SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
CITATION: Harbourfront Corporation (1990) v. Stephen Wilkins, 2026 ONSC 3765
RE: HARBOURFRONT CORPORATION (1990), Applicant
AND:
STEPHEN WILKINS, Respondent
BEFORE: Akazaki J.
COUNSEL: Lauren Baker, for the Applicant Stephen Wilkins, Self-Represented
HEARD: June 19, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION
OVERVIEW
1Harbourfront applied for an injunction to remove Stephen Wilkins’ live-in boat, the Las Vegas Posse, from one of its marinas. It had previously declined his seasonal dock permit application, because he had breached a contractual condition against abusing marina personnel. Frustrated by perceived bureaucratic friction over the insurance paperwork for his dockage permit application for the 2024-2025 winter season, Mr. Wilkins initiated harassing, discriminatory, and profanity-ridden emails to marina staff. He continued in this manner, despite requests to stop. Harbourfront eventually processed his application but declined to allow him to apply for any further seasonal permits.
2Without a valid seasonal permit, he is a trespasser. The marina did not seek the monetary value of his overholding, to prevent an estoppel against granting the injunction. The only point requiring further deliberation was whether the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”), to which he has filed an application, holds exclusive jurisdiction over the dock permit as a tenancy agreement pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17, s. 168(2) (“RTA”). The initial hearing of that application is scheduled for July 28, 2026.
3Mr. Wilkins asked for an adjournment of this injunction hearing, or at least a stay of this decision, to allow the LTB to decide the jurisdictional point. If the core dispute came within the RTA and the controversy was limited to application of an exemption (such as under s. 5, for seasonal tenancy) or scope of remedies, the LTB could indeed be the proper forum to consider such a question. Here, Mr. Wilkins’ position contradicted not only the plain wording of the agreement but also of the statute. The boat is Mr. Wilkins’ home. Beyond that residential aspect, nothing brought his relationship with Harbourfront into the statute regulating residential tenancies. He owns the boat. Harbourfront permits seasonal access to slips in the marina to dock boats. Tenants wishing to dock their boats must apply every winter and summer season. The closest analogy for the marina in the RTA is a mobile home park. The RTA defines a rental unit in a mobile home park as a site on land.
4The Superior Court has general jurisdiction over all civil disputes, unless the legislature has removed the jurisdiction by unequivocal language: Stegenga v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 615, at para. 32; also see Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 SCR 585, at para. 6. At the very least, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the essential character of the dispute brings it into the statutory scheme of the RTA: Letestu Estate v. Ritlyn Investments Limited, 2017 ONCA 442, at paras. 5-12; Mackie v. Toronto (City) and Toronto Community Housing Corporation, 2010 ONSC 3801, at para. 44.
5The only LTB decision cited by the parties did not help Mr. Wilkins. In SOT-02058, 2009 CanLII 51170 (ON LTB), the board declined jurisdiction over a dockage agreement for a permanent live-in boat, because the agreement itself only allowed seasonal use excluded from the RTA. The Harbourfront agreements were also seasonal. Mr. Wilkins argued that his long-standing use of the slip made him a non-seasonal tenant and that, by implication, the exclusion did not apply. To hold that SOT-02058 could bring Mr. Wilkins’ agreement with Harbourfront into the RTA regime requires adoption of the tautology that all non-seasonal marine dock agreements qualify under the statute as rental units in a residential complex. The non-application of an exclusion can only reactivate a legal relation that would be in force but for the exclusion. The LTB never considered whether the water lot dock agreement qualified for regulation under the RTA.
6As a principle of law, the non-applicability of an exclusion or exemption does not bring the legal relation into a particular regime: Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2010 SCC 33, [2010] 2 SCR 245, at paras. 27-28. In statutory interpretation, a meaning that would orphan words in a statute by rendering it superfluous should be avoided: Winters v. Legal Services Society, 1999 CanLII 656 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 160, at para. 48. Allowing an inapplicable exclusion to operate as a back door into inclusion would render the inclusionary terms superfluous and would fail to credit the legislator with knowledge of how language and logic operate: Dillon v. Catelli Food Products et al., 1937 CanLII 335 (ON CA), [1937] OR 114, [1937] 1 DLR 353, at page 401 DLR. The court must therefore consider the issue sidestepped by the LTB in SOT-02058.
