions between the ages of six or seven and around 12. The incidents included manually stimulating her clitoris, performing oral sex on her, touching her with his penis, digitally penetrating her, penetrating her vagina with his penis, and penetrating her anus with his penis.

Count 2: Incest (s. 155(1))

8C. testified that her father would put the tip of his penis in her vagina. She also testified that her father fully penetrated her and she had some bleeding. Afterwards she felt scared, dirty and terrible. She said that on another occasion he fully penetrated her vaginally in the shower. C. also testified about an incident of anal penetration, at her father’s home. She felt disgusted and embarrassed.

Count 3: Invitation to Sexual Touching (s. 152)

9C. testified that her father asked her to touch his penis in the shower when she was very young. She also testified that her father would ask her to lick his penis.

Count 4: Exposure to a Person under 16 (s. 173(2))

10C. testified that her father sat on the couch with his legs open while wearing a towel and she could see his penis. C. also testified that she saw her father’s penis in the shower, and that her father exposed his penis to her in the kitchen.

Whether any of the counts should be stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple

11The Crown submits that none of the counts should be stayed pursuant to Kienapple. The defence asserts that counts 1, 3 and 4 should be stayed and only the incest count should remain. The defence says that the acts can be viewed as one continuous transaction of abuse, and therefore Mr. C. should be sentenced on the incest.

12In R. v. Wolfe, 2024 SCC 34 at para. 71 the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

The Kienapple principle prevents an accused from being convicted of multiple offences when there is a factual and legal nexus connecting the offences. There is a factual nexus where the same act grounds both charges. A legal nexus exists where “there is no additional and distinguishing element that goes to guilt contained in the offence for which a conviction is sought to be precluded by the Kienapple principle”. In short, the rule precludes more than one conviction arising out of the same delict. [citations omitted]

13The jury convicted on all four counts after being instructed on the relevant facts for each count as summarized above. I am bound by the express and implied implications of that verdict: R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at para. 17. Where there is any ambiguity, I must come to my own independent determination of the relevant facts. I find as a fact that the incidents described by C. in the summaries above occurred. Therefore, each count can be grounded in different incidents. Moreover, the offence of incest has the “additional and distinguishing” legal element of requiring that C. was the biological daughter of Mr. C. The principles in Kienapple are not engaged so as to require that any of the counts be stayed.

14I also find that, while this was not a daily occurrence, the abuse was frequent. There were multiple incidents, and a wide variety of types of incidents, as C. has described.

Positions of the Parties

15Ms. Moore, for the Crown, sought a 12 year penitentiary sentence. The Crown relied on R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424 for the guiding principles of sentencing in cases involving sexual violence against children.

16Mr. Logan, for the defence, submitted that an appropriate sentence would be between 8 and 10 years. Mr. Logan says that that is the range for sexual abuse by a biological father with no record, committed over a period of time on multiple occasions. Mr. Logan emphasized Mr. C.’s disadvantages growing up, solid record of employment, and the fact that he was a first offender. Mr. Logan agreed with the ancillary orders proposed by the Crown, but argued that the SOIRA order should be 20 years and the s. 161 order should permit him to go to a park or playground if accompanied by an adult.

Analysis

17My task is to impose a just sentence tailored to this individual offender and his specific offences, in accordance with the principles and objectives laid out in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 11, 56. Thus, the starting point for my analysis is the sentencing principles set out in ss. 718, 718.01, 718.1 and 718.2. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is “to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions”: s. 718. That sanction should have one or more of the following objectives: denunciation, deterrence, protection of society, rehabilitation of the offender, reparation to the victim, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, and acknowledgement of the harm caused to the victim or community: R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29, at para. 71.

18Proportionality is the “loadstar” that guides the sentencing process: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 59; R. v. Lacasse, at para. 12. What is regarded as a proportionate sentence depends on “society’s current understanding and awareness of the gravity of a particular offence and blameworthiness of particular offenders”: R. v. Friesen, at para. 35; R. v. Sheppard, at para. 68. Parity, totality and restraint are also guiding principles: s. 718.2. Parity is an expression of proportionality: R. v. Friesen, at para. 32; R. v. Sheppard, at paras. 69-70.

The Victim and the Impact of the Abuse

19C. testified at trial that she always felt guilty and bad about what was happening, but she also felt like she had to listen to Mr. C. because he was her dad. In her Victim Impact Statement, C. spoke of the love and trust she had for her father, as one of her caregivers. His abuse has taken a physical, mental and emotional toll on her.

20Thankfully, C. now understands that the abuse was not her fault. However, the process of coming forward has been overwhelming, and she knows it will take time and work to address the many impacts of the abuse that she experienced. She now faces the task of trying to “heal that little girl inside of [her]”. It is hoped that she can do so with the strength and grace she has exhibited thus far.

Mr. C.