7The seasonal exclusion would only matter, if the RTA covered rental of water lot units. Because mobile home parks are defined in terms of land, the exclusion is irrelevant. If this interpretation were wrong, I would agree with the LTB that the seasonal nature of Harbourfront’s dock permit excludes it from the RTA. Either way, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to consider the injunction application.
8Harbourfront relied on the interim order of Merritt J. in this application, dated April 17, 2026, requiring Mr. Wilkins to move his boat to facilitate necessary construction. It also cited the brief endorsement of Akhtar J. in Harbourfront Centre v. Dodaro, CV-15-529358, unreported, July 14, 2015. These decisions only found that Harbourfront had established an arguable case, for the purpose of an interim injunction. Neither was a final determination based on a full evidentiary record.
9I have concluded that the RTA does not apply to a marina slip, because it is not a site on land. I will neither adjourn the hearing nor delay the release of my decision. Mr. Wilkins’ boat unlawfully occupies a slip that should be made available for other watercraft owners. An injunction shall issue against Mr. Wilkins. He currently holds no permit to dock his boat in the marina. Harbourfront was within its rights to decline his permit application. His status as trespasser entitles the marina to an injunction removing his boat. I have analyzed the following points, to reach these conclusions:
The RTA’s Non-Application to Watercraft in a Marina
The Dock Permit Agreement
Seasonal Living Accommodation
Breach of the Prior Agreement
Hardship to Mr. Wilkins and Permanence
1. THE RTA’S NON-APPLICATION TO WATERCRAFT IN A MARINA
10The RTA is the current iteration of successive law reform enactments balancing the rights of landlords and tenants. In this case, Mr. Wilkins invoked the statute’s protections against wrongful eviction from rental accommodation. The entry point to the RTA is defined by s. 3(1). If Mr. Wilkins’ relationship with Harbourfront does not come within this provision, the LTB has no jurisdiction over it:
3(1) This Act … applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary. [emphasis added]
11Mr. Wilkins owns his boat. The boat is not a rental unit. His previous seasonal permit allowed him to dock his boat to a slip in the marina. Every type of rental unit in the RTA, bar one, entails rental of the actual living quarters. The exception is a mobile home park. In a mobile home park, the assigned parking spot for a mobile home is the rental unit. To bring a live-in watercraft into this category, the marina’s slip must come within both of the following definitions in s. 2(1):
“rental unit” means any living accommodation used or intended for use as rented residential premises, and “rental unit” includes,
(a) a site for a mobile home or site on which there is a land lease home used or intended for use as rented residential premises …
“residential complex” … means,
(b) a mobile home park or land lease community,
… and,
includes all common areas and services and facilities available for the use of its residents;
12To qualify as a “rental unit” in a “residential complex”, the slip must be “a site for a mobile home” in “a mobile home park”. These are, in turn, subject to these definitions:
“mobile home” means a dwelling that is designed to be made mobile and that is being used as a permanent residence;
“mobile home park” means the land on which one or more occupied mobile homes are located and includes the rental units and the land, structures, services and facilities of which the landlord retains possession and that are intended for the common use and enjoyment of the tenants of the landlord; [emph. added]
13One would ordinarily equate a mobile home with a structure with dimensions allowing it to be towed on a highway. It is subject to municipal construction standards pursuant to the Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23, s. 15.1. One must read any legislation as part of the whole statute book: Sullivan, R., The Construction of Statutes, Seventh Ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), at pages 412-13. Nevertheless, “mobile home” is a defined phrase, meaning the legislature intended to carve out a specific meaning for the purposes of the RTA. Considering the definition, it is broad enough to include a boat with basic living facilities. For sake of argument, I assumed the Las Vegas Posse is such a vessel. Because a slip is a site for the boat, one can also argue that the slip falls into the definition of a “rental unit.”
14To be a rental unit in a “residential complex,” the slip must be a site on land. The equation of a water parking space with land for a mobile home appears contrary to the ordinary sense of the RTA, as well as its legislative context and purposes: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559, at para. 26. Had the Ontario Legislature intended to include marina dock permits in navigable waters, it could have included used wording such as “land or water.” To read water lots into the statute would violate the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the implied exclusion rule that the legislature’s reference to one genus implied the exclusion of the other: Canada v. Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc., 2021 SCC 51, [2021] 3 SCR 687, at para. 59.
15Applying the modern principles of statutory construction, the slip could not come within the RTA’s ambit. I also reached this conclusion after analysis of the property Harbourfront allocates to seasonal boat owners when granting dock permits. I will now turn to that point.
2. THE DOCK PERMIT AGREEMENT
16Harbourfront is a not-for-profit corporation whose mission is to host educational and cultural events along the Toronto waterfront. It leases and occupies 10 acres of property and annually hosts about 12 million visitors. It also operates two marinas on property leased from the City of Toronto. It leases Marina Quay West pursuant to a 99-year lease executed in 1997. Since 1999, it also has also leased Marina Four pursuant to a year-to-year lease as assignee from F & N Yacht Service Limited.
17The 1997 lease for Marina Quay West demised the parcels registered with the Land Registry and Land Titles offices as the site of the buildings and shoreline structures. It described free use, passage, and enjoyment of navigable waters through or upon these parcels but made no reference to any water lot licence from the federal Crown.
18The recitals to the 1999 lease for Marina Four included reference to a Water Lot Lease between the Toronto Harbour Commissioners (“THC”) and the federal Crown, over the water lot in the Marina. In 1997, THC assigned the Water Lot Lease. The remainder of the demised premises consist of a land parcel as the site of the buildings and shoreline structures.
19The separation of land title and title to water lots in navigable waters, such as in Toronto Harbour, originated from the time of Confederation. Subsection 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867, vested navigable waters exclusively under federal Crown control: Power v. The King, 1918 CanLII 88 (SCC), 56 SCR 499, at page 502; and Whitbread v. Walley, 1990 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1273, at page 1293. Structures in and on the water affecting navigation, such as a dock or slip, are part of the water and not the land parcel to which they are connected: Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONCA 565, at para. 92.
20Harbourfront therefore permits boat owners seasonal dockage in slips as sites in water lots. One need not enter a philosophical discussion about docks being waterborne structures or extensions of the shore. The boat occupies the slip. It is secured and fendered to the dock. The dock cannot be land on which the boat is located. The Agreement’s operative term of use appeared in the first sentence of para. 7:
- Boat Secured
Tenant’s Boat shall be secured and fendered in its assigned Slip in a manner acceptable to the Marina Operator to protect its docks and equipment for all local seasonal weather, wind and high or low water level conditions. …
21The relevant definitions for present purposes were:
(b) “Boat” means the boat or other vessel owned, licensed or registered, by the Tenant, the particulars of which are set out herein.
(c) “Marina” means, in the case of Marina Quay West, the water lot and surrounding properties and buildings situated within Spadina Quay. The water lot has been licensed to the Marina Operator by The City of Toronto for the purpose of conducting a marina and all therein; and, in the case of Marina Four, means all premises known as the Simcoe Street Slip, together with the water lot appurtenant thereto and surrounding properties and buildings situated within York and John Quays.
(e) “Slip” means space within the Marina specified by the Marina Operator for use of Tenant for the docking of the Boat.
(f) “Tenant” means the owner, operator, crew, guests, or any duly authorized agent of the Boat owner.
22A permit holder’s exclusive use of a slip, qua assigned part of a water lot, ultimately derives authority from the federal Crown’s authority to control navigable waters and to allow use by all watercraft operators licensed by Transport Canada. Permit holders’ right to use assigned slips and to exclude others therefore differs from their access to various common onshore facilities governed by provincial land titles.