21Mr. C. is a 48 year old first time offender. He moved to Canada in 1996, at 18, with his mother and brother. His sister remained in El Salvador. His father had arrived in Canada in the 1980s, hoping to make a better life for the family.

22Mr. C. left school after grade 7 to help his mother care for the family. When he came to Canada, it was difficult to obtain employment, particularly since he did not speak English. His father hired him as a commercial painter and taught him the trade. Mr. C. has continued in that work for 30 years.

23Mr. C. has three children, two girls and a boy. He has not seen them since 2022. Mr. C. has the support of his parents and his church community

Sentencing for Sexual Offences against Children and the Appropriate Range

24The overarching objective of Canada’s legislative scheme of sexual offences against children is to protect children from wrongful exploitation and harm: R. v. Friesen, at para. 42. Parliament has directed that when sentencing an offender for an offence committed against a person who was under the age of 18, courts should give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct: s. 718.01. The protected interests to consider when sentencing for offences involving children include: personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality of children: R. v. Friesen, at para. 51. The sentence must properly reflect the profound harm caused by these offences: R. v. Friesen, at paras. 50, 87; R. v. Sheppard, at paras. 74-75. Sexual offences against children are “violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities”: R. v. Friesen at para. 5. In short, “[s]exual offences against children are among the most profoundly immoral acts an individual can commit”: R. v. Sheppard, at para. 1.

25The Crown has provided sentencing cases in which sentences of between seven and 11 years were imposed: R. v. A.C., 2025 Ont Ct. J., [unreported], June 27, 2025; R. v. A.P., 2022 ONCA 818; R. v. A.W., 2023 ONSC 4073; R. v. J.B., 2023 ONSC 1275; R. v. K.G., 2024 ONCA 879; R. v. R.S., 2022 ONSC 4604; R. v. T.A.A., 2024 ONSC 1350, 2024 ONSC1350.

26The defence has provided sentencing cases in which sentences of between seven and 10 years were imposed: R. v. Hilal, 2023 ONSC 4270; R. v. R.L., 2025 ONSC 2317; R. v. S.S., 2024 ONSC 3568; R. v. T.A.A., 2024 ONSC 1350.

27I accept Mr. Logan’s argument that the issue of whether the offender had a criminal record is a significant factor when considering the sentencing cases provided to me. At the same time, Mr. C.’s lack of a criminal record “loses much of its force” as a mitigating factor since his offending was repeated and occurred over a lengthy period of time: R. v. Sheppard, at para. 95.

28In determining the appropriate sentence in this case, I am also guided by the direction in R. v. Friesen at para 114 that “mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances.”

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

29There are a number of aggravating factors in this case, including: C. was between seven and 12 when the offences were committed; Mr. C. abused a member of his family; Mr. C. abused a position of trust, as C.’s father; the offences have had a devastating impact on C.; the offences happened frequently and over a period of years; Mr. C. committed a wide range of acts in the course of his abuse of C., and many of the offences were committed in C’s home, which should have been a place of safety and security.

30I consider as mitigating factors Mr. C.’s work history and disadvantaged upbringing, as well as the fact that he is a first offender. It is also significant that Mr. C. has the support of his parents and church community.

CONCLUSION

31In her victim impact statement, C. stated that “[e]very child deserves to be protected by their parents and to feel safe and loved.” Similarly, R. v. Friesen recognized that children “deserve to enjoy a childhood free of sexual violence”: see para. 1. Mr. C.’s actions were a profound and fundamental violation of the position of trust he held as C.’s father. Indeed, he used that position of trust to manipulate C. for his own ends. Part of that manipulation involved using C.’s love for her mother to keep C. silent.

32R. v. Friesen mandates that I impose a sentence that fully reflects and gives effect to “the profound wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children”. The sentence needs to acknowledge that Mr. C.’s exploitation of a father/daughter relationship will no doubt make it harder for C. to process her experiences and try to move beyond them.

33The sentence I impose must also reflect the number of occasions and the period of years during which the abuse occurred: R. v. Friesen, at para. 133. C.’s age at that time means that I should give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence: s. 718.01. In this case, the extreme breadth of the nature of the various acts perpetrated on C. is a significant consideration.

34Having considered the circumstances of this case and the relevant sentencing principles, I impose a global sentence of 11 years, broken down as follows:

• Count 1: Sexual Interference (s. 151) 11 years;

• Count 2: Incest (s. 155(1)) 11 years concurrent;

• Count 3: Invitation to Sexual Touching (s. 152) 4 years concurrent;

• Count 4: Exposure to a Person under 16 (s. 173(2)) 2 years concurrent.

35I also impose the following ancillary orders:

• a DNA order;

• a s. 109 weapons prohibition order for 10 years;

• a s. 161 prohibition order for 20 years, with no exceptions for supervised park visits;

• a SOIRA order for life; and

• a s. 743.21 non communication order in relation to C.

The Honourable Justice B. Wassenaar