23The above analysis applies to the distinction between land and later properties, for the purpose of the rental unit subcategory of sites in mobile home parks. Neither party raised the constitutionality of the RTA’s application to water properties generally.
24Mr. Wilkins has docked his vessel during the summer and winter seasons at Marina Four, for 16 years. Until last spring, he did so pursuant to a Dockage Agreement (“Agreement”). The agreement was a standard form applicable to both marinas. It provided various terms and conditions for the use of the marinas’ slips to dock boats. As a preliminary point, Harbourfront pointed out that Mr. Wilkins and some other “liveaboard” tenants must reapply prior to each summer and winter season for a new dockage agreement. There is no automatic renewal or right of renewal. This point was memorialized in para. 41:
- Restricted Purpose
The Tenant agrees to its use of the Marina and the Marina facilities for their intended purpose only – the dockage of a pleasure craft to be used as such on a regular basis. The Tenant shall not use the Marina for the purposes of using the Boat as a permanent and only residential location during the summer term. The Tenant acknowledges and agrees that the Marina is not being operated primarily as a residential location for the Tenant. The Landlord and Tenant Act does not apply to Slip occupancy. The Marina Operator reserves the right to limit the number of seasonal liveaboards during the summer term as it sees fit. The Tenant acknowledges that the Tenant will take the Boat in and out of the Marina for use as a pleasure craft and it will not remain stationary in its Slip for the term (excluding winter). [emph. added]
25Even if the outdated reference to the Landlord and Tenant Act were construed as the RTA, the above provision would not directly assist Harbourfront in this injunction application, if the dock permits did come under the RTA. Under s. 4(1) of the statute, a landlord cannot contract out of the RTA.
26The tenant possessed no right to choose the slip or to occupy an assigned slip. The dockage conditions were very comprehensive and subject entirely to Harbourfront’s discretion:
- Slip Location
Slip locations are not guaranteed. The Marina Operator reserves the right to alter, from time to time, the assigned Slip location to be used for dockage of the Tenant’s Boat. Assigned slip locations may be changed by the Marina Operator for business purposes, to eliminate or reduce conflict between Tenants or to create efficient use of the docks and Marina space. In event of a high-water levels, which results in the Tenant’s Boat no longer fitting in the assigned Slip due to length, beam or height, the Marina Operator retains the right, in its sole discretion, to move the Boat to an alternate slip, if such a slip is available, until such time that the water levels subside and there is no longer an issue with the Tenant’s Boat fitting into the assigned Slip. Upon decrease of the water level to a suitable level the Tenant shall immediately move its boat back to the assigned Slip. The temporary occupancy of a Slip during one term does not give the Tenant any rights to that Slip in subsequent terms. The Marina Operator does not guarantee the accommodation of a Tenant’s Boat during periods of high or low water. If a proper slip cannot be provided under either condition for the Tenant’s Boat, the Tenant shall be offered a prorated refund and will be required to vacate the Boat from the Marina. The Marina Operator shall not be responsible for moving the Tenant’s Boat at any time. However, the Tenant authorizes the Marina Operator to move the Tenant’s Boat (at the Tenant’s sole expense) as may be required in the event of an emergency or to avoid loss or damage to Marina property, as determined in the sole discretion of the Marina Operator.
27Based on this provision, it would be difficult to consider the slip a “site for a mobile home” operating as a “rental unit.” A dockage agreement allowing the owner to move the boat at any time could hardly be considered an agreement permitting the boat owner to occupy a slip, qua rental unit:
“tenancy agreement” means a written, oral or implied agreement between a tenant and a landlord for occupancy of a rental unit and includes a licence to occupy a rental unit;
28The agreement permitted the boat owner to secure the vessel to the assigned slip. A slip is a berth in the water surrounded by docks extended over a portion of the water lot. The “water lot” is the portion of the Marina allowing passage between the Toronto Inner Harbour and the assigned slip. A water lot cannot be land, for the purposes of the RTA, because the legal status of each as property is fundamentally different. Although the RTA represented a significant departure from the former Landlord and Tenant Acts, I construe “land” as incapable of including a portion of a water lot in this instance. A plain and ordinary reading of the Harbourfront seasonal dock permit leads to the same conclusion as a generic interpretation of the RTA language: the RTA does not apply to a permit allowing a boat owner to secure it to a dock in the Harbourfront marina.
3. SEASONAL LIVING ACCOMMODATION
29If I am wrong about the non-application of the RTA to water lot units such as slips, the language of the Agreement would serve to bring it into the seasonal accommodation exclusion. The bureaucratic dispute originating Mr. Wilkins’ verbal tirade against the marina staff arose from the very process of having to submit a new application twice a year, for each of the seasons. Because Harbourfront followed this process without exception, it was entitled to the legal effect of the dockage agreement as a form of seasonal permit, as opposed to a tenancy agreement for more permanent residential status.
30The seasonal exclusion reads as follows:
- This Act does not apply with respect to,
(a) living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period in a hotel, motel or motor hotel, resort, lodge, tourist camp, cottage or cabin establishment, inn, campground, trailer park, tourist home, bed and breakfast vacation establishment or vacation home;
31The phrase, “living accommodation” appears in the definition for “rental unit”. Therefore, it can bear a meaning including “a site for a mobile home”, as discussed above.
32In SOT-02058, the LTB ruled that a marina’s seasonal dock permit did not amount to a tenancy agreement, for the purposes of the RTA. Although not binding on this court, the treatment of individual seasonal contracts was helpful:
If a person rents an apartment to live in as their home and lives there even one day that person is a Tenant. If a person rents a slip in a marina for a certain period of the year and rents the same slip year after year, even if the person lives on his boat every day from the opening of the season to the end of the season, the definition of the contract is found in what is the basic nature of the exchange. It is the intention of the marina, which falls into the category of resort, to rent to boat owners a place to enjoy their boats for the Canadian boating season. Boat owners are required to have a different permanent address; the contract is for a defined season; the price of the slip rental includes GST which is not chargeable to residential accommodation. The fact the contract is sufficiently attractive to the users to create substantial repeat business does not change the nature of the contract.
33Despite para. 41 of the Harbourfront Agreement containing the tenant’s acknowledgment that the slip would not be used to dock a boat as a primary residential location, it also recognized a limited class of tenants called “liveaboards.” Harbourfront has tolerated Mr. Wilkins as a year-round tenant. However, the process of requiring semi-annual seasonal permit applications that led to the confrontation over insurance meant the parties were under no illusion of a guaranteed slip in the marina. Contrary to Mr. Wilkins’ groundless protestations of anti-Black racism on the part of Harbourfront personnel, it was his misplaced sense of entitlement that drove a subjective belief that he should be afforded a relaxation of the application requirement.
34In the absence of evidence that Harbourfront ever led Mr. Wilkins to believe that his status was anything more permanent than a long-time seasonal permit holder, Harbourfront’s adherence to its policies never gave rise to a promissory estoppel as described in Maracle v. Travellers Indemnity Co. of Canada, 1991 CanLII 58 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 50, at page 57. Indeed, every new application and permit included a provision denying any such promise of tenure. Consequently, in the event the demise of slips in navigable waters is included in the RTA’s definition of mobile home sites, the permit for the slip assigned to Mr. Wilkins would have been excluded under s. 5(a).
4. BREACH OF THE PRIOR AGREEMENT
35Para. 16 of the agreement prohibited any profanity, abusive language, discriminatory comments, or harassment. A tenant engaging in such behaviour was subject to removal from the marina and termination of the agreement, at Harbourfront’s discretion. As with any discretionary contractual provision, the discretion was subject to reasonable use.
36Harbourfront staff delayed Mr. Wilkins’ application for the 2024/2025 winter season, from October to April, because of its omission of proof of insurance. He reacted aggressively to this requirement and considered it an affront to his status as a long-term tenant. He eventually provided the insurance certificate and obtained a permit in January 2025.
37Harbourfront introduced numerous emails from Mr. Wilkins laced with profanity, aggression, and transphobic content aimed mainly, but not exclusively, at a junior managerial employee to whom Mr. Wilkins referred as a “teenage knucklehead”, “his trans ass”, and similar epithets. Undeterred by requests to stop communicating “with us in this manner,” he continued his tirade and accused Harbourfront staff of being “racist fucks.” The junior employee in question escalated the situation to his superiors and stated they “wish to no longer communicate with this man given his abominable behavior, insults, and incessant threats.” When the senior manager approached Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Wilkins responded argumentatively, professing to know “how the courts would adjudicate this fucking matter”.
38Mr. Wilkins filed no responding material denying the authenticity of the evidence filed against him. He acknowledged his status as a paralegal licensed by the Law Society of Ontario. Paralegals do not appear in Superior Court. As a self-represented individual, he must be accorded some leniency. For this reason, I accorded his oral submissions some weight. I did note that the original triage direction from the February 18, 2026, Civil Practice Court attendance contained extensive links to guides for self-represented litigants. Mr. Wilkins’ sole submission on the issue of the vituperative emails was that he did not believe they rose to the level of harassment. He made no apology for his conduct and never promised to refrain from repeating it. His only strategy was to bank on the Superior Court ceding jurisdiction to the LTB.
39I did not construe para. 16 as requiring the conduct to constitute harassment, whether in law or informally. The prohibited conduct included any form of abuse of Harbourfront staff. The junior manager’s request for help and permission not to engage with Mr. Wilkins clearly indicated that Harbourfront management could not condone Mr. Wilkins’ communications without incurring liability to its employee under common law and for violation of its workplace policies under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1. Harbourfront was justified in deciding not to accept further seasonal permit applications from an individual who had so clearly violated the community standards described in para. 16 of the agreement.
40Harbourfront did not process Mr. Wilkins’ 2025 summer permit application. It initially converted his permit status to monthly. This step provoked further aggression from him, until the marina sent him a letter requiring him to vacate the marina by September 15, 2025. The Las Vegas Posse remains docked in the slip.
5. HARDSHIP TO MR. WILKINS AND PERMANENCE
41Eviction cases intersect the possessory rights of the owner to exclude entry or use without consent and of the tenant to remain. Once the tenant ceases to hold a contractual right, “overholding tenant” is simply more diplomatic language to describe a trespasser: Croll (Re), 1946 CanLII 126 (SK KB), at para. 6. Unlike other injunctive relief, the right to exclude a trespasser reverses the conventional primacy of common law damages over equitable relief. Questions of irreparable harm and balance of convenience, to be considered if the relief is interlocutory pending final disposition, do not apply to permanent injunctions: 778938 Ontario Limited v. Annapolis Management Inc., 2020 NSCA 19, at paras. 17-21.
42My decision finally disposes of the application in favour of Harbourfront. The presumptive order is a permanent injunction requiring Mr. Wilkins to remove his boat from the slip: 1711811 Ontario Ltd. (AdLine) v. Buckley Insurance Brokers Ltd., 2014 ONCA 125, at para. 80. Nevertheless, a permanent injunction is extraordinary relief and should not be broader than required to effect compliance with the relevant legal obligations. In most instances, the courts have applied this principle to narrow the scope of perpetual injunctions: Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Castellano, 2020 ONCA 71, at para. 18.
43In this case, the legal compliance issue stemmed from Mr. Wilkins’ failure to abide by the contractual community conduct standards. Harbourfront operates the marina as stewards of a public resource. Despite the public nature of its operations, it is entitled to private law remedies in the same way as any point marina operator leasing water lots along the Toronto waterfront. This dual public-private capacity has long been recognized in Canadian law: CBC and co. v. R., 1983 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1983] 1 SCR 339, at page 341. I need not determine the issue for the purposes of this proceeding. It suffices to point out that, once his boat is removed, he would cease to be a trespasser and could reapply for a permit. Unlike a purely private operator, it cannot arbitrarily refuse his application if a slip is available.
44Nevertheless, to borrow from McEachern C.J.S.C.’s turn of phrase in Cansulex Ltd. v. Reed Stenhouse Ltd., 1986 CanLII 898 (BC SC), at para. 150, the law “would fit Mr. Bumble’s characterization” if, after removing the boat during the present season, Harbourfront were felt obligated to consider his application for the ensuing winter. Harbourfront’s protection of staff from verbal abuse from tenants by suing for injunctions would be rendered ineffectual, if the court’s sanction became a cost of being an abusive tenant. The injunction must exclude the trespasser for a sufficiently long interval to discourage repetition of abuse, if Mr. Wilkins were to apply to return.
45In his submissions, Mr. Wilkins identified two other marinas accepting year-round clients, one in Scarborough and the other one in Pickering. However, he filed no evidence regarding the availability of such opportunities, either at those marinas or elsewhere. He also did not provide evidence of his financial ability to store his boat during the winter while living on shore. I accept that any eviction will be a disruption to his life, but the same can be said of any eviction for breach of the legal obligations of tenancy. He will, out of necessity, likely need to lead an itinerant routine by moving from one marina to the next, until he finds a year-round elsewhere or at the end of the injunction.
46Before concluding this section of my reasons, I observe that Mr. Wilkins submitted a doctor’s note at the hearing of the April 17, 2026, interim relocation motion. According to the endorsement from that appearance, Mr. Wilkins opposed a temporary relocation from an inner slip to one in an outer location in the marina, because “looking at open water” is harmful to his health. I gleaned from this information that he may encounter difficulty finding appropriate alternative accommodation in a marina outside Toronto Harbour. The loss of such an ideal location for his boat should have figured more in his thinking, before he began his intimidation campaign against the staff responsible for facilitating his tenure.
47In addition to an order for the immediate removal of the Las Vegas Posse, the court will grant Harbourfront an injunction against trespass by Mr. Wilkins or the Las Vegas Posse for a period of two years starting from the date of this order. For the sake of clarity, the order will include a term that Harbourfront shall be entitled to require, as condition of any application by Mr. Wilkins after the expiry of the two years, payment in full of the costs of this application. Harbourfront is free to manage to decide how many slips are available for year-round use and to decline to process applications of newcomers (Mr. Wilkins’ status after two years) if none are open.
CONCLUSION AND COSTS
48Judgment shall issue requiring Mr. Wilkins to vacate the marina and remove his boat from the marinas operated by Harbourfront. The form of injunction sought by Harbourfront, applicable to all property, was overly broad. Harbourfront operates various public recreational sites having no connection with Mr. Wilkins’ boat. To ban him from such sites would unduly deny him access to public sites unrelated to the marinas.
49In addition to the restriction of the injunction to the marinas, the judgment will prohibit Mr. Wilkins from reapplying for a seasonal permit for a period of two years. Any application after the expiry of the two years will be subject to Harbourfront’s right of refusal based on its applicable policies, availability of slips, and payment of the court-awarded costs.
50Harbourfront made a costs demand on a partial indemnity scale of $13,351.96. Mr. Wilkins offered no meaningful response beyond submitting that it was excessive and beyond his ability to pay. It is approximately 60% of the actual fees, disbursements, and taxes of $22,025.84. Having regard to the specialized nature of the legal issues and the typical amounts awarded in injunction applications, Mr. Wilkins should consider himself fortunate that the costs were relatively modest. I appreciate that any amount of money could present a hardship to most people, but adverse costs are part of the litigation system in this province. I therefore award $13,351.96 in costs to Harbourfront, payable by Mr. Wilkins.
51Counsel for the applicant may submit a draft judgment to my judicial assistant, to incorporate the above three paragraphs and to add requisite provisions for enforcement by the Sherrif. The respondent’s approval of the form of the judgment is not required.
Akazaki J.
Date: June 30, 2026